SHABARA-BHĀṢYA

Translated into English by

GANGANATHA JHA

IN THREE VOLUMES

Vol. I

ADHYĀYAS I–III

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PREFATORY NOTE.

Twenty-five years ago, when I started work on 'Indian Thought', in collaboration with the late Dr. George Thibaut, it was our ambition that we should between ourselves, complete the translation of the 'Bhāṣyas' of all the six *Darshanas,*—with the exception of course of the Bhāṣya on the *Sāṅkhya-Sutras* which had already been done long before we came to the field. It is therefore a happy day for me,—my esteemed colleague is not here with me to share the happiness,—when I am able to see the fulfilment of that ambition. The *Bhāṣya* on the *Vedanta-Sūtras* (Shāṅkara and Rāmānuja) has been translated by Dr. Thibaut (published in the Sacred Books of the East Series); the Bhāṣya on the *Vaishēṣika-Sutras*—along with the *Kandalī*—has been translated by me (published in the 'Pandit', Benares); the Bhāṣya on the *Nyāya-Sūtras*—along with the *Vārtika,*—was translated by me (published in the 'Indian Thought'); the Bhāṣya on the *Yoga-Sutras* was translated by me (published under the 'Theosophical Publication Fund, Bombay); and now the *Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāmsā-Sutras,* translated by myself is being sent out to the world, in its *First* Volume. The earlier numbers of 'Indian Thought' contained a very small part of the translation of *Shabara-Bhāṣya* from the pen of Dr. Thibaut, but the attempt did not proceed any farther, on account of his having been transferred to the Calcutta University, where he did not find time to continue his literary labours.

It is a matter of satisfaction to me that this work of mine (perhaps the last in my present life) has been able to secure a place in the 'Gaekwad's Oriental Series'. It is a well-known fact that much important work has been, and is being, done at Baroda; and it is difficult nowadays to find a publisher for a work that has the misfortune of appertaining to a field of scholarship which, never 'popular', is becoming increasingly 'unpopular' under the stress of the pressing conditions of modern times. The encouragement therefore that an Oriental Scholar receives at the hands of H.H. the Gaekwad becomes all the more appreciated. One hopes that the work offered here to the world of scholarship will be received with due indulgence, on account of the fact that *Shabara-Bhāṣya* has been regarded as one of the most difficult 'Bhāṣyas' by reason of its archaic language and cryptic style. The fact of its having been included in the 'Gaekwad's Series' lends encouragement to that hope.

The other two volumes are in Press; and from the efficient manner in which the Baptist Mission Press is doing the work, they may be expected to be ready in the course of the next two years.

The inevitable 'Introduction' dealing with 'Chronology' and other more or less speculative matters,—along with the full Index,—will go with the last *(third)* Volume.

My thanks are due in the first place to my late lamented friend, Babu Govinda-dāsa of Benares, who was 'the guiding spirit of my literary life', and next, to Dr. Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, the talented editor of the Gaekwad's

Series for finding room for the work in the Series ;—and lastly, but most of all, to H.H. the Maharaja Gaekwad himself for the encouragement that is extended to the world of scholarship through the work that is being done under the Oriental Institute.

I am specially beholden to my pupil and friend, Pandit Ksetresha Chandra Chattopadhyaya of the Allahabad University, who has carefully gone through the proofs and (what is more) supplied the references to the Vedic texts,—not an easy task, as all students of Mimāmsa know, to their cost.

'MITHILĀ',
ALLAHABAD,
15*th June*, 1933.

GANGANATHA JHA.

SHABARA-BHĀṢYA.

Vol. I.

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ADHYĀYA I.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Propounding of the Enquiry.*

SŪTRA (1).

NEXT THEREFORE (COMES) THE ENQUIRY INTO DHARMA.

Bhāṣya.

...words of the *Sūtras* are, so far as possible, to be understood in that ...e which they are known to convey in common parlance; it is not ...assume meanings for them on the basis of elliptical and other ...or to attribute to them any special technical signification. It is ...s way that all that would have to be done would be to explain the ...ts d...y (with the help of the *Sūtras*); otherwise (if we did not ...rds of the Sūtras in their ordinary sense), it would be necessary ...plain the extraordinary (technical) meanings of the words of the ...hemselves, and then the texts of the Veda. This would involve a ...tion.

...:—"In common parlance, the term '*atha*', 'next', is found to ...essive of *sequence* to an event; in the case of the present *Sūtra*, how...e do not find any *event*; and yet there must be an *event* in *sequence* ...o the *enquiry into Dharma* would come in. It is only thus that the ...*tha*', 'next', could be taken in its ordinary sense."

...*Reading of the Veda* would be the required *event*; as it is only ...*ading the Veda* has been accomplished that *enquiry into Dharma* ...lows.

Objection:—"It cannot be so; as it is possible to have an *enquiry into* ...*harma* after some other event also,—even before the *Reading of the Veda*."

Our answer to this is that the Teacher has used the term '*next*' in ...ference to that particular kind of *enquiry into Dharma* which is not possible ...thout the *Reading of the Veda*.—Why so?—Because in the course of this ...quiry there will be various kinds of discussion over Vedic texts (and until ...have studied the texts there can be no discussion of them). Further, we ...not asserting that there is to be no *enquiry into Dharma* prior to the ...*ading of the Veda*, and that the enquiry is to follow immediately after ...edic Study). In fact, the single sentence (contained in the *Sūtra*) could ...t ...y the possibility of the *enquiry into Dharma* before the *Reading of the* ...*da*,—and at the same time *affirm* the immediate sequence of the *enquiry* to ...*Reading*; if this were to be done, then there would be two distinct ...ences (involved in the *Sūtra*): the form of the sentence denying the

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The text used for translation is the one published in the *Bibliotheca Indica*.

possibility of the *enquiry into Dharma* before the *R... of the Veda* ... have to be different from that affirming its imme... ate sequence to ... *Reading.* For instance, the *affirmation* in regard to the immediate seque... would be done by a sentence in the form '[the enquiry into Dharma *is to ... carried on*] *after one has read the Vedas*', while the other (i.e., the *denial* of th... possibility of the enquiry before the *Reading of the Veda*) would be done by a sentence in the contrary form [viz. 'enquiry into Dharma *cannot be carried on* before the *Reading of the Veda*']; and the author of the *Sūtra* ... going to declare later on that it is only when a group of words expresses a sin... idea that it can be taken as *one sentence* [while under the proposed constr... tion, there are two distinct and contrary ideas].

Further, on the completion of the *Reading of the Veda*, there ar... courses open (to the student): he may return home from the Teacher... (after graduation), or he may (continue to remain there and) carry ... vestigation into the meaning of Vedic texts; and the advice ... in the *Sūtra*) is that one should not leave the Teacher's House ... did, how could he investigate the meaning of Vedic texts?

Objection:—"If that is the case, then, the difficulty is that th... *of the Veda* is not found to be mentioned as the necessary pre... hin *enquiry into Dharma*); as a matter of fact, the injunction is t... that 'Having read the Veda, one should take the Bath (which i... end of studentship)'; under the circumstances, after having st... Veda, and thus having to perform the Final Bath,—if one were to (... the Bath, and) carry on the *enquiry into Dharma*, one would be tra... ing the said injunction; and certainly it cannot be right to trans... injunction."

The answer to this is as follows:—We *shall* certainly tr... ... injunction, when we find that by not transgressing it we w... be ... the Veda, which is highly useful, entirely useless [by not stu... th... ing of the texts]. The useful purpose served by th Veda has been ... be that it makes known to us our duties; persons learned in sacrifi... do not speak of any useful result following from the mere *reading* (of the text). Even though there are passages which appear to speak of such result, they are mere hortatory exaggerations (*Arthavāda*); this is going to be made clear under *Sūtra* 4-3-1, where it is declared that—'in regard to the acts tending to the preparation of substances, the declaration of results should be taken as *Arthavāda*, being meant, as they are, to be subservient to other purposes [i.e. purposes of the sacrifice]'.—Then again (in the injunction 'Having studied the Veda, one should take the Bath'), the *immediate* sequence of the Bath to the Reading of the Veda is not what is enjoined; in fact, there is no term in the sentence expressing *immediate sequence*; all that the past-participial affix '*ktvā*' (in the word '*adhītya*', 'having read') has been laid down as signifying is the mere *precedence* (of the a... denoted by the verbal root), and not the *immediate sequence* (of the next ... —Or, if *immediate* sequence were really meant, then it would preclud... notion of the *Reading* serving a perceptible purpose. [If the student w... to take the Final Bath and go away *immediately* after reading the *text* of ... Veda, then, he would have no time to acquire a knowledge of what is c...

tained in the *Veda*, and it is the acquiring of this knowledge which is the perceptible purpose served by the reading of the Veda]. Through the process of 'indirect indication' we get at the following meaning (of the injunction): As a matter of fact, it is not for any imperceptible (transcendental) purpose that the Bath has been enjoined; all therefore that the injunction can indirectly indicate is the cessation of all such restrictions as 'not-bathing' and the like (that are observed by the Religious Student),—such cessation being simultaneous with the completion of Vedic Study; what thus the entire meaning of the injunction is is that 'Having read the Veda, one should bathe,—but *one shall not go away from the Teacher's House*',—this further (implication) being necessary for the purpose of avoiding the contingency of the Bath being meant only for an imperceptible (transcendental) purpose.

For these reasons, the full meaning of the term '*atha*', 'next', is that 'Having first accomplished the *Reading of the Veda*, one should next seek to know *Dharma*'. We do not mean that *enquiry into Dharma* should not be carried on after any other act (than the *Reading of the Veda*); all that we mean is that after having read the Veda, one should not hasten to take the Final Bath, he should immediately seek to know *Dharma*.—Such is the meaning of the term '*atha*', 'next'.

The term '*ataḥ*', 'therefore', signifies *reason*, and refers to a definite fact; for example, in the sentence—'This country is one where food is easily obtainable, *therefore* I reside here'. Similarly, 'since *the duly read Veda* is known to be a *reason* for *enquiry into Dharma*, therefore after the reading of the Veda, *Dharma* should be enquired into',—such is the meaning of the term 'therefore'. One who has not read the Veda could never be able to study the Vedic texts for the purpose of knowing *Dharma*; '*therefore*'—for this reason—one should seek to enquire into *Dharma* after having read the Veda. Such is the meaning of the term '*ataḥ*', 'therefore'.

The compound term '*dharmajijñāsā*' ('enquiry into *Dharma*') is to be expounded as '*dharmāya jijñāsā*' ('wish for the knowledge of *Dharma*'); and '*jijñāsā*' ('enquiry') is the 'wish to know'.—"In what manner is the enquiry into *Dharma* to be carried on?"—The questions to be investigated are—(*a*) What is *Dharma*?, (*b*) By what is *Dharma* indicated?, (*c*) What are the right means of accomplishing *Dharma*?, (*d*) What are the wrong means of accomplishing *Dharma*?, and (*e*) What is the end or purpose of *Dharma*? The first two questions—'What is *Dharma*' and 'By what is *Dharma* indicated'—have been dealt with by the single *Sūtra* '*Chodanālakṣaṇo'rtho dharmaḥ*' (next *Sūtra*); the remaining three questions—'What are the right means of accomplishing *Dharma*', 'What are the wrong means of accomplishing *Dharma*', and 'What is the purpose of *Dharma*'—the meaning of the last question being 'in what cases does the *Dharma* subserve the purposes of man and in what cases is the human agent only a subordinate factor',—are dealt with by the third and subsequent *adhyāyas*.

Objection:—"*Dharma* must be something which is either *known* or *not known*. If it is *known*, then there need be no *enquiry* into it; if on the other hand, it is something *not known*, then there is all the more reason why there can be no *enquiry* into it. Thus the whole section dealing with

'enquiry into *Dharma*' is absolutely futile. Or, is there any purpose in it?"

Answer:—As a matter of fact, learned men have held divergent views regarding *Dharma*: some people regard one thing as '*Dharma*', some regard a totally different thing as '*Dharma*'. Under the circumstances, if a man were to undertake an act without due consideration, he might take up any one act at random and would thereby ruin himself and also incur evil consequences. For this reason it is necessary to carry on enquiry into *Dharma*; specially as we declare that *Dharma* endows man with the highest good.

The next *Sūtra* describes what this *Dharma* is.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *Definition of Dharma.*

SŪTRA (2).

DHARMA IS THAT WHICH IS INDICATED BY (KNOWN BY MEANS OF) THE VEDA AS CONDUCIVE TO THE HIGHEST GOOD.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*Chodanā*' they use in the sense of the *injunctive text*; men are found saying 'I am doing this act on being *enjoined* (*choditaḥ*) by the Teacher.'—'*Lakṣaṇa*' is that by which something is *indicated* (pointed out): for instance, when *fire* is indicated by *smoke*, they say that smoke is the '*lakṣaṇa*' (indicator) of fire.—That which is indicated by the said Injunctive Text is '*artha*', 'something conducive to the highest good'; that is, it brings man into contact with his highest good;—this is what we assert.

As a matter of fact, it is the Vedic Injunction which is capable of *making known* (indicating) what is past, present or future, also what is subtle or hidden or remote and such like; this cannot be done by any organ of sense. [But what is indicated or made known by the Vedic text is only an *act*, *something to be done*, or things connected with that act, and not any *accomplished thing*;—says *Ṛjuvimalā*].

Objection:—"It is possible that the Veda may say what is wrong or false; just as it is possible for an ordinary assertion,—such as 'there are fruits on the banks of the river'—to be true or false. [So that the proposition that the 'Veda brings happiness to man' would be doubtful; because the Veda is in the form of words, and words are found to be true as also false; hence there can be no certainty or confidence in what the Veda may assert; that is, there can be nothing of which the Veda could be regarded as the '*lakṣaṇa*' or '*pramāṇa*', the means *of right* cognition]."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—There is self-contradiction involved in the assertion that "the Veda *asserts*, and asserts what is false". When the Veda is said to 'assert', what is meant is that it *makes known*,—i.e. becomes the means of something being known; when something becomes known on the presence of some means, this latter is said to make the former known. Such being the case, if on the presence of the Veda, it actually becomes known that 'from the *Agnihotra* follows heaven',—how can it be said that *such is not the case* [i.e. heaven does not follow

from Agnihotra]? If such were not the case, how could it be spoken of as *becoming known*? To assert that a thing *does not exist* and yet *becomes known*, involves a contradiction in terms. Then again, the idea brought about by the assertion 'Desiring heaven, one should perform sacrifices' is not an uncertain one; i.e. it is not in the form 'heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifices'; [in fact, the idea is a definitely certain one that *heaven does follow*], and when this is cognised for certain, it cannot be *false*. That cognition (or idea) alone is *false* which, having appeared, becomes sublated by the notion 'such is not the actual case'; the idea in question (that heaven follows from the performance of sacrifices) is never found to be so sublated at any time, or in regard to any person, or under any circumstances, or at any place. Hence it follows that it is not false or wrong.

As regards the assertion of ordinary men, if it emanates from a trustworthy person,—or if it pertains to something that is directly perceived by the senses,—it must be true; if, on the other hand, it emanates from an untrustworthy person,—or if it pertains to something that cannot be perceived directly by the senses,—then it is unreliable, proceeding as it does merely from the mind of a human being. Because such a thing (which is not perceptible by the senses) cannot be known by men except by means of words [and the words of an untrustworthy person cannot be reliable]. [*Dharma* being something not perceptible by the senses, it can be known only by means of words,—and these words, to be entirely reliable, should not be such as proceed from a human source, which is not absolutely reliable, by reason of the inherent incapability of the human mind to comprehend things beyond the senses.]—It might be urged that the man making the assertion had its source in the previous assertion of another man.—But this previous assertion also would be as unreliable as the other one; and in regard to such things (as are beyond the senses) the words of men cannot be a reliable source of knowledge; just as the words of persons born blind cannot be a reliable source of knowledge regarding shades of colour.

Objection:—"It is not possible for persons not knowing a thing to impart instruction about it; and Manu and others have actually imparted instruction (about *Dharma*); from this it follows that good men have possessed the knowledge (of *Dharma*) [Read '*puruṣāḥ*' for '*puruṣāt*'; with '*puruṣāt*', the meaning would be that 'good men have learnt it from a human source'; this would not go with the next sentence]; just as the fact that colour is apprehended by the eye is deduced only from the fact that the man sees it."

The answer to the above is as follows:—As regards instructions, they might proceed from illusion or wrong knowledge also. [Hence the very fact of human beings having imparted instructions does not necessarily prove that these instructors possessed the *right knowledge* of *Dharma*]; such instructions, in the absence of illusions, proceed also from the Veda [and in the case of the Veda there is no room for illusion or wrong knowledge, as there is no human agency involved, while in the case of human instructors, there is always a chance of mistakes and illusions and ignorance].—But in

the case of teachings emanating from human sources, the notion derived is in the form, 'this man, the speaker, knows this thing to be so and so', and not in the form, 'the thing *is* so and so'; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the notion derived from human assertions is not always compatible with the truth; in the case of the Vedic assertion on the other hand, there is nothing to indicate its falsity.—"There is the inference from analogy: Having found the human assertion to be false, we infer, from its analogy, that the Vedic assertion also, being an *assertion* (like the human assertion) must be false."—It is not so; because the two cases are not analogous; the falsity of one assertion cannot prove the falsity of another; simply because it is *another* (not the same, assertion); for instance, because Devadatta is dark, it does not follow that Yajñadatta also is dark. Then again your idea that 'the Vedic assertion must be false because it is of the same kind as the human assertion (which is found to be false)' is of the nature of an indirect inference based upon a premiss, while the idea derived from the Vedic assertion is of the nature of direct cognition; and no indirect inferential cognition can have any validity when it is opposed to a direct cognition.—From all this we conclude that 'what is learnt from the Veda is conducive to the highest good.'

Objection:—"If such is the case, then what should be enquired into is *something that is conducive to good* [which must be a well-established entity]; what could be the use of *enquiry into Dharma* [which is not a well-established entity, but something that has itself got to be brought into existence] ?"

The answer to this is that *what is conducive to good* is exactly what is expressed by the term '*Dharma*'.

"How are we to know that this is so ?"

If a man performs sacrifices, he is called a 'performer of *dharma*' ('*dhārmika*'); when a man does an act, he is called after that act; e.g. the person who does the act of *purifying* [or *cooking*, if we accept the reading '*pāchakaḥ*' for '*pāvakaḥ*'] is called 'the performer of purification' ('*pāvaka*') and one who performs the act of *cutting* is called 'the performer of cutting' ('*lāvaka*'). Thus it is that *what brings to the man the highest good* is what is spoken of by means of the word '*dharma*' ['sacrificing' brings the highest good to man,—and it is the act of *sacrificing* that is denoted by the term '*dharma*']. This is found to be so not only in common parlance; in the Veda also we find the passage—'*Yajñena yajñamayajanta devāḥ, tāni dharmāṇi prathamānyāsan*'. ['By sacrifice did the deities offer sacrifices, and these were the first *dharmas*'], (*Ṛgveda* 10. 9. 16) where what is denoted by the term '*yaji*' (i.e. the term '*yājña*', 'sacrifice') is precisely what is spoken of as '*dharma*'.

As a matter of fact, the Veda indicates both what is *moral* and what is *immoral*.—"What is *moral* ?"—That which is conducive to good, such as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other acts.—"What is *immoral* ?"—That which leads to evil (sin), such as the *Shyena*, the *Vajra*, the *Iṣu* and other (malevolent) acts.—Thus the *Sūtra* has used the term '*artha*', 'what is conducive to good', in order to preclude the possibility of the *Immoral act* (which is *not* conducive to good) being included under the term '*dharma*'.

Objection:—"Why should the *immoral* act be so called ?"

Reply :—Because it involves inflicting of injury, and the inflicting of injury has been forbidden.

Objection :—"How then is it that an *immoral* act (in the shape of the *Shyena* sacrifice, for instance) is enjoined as something that *should be done* ?"

The answer to this is that the *Shyena* and other such (malevolent) sacrifices are nowhere found to be spoken of as *what should be done*; they are indicated only in the form that 'if a man desires to inflict injury upon another, the performance (of the *Shyena*) would be the means for that purpose'; what the Vedic text says is only that 'one desiring to inflict injury may perform the *Shyena*' (cf. *Saḍviṁsha-Brāhmaṇa* 8. 1-2),—not that 'one should inflict injury'. [The man is urged to undertake the performance of the *Shyena* entirely by his desire to inflict injury, not by any Vedic text enjoining that act as what ought to be done.]

Objection :—"The *Sūtra* as it stands is not capable of expressing all this—(*a*) that '*Dharma* is that which is indicated by the Veda, and not what is indicated by the senses and other means of knowledge', (*b*) that '*Dharma* is moral, not immoral'. Because the *Sūtra* contains a single sentence; and it would involve a syntactical split of the sentence, if it were taken as expressing the said two propositions."

The answer to this is that such syntactical split is objectionable only in cases where the idea is meant to be expressed by a regularly formed sentence; and this is so only in the case of Vedic texts, not in *Sūtras*; because a *Sūtra* is understood to be merely *indicative* of what is gathered from other sources; so that it is only parts of propositions that are *indicated* (*sūtryatē*) in the *Sūtra*; in fact that is why it is called a '*Sūtra*' (Aphorism). Thus it is that the present *Sūtra* is to be taken as containing the parts of the two distinct propositions (mentioned above by the Objector).—Or, the *Sūtra* may be construed as containing the single proposition that '*Dharma* is that particular *act conducive to the highest good* which is *indicated by the Veda*'; so that there is a single proposition [and there is no syntactical split involved].

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *Investigation of the Means of knowing Dharma.*

SŪTRA (3).

THE EXAMINATION OF ITS MEANS [follows].

Bhāṣya.

It has been declared by us that 'the knowledge of *Dharma* is brought about by means of the Veda'; but that was a mere assertion; we shall now proceed to examine the means of that knowledge: Is the Veda alone the means, or is there something else also? Until this examination has been made, it cannot be known for certain that '*Dharma* is that which is indicated by the Veda as conducive to the highest good' (Sū. 2).

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *Dharma not amenable to such means of Cognition as Sense-perception and the like.*

SŪTRA (4).

THAT COGNITION BY A PERSON WHICH APPEARS WHEN THERE IS CONTACT OF THE SENSE-ORGANS IS 'SENSE-PERCEPTION', AND IT IS NOT A MEANS (OF KNOWING DHARMA), AS IT APPREHENDS ONLY THINGS EXISTING AT THE PRESENT TIME.

Bhāṣya.

The examination (promised in the preceding *Sūtra*) is as follows:—Sense-perception is not the means (of knowing *Dharma*),—why?—because the character of Sense-perception is that it is 'that cognition by a person, etc.' (*sūtra*); that is, it is that cognition which a man has when his sense-organs are in contact with the object cognised.—*Dharma* however is something that is yet to come, and it does not exist at the time that it is to be known;—while Sense-perception is the apprehending of an object that is actually present and not non-existent at the time (of cognition);—hence Sense-perception cannot be the means (of knowing *Dharma*).

In the *Sūtra*, no stress is meant to be laid upon either 'cognition', or the 'appearance', or upon mere 'contact'; the only factor meant to be emphasised is the fact of its being such as is possible only when there is *contact between the sense-organ and the object*, and not when there is no such contact between them. If stress were laid upon several factors, then there would be syntactical split.

As for (the other means of Cognition,) Inference, Analogy, and Apparent Inconsistency, these also presuppose (are based upon) Sense-perception; hence these also cannot be the means (of knowing *Dharma*).

Nor can *Dharma* be amenable to 'Negation' [i.e. it cannot be regarded as *non-existent*; because of the reason given in the next Sūtra which indicates the real *means* of knowing Dharma].

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *Dharma cognisable by means of Verbal Injunctions.*

SŪTRA (5).

THE RELATION OF THE WORD WITH ITS DENOTATION IS INBORN.—INSTRUCTION IS THE MEANS OF KNOWING IT (Dharma),—INFALLIBLE REGARDING ALL THAT IS IMPERCEPTIBLE; IT IS A VALID MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, AS IT IS INDEPENDENT,—ACCORDING TO BĀDARĀYAṆA.

Bhāṣya.

'*Autpattika*' ('inborn'),—what we mean by this is 'constant'. It is *existence* (presence) that is figuratively spoken of as '*origin*'. What is meant is that the relation between word and its meaning is *insepar-*

able.—It becomes the *means of knowing* [‘*jñāyatē anena iti jñānam*’ says the *Shlokavārtika* 5. 9] *Dharma* in the shape of *Agnihotra* and such acts, which are not known by means of Sense-perception and such other means of knowledge.—“How so?”—Because there is ‘*Instruction*’; ‘instruction’ stands for the speaking of a particular set of words. [Thus it is the *Word*, in the form of Instruction or Injunction, which is the means of knowing *Dharma*.]—Of this ‘means of knowledge’ there is ‘*infallibility*’; i.e. the cognition brought about by that means never fails (is never wrong); when a cognition is not found to be wrong, it cannot be said with regard to it that ‘this is not so’, or ‘the real thing is not as it is represented by this cognition’, or ‘the real thing is otherwise than what is represented in this cognition’, or ‘it may be that the idea in the mind of the speaker is different from what is expressed by his words’, or ‘the words used give rise to contradictory ideas, representing the same thing as *existing* and as *non-existing*’.—For these reasons (since cognition brought about by words is not fallible), it is ‘*a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent*’. That is, when a cognition has been brought about by means of words, there is no need for any other cognition (to corroborate it), or of any other person as having the same cognition.—The mention of ‘*Bādarāyaṇa*’ means that ‘what is stated here is the opinion of Bādarāyaṇa’; and the name is mentioned only for the purpose of showing reverence to Bādarāyaṇa, and it does *not* mean that what is stated is not the author's (Jaimini's) own opinion.

There has been some confusion regarding the exact extent of the ‘*Vṛttikāragrantha*’’ introduced by Shabara on page 7, line 18. This confusion has been due to the Editor of the Bhāṣya (Bib. Ind. Ed.), who puts the words ‘*Vṛttikāramatam samāptam*’ (at the end of Bhāṣya, page 18, line 6); and to the Editor of the *Shlokavārtika* who has put the words ‘*Vṛttikāragranthaḥ samāptaḥ*’ at the end of 26 Kārikās.

As a matter of fact, the ‘*Vṛttikāragrantha*’ starts with page 7, line 18, and ends with the end of the Bhāṣya on *Sūtra* 5, page 24, line 11.

That all this represents ‘*Vṛttikāragrantha*’ is borne out by Maṇḍana Mishra who says in his *Mīmāṁsānukramaṇikā*—

बह्वर्थं वक्तुकामेन तमर्थं सौत्रमिच्छता ।
वृत्तिकारमतेनेयं विवृती वर्ण्यतेऽन्यथा ॥

The ‘*bahu-artha*’ spoken of here can only be all those philosophical topics that we find dealt with in the Bhāṣya (pages 7 to 24). If it had referred only to what is said regarding the *Pratyakṣapramāṇa*, Maṇḍana Mishra could have had no justification in speaking of it as ‘*bahu-artha*,’ ‘many topics.’—The so-called ‘*Vṛttikāramatam*’ in the *Shlokavārtika* also deals with a part of *Sūtra* 4 only; and if this was all that was meant by the *Vṛttikāra*, then the Bhāṣya would have introduced it after Sūtra 4 and not after Sūtra 5.

The interpretation of the *Vṛttikāragrantha*, according to this view, is as follows: Sūtra 3 puts forward the view that it is *not* necessary to carry on a detailed enquiry into the question of *Pramāṇa* for *Dharma*. [In this case a *na* has to be added to the Sūtra which necessity has led Prabhākara to the view that the *Bhāṣyakāra* is quoting the ‘*Vṛttikāramata*,’ not with approval, but only as a view held by ‘others,’ ‘*para-mata*’]; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the exact nature of all *Pramāṇas*, including *Shabda* or *Chodanā* is already well known. Against this the opponent urges (Bhāṣya, pages 7, l. 21) that examination is necessary

on account of the chances of error.—This objection is answered in the first half of Sūtra 4, where the right perceptional process is described (this is obtained by transposing सत् and तत्), and it is shown that Perception by itself is never erroneous, and must be accepted as valid until we discover some defect in the process leading up to it. Similarly with Inference and the other forms of Cognition.—This goes on up to Bhāṣya, page 10, line 10.—The upshot of all this is that all cognition is inherently valid.—Next the opponent raises the objection against the *prāmāṇya* of *Shabda* specially (page 10, l. 22). This objection—according to the *Vṛttikāra*—is embodied in the second part of Sūtra 5; and after a series of objections and counter-objections, the final conclusion on the point is stated on page 18, l. 6.—The discussion regarding *Ātman* also arising out of what occurs in the *Vṛttikāramata*, this latter *mata* must be taken as extending up to the end of *Sūtra* 5 (page 24, line 11).

According to the *Bṛhatī* and *Ṛjuvimalā*, the *Bhāṣya* does not approve of the explanation propounded by the *Vṛttikāra*; but according to Maṇḍana Mishra, the *Bhāṣya* has purposely introduced this explanation as it provides Shabara with the opportunity of dealing with many philosophical topics.

The author of the *Vṛtti* has explained the text beginning with Sūtra (3) [i.e. Sūtras 3, 4, and 5) in the following entirely different manner]:—

[The *Siddhānta* view propounded in the Sūtra (3) is that] *the means of (knowing Dharma) need* not *be examined* (Sūtra 3) [The negativing '*na*' has got to be added in this case]; because Sense-perception and the other Means of Cognition are all well known; and as for the Scripture (*Shāstra, Veda*), this also is included among those same Means of Cognition; hence this latter also need not be examined.

The argument against this is that the examination is necessary, because of mistakes; for instance, the shell is sometimes actually perceived as silver, which shows that Sense-perception is sometimes wrong; and if Sense-perception may be wrong, it follows that Inference and the other Means of Cognition, being based upon Sense-perception, may also be wrong. Such being the case, if one were to act entirely in accordance with the notions derived through the said Means of Cognition,—without an examination (regarding the validity or otherwise of the means concerned),—he would fail in his purpose, and might, at times, come by what is undesirable.

Siddhāntin :—It is not so; as what is real *Sense-perception* is never *wrong*; what is *wrong* is not *Sense-perception*. What is real *Sense-perception* is explained in *Sūtra* (4), which (being construed by transposing '*sat*' and '*tat*') means that 'That Cognition is *real Sense-perception* (*sat pratyakṣam*) which appears when there is contact of the sense-organs *with the object perceived* (*tatsamprayoge*)'; that is to say, when the sense-organs are in contact with the object actually perceived, the resultant cognition of the man is real Sense-perception,—and it is not real Perception when the object perceived is different from that with which the Sense-organ is in contact. [So that in a case where the *shell* has been perceived as *silver*, what is perceived is the *silver* while the eye is in contact with the *shell*, not with the *silver*; hence this is not a case of real Sense-perception at all].

Question :—"How is it to be understood that one perception appears on the actual contact (of the sense-organ) with the object perceived, and another does not appear on such contact?"

Answer :—When it is found that at the time of the perception in question, there is no contact (of the sense-organ concerned) with any object other than the one perceived, it follows that the perception has appeared on the contact with the object actually perceived; and when the contrary is the case, the perception is taken as following upon contact with something other than the object perceived.

Question :—"But, how can this be ascertained,—when, as a matter of fact, at the time that a person perceives the *shell* to be *silver*, he thinks that his eyes are actually in contact with real *silver*?"

Answer :—In cases where a perception is subsequently followed by a sublative cognition to the contrary—such as 'in reality it is not as I have perceived, my perception has been wrong',—it is understood that the perception in question had appeared on the contact of the sense-organ with something other than the object perceived; while in cases where no such sublative cognition appears, it is understood that the perception had appeared on actual contact with the object perceived.

Question :—"How can this distinction be made before the appearance of the sublative cognition? In fact, at the time that the perception actually appears, there is nothing to differentiate a *right* cognition from a *wrong* one (until the subsequent appearance or otherwise of the sublative cognition)."

Answer :—A cognition is *wrong*, (*a*) when the mind is affected by some sort of derangement [the reading '*chakṣurādibhiḥ*' is apparently wrong; what is wanted is some word expressive of a mental derangement],—or (*b*) when the sense-organ concerned (i.e. the eye) is beset by darkness or other such disabilities,—or (*c*) when the object itself suffers from such disabilities as being too subtle (for perception) and so forth. While in cases where none of the three (mind, sense-organ, and object) suffers from these defects, the cognition is *right*. What brings about a right cognition is the contact of the sense-organ, the mind, and the object; when there is no such contact, the cognition is wrong; hence what leads to a wrong cognition is a defect in (one or the other of) the three factors (mind, sense-organ, and object). [In place of '*ubhaya*', which means *both*, we should have '*tritaya*' or some such word expressing *three*];—when these are defective, the cognition becomes *wrong*.

Question :—"How do you know this?"

Answer :—It follows from the fact that on the disappearance of the defects, there appears the cognition which is recognised by all persons as *right*.

Question :—"How is one to know if any of the three is defective or free from defects?"

Answer :—Even on careful scrutiny, if we do not find any defect, we should conclude that there is no defect, simply because there is nothing to show that there is a defect.

From all this it follows that only that cognition is *wrong* the means whereof are defective, or with regard to which there is a sublative cognition that 'it is wrong',—and no other cognition can be regarded as wrong. [And

as all cognitions are not *wrong*, as stated by the Opponent, there can be no need for any examination of the Means of Cognition in general.]

[The Opponent next attacks the validity of Sense-cognition in general on the basis of *Idealism*]—" All cognition is baseless (without a real substratum in the external world), like dream-cognition. In the case of Dreams, we have found that *Cognition* has no real substratum;—waking cognition, also in the form 'a pillar' or 'a wall' and so forth, is a *Cognition*;—hence waking cognition also must be without a real substratum." [This objection is introduced here with the view that if there is no *real* object in the external world, there can be no contact of the sense-organs with an object of perception; and hence no perception could fulfil the essential condition laid down in the definition of Sense-perception; which would mean that Cognitions are in their very nature wrong; and hence an examination of the Means of Cognition is necessary.]

The cognition of the 'pillar' that one has during the waking state is positively determinate; how then could it be *wrong*?

"In dream also the same cognition was equally positively determinate, before waking; there is no difference in the character (of the dream-cognition and the waking cognition of the *pillar*)."

It is not so; in the case of dream-cognition we find that it is sublated (set aside, rejected, on waking), which is not the case with the other cognition (i.e. waking cognition).

"But from the analogy of the dream-cognition, to which the waking cognition is similar, it may be presumed that *sublation* will follow in the case of the waking cognition also."

This presumption in the case of the waking cognition would be possible only if the falsity of the dream-cognition were due to its being a *cognition*. That is to say, if the falsity of the Dream-cognition were due to the fact that it *cognises*, i.e. apprehends,—then, inasmuch as waking cognition also is a *cognition* in the same sense, it could not be said that this latter is otherwise (i.e. not false). As a matter of fact, however, the falsity of the Dream-cognition is inferred from other reasons, such for instance, as the fact of its being sublated by a cognition to the contrary—" How ?"—When a man is sleepy, his mind is weak (inactive, not alert); and hence it is *sleepiness* which is the cause of falsity in the cognition appearing at the beginning and the end of sleep; and during deep sleep, there is no cognition at all; as it is only when a man is entirely unconscious that he is said to be 'in deep sleep'.—From all this we conclude that the cognition of the waking man is not false.—" But during the waking state also, there may be some defect in the instruments of perception (which would give rise to false cognitions)."—If there were such a defect it would be detected.—" Even at the time of dreaming, the defect in the cognitive instrument is not detected."—But in this latter case, on waking, the man realises that his mind had been beset with sleepiness [so that the defect is actually cognised in this case].

[The 'baselessness' or falsity of Cognitions *as cognitions* has been rejected on the general ground that no cognition can be regarded as baseless or false unless it is found to have been brought about by means of defective Instruments. This is

met by the Opponent with the assertion that cognitions have to be regarded as false or baseless, not only because they are brought about by means of defective instruments, but chiefly because they are devoid of a real external object,—hence there can be no real contact between the sense-organ and the object;—hence there can be no valid perception which has been defined as Cognition brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.]

[There has been some confusion of thought in regard to the exact position of the two sections which have been called by the editors from ancient times, '*Nirālambanavāda*' and '*Shūnyavāda*'; which has led to the idea (*a*) that the portion of the *Bhāṣya* preceding the words '*shūnyastu*' deals with the doctrine of Idealism that there is no real object in the external world, hence all cognition is *baseless*,—and (*b*) that with the words '*Shūnyastu*' the Bhāṣya introduces the doctrine of Nihilism, that nothing, not even Idea, exists.—But this interpretation of the Bhāṣya is entirely wrong. From the last verse of the so-called '*Shūnyavāda*' section of the *Shlokavārtika* it is clear that the whole of that section is meant to establish *the reality of the external object*, in confutation of the doctrine of Idealism, and the only argument in refutation of the doctrine of Nihilism is that 'when the reality of the external object cannot be denied, it is all the more unreasonable to deny the reality of the Idea or Cognition'; so that the Mādhyamika doctrine of *Shūnyavāda* is not what is meant to be directly introduced or attacked in the Bhāṣya beginning with the words '*Shūnyastu*', which, in reality, is only a continuation of the refutation of the doctrine that there is no real external object. This is made clear by the section of the *Bhāṣya* concluding with the words '*Ato na nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*', 'for this reason, cognition is not devoid of a real substratum'.—The *Bṛhati* clearly says—"It should not be thought that the section of the Bhāṣya preceding the words '*Shūnyastu*' has refuted the denial of the real external substratum of Cognitions, and the section beginning with '*Shūnyastu*' proceeds to deal with the Mādhyamika doctrine of Nihilism. Because the *shūnyatā*, '*voidness*', spoken of in the *Bhāṣya* is meant to be the *voidness* of the Cognition itself—i.e. the cognition is *devoid* of a real object,—and it is not that the Idea or Cognition itself is denied."—According to Kumārila (*Shlokavārtika, Shūnyavāda*, verse 3), the question discussed in the *Bhāṣya* beginning with '*Shūnyastu*' is—"Is it a fact that Cognition is able to function only when such objects as the Pillar and the like have an existence in the external world—or is it that Cognition rests in itself as the object cognised, and not in any object extraneous to itself?" So according to this also, the *Bhāṣya* does not introduce here a separate discussion of the Mādhyamika doctrine of Nihilism.]

Opponent:—"But as a matter of fact, Cognition is an empty void—[i.e. devoid of substantial reality or foundation in the external world].—Why?—Because we do not perceive any difference between the form of the *Object* and (its) *Cognition*. What is *perceived* (by the senses) is the *Cognition*, hence we conclude that there is no *form* of any object apart from that Cognition itself."

Answer:—This would be so if the *Cognition* had the form of the *Object*; as a matter of fact, however, our *Cognition* is *without form*; it is the external object that has form, and is actually apprehended as existing in external space. Then again, the objective of the Sense-cognition is the *object*, not another *Cognition*; and this for the simple reason that Cognition, having only a momentary existence (specially according to the Opponent, Bauddha), could never continue till the appearance of the other cognition (of which it could form the objective).

The Opponent might argue as follows :—

"[Is it not a fact, according to the *Siddhāntin* himself that] it is while itself coming into existence that the Cognition becomes cognised, and at the same time makes the other object (the external objective) cognised,—as is found to be the case with the Lamp (which is itself seen and renders other things visible) ? [This argument is put in the mouth of the opponent, *not* as setting forth his own view, but only as against the contention of the *Siddhāntin* that Cognition cannot form the objective of a Cognition; the idea of the opponent being that even the *Siddhāntin* cannot deny the fact that a Cognition, while making its own objective cognised, must itself be cognised]."

We deny this; no one ever cognises a Cognition until the object has been cognised; it is only *after* the object has become cognised that the person comes to know of the Cognition, and this is through Inference [that is, according to us, the existence of the *Cognition* is only *inferred* from the fact of *the object being cognised*, which would not be possible if there were no *cognition*]; and thus there can be no simultaneity between the cognition of the *Object* and the cognition of the *Cognition* itself.

Opponent :—" Even so (according to you), it is only after the Cognition has come into existence that you speak of the object as 'cognised', which cannot be done until the Cognition had come into existence; so that (even according to your own view that there can be no simultaneity) the fact would appear to be that it is the Cognition that comes into existence (and is cognised) first, and it is only after this that the object is known as 'cognised' [so that it cannot be true to assert that the Cognition becomes cognised by Inference *after* the object has been cognised]."

Answer :—It is true that the Cognition *appears* first; but it is not *cognised* first; it sometimes happens that even a cognised object is spoken of as 'not cognised' [when for instance, on referring to the past, a man says 'I do not remember that I ever knew this thing', even in cases where the thing might have actually been known to the man in the past,—says the *Shlokavārtika*].

Further, the form of the *cognition* is never apprehended except in terms of the *object* [which could not be the case if both Cognition and Object were cognised by Sense-perception; we never, for example, perceive Colour in terms of Touch, says the *Ṛjuvimalā*]. Hence the Cognition cannot be spoken of (as the object of perception); and what cannot be so spoken of cannot be the objective of Sense-perception. Thus it is that Cognition cannot be the objective of Sense-perception. [It can only be an objective of Inference].

Further, even if the Cognition and the Object were identical in form, it would be the *Cognition* that would have to be denied (a separate existence), and not the *Object* which is actually perceived. As a matter of fact, however, the two are *not* identical in form; when we infer a *Cognition* (from the fact of the object being cognised), we infer it *without* a form (simply as 'cognition', not as 'cognition of such and such a thing'),—whereas when we directly perceive an *object*, we perceive it *with* a form.

From all this it follows that Cognition has its substratum in the object.

Further, whenever the cognition of 'cloth' appears, it does so invari-

ably only when the yarns (composing the cloth) are there [which establishes a permanent connection between the cognition and the object in the shape of the *cloth*, whose existence therefore cannot be denied]. If this were not so (if there were no such relationship between the *cognition of cloth* and the *cloth*), then even when the *yarns* would be there, it might be possible for a man with perfectly healthy organs to have the cognition of the '*Jar*'. This however never happens. Hence we conclude that Cognition is not without a substratum (in the external world).

Thus the conclusion is that Sense-perception is never false or wrong. [And hence no examination of it is necessary].

When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship (of Invariable Concomitance) leads to the cognition of the other factor of that relationship,—which latter is not in contact with the person's sense-organs,—this second Cognition is what is called '*Anumāna*', 'Inference' (Inferential Cognition). [We take the compound '*Jñātasambandha*' in the sense of 'well-recognised relationship', according to the *Shlokavārtika*, 2; which appears to give the simplest meaning.]—This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds—(1) that based upon a directly perceived relationship, and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship; as an example of the former, we have the (inferential) Cognition of 'Fire' following from the Cognition of 'Smoke' (which is based upon the invariable concomitance of Smoke and Fire which has been directly perceived in the kitchen); and as an example of the second kind of Inference we have the case where finding that the sun changes its position we infer that 'the sun is moving',—on the ground of our experience that in the case of the person Devadatta we have found that it is only after he moves that he changes his position (which experience has led us to the generalised premiss that 'whenever an object changes its position it moves', and it is on this generalised premiss that the inference of the movement of the sun is based).

'*Shāstra*' 'scripture', (Injunction), is that means of cognising the object not in contact with the senses, (i.e. *Dharma and Adharma*) which follows from verbal cognition. [The Bhāṣya does not waste time in providing a definition of 'Word' or 'Verbal Cognition' in general,—it defines only the particular form of 'Word', 'Injunction',—because it is only in reference to the means of Cognising *Dharma*, which has been declared to be Injunction alone, that the *Vṛttikāra* is proving the unnecessary character of an examination of the Means of Cognition; hence the term '*shabda*' stands for the Vedic or scriptural word, and '*artha*' for '*Dharma and Adharma*' which form the special subject-matter of Scripture.—*Shlokavārtika*, *Shabda*, 8-13.—According to the *Ṛjuvimalā*, '*Shabdavijñāna*' stands for the 'cognition of things through Word'—i.e. the cognition of something to be done; and the '*asannikṛṣṭa artha*' is *Injunction, urging to action*; hence '*Shāstra*' is that means of cognising Injunction which is derived from that knowledge of *something to be done* which is obtained through words.]—[And these two means of cognition also being well known do not need to be examined.]

'*Upamāna*', 'Analogy'—i.e. *similitude*—also brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance, the sight of the *Gavaya* (which is similar to the cow) brings about the remembrance of the

cow (as being similar to the *Gavaya*). [According to *Ṛjuvimalā*, the meaning of the sentence is 'the sight of the *Gavaya* brings about the analogical cognition that "the animal seen is called *Gavaya*", to the man *who 'has remembered the cow'*. This is the same as the *Nyāya* view, which has been controverted by the *Shlokavārtika*, whose rendering of the passage has been adopted in the translation.] [And as this Analogy is well-known, it does not need to be examined.]

'*Arthāpatti*', 'Presumption', also consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard would not be possible without that presumption; for instance, it is found that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house, and this *non-existence in the house* leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house [as without this, the aforesaid fact of his being alive and not in the house could not be explained.] [This also needs no examination.]

Abhāva, 'Negation', 'Non-apprehension', stands for the non-existence (non-operation) of the (five) means of Cognition (described above); and it is what brings about the cognition that 'it does not exist', in regard to things not in contact with the senses. [That is, in a case where Sense-perception and the other means of Cognition are not found to be operative towards bringing about the notion of the *existence* of a certain thing, we have the notion of the *non-existence* of that thing; and the means by which this notion is brought about is called '*Abhāva*'—*Shlokavārtika*, *Abhāva* 1.] [This also being well-known, does not need to be examined.]

From all this it follows that (all) means of Cognition being well-known, they need not be examined.

The opponent raises a fresh objection:—"Sense-perception and the rest may be right means of Knowledge; but *Word* (Injunction) can never be so;—Why?—*The word (Vedic Injunction) is not a means of true knowledge, because what exists is actually perceived* (Sūtra 4, latter part). The Injunction (of the *Chitrā* sacrifice, for instance, for the purpose of acquiring cattle) is not a means of right knowledge; because if a thing which is perceptible is not perceived, it is taken as *non-existent*; as in the case of the Hare's Horn (which, not being perceived, is taken as non-existent); now (as regards the *Chitrā* sacrifice which is enjoined as bringing about the acquisition of Cattle) Cattle and such other things are such as could be perceived by means of the sense-organs; and yet we find that no cattle are found to appear after the performance of the sacrifice (*Chitrā*) enjoined for one desiring Cattle; and from this it follows that the sacrifice does not bring about Cattle [and hence that the Vedic Injunction is *false*, i.e. *not a means of right cognition*.] The effect of an act must appear at the time of the performance of the act itself; for instance, the pleasure derived from massage appears at the time of the massage itself.—It might be argued that the act may bring about its result at some future time.—But any result that may appear at some future time we cannot regard as being the result of that particular Act;—why?—because at the time when the Act itself was there, it did not bring about its result; while at the time when the result does appear, the Act itself is not there; and being itself non-existent, how could it be the bringer about of the

result?—Then again, of the particular effect (acquisition of cattle), we actually find other causes (in the shape of gift, purchase, and so forth); and so long as a perceptible cause is there, there can be no justification for assuming an imperceptible one. Thus having found the Veda to be fallible in this one case, we conclude that the other results also—such as Heaven and the like—do not really follow (from the Acts enjoined in the Veda).—Further, we find the Veda actually speaking of things contrary to what is actually seen; for instance, having enjoined the collecting of the Sacrificial vessels (on the death of the sacrificer), the Veda goes on to say that 'the sacrificer thus equipped with the sacrificial implements goes straight to the heavenly regions'; this clearly refers to the *body*, and yet the body never goes to the heavenly regions, as it is actually burnt before our eyes. Nor can the word '*goes*' be taken as an injunctive word (whereby the passage would mean that the body *should* go to heaven, and not that it actually *does go*; so that the sentence would not contain anything contrary to a perceptible fact).—Such apparently absurd assertions therefore cannot be the means of right Cognition; as they would be like such absurd assertions as 'dry gourds sink in water, while stones float.' Thus then we cannot have any confidence in the injunctions of the *Agnihotra* and such other Acts; as these Injunctions also belong to the same category as those that have been shown above to be absolutely false (and unreliable).—From all this it follows that *Dharma* is *not* 'that which is indicated by the Veda as conducive to the highest good'—[as declared in 'Sū. (2)]".'

The answer to the above is provided in the first part of Sūtra (5), ending with the word '*Jñānam*'—'*But the relation of the word with its meaning is original, etc., etc.*'—The particle '*tu*', 'but', serves to reject the opponent's view. The meaning is that *the relation between the word and meaning—which relation does not originate from a human being* [*i.e. which is primordial, original, self-sufficient, not dependent upon any other means of Cognition*]—*is the* 'J ñ ā n a', *means of knowing*,—'T a s y a', '*of that*', *i.e. of such things as the* A g n i h o t r a *and the like which are not cognisable by means of Sense-perception and the rest.* [If the connection of the word with its meaning were dependent upon other means of Cognition, then all those words and expressions which speak of things not amenable to the other means of Cognition, might be regarded as of doubtful validity; when however the said connection is self-sufficient, then there is nothing to shake the inherent validity of what is spoken of in the words of the Veda—*Bṛhatī* and *Ṛjuvimalā*]. Thus then the notion derived from the Vedic Injunction must be right. In the case of a notion derived from words emanating from human beings, there might be doubts regarding its validity; because in that case what is asserted would be dependent (for its validity) upon things extraneous to itself [such as the validity of those sources from which the human being may have derived his knowledge of what he is speaking of, and so forth]. On the other hand, when a (self-sufficient) word (not emanating from a human source) speaks of something, why should that be false? Certainly we do not require any corroboration of what we learn from the said word. When the word 'speaks' of something, what is meant is that it makes that thing known, i.e. it becomes the means of that thing becoming known; so

that as soon as the means in the shape of the Word is there, what is spoken of by it becomes known by itself (without any extraneous help); under the circumstances, how could one call it 'false', declaring that 'what the word says is not really so'?—As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the Injunction is not of a doubtful character,—in any such form as 'this may or may not be so'; nor at any other time or place, or in any other circumstances, or in any other person, does there appear any notion to the contrary, that 'it is false'.—As regards the idea that 'the notion derived from this Vedic Injunction must be false because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false',—this is only an *Inference*, and as such becomes sublated by the aforesaid *direct* Cognition to the contrary.—From all this it follows that '*Dharma is what is indicated by the Vedic Injunction as conducive to the highest good*'.

The Opponent raises a fresh objection:—'All this may be so; but in reality there is no relationship between the word and its meaning; how then could any such relationship be either created by human beings or not created by human beings?—Why?—If the relation between the word and the thing denoted by it were held to be of the nature of *Contact* (Conjunction), then on the utterance of the word "razor", the mouth (of the speaker) would be ripped open, and similarly on the utterance of the word "sweets", his mouth would become filled with sweets. As for the other kinds of relation—(*a*) that subsisting between the material cause and its product, or (*b*) that between the efficient cause and its effect, or (*c*) that between the container and the contained, or (*d*) that of birth and so forth,—these are not possible at all in the case of Word.'

The answer to the above is as follows:—The only relation that is possible to assert in the case, you do not assert; that is, the relation that subsists between the denoter and the denoted, which is the relation called 'that between the *name and the named*.'—'If the word is the *denoter* (of its meaning), then why does it not denote it when it is heard for the first time?'—The answer to this is that in every case experience is our guide (and authority); it is only when we find a word actually denoting a thing that we regard it as its 'denoter'; this is not possible in the case of a word heard for the first time, as in its case we have never found it denoting anything; in fact the meaning of a word is understood only when it has been heard (used) as many times as makes it definitely recognised that 'this word is the *name* and this thing is the *named*? [Nor does this need for repeated experience vitiate the denotativeness of the word; because] in the case of the Eye also it is found that it is unable to *see* if there is no external light, and yet this does not mean that the Eye has not the power to see. [Thus then, the conclusion is that there is a definite relation between the Word and what is denoted by it.]

[A fresh discussion is started:—Says the Opponent]:—'If (as has been just stated) the Word does not express anything when it is heard for the first time, then the relation between the Word and the thing denoted by it must be one that is created (artificial)'—why?—(*a*) because *sui generis*, the word and the thing denoted are not related, as is clear from the fact that the word is uttered in the mouth while the thing denoted is found on the ground;

(b) because people clearly make such a distinction as "this is the *Word* not the *Thing*", "this is the *Thing*, not the *Word*";—and (c) because there is a clear difference in the forms of the two also: for instance, the word that they pronounce is in the form '*Gauḥ*' ('Cow'), while the object that they understand as denoted by it is *an animal with the dewlap and other features*; and in actual experience we have seen that any relation (or connection) that appears between two distinct things is artificial (created); as for example, the relation between the *jar* and the *rope* (to which it is tied).

[The answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* which is reiterated on page 15, lines 16 to 18, comes in the Text on page 15, line 18; in the interval in order to clear the ground, the Author discusses the three questions—(1) What is 'word'? on page 13, line 7 to page 14, line 15,—(2) what is 'meaning' (or denoted thing)? on page 14, line 16 to page 15, line 14,—and (3) what is the 'relation' between the two? on page 15, line 15.]

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(1) In the case of '*gauḥ*' ('Cow'), what is it that is called the 'word'? The letters '*ga*', '*au*', and '*ḥ*' (visarga) constitute the word—says the revered Upavarṣa. Among people the term 'word' is applied to what is apprehended by the ear; and in the case of the word '*gauḥ*', the said letters are what are apprehended by the ear.

The *Sphoṭavādin Grammarian* :—"If that is so, then no cognition of the meaning (of the word) is possible;—why?—because as a matter of fact the cognition of the meaning does not appear on the hearing of the single component letters severally; and apart from the components there is no single entity in the form of a *composite whole*, from which the cognition of the meaning would follow. At the moment of hearing the letter '*ga*', the letters '*au*' and '*ḥ*' are not heard; and at the moment that these letters are heard, the letter '*ga*' is not heard. From this it follows that the word '*gauḥ*' (as a composite whole) is something different from the component letters '*ga*' and the rest; and it is from this composite that the Cognition of the meaning follows.—It might be urged that after the word (i.e. the letters) have ceased, there is a remembrance (of them), and it is from this remembrance that the Cognition of the meaning follows.—But this also cannot be; as the Remembrance also has only a momentary existence and hence is as unable to bring about the Cognition of the meaning as the letters themselves."

There is no force in all this, we reply; because what happens is that each letter, as it is uttered, leaves an 'impression' behind, and what brings about the cognition of the meaning of the word is *the last letter along with the impressions of each of the preceding letters*.—'If that were so [i.e. if the cognition of the meaning were so derived from the *last letter*, etc.], then the assertion of the ordinary people that "we cognise the meaning from the *word*" would be unjustifiable.'—Our answer to this would be that if it cannot be justified, it must be unjustifiable; simply because a certain popular assertion is unjustifiable, it cannot be right to admit the existence of something which is not vouched for by any means of Cognition, Sense-perception and the rest. As a matter of fact, popular assertions are found to be of both kinds—some are justifiable (true) and some are unjustifiable (false); for instance, such assertions as 'Devadatta, please

drive the cow' are justifiable (reasonable, serving a definite purpose); while such other assertions as 'ten pomegranates, six cakes' and the like are unjustifiable (unreasonable, entirely purposeless, having no meaning).—"[It is not the popular notion alone that is contrary to the *Siddhānta* view.] Scientific writers also have made such declarations as 'what is denoted by a verb, like *goes* or *cooks*, is a single entity (act), consisting of several acts beginning with the starting (of the act) and ending with its fulfilment, ranging in sequence over several points of time' —(*Nirukta* 1-1) [which also lends support to the view that the word also is a composite whole apart from the component letters.]"—The answer to this is that even the declaration of scientific writers cannot render possible (or reasonable) what cannot be established by any valid means of Cognition.

Then again, there is nothing unreasonable in the view (stated by us) that the letters (composing a word) produce impressions, and from these impressions follow the apprehension of the meaning; so that in the bringing about of the apprehension of the meaning, the letters would be the cause.—"But in that case, the word would be only a subordinate cause (of the apprehension of the meaning)."—Not so; the causal efficiency of the letters is by no means subordinate,—because as a matter of fact, the apprehension of the meaning comes only when the letters are there, and it does not come when they are absent [which shows that the letters are the principal, not the subordinate, cause.]—But even if they were only a subordinate cause,—it would not be right to assume something not vouched for by Sense-perception or any other means of Cognition, simply for the purpose of saving the *Word* from being a subordinate cause. For instance, when it is asserted that 'the boy is fire', it is not understood that the Boy is actually *Fire*, for fear of making the word 'Fire' figurative (taken in the indirect or subordinate sense of 'brilliant');—for the purpose of saving the word 'fire' from being understood in its subordinate (or figurative) sense of (*brilliance*), the 'Boy' is not taken to be *Fire* itself (in the literal sense).

As a matter of fact also, such a word as '*go*' (Cow) is never actually perceived apart from the letters '*ga*' and the rest; and this for the simple reason that no difference is perceived between them (i.e. between the word and its component letters), and that they are actually found to be non-different. What again is actually perceived are only the letters '*ga*' and the rest. From this it is clear that the word '*gauḥ*', beginning with the letter '*ga*' and ending with the '*ḥ*', is only these letters themselves; and hence there is no such thing as 'Word' apart from those letters.

Objection:—'The assumption of Impressions (left by the component letters) involves the assumption of something that is not perceived'.

The answer to this is that the theory of the 'word' (as distinct from the letters) involves the assumption of the *Word* and also that of the *Impressions* (the assumption of which is necessary in this case also, for explaining the process of denotation); [whereas in our view, it is necessary to assume the Impressions only: so that while the Opponent's theory involves two assumptions, our theory involves only one assumption].—From all this we conclude that the letters themselves are the *word*.

(2) [The next question is]—What is the *denotation* (meaning) of the word '*gauḥ*' (Cow)?—What we assert is that *the class (or genus) characterised by the dewlap and other features* is what is denoted by the Word.—[In the *Nyāya-sūtra*, '*Ākṛti*' has been taken as different from *Jāti*, Class; it has been taken there in the sense of the *shape* or *form* that characterises a particular *Class* of things. In Mīmāṁsā however, we find that '*Ākṛti*' is taken to be the same as '*Jāti*.' The *Shlokavārtika-Ākṛti, Verse* 3 clearly says that 'This *class* (*jāti*) itself has been called *Ākṛti* in the sense that the Individual is characterised (*ākriyatē*) by it': and Maṇḍana Mishra also declares in his *Anukramaṇi* that 'the word *go* denotes the Class.']

The Opponent asks—"Is this 'Class' *something to be accomplished*, or not?" [The real motive behind this question is that, if the class is something to be accomplished, then its relation to the word cannot be *eternal*.]

[The answer is that] Being actually perceived, it cannot be something yet to be accomplished; as what is actually perceived is only an accomplished entity, such as the necklace, the road-crossing, the dish, and so forth.

'But this (notion of *Class*) may be a mere illusion.'

That cannot be; unless we find a conception set aside or negatived by a subsequent conception, we cannot regard it as an *illusion*.

'As a matter of fact, we find such conceptions as *series, group, forest* (as single entities),—while in reality there are no such single entities apart from the component individuals [the *series* being nothing apart from the individual factors, the *group* being nothing apart from the individuals composing it, and the *Forest* being nothing apart from the trees. Similarly, the *Class* being nothing apart from the individuals composing it, the conception of the "Class" must be a misconception, a mere illusion]'.

Not so; you have put forward a most incoherent statement. By asserting that 'there is a conception of the Forest while in reality there is no such thing as forest', do you mean to deny the validity of Perception (which provides us with a clear notion of the *Forest* as a real entity)? If so, then you might as well say that 'the trees also do not exist'. In that case your view would be the same as that of the Bauddha Idealist (who denies the existence of all external objects); and this view we have already refuted. [So that what you have asserted does not lend support to your own theory that there is no such entity as *Class*].—Your assertion may be a complaint against the upholder of the *Class*, to the effect that "(by positing a single entity) you vitiate another doctrine of yours,—inasmuch as (according to you) the notion of the 'Forest' (as a single entity) appears while in fact there is no such (single) entity as Forest [what really exists is only a large number of trees; so that you have the notion of a *single* entity in reference to a *plurality* of trees; and this vitiates your doctrine" [Read for '*pi sati*', '*pyasati*', as read in *Bṛhati*] that it is only a single thing that can be conceived of as a *single* entity.]—If such is your meaning, then, it comes to this that being unable to refute the theory under discussion, you proceed to find fault with a totally different doctrine, and thereby render yourself open to a 'ground of defeat' (in discussion, by shifting your ground); specially as what you put forward does not establish anything. Because

the Siddhāntin will retort—If the other doctrine becomes vitiated, let it be vitiated; what does it matter if that doctrine is vitiated or not vitiated? [The rule regarding the use of the singular or the plural number is not meant to be absolute; if then, it becomes vitiated by a perceptible fact, it does not matter; merely on the strength of the said rule, we cannot deny a perceptible fact.] What *does* matter is whether you succeed in establishing your own doctrine or in refuting my doctrine (regarding the subject-matter under discussion, i.e. the existence of the *Class*). Merely because the *Forest* is not perceived apart from the *trees*, it does not follow that the *Forest* does not exist; if there is some other reason which gives rise to a notion *against* (i.e. sublative of the notion of) the existence of the Forest, then only can the notion of the Forest be regarded as false; and then alone could we conclude that the Forest does not exist. [Even though in regard to the Forest and other things mentioned by you, such a sublative notion may appear, yet] in regard to such things as the *Cow* and the like (which we are discussing), we do not find our notion of *class* being sublated. So that there is no analogy between the two cases (that of the *Cow* and that of the *Forest*). In regard to the Forest and other things also, if there is no sublative notion, we cannot say that they do not exist.—From all this it follows that the statement that you have made regarding the *Series*, the *Forest* (and the *Group*) is entirely incoherent (having no bearing on the discussion, in hand).

The conclusion thus is that the assertion (of Jaimini) to the effect that 'the Class forms the denotation of the word' (*Sūtra* 1. 3. 33) is fully established. How the *Class* is denoted by the word we shall explain in detail later on (under 1. 3. 33).

(3) [The third question is]—"What is the *relation* (between the *word* and its *denotation*)?" [This question is introduced with a view to discuss the eternality of words and of their relationship to their denotations—says *Shlokavārtika* 10].

The answer is that the relation between the word and its denotation is that on the *word* being cognised, what is *denoted* by it becomes cognised. [That is, the relation of *Name and Named*, as already stated above.]

The opponent:—"We have already proved above that this relation is artificial; hence we opine that a certain person created the relation of words with their denotations and then with a view to make use of the words, he composed the Vedas."

Our answer to this view is as follows:—What we have asserted (regarding the relation between word and its denotation) is established by the fact that the said relation could never have been created by a human being.

Question:—"But how do you know that the relation could not be created by a human being?"

Answer:—It follows from the fact that there could not have been any persons to create the relations.

Question:—"Why could there be no creator of the relation?"

Answer:—[No such creator can be admitted] because no such person can be cognised by means of Sense-perception, and the other means of cognition also are preceded by (based upon) Sense-perception.

"As the creator existed a long time back, it is only natural that he should be beyond the Sense-perception of men of the present day."

Even if he had existed a long time back, it would not be impossible to remember him. In the case of such (important) things as the Himālaya mountain and the like, it would be impossible to forget the creator, in the manner in which the builder of a wall, a garden and such things becomes forgotten. In the case of these latter things there are such causes (for the builder being forgotten) as the disappearance (of all idea) of the builder, due either to the disruption of his country or to the extinction of his family. In the case of words and their meanings on the other hand there is no total disappearance of persons making use of them.

It might be argued that—"what men have to deal with is only the relation of words and meanings, and the matter of the creator of the relation would have no interest to them, and hence paying no heed to it, they would forget him."

But this also is not possible. If there were a person who created the relation and started its use, he would surely be remembered at the time of using the word. A certain usage becomes possible only when there is an agreement between the creator and the adopter of the usage,—and not when there is disagreement between them. For instance, Pāṇini (Sūtra 1. 1. 1) is the creator or originator of the relation between the technical name '*Vṛddhi*' and the letters '*āt-aich*', and a person making use of words independently of Pāṇini, or one not accepting the work of Pāṇini as authoritative, could never apprehend the word '*Vṛddhi*' as standing for those letters. Similarly Piṅgala being the originator of the connection between the technical name '*ma*' and *three long syllables*, to a person not acting according to Piṅgala, or to one not accepting the work of Piṅgala as authoritative, the letter '*ma*' could never bring about the idea of a group of three long syllables. Thus it is that there is always an agreement between the originator and the adopter (of a usage). Consequently persons who would be making use of the Veda would surely remember the creator (or originator) of the relation of words and their usage. If one forgot the author of Pāṇini's *Sūtra* to the effect that 'the term *Vṛddhi* stands for the letters *Āt* and *Aich*' (1. 1. 1), he could never make any sense out of the *Sūtra* '*Vṛddhiryasyāchāmādistad vṛddham*' ['That group of letters is called '*Vṛddha*' among the vowels wherein the first one is a *Vṛddhi*, i.e. *ā* or *ai* or *au*] (Pāṇini 1. 1. 73).

For these reasons we conclude that no person created the relations (of words) and then for the purpose of making use of them, composed the Vedas.

Even if the possibility of (the creator) being forgotten were there, we could not admit a creator of the relation unless there were proofs for it. For instance, even though it is possible for an existing thing to be not perceived, we do not merely on the ground of that possibility, admit the existence of the Hare's Horn, because there is no proof of it. For this reason the relation between words and their meanings cannot be regarded as created by a person.

[The opponent puts forward a proof of the creator of word-relations]—
"We would deduce the existence of the creator of word-relations from

Presumption: As a matter of fact we do not find people comprehending the meaning of those words whose relation (to the meaning) has not been fixed. If people were to comprehend the meaning of such a word, they could comprehend the meaning of such words also as they might hear for the first time; as a matter of fact however they are not found to do so; hence there must be a person who fixes (creates) the relations (of words and meanings)."

This is not right. Because *words* are taught as accomplished entities (having the inherent power of denoting their meanings,—[This is what is meant by the term '*upadēshaḥ*' in sūtra 5—says *Bṛhati*].—If it were a fact that in the absence of a creator of word-relations, the meanings are never comprehended, then alone could we deduce a creator by presumption. In reality however, there is another way (in which the meanings of words are comprehended); for instance, we find that when older people are making use of words for their own purpose, the younger men who happen to hear those words are actually found to understand them; these old people also, when they were young, understood the words as used by the older people at the time; these latter also understood them from other older people; and so on the process has gone on without any beginning in time. This is one possible explanation of the phenomenon (of the use and comprehension of words);—and the other explanation (proposed by the opponent) is that "in the beginning there was no relation at all between a word and its meaning, subsequently some one set going the relations."—Now as between these two possible explanations, so long as the explanation based upon the usage of older people is available [and it is actually perceived in everyday life], it would not be right to *presume* a creator of relations. Further the upholders of the 'Usage Theory' point to a fact of direct perception (in proof of their theory), while the other party only presume a creator of relations; and certainly Presumption has no force as against a fact of direct Perception. From all this it follows that there can be no creator of word-relations.

'*Avyatirēkashcha*', 'it is infallible', says the next term in *sūtra* 5. It is found that just as the word '*go*' denotes the *animal with the dewlap* in one place, so does it also in the most inaccessible places; how could it be possible for the many creators of the word-relation to come together? Certainly no single person could create a relation (that would receive such universal acceptance). For this reason also there can be no creator of word-relations.

Another writer explains the phrase '*avyatirēkashcha*' in the following different manner:—There can be no point of time when the word-relation has been totally absent and when no word has been related to any meaning.—Why so?—Because, if there were, then the act itself of creating the relation would not be possible; for when the creator of the relation would proceed to create a relation, he could do so only by means of words; and the question arises—who created the relations of the words that the said creator uses when creating the new relation? If those were created by some other creator, then who created the relations of the words used by the older creator? And so on and so forth, there would be no end to this

enquiry. Consequently, it has to be admitted that when a person would proceed to create new word-relations, he would make use of words whose relationships have come down through the usage of older people, and have not been created by any one. And when *usage* has to be admitted (at a certain point), why should it be at all necessary to presume any creator of word-relations at any point of time? Thus it is clear that there can be no valid Presumption either (in support of a creator of word-relations).

The opponent may ask—"How is it possible for the younger people, to whom the word-relations are not known, to learn the meanings of words from the older people?"

The answer to this is that the question of possibility cannot arise in regard to a directly perceived fact. Younger people are actually found to learn the meanings of words from older people; and on the other hand, they are not found to have any such comprehension of a creator of word-relations. Hence the cases (of words and creators) do not stand on the same footing.

The next phrase in *sūtra* (5) is—'*arthē anupalabdhē* ('*regarding what is imperceptible*').—In regard to such imperceptible things as the *Deity and the like* [Right reading '*devatādau*' supplied by the *Bṛhatī*], the creating of a name (expressive word) would be useless and also impossible. When a thing is known in its general form, and its particular forms are not known, then alone are names propounded in regard to these particular forms; and in the case of such words as 'deity' and the like, no particular forms can be known; as both the conditions are absent. For this reason also the relation of the word with its meaning cannot be one created by any person.

For this same reason [of not having its relation created by a person), the Word is '*pramāṇam*' ('*a valid means of knowledge*' (sūtra 5),—'*anapekṣatvāt*' ('*as it is independent*') (sūtra 5); that is to say, being such as described, the word does not need (for its validity) another person or another cognition.

For all these reasons we conclude that Dharma is *what is indicated by the Vedic Injunction*:—and not what is indicated by anything else.

The significance of the mention (in sūtra 5) of the name '*Bādarāyaṇa*' has already been explained above.

[The Author now proceeds to answer the objections that have been urged by the Opponent against the trustworthy character of the Veda.]

It has been argued above that "Word (Injunction) cannot be the means (of knowing Dharma), as the result of the act is not found to appear at the time of its performance, and at the time that the result does appear the act is not there; consequently the word cannot be a means of right knowledge".—Our answer to this is as follows:—It would be true that Word is *not* a means of right knowledge, if there were only five such valid means (in the shape of Sense-perception, Inference, Analogy, Presumption, and Non-apprehension); every means by which a right cognition is obtained is a means of right cognition;—as a matter of fact, right cognition is obtained by means of *word* also;—therefore Word must be a means of right

knowledge,—in the same manner as Sense-perception is. If a certain thing is cognised by *one* means of cognition, it does not cease to be *cognised* if it is not cognised by another means of cognition [so that if the result of the act is cognised by means of the Vedic Word, it cannot be regarded as *not cognised* simply because that result is not cognised by other means of cognition]. Then again it is nowhere declared in the Veda that "the reward of the act is obtained merely by the performance of the act"; all that is said is that "the reward of the act is obtained".—As for the argument that "at the time when the reward does appear, it is cognised by means of *Sense-perception* and not by means of the Word",—this does not vitiate our position; because at that time Sense-perception is one means of cognising the reward, and Word also is the other means.

The opponent has cited a passage from the Veda which asserts something contrary to a fact of direct perception,—the passage which says that "the sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements proceeds straight to the heavenly regions", where it is clearly the body that is spoken of (as proceeding to Heaven; while as a matter of fact the body is burnt).—Our answer to this is that in fact that entity also to whom the body belongs is spoken of as "equipped with the sacrificial implements", by reason of the connection of those implements with the body (to which the said entity is related).—The opponent asks—"What is this other entity? We do not know of any such entity (apart from the body)".—We infer the existence of such an entity through such acts as breathing and the like; so that the entity spoken of as "equipped with the sacrificial implements" is one who carried on such activities in the body as breathing in, breathing down, breathing out, winking, and so forth.—"But it is the body itself that breathes in and breathes down."—Not so; breathing and the rest cannot belong to the same category as the properties of the body, because they do not continue to exist as long as the body lasts; as a matter of fact we find that the properties of the body, colour and the rest, continue to exist as long as the body is there; on the other hand, breathing and the rest cease to exist even while the body is there. Then again, Pleasure, Pain, and such other feelings are cognised only by the person himself, while colour and other properties belonging to the body are perceived by other persons also. [This also shows that there are certain activities of the person which belong to an entity other than the body.] From this fact of there being certain properties which differ from the properties belonging to the body, the conclusion is that the entity spoken of as 'equipped with the sacrificial implements' is other than the body.

The opponent asks—"How is it known that there is an entity other than Pleasure and other Cognitions to whom these latter belong? As a matter of fact, we do not see any form of such an entity apart from Pleasure and other Cognitions. This leads to the conclusion that the said entity is as non-existent as the Hare's Horn.—If it be asked—'To whom then do Pleasure and the rest belong?'—our answer would be that they belong to no one. It is not necessary that whatever is perceived must be related to some one else; we recognise one thing as 'related' to another only when we actually perceive the things related, as also the relation itself: When we see the moon or the

sun, we do not proceed to search the thing to which the moon or the sun belongs; in fact, we recognise that they belong to no one. From this we conclude that there is no entity apart from Pleasure and the rest to whom these latter belong.—Then again, if it be absolutely necessary to assume an entity to whom every perceived thing is related, then, in the same manner, on perceiving the *Self* (soul), we should search for another relative to whom that Self would belong;—and having found such another relative, we should search for yet another to whom this latter would belong; and so on and on there would be no end to such assumptions. If (in order to save yourself from this unending series of assumptions) you would not assume a further relative after having assumed a relative at a certain stage,—and you would stop short at that, and feel satisfied,—then you can rest content with positing the '*Vijñāna*' (Idea, Cognition) pure and simple and desist from all further asumptions."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—If there is no entity apart from the *Cognition*, then who is it that is spoken of as 'he knows'? The entity spoken of by this phrase is the nominative agent of the act of *cognising*; for the purpose of making this phrase give some sense, we should assume the existence of the *Self* distinct from the Cognition.

Says the opponent:—"Let the Divinities (Read '*devāḥ*') assume a meaning for the phrase if they regard it necessary to assume it! [It is beyond our power to do it]. As a matter of fact, there are many people upholding the existence of the Self who say 'the Self exists', who directly utter the word 'Self'; and yet even these people do not succeed in assuming the existence of the Self; how much less possible is it to assume its existence on the basis of the indirect expression 'he cognises'? Hence we conclude that the assumption of the Self is not right."

Our answer is as follows:—It is through Desire that we perceive the Self.—"How so?"—Desire appears only when the desired object is one that has been perceived before: for instance, we have no desire for those sweet fruits that grow to the North of the Meru mountains and which have never before been tasted by people like us. Nor does Desire appear in one person for an object that has been perceived by another person. And yet Desire does appear in a person for an object perceived by him on the previous day. From this we conclude that the person *desiring* and the person *perceiving* must be the same. If mere Cognition had been the *perceived* then, inasmuch as that Cognition would have disappeared on the preceding day (when the object was perceived), how could there be a *Desire* (for the same object) on the following day? If, on the other hand, there is a *cogniser* apart from the Cognition, who is everlasting, then the person *perceiving* the object on one day would be the same as the one *desiring* it on the other day. The phenomenon of Desire would be impossible otherwise.

Says the opponent:—"In regard to what do we have the idea that *it cannot be possible?* It is only in regard to what cannot be known by any means of right knowledge. Now, as a matter of fact, we do not know anything other than *Cognition* (Idea); and what we do not know we conclude to be non-existent, like the Hare's Horns. Nor is it impossible to have Cognition without that unknown something; because we actually have a direct

perception of the Cognition. That the Cognition has a momentary existence,—that too is a fact directly perceived. And yet, even though we have no *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*,—and even though the Cognition is not a lasting entity (as it has only a momentary existence),—it is not impossible for Desire to appear on the next day; because we actually perceive the Desire so appearing. Nor have we found it always to be the case that the *Cogniser* today is the same as the *Desirer* on the next day; all that we have found is that in some cases what has been *perceived* by one man is *desired* by another, while in other cases it is not so. In fact [there being nothing except an influx of series of Cognitions] what happens is that within the same series one (Cognition) desires what has been perceived by another (Cognition); but in case the two belong to two different series, one does not desire what has been perceived by another. From all this we conclude that there is no Self apart from Cognitions like Pleasure and the rest."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—It is not possible that persons who do not *remember* (i.e. have an idea of) a thing should *desire* it; nor is remembrance possible of what has not been perceived before; hence it is impossible that there should be remembrance in what is a mere momentary Cognition (Idea).

Says the opponent:—"The case of Remembrance is like that of Desire; what is called 'remembrance' is either a Cognition similar to a previous Cognition, or a Cognition having a previous Cognition as its object [and the same is the case with Desire also]. Now (such being the nature of Remembrance and Desire) even if the seer (i.e. the Cognition of the previous day) has ceased to exist on the next day, it cannot be impossible (for the Remembrance or the Desire) to appear on that day [i.e. there is nothing incongruous in the appearance of a Cognition on the second day which is similar to, or has for its object, the preceding day's Cognition]; for the simple reason that we directly perceive that this does happen. What happens is that when a Cognition has been cognised by another Cognition, it is recalled by another Cognition occurring in the same series as the former apprehending Cognition,—and not by a Cognition appearing in the series of another Cognition.—From all this we conclude that Cognitions are entirely *Void* (i.e. without any extraneous substratum in the shape of the *Self*). In support of this view we have the following Brāhmaṇa text also:—'This pure Cognition which rising out of the elemental substances (of the body, at death) enters those same substances, and there is no consciousness after death.' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4.5.13)."

Our answer to the above is that it cannot be as set forth above; as a matter of fact, it is only when one has seen a thing on one day that he has the notion (Remembrance) on the next day in the form 'I have seen it'; and this notion (of Recognition) appears only in the Self, not in anything else; as in the case of anything else, the entity that would have seen the thing on the previous day could be some one totally different (from the one recognising it on the second day). Hence it follows that there is something apart from Cognitions, and it is to this something that the term 'I' is applied.

Says the opponent:—"In several cases the term 'I' is applied figuratively to entities other than the Self,—when, for instance, a man says 'I

am the son', 'I am Devadatta', 'I am going' [where the term 'I' stands for the *body*—says the *Shlokavārtika, Ātmavāda* 108]."

Our answer to this is that we do not put forward the use of the term 'I' as a *reason* for our conclusion (that there is a Self apart from the Cognitions); what we are pointing out (as the reason) is something different from the word 'I'; what we are pointing out (as our reason) is the *recognitive notion* [The right reading is '*pratyabhijñāpratyayam*' as found in *Nyāyaratnākara*, p. 716] that we have to the effect that 'It was *we* that saw this thing on one day, and it is *we* that remember it today'; which shows that we recognise the fact that 'it is *we* that existed yesterday and it is the same *we* that exist today'; and the entities that existed yesterday and exist today also could not have ceased to exist. In support of this (view of an enduring Self) we have the Brāhmaṇa-text—Having declared that 'This same is the Self', (*Bṛhadā-Upa.*, 4. 5. 13, where the reading is slightly different), it goes on to say—'Being imperishable, it perisheth not' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4. 5. 15); and again, 'This Self is indestructible, not liable to disruption' (*Ibid.*, 4. 5. 15).—Cognition on the other hand is evanescent.—Hence we conclude that the Self (which is imperishable) must be something distinct from the Cognition which is evanescent. No one can hold the view that "things are *not* as they are found to be, they *are* as they are not found to be." For if that were so, then it would come to this that "the Hare does not exist, what does exist is the Hare's Horn"!—Nor again can the notion of 'I' be said to be an illusion; because we do not find any subsequent cognition sublative of that notion.

From all this we conclude that there *is* a Self apart from Pleasure and other cognitions. And such being the case, it is this Self that has been spoken of in the Vedic text as 'equipped with the sacrificial implements'.

Says the opponent:—"If there is a *Cogniser* distinct from the *Cognition*, then, leaving aside the Cognition, please point out the *Cogniser*—'This and such is the *Cogniser*'. You cannot point out any such Cogniser. Hence we conclude that there is no *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—As a matter of fact, the Cogniser is self-cognised, he cannot be perceived by another; how then could he be pointed out to another? Just as for instance, when a man with eyes himself sees a colour, but he cannot point it out to another who is blind,—and yet, simply because the Colour cannot be pointed out to another, it is not concluded that it does not exist;—in the same manner, a person cognises his own Self, but cannot point it out to another person, for the simple reason that (like the blind man) this other person does not possess the capacity to perceive the said Self (of the former person); and yet this other person cognises his own Self, but not the Self of other persons. So that all individual Selves cognising themselves must exist, even though none of them cognises the other Selves. In support of this we have the following Brāhmaṇa-text—'When speech ceases, what light does the Person possess? He possesses the light of the Self, O king' (Shatapatha Brā-Mādhyandina, 14. 5. 4. 11, and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, Kāṇva*, 4. 3. 9 where the reading is slightly different).—In support also of the view that one Self is not apprehended by another, we have the (Brāhmaṇa-text—'Being inapprehensible,

it is not apprehended' *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 3. 9. 25); what this means is that it is not apprehended *by another*;—'how so?'—because the Self has been spoken of as 'self-luminous' in the text 'Herein the Person is self-luminous' (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, 4. 3. 9) [which means that the Self is cognised by itself, not by another self].—"By what means then can one Self be explained to another?"—This means also has been indicated in the Brāhmaṇa-text itself—'He said that this Self is *not this, not that*' *Bṛhadā-Upa.* 4. 23;—that is to say, it cannot be asserted that 'the Self has such and such a form'; the method by which it can be indicated to another is by denying (i.e. rejecting) what the other person regards as Self; that is, if the other person regards the Body as the Self, he is taught that 'the Body is not the Self, the Self is something different from the Body',—where the teaching of the Self is done by denying the Body. Similarly the Life-breath and such other things not being the Self, the Self is taught by means of the denial of these as being something different from the Self. Similarly the Pleasure and other Cognitions of one person are inferred by another through certain signs, and by declaring that 'these are not the Self', the Self is taught as being something different from them. Lastly, that 'the Person (or Self) is not different from one who perceives himself' is also inferred from the activities of the person himself: for instance, we find that when on one day a man has left an action half-done, he tries to make up for it and complete it on the next day; and from this action it is inferred that the Person regards himself as enduring (lasting) in relation to things (like actions) that are evanescent. [Or, on the basis of the *evanescent* activities one comes to cognise the *enduring* Self.]

Further, through Analogy also this same Self is pointed out, in the words—'Just as you perceive your own Self, so on the same analogy, please understand that I also perceive the Self in the same manner.' There are several such indications through Analogy; as for instance, a man indicating his suffering to another, says—'It is *as if* I were being burnt', 'It is *as if* I were being tortured', 'It is *as if* I were being hampered.'—Thus on the ground of this self-realisation, it is concluded that there is a Person (Self) distinct from Cognition.

It has been urged by the Opponent above—"Leaving aside Cognition please point out the *Cogniser* apart from the *Cognition*."—Our answer to this is that when you leave aside the *means* itself, how can the *end* be attained without the means? The only means of knowing things is to realise that 'everything *is* as it is cognised to be'. For instance, what is 'white'?—It is that in which there is *whiteness*; i.e. that to which the term 'white' is applied.—To what is the term 'white' applied?—It is applied to that which is cognised (understood) whenever the term 'white' is uttered.—From this it will be seen that if we 'leave aside Cognition' (as suggested in your argument), we cannot indicate anything at all [as things can be indicated only as they are *cognised*].—Then again, there is no such hard and fast rule as that the *object of cognition* is cognised only when the Cognition itself is cognised; the object is actually cognised even when the Cognition is not cognised; for instance, *Cognition* is not amenable to Sense-perception, while

the *object known* is amenable to it. This we have already explained above (*Text*, p. 9, l. 15, where it is shown that the form of the *Cognition* is not the same as that of the *cognised object*].—So that if anything has to be 'left aside' (denied), *Cognition* itself might as well be left aside,—not objects. This also we have already explained (*Text*, p. 10, l. 4).

Thus we conclude that there is an everlasting Person apart from Pleasure and other cognitions.

The Opponent has quoted a text (from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*) speaking of the Cognition arising out of the elemental substances and entering the same, etc.—Our answer to this is as follows:—As a matter of fact, after this passage had been addressed by Yājñavalkya to Maitrēyī, the latter complained of the teaching, saying 'Hereby your Reverence has led me into delusion' (*Shatapatha-Brā-Mādhya*. 14. 7. 3. 14), and in meeting this complaint, Yājñavalkya, repudiating all desire to delude her, has concluded by saying—'I am not talking delusion; in reality this Self is indestructible, not liable to disruption; but It does come into contact with perishable things (like the Sense-organs, Merit, Demerit, and the like)' (*Shatapatha-Brā-Mādhya*. 14. 7. 3. 15); from the whole context it is clear that the view of the Upaniṣad is *not* that Cognition is the only entity. Thus there is a great difference [between your view that there is no Self apart from the fleeting *cognitions*, and the view adumbrated in the Upaniṣad text quoted by you and taken along with its whole context].

Lastly, the Opponent has argued that the verb 'goes' (in the text 'the Sacrificer equipped with the sacrificial implements *goes* straight to the heavenly region') is not injunctive.—The particular word may not be injunctive; but it could very well be reiterative of the injunction contained in such texts as 'Desiring heaven *one should perform sacrifices*'. So that there is nothing incongruous (in the non-injunctive character of the verb 'goes').

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *Eternality of Words.*

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WORD IS A PRODUCT (NON-ETERNAL), BECAUSE IT IS SEEN TO FOLLOW (AFTER EFFORT)",—SO SAY SOME PEOPLE.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent:—"It has been said above that the relation between the Word and its Meaning is eternal. But this is not possible,—because Word itself is not eternal. Word is often found to be destroyed, so that when it comes to be produced (uttered) again, its relation (to its meaning) cannot but be artificial (newly made). Then again, no one ever comprehends the meaning of a Word heard for the first time.—'But why should the *Word* itself be regarded as non-eternal?'—Because as a matter of fact, it is seen to follow after effort; finding that there is an invariable concomitance (between the appearance of the Word and human effort, the Word appearing only when there is human effort) we infer that the word 'is produced' by the effort.—'It may be that the effort only manifests the (already existing) Word'.—We say that it cannot be so; because there is nothing to prove that the Word existed before the said *manifestation*; and it is only what already exists—never what is non-existent—that is *manifested.*"

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"BECAUSE IT DOES NOT PERSIST."

Bhāṣya.

"When the Word is uttered, we do not find it to persist even for a moment; from which we conclude that 'it has been destroyed'.—It might be urged that 'the Word though there, is not perceived (when you feel that it is destroyed)'.—This cannot be,—because as a matter of fact, the Word is not perceived even when there are no causes of its non-perception in the shape of obstruction and the like.—Nor can it be urged that [the Word is not perceived because] it has not reached the substratum (where it could be perceived);—because its substratum is the *Ākāsha* (which is all-pervading, hence it is never possible for the Word *not* to reach its substratum); and yet it is not perceived even in our ear-cavity (to say nothing of *Ākāsha* in general)."

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO, BECAUSE OF THE TERM 'TO MAKE' (*karoti*) [BEING USED IN CONNECTION WITH WORDS]."

Bhāṣya.

"Further, in practice people make use of such expressions as 'make (*kuru*, utter) the word', 'do not make the word': and yet they do not feel that they are referring to the same word (that has been in existence)."

SŪTRA (9).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS SIMULTANEITY (OF THE PERCEPTION OF THE WORD) IN DIVERSE PLACES."

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, we hear a Word (uttered) in several places; this could not be possible if the Word were only *one* and *eternal*. Unless there is something special there can be no plurality of what is eternal; it is only in the case of (non-eternal) products, which are many, that on their being produced in several places, they come to be connected with those several places. For this reason also *Word* must be non-eternal."

SŪTRA (10).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE ARE ORIGINAL FORMS AND MODIFICATIONS."

Bhāṣya.

"In the case of such expressions as '*dadhyatra*', we find that in the original form we had 'i' (at the end of the term '*dadhi*'), and this '*i*' becomes modified into '*ya*' (by reason of its being conjoined with the following '*a*' in '*atra*');—such is the teaching (of grammarians). As a rule, whatever is liable to modification must be non-eternal. Further, there is some similarity (of sound) between '*i*' and '*ya*', which also shows that the one is the modification of the other."

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"FURTHER, THERE IS AN AUGMENTATION FOR THE WORD(-SOUND), DUE TO THE MULTIPLICITY OF ITS PRODUCERS (SPEAKERS)."

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, we find that when a Word is uttered by many persons, the sound heard is very loud. If the Word were only *manifested* (and not *produced*, by the utterance), then the sound heard would always be the same, whether it were uttered by many or fewer persons. From this we conclude that some portion of the Word is *produced* by each of the speakers, and it is by reason of the augmentation thus caused in the Word that a louder sound is heard."

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—[*Answer to Sū.* 6]—BUT THE FACT OF BEING 'SEEN' IS EQUAL IN BOTH CASES.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*', 'but', serves to reject the view set forth above.

It has been urged (under Sū. 6) that, "inasmuch as Word is seen to

appear after human effort, it must be regarded as artificial, produced".—But if, by means of clear reasons, we are able to establish the eternality of the Word, then, on the strength of this notion of eternality, the right conclusion would be that 'the Word is *manifested* (not *produced*) by human effort'; that is to say, if, before being pronounced, the Word was not manifest, it becomes manifested by the effort (of pronouncing). Thus it is found that the fact of Word being 'seen after effort' is equally compatible with both views.

SŪTRA (13).

[*Answer to Sū.* 7]—WHAT HAPPENS (WHEN THE WORD CEASES TO BE HEARD) IS THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTION OF THE EXTANT (WORD) ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-REACHING OF THE OBJECT (BY THE MANIFESTING AGENCY).

Bhāṣya.

The second reason put forward in the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "Word is destroyed (ceases to exist) as soon as it is uttered".—Here also, if we are able to clearly establish the eternality of Word, then,—if we find that the Word is perceived at one time and not perceived at another,—we shall, on the strength of the said well-established notion of eternality, assume that there must be some cause which brings about the *perception* of the Word [and the absence of which leads to the *non-perception* of the Word]. And since we find that there is perception of the Word only when there are certain *conjunctions and disjunctions* (in the shape of sound-waves), we shall conclude that these 'Conjunctions and Disjunctions' are what *manifest* (render perceptible) the Word.—It might be urged that—"In reality the Word is heard *after* the Conjunctions and Disjunctions have ceased [so that these could not be the cause of the manifestation]".—But it is not so; in fact, the 'Conjunctions and Disjunctions' do not cease,—as is clear from the fact that the Word is actually heard; all that happens is that the 'Conjunctions and Disjunctions' are *not perceptible* [that is all that you can say, you cannot say that they have ceased to exist].

Says the Opponent:—"If the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* only *manifest* the Word, and do not *produce* it,—then the Word manifested by the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* in Srughna would be heard by people in Pāṭaliputra; because the substratum of the Word (sound) is *Ākāsha* and *Ākāsha* is one only, so that the *Auditory Ākāsha* in one place would be the same as that in other places. On the other hand, according to those who regard the Word as being *produced* (and not *manifested*), the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions*, being aerial and subsisting in the air, would produce the word *in the air* itself; just as the yarns produce the cloth in the yarns themselves; and in this case it is only right that the Word is not heard in Pāṭaliputra, being produced, as it is, in the air-waves in Srughna.—The Siddhāntin might argue that—'also for one who holds that the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* manifest (not produce) the Word, the said incongruity (of the Word uttered in Srughna being heard in Pāṭaliputra) does not arise, because the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* operating in one place do not affect the ear-drum at a

distance, so that the auditory organ at a distance does not catch the word-sound that is manifested'.—But this is not so; [the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* can affect the ear-drum either by actually reaching it or without actually reaching it; as a matter of fact however, as the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* originate in the source of the Sound, it is not possible for them to actually reach the ear; the only alternative possible then, according to the Siddhāntin, is that the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* affect the ear without reaching it; now] if the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* could affect the ear without reaching it, then the ear placed near the source of the Sound would apprehend the Sound at the same time as the ear placed at a distance; as a matter of fact however, they do not hear it at the same time; hence the conclusion is that the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* do not affect the ear without reaching it. If (in order to escape from these difficulties) it be held that *the Conjunctions and Disjunctions* do not affect the ear at all, then the inevitable conclusion would be that the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* have nothing to do with the apprehension of the Word (Sound)."

[Our answer to the above is as follows]—It is not so; what happens is that the air-particles disturbed by the (sound-provoking) stroke strike against the stagnant air-particles and produce *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* (i.e. ripples) on all sides, which go on spreading as long as the momentum lasts;—the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* (ripples) are not perceived, because the Air (of which they are ripples) is imperceptible; and as for the Sound, it is heard only so long and so far as the ripples do not cease, and after they have ceased, the sound is not heard. Thus there is no incongruity at all. It is for this same reason that the Sound is heard at a greater distance when the wind is favourable.

SŪTRA (14).

[*Answer to Sū.* 8]—THE TERM REFERS TO THE USING.

Bhāṣya.

Another argument urged by the Opponent is that in practice, people make use of such expressions as '*shabdaṁ kuru*' (make the word-sound), and '*shabdam mā kārṣīḥ*' (do not make the word-sound).—But if it is beyond doubt that Word is eternal, then the meaning of these expressions would be 'make *use* of the word'; just as in the expression '*gomayān kuru*' (Make the Cowdung), the term '*kuru*' (make) means *collecting*.

SŪTRA (15).

[*Answer to Sū.* 9]—THE SIMULTANEITY IS AS IN THE CASE OF THE SUN.

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged above (under Sū. 9) that "any single entity existing at one place cannot possibly be seen simultaneously at several places".—Look at the Sun, O 'Loved of the Gods' (Fool)! Being only one he is seen as if occupying several places.—"But how is it known that there is only one Sun?"—Our answer is that Devadatta, facing the East in the morning,

sees the Sun at that time in front of himself; another man standing to the right of Devadatta does not see two suns, one straight in front of himself and another oblique to himself but straight in front of Devadatta. From this it follows that there is only one Sun.—"But in the case of the Sun, his exact location is not grasped and hence there is delusion."—In the same manner in the case of the Word also its exact location cannot be grasped.

If the Auditory Organ apprehended the Word (sound) on getting at the place where the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* are,—then it might be possible for us to apprehend the Word (sound) as occupying several points in space; as a matter of fact however, the Auditory Organ does not get at the place of the Conjunctions (and Disjunctions); it is clearly perceived that the location of the Auditory Organ is in the Ear-drum. Then again, the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* are in the Air which is imperceptible; hence when they appear in the Ear-drum, they are not perceived [and this gives rise to the illusion that the sound that is heard is at some other place, where the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* started; though in reality the sound that is heard is at the Ear-drum itself]. Thus there is no incongruity in our theory, and the idea that the Word occupies several places is illusory. Further, in reality, the locus of the Sound is *Ākāsha*; and *Ākāsha* is one only; for this reason also Sound cannot exist in several places.

Lastly, when the form of the Word is one only, if there are various places (where the Word is heard), it is the *places* that would be diverse, not the *Word* itself. For this reason there is nothing incongruous even in the view [that Word-Sound is heard in several places].

SŪTRA (16).

[*Answer to Sū.* 10]—It is a different letter, not a modification.

Bhāṣya.

The expression '*dadhyatra*' is not a case of modification of an original; in fact the (resultant) '*ya*' (in '*dhya*') is a letter totally different from the (original) '*i*' (in '*dhi*'). People going to make use of the letter '*ya*' do not take up the letter '*i*',—in the manner in which people desiring to make a *mat* take up the *reeds* [where the *reeds* are the material which become modified into the *mat*]. Merely because we perceive some similarity (between two things), one is not called either the material cause (original) or the product (modification) of the other. For instance, on seeing a lump of curd and a lump of *kunda* flowers (both of which are white), we do not regard one as the original cause and the other as its product (or modification).—Thus the objection urged by the Opponent is not applicable to our doctrine.

SŪTRA (17).

[*Answer to Sū.* 11]—The 'augmentation' spoken of is the augmentation of the noise (not of the Word).

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the Opponent that "when several people are beating a drum or pronouncing a word, the sound heard is very loud, which

shows that with each person (beating the drum or pronouncing the word) there is an augmentation of the particles of the Sound".—But as a matter of fact, it is not so; Sound has no parts, as is shown by the fact that we cannot perceive any component parts of Sound; and as it is without parts, no augmentation of it is possible. Hence there can be no augmentation of the Word (sound). What happens is that when the Word is pronounced by one man, its sound is *soft*; but when it is pronounced by several persons, those same letters (which had sounded *soft*), on account of being taken up continuously by such Conjunctions and Disjunctions (ripples) as fill all the space in the Ear-cavity, come to be heard as 'augmented', and hence as having parts. As a matter of fact, however, when the *Conjunctions and Disjunctions* continuously set up render the (same) Word manifest, they come to be called by the name 'noise'. Hence the 'augmentation' (spoken of by the Opponent) is of the *noise*, not of the *Word*.

SŪTRA (18).

[*Final Siddhānta*]—IN FACT (THE WORD) MUST BE ETERNAL; AS (ITS) UTTERANCE IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF ANOTHER.

Bhāṣya.

The Word must be eternal;—why?—'because its utterance is for the purpose of another'. The term '*darshana*' stands for *utterance*; this utterance is 'for the purpose of another', i.e. for the purpose of making known the meaning to 'another'. If the word ceased to exist as soon as uttered, then no one could speak of (make known) any thing to others; and in that case the word could not be uttered for the purpose of another. On the other hand, if the word does not cease to exist, then it is only right that on hearing the word many times, there is comprehension of its meaning.—It might be argued that—"the comprehension of the meaning (of one evanescent word) is due to its being similar to another word which had expressed a meaning (which has ceased to exist after utterance) [and the two words are not the *same* as presupposed by the Siddhāntin]."—But (according to the opponent) no word could have expressed its meaning, each word being equally new (disappearing as soon as uttered, without expressing any meaning).—"But there may be some previous individual word whose connection with the meaning might have been created [and the similarity to this word would enable the subsequent words to express that same meaning]."—This (creation of the connection of a new word with its meaning) has been already explained by us (to be impossible) [in the section on the Relation of words to Meanings under Sūtra 5—says the *Shlokavārtika*—Chap. on Eternality of Words, 255]. Further, if a cognition (of the meaning of a word) were based merely upon the similarity (of that word to a previous denotative word), then, there would always be a chance of its being mistaken and hence liable to sublation; for instance, the words '*mālā*' (garland) and '*shālā*' (house) being similar (in sound) one might derive the notion of the *garland* from the word '*shālā*' [Read '*shālā*' for '*mālā*'], and such a notion would certainly

be a mistaken one (and hence liable to sublation).—"But (this need not be so in all cases; for instance) the notion of the *animal with the dewlap* having been derived from the word '*gāvī*' (through its similarity to the word '*gauḥ*' which denotes the said animal), that notion is not sublated; the same may be true with the case in question [e.g. the notion of the *jar* may be derived from the word '*ghaṭa*' heard by a person today through its similarity to another word '*ghaṭa*' which he had heard on a previous day as denoting the jar: and certainly there would be nothing wrong in this notion and it would not be sublated]."—This is not right; in the case of the (corrupt) word '*gāvī*', the speaker really wishes to make use of the correct form '*gauḥ*' [and it is through incapacity or ignorance that he uses the corrupt form '*gavī*', so that if one understands this corrupt word as denoting the animal denoted by that correct form, that too must be due to incapacity and ignorance and hence liable to be mistaken,—says the *Shlokavārtika*, Chap. on 'Eternality of Words', 276-277]; while in the case in question [where the same form '*gāuḥ*' is repeated], there is no desire to use any other form [and the comprehension of the object denoted therefore cannot be due to similarity.]—Further, it is not possible that the single act of utterance should bring about the use of the word itself and also create its relation to its denotation. [Each time that the word '*go*' is used, if it were a new word, only *similar* to the word '*go*' used before, then it would mean that whenever the word is uttered, it produces two things: (1) the use of the new word and (2) the connection of this new word with the thing denoted by it; and this is not right.]

For these reasons, we conclude that 'its utterance being for the purpose of another, the word must be eternal'.

SŪTRA (19).

THERE IS SIMULTANEITY THROUGHOUT.

Bhāṣya.

Whenever the word '*go*' ('cow') is uttered, there is a notion of all cows simultaneously. From this it follows that the word denotes the *Class*. And it is not possible to *create* the relation of the Word to a Class; because in creating the relation, the creator would have to lay down the relation by pointing to the Class; and without actually using the word '*go*' (which he could not use before he has laid down its relation to its denotation), in what manner could he point to the distinct class denoted by the word '*go*',—seeing that the *body of the cow* (which alone could be pointed to is the receptacle of many *classes* [such as 'Earth', 'Substance', 'Being', 'Tail', and so forth—says the *Shlokavārtika*, Chap. on 'Eternality of Words', 360]? If, however, the word '*go*' is eternal, it is the same word that is uttered many times and has been previously heard also many times, as applied to other individual cows; and thus by a process of positive and negative concomitance the word comes to be recognised as denoting the particular *class*.—For this reason also, the Word must be eternal.

SŪTRA (20).

BECAUSE THERE IS NO NUMBER (IN CONNECTION WITH A WORD).

Bhāṣya.

People speak of the word '*go*' being *pronounced eight times*; they never speak of the word '*go*' itself being *eight in number*.—"What, if that is so?"—The use of such an expression shows that people *recognise* (the *same* word); [they argue as follows—] 'we recognise the word as the same,—our perceptive organs are not defective,—others also recognise the Word as the same,—like ourselves, all persons recognising the Word as the same, would be prepared to assert that the Word is not different (but the same)'.—It might be held that "though the words are actually different, yet people are deluded by their similarity and hence declare them to be one and the same word".—This is not right, the notion that people have is *not* that 'this is *similar*', but that 'this is the same as that'; and further, the idea of sameness could be called a 'delusion' only if the difference among them were clearly perceived; as a matter of fact however, the idea that 'this word *go* is other than that word *go*' is not got at by direct perception, or by any other means of right cognition.

The opponent might urge—"Cognition and Action also (which are admitted by all to be ephemeral things) are *recognised* to be the same [(*a*) the *cognition of the cow* that one has today is recognised as the same *cognition of the cow* that he had yesterday; and (*b*) the *action of walking* done today is recognised as the same *action of walking* that was done yesterday]: and so by your reasoning these two also should be eternal."

This does not affect our position; because these two are not directly perceived; if they were directly perceived, they also would be eternal. [This is an obscure passage. The *Shlokavārtika*, Chap. on Eternality of Words, provides the most satisfactory explanation in Verses 390-394:—'We do not accept mere Recognisability of the Word as proof of its Eternality; all that we mean by citing the fact of Recognition is to show that the theory of the non-eternality of words is opposed to a fact of Sense-perception (Recognition), and not that eternality is *inferred* from Recognition. So that the objection urged by the opponent,—that on the same ground of Recognition, Cognitions and Actions also should be inferred to be eternal—is not relevant.—But even to this irrelevant objection we have a suitable answer:—'It is by *Inference* that people can get at the idea of the *non-eternality* of words, whereas their *eternality* is proved by the *Perception* of Recognition; and naturally Inference is set aside by Perception; in the case of Cognitions and Actions, on the other hand, their *eternality* is only *inferred* from their *recognisability* (their *recognition* not being a fact of perception); and their *non-eternality* is proved by Inference; hence between these two there is no difference in the strength of their validity'.—Another explanation suggested is that when Cognition and Action are said to be 'not perceptible', what is meant is that they are 'not perceived' *by the Auditory Organ*. Further, only those actions are spoken of here as 'not perceptible' as belong to supersensuous things; and as regards Cognitions, that these are imperceptible has been explained under '*Shūnyavāda*.' Those actions that belong to

perceptible things are accepted by us to be eternal, like Letters and Words, on the ground of Recognition, etc., etc.]

Says the Opponent:—"The Word pronounced yesterday has ceased to exist; so that the Word pronounced today must be a different word".

Certainly the word pronounced yesterday has *not* ceased to exist; for the simple reason that we perceive it again; when people see an object, and failing to see it for a moment, see it again and recognise it to be the same as seen before, they never think that the object had ceased to exist. If they were to think so, then, on seeing their mother or wife or father a second time, they would not believe them (to be the same). Simply on not perceiving a thing people do not regard it as *non-existent*, and do not assume that it has ceased to exist. It is only when a thing is not found to be cognisable by any means of cognition that we regard it as *non-existent*. So that when there is Sense-perception available as the means of cognising a certain thing, that thing could not be regarded as *not cognisable by any means of cognition*. When again a certain thing has been unmistakably found to be *existing*, its existence cannot be denied; and so long as the thing is not actually found to be *non-existent*, the notion of its being *existent* cannot be regarded as *wrong*. Now in the case in question, the non-existence (of the word) has not been proved. Hence the notion (of the continued existence of the Word) not being *wrong*, there can be no *non-existence* (of the Word). All this is proved *seriatim*. From this it also follows that even in the case of a word not pronounced before, if people do not perceive it, they cannot assume that it has ceased to exist. For instance, when people, going out of the house, do not see all their family-members, but on returning see them again, they do not regard them as having ceased to exist before the said return. In the same manner people cannot regard the Word (heard today) to be other (than the same word heard yesterday).

Even those people who regard all things as undergoing destruction every moment, cannot say the same with regard to the Word; because in regard to other things they hold the said view because they find the things *perishing in the end*,—while in the case of the Word there is no *end*, nor is it found to *perish*.

Lastly, the notion that 'this (what I hear today) is the *same* as that (heard by me yesterday)' is got at by Perception, while the notion that 'it is *similar* to it' is got at by Inference; and no Inference can appear against Perception, nor can it establish its object.

From all this it follows that Word is eternal.

SŪTRA (21).

BECAUSE IT IS NOT DEPENDENT.

Bhāṣya.

Even in the case of things whose actual production has not been perceived, some of them are regarded as non-eternal, in whose case we find that there are causes tending to destroy them. For instance, when one sees a piece of new cloth which he has not seen being woven,—and yet on merely seeing its form, he understands that it is perishable,—seeing that it

has been produced by the conglomeration of the yarns, and as such, it must perish on the destruction of that conglomeration of the yarns, or on the destruction of the yarns themselves.—In the case of the Word, however, we do not perceive any material cause, on the destruction whereof the Word itself would be regarded as ceasing to exist.

SŪTRA (22).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO IDEA OF THE CONNECTION (OF THE WORD, WITH ANY MATERIAL CAUSE).

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* has to be construed as following upon a few words, such as the following (emanating from the Opponent)—"The Word may be the product of Air: in fact it is Air which, through certain conjunctions and disjunctions, becomes the Word. The author of the *Shikṣā* also has declared that 'Air takes the form of Word'."

[It is in answer to this that we have the Sūtra.]—It cannot be so; if the Word were the product of Air, then it could only be Air in a particular shape. As a matter of fact, however, we do not recognise any particle of Air in the constitution of the Word, in the manner in which we recognise the particles of yarn in the constitution of the Cloth. Therefore the Word cannot be a product of Air. If the Word were a product of Air, then we could perceive it with our tactile organ (as we perceive Air); and yet we do not feel by touch any air-particles in the Word. Hence Word cannot be a product of Air. Therefore it must be eternal.

SŪTRA (23).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

We also actually find a Vedic text indicating the eternality of Word—e.g. 'By means of Word which is eternal, etc.' Though this text relates to a different topic, yet it reiterates the eternality of the Word.

From all this we conclude that Word is eternal.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Expressiveness of Sentences (in the Veda).*

SŪTRA (24).

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"EVEN THOUGH THEY (WORD, ITS MEANING, AND THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWO) BE ETERNAL, THEY COULD NOT BE EXPRESSIVE OF THE VEDIC SUBJECT-MATTER (OF THE VEDIC INJUNCTION, *Dharma*); BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT EFFICIENT FOR THAT PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

[It has been established that *Words*, their meanings, and the Relation between them are inborn, eternal; but so far nothing has been said regarding *Sentences*; and as the Vedic Injunction, which is the sole means of knowing *Dharma*, is always in the form of *Sentence*,—until the same fact is established regarding *Sentences*, the validity of the Injunction as a means of knowing *Dharma* remains doubtful. Hence the Author now proceeds to deal with the nature of the *Sentence* and its meaning].

Pūrvapakṣa.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"Even though the Word, its Meaning and the Relation between the two be inborn,—i.e. eternal,—yet it cannot be true that '*Dharma* is that which is indicated by the Vedic Injunction as conducive to the highest good.' The Injunction must be a *sentence* (not a *Word*); and in the injunction 'one desiring heaven should perform the *Agnihotra*', there is not a single *Word* which expresses the idea that 'heaven results from the performance of the *Agnihotra*'; this idea is comprehended only from all the three words (*a*) '*Agnihotram*'—(*b*) '*juhuyāt*'—(*c*) '*svargakāmaḥ*', [(*c*) '*one desiring heaven*—(*b*) *should perform*—(*a*) *the Agnihotra*']; and there is no fourth word apart from the group of the said three words;—no such *group of words* however is met with in common parlance, on the basis of which usage the meaning of the group could be deduced. Every single word of the group is used (in common parlance), and the meanings of these words are eternal; but the *group* as such is never used in common parlance; hence the meaning of this *group* (not being eternal) must be either artificial (created) or illusory.

"It cannot be that the meanings of the (component) *words* themselves form the meaning of the (composite) *group* (sentence). Because (according to the *Siddhāntin* himself) the *Word* denotes the *Universal* (Class), while the *Sentence* refers to the *Particular* (Individual); and the *Universal* is something quite different from the *Particular*.—Nor would it be right to assert that 'the meaning of the *sentence* is deduced from the meaning of the (component) words'; because there is no connection between the two; and when there is no connection between them,—if it were possible that the compre-

hension of the meaning of some one word would lead to the comprehension of some totally different meaning,—then it might be (as well) possible to comprehend everything from the comprehension of one thing. No such thing however ever takes place. Hence we conclude that the meaning of the Sentence must be distinct (from the meaning of the words).

"The following might be urged by the other party—'Even from a sentence that has not been used before, and (hence) with regard to which no connection with any meaning has been established,—the comprehension of a meaning might be obtained by virtue of the nature of the sentence itself.—The *Pūrvapakṣin* might urge that in that case the Word would go against its own nature; as it is not in the nature of the *Word* that the meaning is comprehended even from an unused word; in fact people never comprehend any meaning from the *word* heard for the first time.—The answer to this would be that what is set forth here (that no meaning is comprehended from an unused word) is a characteristic of the *Word*, not of the *Sentence*; because people are actually found to comprehend the meaning of a sentence which they have heard for the first time.'

"To this the answer (of the *Pūrvapakṣin*) is as follows:—This cannot be; if people were to comprehend the meaning of a sentence heard for the first time, then all men would comprehend it,—those knowing the meanings of the component words, as also those not knowing them. As a matter of fact, however, those not knowing the meanings of the component words never comprehend the meaning of the sentence. Hence what has been urged by the other party is not possible.

"The other party retorts—'Even when the meaning of the sentence is comprehended by those knowing the meaning of the component words, the relation between the *Sentence* and its meaning must be one that is not artificial (created); and like the meaning of the *Word*, the meaning of the sentence also could be comprehended only by those who would be conversant with that (inborn) relation; just as the meaning of a word heard a second time is comprehended only by those who had heard and comprehended it before.'

"To this our (*Pūrvapakṣin's*) answer is—No; in the case of the sentence, if the last letter, along with the impressions left by the preceding letters, serves to express a meaning other than that of the *words* (composing the sentence),—then this process could not be held to be helped in any way by the knowledge of the meaning of the component words. [Read '*tadā na*' for '*tadānīm*']—From all this it follows that the cognition of the meaning of the sentence must be either artificial or illusory,—and that the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence cannot be got at through the meaning of the component words.

"The other party argues—'The process would be as follows:—The meaning of the sentence [e.g. *shuklo gauḥ*, white cow, or *kṛṣṇo'shvaḥ*, black horse] is comprehended when the word 'white' or 'black'—which denote the *particular*—happens to be near the word 'cow' or 'horse'—which denote the *universal*.'

"But this cannot be; when, as a matter of fact, the word 'cow' or 'horse', which denotes the *Universal*, brings about the notion of *all cows* or *all horses*, by direct denotation,—that notion could not be withdrawn from

any one of those cows or horses, under the influence of the *Sentence.* Nor does any such word as 'white', which denotes the *Particular*, express any such idea as 'the exclusion of the Black and others'. Nor can we assume the meaning of a word simply for the purpose of avoiding the contingency of its becoming meaningless.—Thus also the meaning of the Sentence cannot be due to the meanings of the Words; it must be artificial. Specially as sentences are only *groups of words*, and groupings of words are found to be made by man, in the form of such sentences as—'The sweet-voiced swans moving about amidst clusters of blue lotuses, appear as if dancing [read '*pranṛtyanti*' for '*praṇashyanti*'] with their bodies covered with blue silk'. From this it also follows that the Vedic Sentences also are created (not eternal, and hence not valid means of knowing *Dharma*)."

SŪTRA (25).

[*Answer to the Pūrvapakṣa arguments*]—[IN THE SENTENCE] THERE IS ONLY A PREDICATION (OR MENTION) OF WORDS WITH DEFINITE DENOTATIONS ALONG WITH A WORD DENOTING AN ACTION; AS THE MEANING (OF THE SENTENCE) IS BASED UPON THAT (i.e. THE MEANING OF THE WORDS).

Bhāṣya.

In the sentence there is a predication—or mention—of such words as are tied to their denotations—along with a word denoting an action. Hence the Sentence can never be said to have any separate meaning independently of the meanings of the words composing it;—why?—because there is no proof for it; there is no valid means of knowledge whereby we could have any cognition (of the independent meaning of sentences). Even the last letter of the sentence along with the impressions left by the previous letters has no power, independently of the meanings of the component words, to express any meaning totally different from what is expressed by those words.

Says the Opponent:—"But there *is Presumption* (of the sentence having the power to express an independent meaning): for instance, as a matter of fact, we do comprehend a meaning of the Sentence which is different from the meaning of the words; and this comprehension could not be possible unless the sentence had the requisite *power*."

This is not right; *as the meaning (of the sentence) is based upon that (i.e. the meaning of words)*. The Presumption (put forward by the Opponent) would be possible, if, in the absence of the said *Power*, there were no other basis available; as a matter of fact however, such other basis is available—what?—in the shape of the *meanings of words*. What happens is that each of the words (composing the sentence) ceases from activity after having expressed its meaning,—and the meanings of the words thus comprehended bring about the comprehension of the meaning of the *sentence* (as a whole). ——"How?"——When such words as 'white', 'black' and the like bring about the notion of the *quality* (of *whiteness*, *blackness* and the rest), they are quite capable of bringing about the notion also of the thing possessing

that quality; it is for this reason that people desiring to bring about the notion of the *thing possessing the quality* make use of only the word denoting the *quality*, and thereby their desired object is attained, and the notion of the *qualified thing* is actually brought about;—and it is this notion of the *qualified thing* that constitutes the *meaning of the sentence*. [This shows that the meaning of a *word* brings about the notion of a qualified thing; and as what is expressed by the sentence is only a qualified thing,—viz. the meanings of words as qualified by one another,—it follows that the comprehension of the meaning of the Sentence is derived from that of the meanings of words]. Such being the case, the meaning of the sentence is got at from something quite different (from the *Power of the Sentence*, posited by the *Pūrvapakṣa*). When too no actual 'Power' in the *group of words* (i.e. Sentence, apart from the component words) is perceived, who can dare to say that the presence of this Power is deducible from (presumed on the basis of) the Meaning (of the Sentence)? [As such an assumption would involve a vicious circle, Meaning depending upon Power, and Power depending upon Meaning].—Then again, whether one thing is separate or not from another is ascertained by positive and negative concomitance; and in the case in question it is found that sometimes, by reason of some mental derangement (loss of memory), the meanings of the words uttered are not comprehended; at such a time the meaning of the sentence (composed of those words) would *never* be comprehended only if the meaning of the sentence were not entirely separate from the meaning of the Words;—as a matter of fact, it is found that under the said circumstances, the meaning of the sentence is *never* comprehended. [It follows therefore that the meaning of the sentence is *not* entirely separate from the meaning of the component words].—[Some people might argue that in the case cited, when the meaning of the words is not comprehended by reason of some mental derangement, the sentence also is not perceived; so that the non-comprehension of the meaning of the sentence is due to the non-perception of the Sentence itself, and not to the non-comprehension of the meanings of the words. The answer to this is that] even in a case where the word 'white' is not uttered, if one happens to have some idea of 'whiteness', he has also the idea of the thing possessed of the quality of *whiteness* [so that the idea of the *qualified thing* follows from the idea of the *quality*; in the same manner the conception of the meaning of the sentence, which consists of the conception of the meanings of the words qualifying one another, follows from the conception of the meanings of the words; for instance, when we see a white animal running at a distance and hear its neighing, and we have some notion of *white horse* and *running*,—there follows the notion '*the white horse is running*', which is the meaning of the sentence 'the white horse is running', even though no such sentence has been uttered. If the *non-perception of the sentence* were the cause of the *non-comprehension of the meaning of the sentence*, then in the case cited, there could be no comprehension of the meaning of the sentence; as the sentence, not being uttered, has not been perceived].—From all this it follows that the meaning of the sentence is comprehended only on the comprehension of the meanings of the component words; and it has no connection with (and does

not follow from) the *group of words* (Sentence, as something distinct from the Words).

It has been argued above (*Text*, p. 33, l. 17) that "the direct denotation of the *word* (including all individuals) could not be withdrawn from any particular individuals simply in consideration of the sentence: [e.g. when the word 'Cow' denotes all cows, there can be no justification for restricting its denotation to any particular cow only because the word happens to appear in the sentence 'the white cow goes'.]—True, this is so. But we admit the qualified (restricted) denotation of the words as forming *the meaning of the sentence*, only where we find that the meaning of the Word as used by itself serves no purpose and hence becomes useless,—and not in all cases;—our idea being that (if it can serve no useful purpose as the isolated meaning of the word) it may serve some purpose by being taken as the qualified meaning of the sentence.

This same reasoning also sets aside the other objection that "the Word ('white') does not denote *the exclusion of other qualities*" (see *Text*, p. 33, l. 18). [That is, we can take the word as denoting the *exclusion of other qualities* if we find that, if not so taken, it becomes useless.]

Further, the Accusative and other case-endings appearing at the end of a noun clearly indicate the rule that the denotation of the noun qualifies (and restricts) the signification of those endings; and this particular rule (that the Accusative ending appearing along with the word '*gām*' signifies the *objective character as restricted to the cow*) would set aside the general rule (that the Accusative ending signifies the *objective character* in general).

Lastly, it has been urged (*Text*, p. 33, l. 21) that "groups of words (sentences) are found to be composed by human beings".—This has been refuted by us by such arguments as that people have no remembrance [idea of any human beings as the composers of Vedic sentences] (see *Text*, p. 15, l. 23). Further, we do not find among human beings any such capacity as would enable them to compose sentences on such (supersensuous) subjects (as Sacrifice, Heaven and the like).

SŪTRA (26).

IN REGARD TO THE ORDINARY (WORLDLY) THINGS,—INASMUCH AS THERE IS CONTACT (OF THE THING WITH THE ORGANS OF PERCEPTION),—IT IS POSSIBLE FOR SENTENCES TO BE ACTUALLY COMPOSED IN USAGE.

Bhāṣya.

[It has been shown that it is not possible for human beings to compose sentences dealing with supersensuous things.] In regard to the things of the world, it is possible (for men), after having actually perceived the things, to compose sentences speaking of these things,—such as 'the swans roaming among the clusters of blue lotuses, etc.' (quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*).

From all that has gone above we conclude that the connected idea that *Heaven is attained by performing the Agnihotra* is obtained out of just those

meanings (ideas) that are severally expressed by the words (*a*) '*Svarga-kāmaḥ*' (Desiring Heaven), (*b*) '*juhuyāt*' (one should offer), and (*c*) '*Agnihotram*' (the Agnihotra sacrifice);—the comprehension of the meanings of words being derived from *Words*, and the meaning of the Sentence being derived from the meanings of the component words.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The Veda is not the work of any Person.*

SŪTRA (27).

[*Pūrvapakṣa*]—"SOME PEOPLE REGARD THE VEDAS TO BE MODERN, BECAUSE THEY ARE NAMED AFTER PERSONS."

Bhāṣya.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*:—"It has been declared above that 'Dharma is that which is indicated by the Vedic Injunction as conducive to the highest good', because relation between Words and their meanings is not created by man. Our objections regarding Words and Sentences have been answered (by the *Siddhāntin*). We are now going to attack the *Siddhānta* doctrine from another standpoint: What we say now is that the Vedic Injunctions themselves are the work of human beings; that is, the Vedas belong to recent times, being composed in modern days: and as the Injunctions are all contained in the Vedas,—if the Vedas are the work of human authors, the Injunctions also must doubtless be the work of human authors.—The *Siddhāntin* may ask—'On what grounds do some people regard the Vedas as composed (by man)?'—The answer is—*Because they are named after persons*; as a matter of fact, we find that the Vedas are named after certain men,—being named as '*Kāṭhaka*' (composed by Kaṭhaka), '*Kālāpaka*' (composed by *Kalāpaka*), '*Paippalāda*' (composed by *Pippalāda*), '*Mauhula*' (composed by *Muhula*), and so forth. Such naming would not be possible unless the texts had some connection (with the persons whose name they bear); and the man can have no connection with a text except that he is the author and the text is his work.—'But the name might be due to the text having been *expounded* (not composed, by the person).'—That cannot be, we reply; the qualification of a thing is always such as is peculiar to that thing itself; and it is only the *author* that can be one only for a text, the expounders might be many [so that the distinguishing name could not be based upon those *expounding* it; as in that case there would be no reason for the text being named after any *one* of the expounders].—From all this we conclude that there must have been an author of the Vedic Injunctions, even though we do not remember (have no idea of) him. And therefore 'the *Dharma* indicated by the Vedic Injunction' cannot be accepted as authoritative."

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND EPHEMERAL THINGS (MENTIONED IN THE VEDA)".

Bhāṣya.

"In the Veda we find several such things spoken of as are prone to birth and death; for instance, we find such sentences as—'Babara, the son of Pravāhaṇa, desired,' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 7.1.20), 'Kusuruvinda, the son of Uddā-

laka, desired '(*Taitti. Saṁ.* 7. 2. 2), and so forth. Now the 'son of Uddālaka' must be *born* of Uddālaka; and if so, the text speaking of him could not have existed before his birth. In this way also, the non-eternality (of the Veda) becomes established."

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THERE IS AN UNBROKEN CONTINUITY OF THE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

We have already explained that (under *Sū.* 5) there is an unbroken tradition of the text among the students of the Veda [which proves that the Veda is eternal]; all that we have to do here is to answer the objections (urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*); and this we are going to do in the following *Sūtras*.

SŪTRA (30).

THE NAME IS DUE TO EXPOUNDING.

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that such names of Vedic texts as '*Kāṭhaka*' and the like must be indicative of the *author*.—Our answer to this is as follows:—No such presumption (of the author) is justifiable; as people might call a text by the name of one who is not the author at all; it is possible that all that Kaṭha and other persons (whose names are applied to certain Vedic texts) have done is such superior *expounding* of the text as has not been done by any one else; and there are people who call texts by the names of such exceptional expounders. Then again, we are told that, while Vaishanpāyana was a student of all the Vedic texts (of the *Yajurveda*), Kaṭha taught only the one particular Recensional text (which is named after him), and among the many students of several Recensions, if any one man concentrates upon a single Recension and does not study any other Recension, he becomes an expert in that Recension, and as such it is only natural that he should be specially connected with that Recension which may be distinguished (from other texts) by its connection with him. [So that the name of the text does not necessarily indicate an author.]

SŪTRA (31).

IN REALITY, THERE IS ONLY A SIMILARITY OF SOUNDS.

Bhāṣya.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* has cited the term '*prāvāhaṇi*' (as a proper name occurring in the Veda, and hence proving that the Veda came after that person).—But this is not right. We do not know of any person of the name of '*Pravāhaṇa*',—hence the term '*prāvāhaṇi*' cannot mean 'the son of *Pravāhaṇa*'; in fact the prefix '*pra*' is well-known as signifying *excellence*, and the root '*vaha*' as signifying the *act of carrying*; and we do not know of the combination of these two (*pra-vahaṇa*) as forming any common well-known word;—as regards the 'i' (in the term '*prāvāhaṇi*'), it is known as

signifying 'progeny' as well as 'agent of an action';—so that the term '*prāvāhaṇi*' signifies 'one who carries things in an excellent manner' [and it cannot mean 'the son of *Pravāhaṇa*', as we do not know of any person of the name of '*Pravāhaṇa*'].—As for the term '*babara*', it is only a word imitative of sound (produced by the blowing wind).—Thus the two words ('*prāvāhaṇi*' and '*babara*') only express the everlasting thing (the *blowing wind*).—It is this that is meant by the words of the Sūtra—'*There is only a similarity of sounds.*'

SŪTRA (32).

ON ACCOUNT OF PASSAGES BEING CORRELATED TO ACTIONS, THE PASSAGES IN QUESTION WOULD BE OF USE IN REGARD TO AN ACT.

Bhāṣya.

Asks the Opponent—"How do you know that all this (Veda) is not like the utterance of lunatics and children? As a matter of fact, we find in it such sentences as 'Trees sat at the sacrificial session', 'Serpents sat at the sacrificial session', 'The old bull sings maddening songs'. Now, how could the 'old bull' sing? How too could 'trees' or 'serpents' sit at sacrifices?"

The answer to this is as follows:—As a rule we find the sentences occurring in the Veda laid down as mutually connected.—"How so?"—Having stated the word '*Jyotiṣṭomaḥ*', the term 'should be performed' is added;—then the question arising as to the means of the performance—'by what is it to be performed?'—the term 'by means of the *Soma*' is added;—then arises the question, 'for what purpose?';—and in answer there is the term 'for the purpose of attaining heaven';—then comes the question, 'in what manner?'—and the answer is 'thus, by this process'. Thus seeing that the entire passage affords an idea which is the sum total of what is expressed by each of the terms described above,—how could we say that it is like the utterance of a lunatic or a child?

"But the statement that we find to the effect that 'Trees sat at the sacrificial session' is clearly absurd."

It is not absurd. In the first place, even if this particular statement were absurd, that would not make all other statements—such as 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Agnihotra*'—absurd.—But in reality, even such statements as 'Trees sat at the sacrificial session' are not absurd. They serve to eulogise the sacrificial session; the sense being, 'even such inanimate things as trees performed this sacrifice, what to say of learned Brāhmaṇas?' Just as in common parlance we say 'At evening-time even animals do not graze, what to say of learned Brāhmaṇas?'—Further, the teaching in the Veda being found irreproachable, wholesome and definite, how could it ever be suspected to be like the utterance of lunatics and children?

For these reasons, it becomes established that '*Dharma is what is indicated by Vedic Injunctions as conducive to the highest good*'.

Thus ends Pāda I of Adhyāya I,

the Tarkapāda.

PĀDA II.

Authority of the Arthavāda.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Authority of Arthavāda Passages in general.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE PURPOSE OF THE VEDA LYING IN THE ENJOINING OF ACTIONS, THOSE PARTS OF THE VEDA WHICH DO NOT SERVE THAT PURPOSE ARE USELESS; IN THESE THEREFORE THE VEDA IS DECLARED TO BE NON-ETERNAL (UNRELIABLE)."

Bhāṣya.

[Having established the authoritative character of the Veda, the Author now proceeds to explain the usefulness, with regard to *Dharma*, of the whole Veda, consisting of *Vidhi* (Injunction), *Arthavāda* (Valedictory Passages), *Mantras* and Names, each of these being considered separately with reference to its own specific use.—The use of *Vidhi*, Injunction, has been discussed fully in the preceding *Pāda*, where it has been shown that it is the only means of knowing *Dharma*. The present *Sūtra* starts the consideration of the *Arthavāda* or Valedictory Passages.]

The propounders of the scripture read (in the Veda) such passages as—(*a*) 'He wept (*arodīt*);—because he wept, *Rudra* came to be called *Rudra*' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 1-51), (*b*) 'Prajāpati cut out his own fat' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 2. 1. 1), (*c*) 'The deities, on coming to the sacrificial ground, did not know the directions' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 6. 1. 5).—In connection with these, the question arises—Do these bring about the knowledge of any *Dharma* or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is stated as follows:—

"The propounders of the scripture quote texts only for the purpose of explaining in what manner an act is to be performed. Such being the case, if there are passages which do not indicate an act to be done, or some detail connected with the act, and which speak of only past events,—such for instance as 'Rudra wept', 'Prajāpati cut out the fat', 'the deities did not know the directions' and so forth,—of what *Dharma* could these bring about a knowledge?—It might be said that 'some suitable meaning (tending to indicate an act to be done) might be got out of even such passages, by the several methods of indirect interpretation,—such as (*a*) supplying of ellipsis, (*b*) changing the forms of words, (*c*) connecting what is disconnected, (*d*) disconnecting what is connected, and (*e*) imputing a figurative meaning. [Examples of these methods are given in the *Shlokavārtika*, *Sūtra* 1, verses 54-58]'.—Even if such a meaning could be assumed, what is the definite meaning that could be actually assumed? It could only be the following:—(*a*) 'Rudra wept, therefore other people also should weep', (*b*) 'Prajāpati cut out his fat, therefore other people also should cut out their fat', (*c*) 'At the time

of the sacrifice, the deities did not know the directions, therefore other people also should not know the directions.'—But none of these acts could be done: for instance, (*a*) when a man sheds tears either on account of separation from a loved person or by reason of being hurt, that action is called 'weeping'; and certainly no one does this act voluntarily;—(*b*) nor can any one cut out his own fat, offer it into the fire, and with the hornless animal rising out of it, perform a sacrifice;—(*c*) nor could people be voluntarily bewildered regarding the directions at the time of a sacrificial performance.—For these reasons we conclude that all these passages must be useless.—And because they are '*useless*,' therefore they are described as '*non-eternal*'; which means that 'though (being contained in the Veda) they are eternal, yet they do not serve any eternal (lasting) purpose'.—This attack is aimed at a few of the sentences (in the Veda, i.e only *Arthavādas*), not against the entire body of Vedic texts.—'But if a portion of a number of mutually related words is rejected, they become defective and as such unable to serve their purpose; consequently the rejection of a part must mean the rejection of the whole'.—Not so; there are certain groups of words (sentences) which are capable of enjoining a certain act, even without any *Arthavādas* (Valedictory Passages); it is only such sentences as by reason of being connected with the Valedictory Passages, enjoin something quite different, that become rejected by the rejection of those Valedictory Passages".

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS CONTRADICTION OF THE SCRIPTURES AND OF DIRECTLY PERCEIVED FACTS."

Bhāṣya.

"There are such passages in the Veda as—(*a*) 'The Mind is a thief', 'Speech is a liar' and so forth. These passages, containing mere descriptions of accomplished things, cannot serve as the means of knowing *Dharma*.—Even if some indirect meaning could be assumed by the indirect methods of interpretation, the only injunction of actions that could be derived from these would be—(*a*) that 'one should commit theft', and that (*b*) 'one should tell lies'; and the acts thus enjoined cannot be performed without transgressing the prohibitions of *stealing* and of *telling lies*. Nor could the two (Stealing and Not-stealing, or Lying and Not-lying) be taken as optional alternatives; as the two do not stand on the same footing: in the case of one (i.e. *Stealing*) the injunction is assumed (on the basis of the Arthavāda 'the mind is a thief'), while in that of the other (*Not-stealing*), we have the direct injunction ('thou shalt not steal').

"Then again, there is contradiction of directly perceived facts also: For example—'During the day, it is only the smoke of the fire that is seen, not its flame, and during the night only the flame of the fire is seen, not the smoke' (*Taitti. Brā.* 2. 1. 2); and in support of this statement we have the further assertion—'The Fire going forth from this World enters the Sun, and during the night the Sun enters the Fire'.—Both these statements (of fire entering the Sun and the Sun entering the Fire) are contrary to perceptible

facts; and hence cannot prove the aforesaid restrictive assertion (that 'it is *the smoke alone*' or '*the-flame alone*' that is seen).

"Another example of the contradiction of perceptible facts we have in the passage—'We know not whether we are Brāhmaṇas or Non-Brāhmaṇas' (*Gopatha-Brāhmaṇa* 5. 21). In the first place this sentence, not laying down anything in regard to any *action*, is useless. Secondly, if it actually means that 'we do not know whether we are Brāhmaṇas or Non-Brāhmaṇas', then it is contrary to a perceptible fact, and as such cannot be true.

"An example of the contradiction of what is stated in the *scriptures* we have in the passage—'Who knows whether one lives in the other world or not' (*Taittiriya-Saṁhitā* 7. 2. 2; 6. 1. 1).—If it is a mere question, then, serving no purpose regarding any act, it is useless. If it expresses a real uncertainty, then it is contrary to what is declared in the Scriptures (regarding men going, after death, to regions other than the Earth). And thus being contrary to well-ascertained facts, the statement cannot be true."

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF RESULTS."

Bhāṣya.

"With reference to the *Gargatrirātra Brāhmaṇa*, it is said 'If one knows this, his face shines' (*Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa* 20. 16. 6). If this is a mere statement of an accomplished fact, then it has no value. If it describes the result following from the reading of the particular text, then it is a description of what does not exist (is not true).—'But the result may come at some future time'.—There is no evidence for this.—'The statement may be taken as an Injunction (of the result)'.—But the sentence is not capable of being taken as an Injunction; and further, it is going to be considered later on, under the *Sūtra* '*Dravyasaṁskārakarmasu, etc.*' (4. 3. 1), whether such passages as the one under consideration are Injunctions of results or *Arthavāda* [and the conclusion arrived at there is going to be that they are *Arthavāda*]. In the present context all that we have to consider is whether the passage is a mere description of an established fact, or it lays down something helpful to an Action [and we have seen that as a description it is untrue, and it does not lay down anything in connection with any Action].

Another example of the same kind is the passage—'If a man knows this, an extremely wealthy child is born among his progeny'.

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"BECAUSE OF THE USELESSNESS OF OTHER (ACTS)."

Bhāṣya.

"There are the following three texts—(1) 'By pouring the Final Oblation one fulfils all desires' (*Taitti. Brā.* 3. 8. 10); (2) 'One who performs the *Pashubandha* sacrifice wins all regions'; (3) 'He passes beyond death, he passes beyond the sin of Brāhmaṇa-slaughter, who performs the *Ashvamedha*

sacrifices, as also one who knows this'.—Now if these are mere descriptions of established facts, then they are useless. If they lay down the actual results following from the acts mentioned, then there is no use for any other acts. For instance, (a) until the Final Oblation has been already poured into the Fire, the *Agnihotra* and other acts are not completed [so that if all desires were to be fulfilled by the pouring of the Final Oblation, then there would be no need for performing the *Agnihotra* or any other act];—(b) similarly, until the *Agniṣomiya* (which is a kind of *Pashubandha*) has been performed, the Soma-sacrifice is not completed [so that if *all regions* including heaven were actually won by the performance of the *Pashubandha*, there would be no need for the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, for the purpose of attaining heaven];—(c) similarly, until they have read the section dealing with the *Ashvamedha*, people do not perform the *Ashvamedha* Sacrifice [so that if immortality and freedom from sins were already attained by the mere *knowledge* of the *Ashvamedha*, there would be no need for performing the sacrifice]. So that the case of all this should be like the case where men seeking for honey would never leave the honey found on the *Arka*-plant growing on the way and proceed further on to the mountain. To this end there is the popular saying—'If honey can be found on the *Arka* plant, wherefore should one go to the mountain? which wise man would go on working after the desired object has been attained?'

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE PROHIBITING OF WHAT CANNOT BE PROHIBITED."

Bhāṣya.

"Such passages as 'The Fire shall not be kindled on the Earth, nor in the Sky, nor in Heaven' (*Taitti. Saṁhitā* 5. 2. 7) prohibits things which are incapable of being prohibited. For instance, it is already known (without the help of the text) that fire cannot be kindled in the *Sky* or in *Heaven*; as for the kindling of fire on the *Earth*, if a sentence were to prohibit that, it would mean the prohibition of all kindling (of fire).—If we take the statement as not true, then these incongruities do not arise. In fact, how can that be true (a valid means of knowledge) which perturbs (goes against) another Injunction, (that of *fire-kindling* for instance), and is itself confounded (as prohibiting the Kindling in the *Sky*); in the case in question, the prohibition that 'fire shall not be kindled' would go directly against the injunction that 'fire shall be kindled after placing a piece of gold on the ground' (*Ibid.*).

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF NON-ETERNAL THINGS."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the authoritative character of the Veda, the objection that there is mention of non-eternal things in the Veda has been answered

by the declaration that 'it is merely a similarity of sounds' (Sū. 1. 1. 21).—The same objection is raised here again in support of the attack upon some parts of the Veda—on the basis of the mention in the Veda, of such apparently ephemeral things as '*Babara*, the son of *Pravāhaṇa*, desired' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 7. 1. 10).

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BEING CONSTRUED ALONG WITH INJUNCTION, THEY WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF COMMENDING THOSE INJUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

[The Bhāṣya proceeds with the *Siddhānta*, in connection with a passage distinct from all those that have been cited by the opponent; the reason for this has been thus explained in the *Tantravārtika*: As regards the passages cited by the opponent, even in their literal significations they are open to doubt; consequently to begin with them would entail the additional initial effort of proving those to be true and then showing their bearing upon an Injunction; and inasmuch as this initial effort would be of no consequence regarding the connection of *Arthavāda* passages with Injunctions,—which is the real subject-matter of the present context,—the *Bhāṣya* has cited a passage which, in its literal signification, is universally recognised to be true; whereby it becomes easier to explain that such passages are glorifications, to be taken along with Injunctive passages, and as such help in the knowledge of *Dharma*; and to facilitate the matter further, the *Bhāṣya* cites a passage which is instantly recognised as one to be taken along with, and forming part of, a direct Injunction.]

The following text is found in the Veda—'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal *Shveta* dedicated te Vāyu;—Vāyu is the eftest deity;. . . .he leads the man to prosperity' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 2. 1. 1). Though the sentence 'Vāyu is the eftest deity' does not indicate any *action* (to be done), or anything connected with an action, yet it becomes a valid means of knowledge by being construed with an injunctive sentence; in the entire passage quoted, the sentence ending with '*bhūtikāmaḥ*'—i.e. the sentence 'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal dedicated to *Vāyu*',—is injunctive; and it is with this injunctive sentence, that the sentence in question—'Vāyu is the eftest deity'—is construed.—"But how can there be any syntactical connection between the two sentences?"—There is syntactical connection between the Injunction and the eulogy, because the words (of the two sentences) are interdependent; the construction being—'One desiring prosperity should sacrifice,—why?—because Vāyu is the eftest deity'. [With a view to avoid the need of the sentence eulogising *Vāyu*] the injunctive sentence may be sought to be construed in the following way—'The man desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal,—why should he sacrifice it?—because prosperity results from the sacrifice'.—But this construction will not be acceptable if the two concepts ('sacrifice' and 'results') are totally distinct, and hence if both were predicated, there would be a syntactical split.

It may be asked—"Why should there be commendation (of the enjoined act)?"—There is commendation for the purpose of making the Act attractive and hence performed.—"Even without the commendatory sentence,

the performance of the Act would be secured by the force of the injunction itself, ending with the term '*bhūtikāmaḥ*', so that the commendatory sentence is absolutely *useless*".—Not so; as a matter of fact, if there were no commendatory words, then the enjoining would be accomplished by the preceding sentence (ending with '*bhūtikāmaḥ*', i.e. only the sentence 'one desiring prosperity should sacrifice the animal dedicated to Vāyu'); but when the commendatory sentence is there, then the enjoining of the sacrifice for the man desiring prosperity would not be accomplished (without the help of the eulogy). For instance, when we have the simple sentence '*Paṭo bhavati*', it expresses the sense that *the cloth is produced*, as the two words forming the sentence are complete by themselves and do not need any other factor: but when along with the same two words we find the third word '*raktam*' (red), then we get the further sense that *there is connection with colour*; and in this case the first two words do stand in need of being construed with the word '*raktam*' (which otherwise would be wholly unconnected and hence meaningless). In the same manner, if there were no commendatory words, then the necessary persuasion (needed by the Injunction) would be done by the Injunctive word itself. But when there is a commendatory word, the persuasion is done by the praising.—"But even so, why should we have the commendatory word at all? When (as you say) its presence makes the Injunction lose its injunctive force, it had better not be there; specially as if it were not there, the necessary persuasion would be done by the preceding Injunctive sentence itself".—True; even without the commendatory word, the persuasion could be accomplished; but the commendatory word *is* there; and when it is there, the sense that is expressed by it is the *commending* (of the Act); and this *commending* is the purpose served by both the sentences [the injunctive and the commendatory sentences. The object commended, i.e. the Act, is indicated by the Injunctive sentence,—no commending is possible without any indication of what is commended,—so the Injunctive sentence also, in this way, serves the purpose of commending.—*Tantravārtika*, Trans. p. 37]. It is only when the commendatory Word is not there that the persuasion may be regarded as being done by the Injunctive sentence (which involves a highly complicated process).—"Even when the commendatory words are there, inasmuch as the preceding sentence has the clearly injunctive form, the injunction would be naturally regarded as expressed by that sentence, and there would be no need felt for connecting that sentence with the commendatory words. It might be argued that—'in this way, the commendatory words would be meaningless and incomplete';—our answer to this would be that, yes, they would be meaningless; let them be so."

So long as the Words afford good sense, they cannot be regarded as meaningless. As a matter of fact, the injunctive sentence is capable, independently by itself, of enjoining its object, and it is also capable of being construed along with the commendatory words. And in the case in question, the fact that it can be so construed is clearly manifest. For this reason we take the commendatory words as containing the commendation of what is enjoined by the Injunction ['*asmāt*', from the commendatory text in question; '*vidhēḥ*', of what is enjoined].

"We could deduce the injunction from the injunctive sentence independently by itself."

That may be so; if that is so, there is nothing incongruous in it. But when the connection of the commendatory words is there, the desired Injunction cannot be expressed (by the Injunctive sentence, independently by itself). Every Sentence indicates a relationship; if then, the Injunctive sentence were to indicate two relationships—such as,—(1) 'one desiring prosperity, should sacrifice', and (2) 'by sacrificing, such and such good things would be accomplished',—then there would be a syntactical split.

It has been argued above (*Text*, p. 39, l. 9) that—"the sentence in question ('*Vāyu* is the eftest deity') does not express an act, nor anything connected with an act [and hence it is useless]."—The answer to this given by the Sūtra is that the eulogistic passages '*would serve the purpose of commending the Injunctions*'; that is, the commendatory words, eulogising the Act (enjoined), persuade the performers and thus help the Act itself. In this same manner all such (commendatory) words eulogise something and thereby help its being enjoined.

From all this we conclude that such sentences as '*Vāyu* is the eftest deity' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 2. 1. 1. 1) are useful as means of right knowledge (of *Dharma*).

SŪTRA (8).

AND THE CONNECTION OF LONG-ESTABLISHED TRADITION ALSO IS EQUALLY PRESENT (IN THE INJUNCTIVE AND THE COMMENDATORY WORDS).

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent might argue as follows:—"Even before the Commendatory Words appear, the Injunctive Words, having the injunctive form, accomplish, independently, by themselves, the enjoining (of the act to be enjoined); and the presence of the Commendatory Words must be regarded (and rejected) as a wrong reading of the text".

It is not so; because they give very good sense; and also because '*the connection of long-established tradition is equally present*'; that is, all those characteristics that go to establish the 'tradition' are present equally in the Injunctive and the Commendatory Words;—such characteristics being—(*a*) 'the text should be read on certain days, and should not be read on certain days', (*b*) 'the text must be learnt from the mouth of the Teacher', (*c*) 'the rights and duties of the Teacher and the Pupil are such and such', and so forth; all which are equally observed for the unimpeded study of all Vedic texts.—And further, there is a firm remembrance (of the entire Vedic text consisting of the Injunctive and the Commendatory Words).—For these reasons, the presence of the Commendatory Words cannot be regarded as 'wrong (or mistaken) reading.'

SŪTRA (9).

THE INCONGRUITY (URGED BY THE OPPONENT) IS NOT APPLICABLE (TO THE SIDDHĀNTA); BECAUSE THE INCONGRUITY COULD BE THERE ONLY IF AN ACTION WERE INDICATED (BY THE COMMENDATORY WORDS); AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER, WHAT THESE WORDS INDICATE IS NOT AN ACTION. HENCE IT IS ALL RIGHT.

Bhāṣya.

The incongruity has been urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin* under Sūtra 2) to the effect that "there is contradiction of the scriptures and of directly perceived facts" and so forth.—But as a matter of fact, this incongruity is not applicable to the sentences '*He wept*, etc.,' and the rest (which have been cited by the *Pūrvapakṣin*,);—why?—because there would have been 'contradiction' (or incongruity) if the sentences had indicated (or enjoined) the *action* of 'stealing' and so forth; as a matter of fact, however, what the words indicate is not an *action*. Hence all these texts—'The mind is a thief', 'The speech is a liar'—are all right (not incongruous).

SŪTRA (10).

THEN THERE IS INDIRECT APPLICATION (FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION).

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent:—"It has been asserted (by the *Siddhāntin*, Text, p. 43, l. 7) that the commendation serves the purpose of recommending the enjoined act. But how will this be possible in a case where what is commended is totally different from what is enjoined? For instance, we find the injunction laying down that 'Fire is to be removed by a branch of the *Vetasa* or by *Moss*' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 5. 4. 4) where the things enjoined are the *Vetasa* and the *Moss*; while what is commended in the connected commendatory sentence—'Water is calm' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 5. 4. 4)—is *Water*. [Certainly the praise of *Water* does not recommend the use of the *Vetasa* or the *Moss*.]"

The answer to this is that '*there is indirect application*'. It is an indirect or figurative way of saying things when, for the purpose of eulogising a certain thing, we praise another thing related to it. In the case in question, *Water* is the origin of the *Vetasa* and *Moss*; these grow out of Water; and by the praise of the *origin*, the thing growing out of that origin becomes praised; for instance, Devadatta born in the *Ashmaka* country regards himself as praised when the *Ashmaka* country is praised. The same should be understood to be the case with the sentence in question (dealing with *Vetasa*—*Moss* and *Water*).

The Opponent asks—"To what Injunction is the commendatory sentence '*He wept*' auxiliary?"

It is auxiliary to (and to be taken along with) the Injunction that 'Silver shall not be given on the *Barhis*' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 1. 5. 1. 2).—"How

so?"—Because of the mutual requirements of the words of the two texts: For instance, first of all we have the sentence '*He* wept, and the fact that he wept makes Rudra *rudra*' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 1. 5. 1),—and here the pronoun '*he*' requires (refers to) some subject spoken of in the context, as such is the signification of the pronoun '*tat*' (of which '*saḥ*', 'he', is the nominative form); next follows the sentence '*his* tears that flowed became silver', where also the pronoun '*tasya*', 'his', refers to the same aforesaid subject;—[thus the idea expressed by the two sentences taken together is that 'The tears that flowed when Rudra wept became silver'].—Now this idea supplies the justification for the Prohibitive Injunction that 'silver should not be given on the *Barhiṣ*',—this justification being that, 'if one gave silver at the sacrifice, then before a year passes, there shall be weeping in his house', (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 1. 5. 1. 2)—and for this reason 'one shall not give silver on the *Barhiṣ*'. Thus it is found that all the words of the two texts are mutually complementary.—"But in what manner do the words of the deprecatory text help the Injunction?"—They do it by 'indirect implication' (of excellence); the sense being that 'silver being produced from tears turns into tears for one who gives silver', and hence it constitutes the *excellence* of the Prohibitive Injunction that one who obeys it (and does not give silver) is saved from the *weeping*.

"(*a*) But when there was no real *weeping*, how can it be said that 'he wept'? (*b*) How too can the silver be spoken of as produced from tears, when, as a matter of fact, it is *not* produced from tears? (*c*) Lastly, when we actually find that there is no weeping in the house 'before a year passes', how can it be asserted that 'there is weeping'?"

The answer to this is that—'*There is indirect application*'; that is, all these words are used in the *indirect* (figurative) sense. (*a*) It is said that 'Rudra wept', because the name '*rudra*' is derived from the root '*rud*, to weep';—(*b*) even though silver is not produced from tears, the speaker, wishing to decry it, describes it as produced from tears, on the basis of its having the same colour (*white*) as tears;—(*c*) again, it is with a view to decrying silver that the speaker asserts that 'there is weeping in the house before the year passes', on the basis of the fact that the giving away of wealth (and silver is a form of wealth) causes pain.

Similarly, there is the Injunction —'If one desires offspring or cattle, he should sacrifice the hornless goat dedicated to Prajāpati' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 2. 1. 1. 4, 5); and as this Injunction requires supplementing, we have the following passage as its auxiliary—'Prajāpati cut out his own fat' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 2. 1. 1. 4).—"What is the *indirect implication* here"?—It is this: 'There were no cattle at the time when Prajāpati cut out his fat; but such was the force of the act (of cutting the fat and offering it) that as soon as the fat was thrown into the fire, a hornless goat rose out of it;—thus it is that by sacrificing the hornless goat one acquires many cattle'.—"When in reality, Prajāpati never cut out his fat, how was it stated that he did it?" —The answer to this is that the mention of an event that never happened serves the purpose of eulogising (the act), because it is clear that some *praising* is meant. Whenever an event is mentioned, it produces two effects—(1) a knowledge of the event itself and (2) attraction to, or repulsion

from, a certain thing. Of these, the knowledge of an event does not lead either to any activity or to any desisting from activity, so that serving no purpose in regard to actions, it would be useless; and hence the mention of the event in question cannot be taken as meant to serve the purpose of bringing about the knowledge of the event. On the other hand, through attraction, one undertakes the act, and through repulsion, one desists from the act; these therefore are meant to be brought about by such mention of events. If the mention of events were itself meant to be predicated by the Vedic text, then it would make the Veda open to the charge of having a beginning.—"But how is it that the Veda makes such a baseless statement as the one under consideration?"—The answer to this is as follows: [The statement, even in its literal sense, need not be entirely baseless; for instance] '*Prajāpati*' may be taken as standing for any eternal entity such as (*a*) Air, or (*b*) *Ākāsha*, or (*c*) the Sun;—'the cutting of his own fat' may stand (respectively) for (*a*) *rain*, or (*b*) *wind*, or (*c*) *rays*;—as for 'the throwing into fire', 'fire' may stand for (*a*) *lightning*, or (*b*) *light*, or (*c*) the *ordinary fire*;—lastly, as regards the 'rising of the *goat*', the 'goat' may stand for (*a*) *food*, or (*b*) *seed*, or (*c*) *creepers*.—Having 'sacrificed',—i.e. made use of—this 'goat', one obtains *offspring* and *cattle*.—In this explanation, all the words are taken in their 'indirect' ('figurative') sense.

Lastly, there is the injunction that 'The *Prāyaṇīya charu* is to be offered to *Aditi*,—the *Udayanīya charu* is to be offered to *Aditi*' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 6. 1. 5. 1); and as an auxiliary to this Injunction, we have the passage—'The gods on reaching the sacrificial ground, did not know the directions' (*Ibid.*); that this is so is clear from the fact that this eulogistic statement is wanted (by the Injunction);—and the meaning of the eulogy is that 'The *charu-offering* to *Aditi* destroys all illusions, and so also the illusion in regard to the directions'.—"How is it that the text speaks of *illusion regarding directions*, when there was never any such illusion in fact?"—The answer to this is as follows:—At the time of performing a sacrifice, when a host of details not pertaining to the sacrifice in hand present themselves, the mind of the performer becomes bewildered; and it is this *bewilderment* that is figuratively spoken of as 'illusion'; and that this is so is shown by the fact that the act of offering of 'the *Charu* to *Aditi*' provides the respite necessary for the performer to collect his mind and settle the actual details to be taken up.

[After having gone through the performance of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, when a man comes to take up the *Soma-sacrifice*, and finds that the details relating to the latter are different from those that he has been accustomed to in the former sacrifice, he becomes bewildered as to the exact procedure; it is this bewilderment that is spoken of as 'not knowing the directions'.—Now on this occasion if the *Prāyaṇīya* sacrifice to Aditi is performed, the details of which are similar to those of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* which are thoroughly known to the performer,—it provides the necessary interim of respite to enable him to collect his wits about the details to be performed in connection with the *Soma-sacrifice*. Thus, inasmuch as this respite is provided by the *Prāyaṇīya* sacrifice, it has been eulogised as helping to

remove the *bewilderment*, figuratively spoken of as 'not knowing the directions'.—*Tantravārtika*.]

SŪTRA (11).

(a) On the similarity in form, and (b) on the character of the greater part [is the indirect signification based].

Bhāṣya.

[This answers the first two objections urged under Sūtra (2).]

There is an injunction to the effect that 'one should hold the gold-piece in one's hand and then he (the Priest) takes it' (see *Maitrā. Saṁ.* 4. 8. 2. 3); this injunction stands in need of aid, which is supplied by its auxiliary in the shape of the statement that 'the mind is a thief, and speech is a liar.' This deprecatory assertion serves the purpose of commending the Gold; just as we have the statement—'What is the need for a sage? Feed Devadatta alone.'—"But even for decrying it, why should the *mind*, which is *not* a thief, be spoken of as *thief*? Why too the Speech, which is not a liar, be spoken of as *liar*?"—The answer is that this also is '*figurative expression*', based (*a*) '*upon the similarity of form*',—as thieves remain hidden, so Mind also remains unseen, the term 'thief' being taken in the figurative sense of 'one who remains hidden',—and '*upon the character of the greater part*',—for the most part what people speak is *untrue*.

SŪTRA (12).

Because of the Greatness of distance.

Bhāṣya.

[This answers the *third* objection urged under Sūtra (2).]

As an example of a statement (in the Veda) contrary to directly perceived facts, the Opponent has cited the passage—'During the day only the smoke of fire was perceived, not the flame, and during the night only the flame of fire was perceived, not the smoke' (*Taitti. Brā.* 2. 1. 2. 10).—This passage is auxiliary to the injunctive passage—'In the evening one makes the offering with the *Mantra*, *Agnirjyotirjyoti-ragniḥ svāhā*, and in the morning, one makes the offering with the *Mantra*, *Sūryo jyotirjyotiḥ sūryaḥ svāhā*', (*Vājasa. Saṁ.* 3. 9);—which enjoins two *mantras* having inter-mixed implications, and hence requires justification, and the sense of the Eulogy is that 'the *Homa* should be offered when both the deities are there'.—It is the fact of their being at a 'great distance' that is figuratively spoken of as the 'not seeing' of the *smoke* and the *flame*. [The explanation of this statement lies in the fact that during the day, when we look at the Fire burning at a great distance, we see the Smoke only; while at night, we perceive the flame, not the Smoke. This statement of a well-known fact serves as the basis for the Praise.]

[The *Tantravārtika*, Trans., pp. 46-47, says that the *mantras* as cited in the *Bhāṣya* are not found to have 'intermixed implications', as one *mantra* clearly speaks of *Agni* and the other of *Sūrya*, as the deity;—and

that the right *mantras* to be cited would have been '(a) *Agnirjyotirjyotiḥ, sūryaḥ svāhā*, (b) *Sūryojyotirjyoti-ragniḥ svāha*', where both *mantras* speak of both *Agni* and *Sūrya*.]

SŪTRA (13).

ON ACCOUNT OF THE FAILINGS OF WOMEN, (THERE CAN BE NO CERTAINTY REGARDING ONE'S CASTE); SPECIALLY AS THE SON BELONGS TO THE PROGENITOR.

Bhāṣya.

[This answers the fourth objection urged under Sūtra (2).]

Another example of a Vedic text stating what is contrary to direct facts, cited by the Opponent is—'We know not if we are Brāhmaṇas or Non-Brāhmaṇas' (*Maitrā. Saṁ.* 1. 4. 11). This is auxiliary to the Injunction 'When the *Pravaras* are being recounted, one should say *the deities are our fathers*' (*Ibid.*), which stands in need of justification; and the meaning of the eulogistic passage is that 'Even a Non-Brāhmaṇa would become a Brāhmaṇa by the recounting of *Pravaras* [and hence it is necessary for the Brāhmaṇa also to recount his *Pravaras*, as one can never be sure of one's Brāhmaṇa-hood]'. It is *difficult to know* if one is really a Brahmaṇa;—this is what is figuratively spoken of as '*we do not know*'; and the difficulty in knowing it for certain is due to '*the failings of women*', and also to the fact that '*the son belongs to the progenitor*'; this is also indicated by the advice 'May you guard this dynastic line with great care.' (See *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra* 2. 6. 13. 6.)

SŪTRA (14).

THERE IS DESIRE FOR IMMEDIATE GOOD.

Bhāṣya.

[This is an answer to the fifth objection urged under Sūtra (2).]

As an example of a Vedic text making a statement contrary to what is found in the Scriptures, the Opponent has cited the passage—'Who knows that there is Heaven, etc.?' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 6. 1. 1. 1.) This is an auxiliary to the Injunction that 'One should set up windows on all sides' (*Ibid.*), which stands in need of justification. The sense of the commendatory sentence is that the making of windows brings perceptible (and immediate) comfort (by allowing the smoke to escape). The assertion of *uncertainty* regarding Heaven is to be taken in the figurative sense of *coming after a long time* (and hence not being so desirable as the making of windows which brings immediate relief).

SŪTRA (15).

IT IS PRAISE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Bhāṣya.

[This answers the objection urged under Sūtra (3).]

Under Sū. (3), the Opponent has cited the passage,—'His face shines who knows this?' (*Tāṇḍya-Mahābrā.* 20. 16. 6.) This is an auxiliary to the

Injunction of reading the *Gargatrirātra-Brāhmaṇa*, which stands in need of justification.

As for the second passage cited under the same *Sūtra*—'An extremely wealthy child is born among his progeny',—it is auxiliary to the injunction of the careful study of the Veda.

The *shining of the face* and the *possession of wealth* are expressive of '*guṇa*', (quality); and in this sense, the expressions are '*gauṇa*' (in the sense of being *expressive of quality*, and not in the sense of being *indirect* or *figurative*). The face of the *learned* teacher really *shines*, when it is looked up to by the pupils;—and the child born in a family where the Veda is being constantly read becomes very intelligent, and on becoming learned, he obtains many gifts and becomes the possessor of much food (and wealth). [In the case of these two passages, the direct meaning also is not incongruous in any way: hence these statements cannot be called '*guṇavāda*' in the sense of *indirect or figurative assertion*; hence the author has explained the term '*guṇa*' in relation to these passages as standing for *Quality*.]

SŪTRA (16).

THE MENTION OF 'ALL' REFERS TO THE FACT OF THE MAN BEING ENTITLED (TO PERFORM ALL ACTS AND OBTAIN ALL THEIR REWARDS).

Bhāṣya.

[This answers the objections urged under Sūtra (4).]

As an example of a passage that makes the performance of all acts useless, the Opponent has cited the text—'By means of the Final Oblation, one attains all desires'. This is an auxiliary to the injunction that 'one should offer the Final Oblation', which stands in need of support.—Another text cited by the Opponent is 'He who knows the *Ashvamedha* also passes beyond death, etc.' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 5. 3. 12. 2); and here the statement 'passes beyond death' is auxiliary to the injunction that 'one should know the *Ashvamedha* (texts)' which stands in need of support. The mention of the results (in the injunctive text itself) is purely commendatory.

When the text speaks of the man 'attaining all desires', it is only a figurative way of stating that he performs the acts bringing about the reward in the shape of the attaining of all desires. And though '*all*' is not meant, yet the word 'all' is used, in the sense of all that the man may be *entitled to.*

SŪTRA (17).

THE RESULT BEING ACCOMPLISHED BY MEANS OF ACTIONS, THE DIFFERENCE IN THE RESULTS COULD BE DUE TO THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ACTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

This is a bold assertion (in answer to the same objection that has been answered in the preceding Sūtra).—Even if one takes the statement in question

(to the effect that 'All desires are obtained by the Final Oblation') as laying down the results actually following from the oblation,—the statement would be quite reasonable even in its direct literal sense; and even though all results might really follow from the Oblation, yet there would be a difference in the quantity and quality (of the results as obtained by the simple act of the Final Oblation, and as obtained by means of the more elaborate Sacrifices; and hence the actual performance of the latter would not be superfluous.) [Similarly even though the results of the *Ashvamedha* might be really obtained by the mere knowledge of the texts bearing on that sacrifice, yet the same results as obtained by the performance of the sacrifice would be *larger* and *better*.]

SŪTRA (18).

THE ANSWER TO THE LAST TWO (ARGUMENTS OF THE PŪRVAPAKṢA) WOULD BE AS ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

Under Sūtra (5), the Opponent has cited the passage 'The Fire is not to be kindled on the earth, nor in the sky, nor in heaven' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 5. 2. 7. 1). This is auxiliary to the Injunction that 'The Fire is to be kindled after placing a piece of gold under it' (*Ibid.*, 5. 2. 7. 3), which stands in need of justification. The deprecation of the earth, sky, and heaven serves the purpose of eulogising the gold. Though there is no possibility (of the fire being kindled in the sky or in heaven), yet the statement may be taken as referring to the well-known fact (that Fire cannot be kindled in the sky or in heaven). [The sense is that 'just as the kindling of the Fire in the sky or in heaven is not possible, so it is also on the bare ground, hence a gold-piece should be placed under the fire'.—*Tantravārtika*.]

Under Sū. (6) the mention of ephemeral things in such passages as '*Babara prāvāhaṇi desired*' (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 7. 1. 10. 2) has been cited by the Opponent. This objection (though already refuted in the *Tarkapāda*) was raised again (under Sū. 6) with special reference to the *Arthavāda* section of the Veda; and on the present occasion we shall refute it by simply asserting the authoritative character of the *Arthavāda*.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *Treating of the authoritative character of such Arthavāda passages as resemble Injunctions.*

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT SHOULD BE AN INJUNCTION, BECAUSE IT LAYS DOWN SOMETHING NOT ALREADY KNOWN; SPECIALLY AS A MERE NARRATION WOULD BE USELESS."

Bhāṣya.

[The *Arthavādas* containing mere descriptions of facts and events having been dealt with in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, we now proceed to consider those *Arthavādas* that appear in the form of Injunctions.]

The texts to be cited as examples in this connection are those passages which resemble Injunctions. For instance—'The sacrificial post is to be of *Udumbara* wood; the *Udumbara* wood is the essence of food; cattle are strong; through this strong *Udumbara* post one acquires strong cattle, for bringing about strength'. (See *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 2. 1. 1. 6.)—Here the question arises—Does the sentence ('Through this strong *Udumbara* post one acquires strong cattle') serve as an *injunction* (of the particular result, *the obtaining of strong cattle and strength*, as following from *the act of having the post of Udumbara wood*, which has been enjoined in the first sentence 'The sacrificial post is to be of *Udumbara* wood', the injunctive character of which is admitted by both parties)? Or does this also contain only the *praise* (of the act of *making the post of Udumbara wood*)?

On this question we have the following PŪRVAPAKṢA:—

"*It should be an injunction, because it lays down something not already known; specially as a mere assertion would be useless.* That is to say, all such passages as resemble Injunctions, like the one cited, should be taken as containing the *injunction of results* [the meaning of the full injunction being 'one who desires to obtain strong cattle, etc., should make the post of *Udumbara* wood'], because a result is definitely recognised as mentioned in the sentence ('through this *Udumbara* post one obtains strong cattle'), and because in this manner, the sentence in question would be laying down something not already known. Otherwise, if the sentence were taken as containing a mere 'narration' of praise, it would serve no useful purpose; because whether a certain thing (an act, for instance) is praised or not praised, it remains the same.—Further, the phrase '*ūrjovaruddhyai*' ('for bringing about strength') speaks of a *purpose*, the motive, the result aimed at, while there is no word (in the text) expressing the idea that what has been enjoined 'is praiseworthy'; the *praise* therefore, if intended, could be got at only through indirect indication; and certainly *Direct Assertion* (of motive, or purpose) is more authoritative than *Indirect Indication*."

SŪTRA (20).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—" IF IT BE URGED THAT IT MAY BE AS IN COMMON PARLANCE ; "—

Bhāṣya.

[The *Siddhāntin* is supposed to urge the following argument against the *Pūrvapakṣa*]—If you think that "mere praise would be useless,—and the praise is not expressed by any word in the text cited",—then our request to you is that—Please look at the sentences met with in common parlance; for instance, the sentence "This cow belonging to Devadatta should be purchased, she gives much milk, gives birth to she-calves and never loses a progeny';—here, even though the injunction that 'the cow should be purchased' is there (enough to make the intending buyer buy it), yet the addition of the praise supplies the additional incentive;—the words 'giving much milk, etc.', pointing out the excellences of the cow.—The same may be the case with the Vedic text also. [The injunction 'the post should be of *Udumbara* wood' is quite sufficient to urge the agent to make the post of *Udumbara* wood, and yet the Praise contained in the subsequent sentences supplies the additional incentive; and in this way the Praising would not be *useless.*]

[If this be urged by the *Siddhāntin*, then the answer of the *Pūrvapakṣin* to this would be as set forth in the following *Sūtra*]—

SŪTRA (21).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—" THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE IT IS KNOWN BEFOREHAND."

Bhāṣya.

"What has been urged by the *Siddhāntin* (under Sū. 20) is not possible; in common parlance, what is spoken of,—such, for instance, as the fact of the cow giving much milk and so forth,—is already known beforehand; so that the bringing about of the mere cognition of it would be of no use; and so the words are taken as containing Praise. People would have no faith in a mere assertion of what is *not* already known,—to the same extent that they have in an assertion of what is already known; and it is only when the fact asserted is well known that its assertion serves to persuade people. As regards Vedic passages, on the other hand, if people would not be persuaded by the *Injunctive Sentence* itself, they would be much less so by the *Reiterative Sentence* (*Arthavāda*), because if the man fails to be persuaded by the Injunctive sentence, it is only because doubts have arisen in his mind regarding (the authority of) that Injunctive sentence [and if that is so, then, no amount of Praising would persuade him]. If, on the other hand, he has been already persuaded by the Injunctive word, then what is the use of the Reiterative Word (*Arthavāda*)?—Further, the conditions of the Vedic passage under consideration are totally different (from those of common parlance). Here, first of all, the expression 'for bringing about strength' states a fact not already known;—secondly, the reason propounded for

this, that '*because the Udumbara is the essence of food*, therefore the Post should be made of *Udumbara*' is also something not already known;—hence there being a suspicion that one statement '*Udumbara is the essence of food*' is false,—the conclusion would be that the other statement (in the passage) also is false."

SŪTRA (22).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT THE FACT OF SUCH SENTENCES BEING TAKEN ALONG WITH OTHER SENTENCES HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

The fact that such sentences as those under consideration are taken along with other sentences has already been explained by us under Sū. 7, where it has been shown that *Arthavāda* passages are to be taken along with other Injunctive passages.—" But it has been shown that the passage we are discussing now contains the *injunction of a Result*, and not *commendation* [and what has been said under Sū. 7 in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* is with regard to passages containing Commendation or Deprecation]."—The mention of the Result that we have in the sentence in question could pertain only to the *Post made of Udumbara wood*; but this *Post made of Udumbara wood* (having been already enjoined by the first sentence, 'the Post is of *Udumbara*') is not something *not* already enjoined [and hence to be *enjoined along with the result* by the second sentence '*Udumbara* is food', etc.]; and the mention of the mere Result, without an injunction, would be meaningless.—[In the entire passage we have three factors—(1) the *Post made of Udumbara*, (2) the *Injunction of that Post*, and (3) the *Result following from the Post*; now, if, as held by the *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have injunction of the *Post made of Udumbara*, and also the *Injunction of the Result*, then the *Post made of Udumbara* will have to be connected with both (2) and (3), which would give rise to a syntactical split; hence the mention of the result cannot be connected with the *Post of Udumbara*. It could be so connected if the sentence that mentions the result had contained the injunction of that Post; but as a matter of fact, no such injunction is contained in that sentence, which speaks only of the *Udumbara post* leading to the acquiring of cattle and so forth. Thus then, the mention of the Result, having no connection with the enjoined Post, becomes meaningless. But this is so only if we admit of the mention of the Result being an Injunction. The necessary connection could be secured only if the mention of the Result were taken as containing a Praise of the Post that has been enjoined.]—" But there is no word expressive of commendation."—The sentence which mentions the result signifies (*a*) that what has been enjoined brings a reward, and (*b*) what brings a reward is certainly *commendable*; now this latter factor of *commendation* is implied on the basis of the fact that, without this implication, the mention of the reward (or result) would be meaningless.—It might be urged against this that " such an implication would involve a process of indirect indication".—But there is no force in this; because even if something is got at through indirect indication, it becomes useful all the same; and then *indirect indication* also is among the ordinary processes of signification.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* recalls a former objection—"We have pointed out above that what is stated in the text of the Veda (under consideration) is at variance with well-known facts; for instance, *Udumbara* is *not* the *essence of food*."—What we assert is that it is through indirect or figurative signification that the sentence serves the purpose of persuasion (through commendation); and this figurative interpretation would reconcile the Vedic declaration with ordinary facts.—"But what is the *similarity* (on which the figurative signification would be based)?"—The similarity is this—Just as Food is the means of satisfaction, so this (Post of *Udumbara* wood) also has the power to bring about satisfaction; and it is on this basis that the Post is being commended and spoken of by means of a word ('*ūrk*', 'essence of food') denoting a means of satisfaction. Further, the *Udumbara* is capable of being spoken of as the 'essence of food' also on the ground of its ripe fruits (being edible).

SŪTRA (23).

IN CERTAIN CASES, INJUNCTION IS FOUND TO BE ACTUALLY MEANINGLESS; IN WHICH CASES THE SENTENCE WOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATING COMMENDATION: AND WHEN OTHER SENTENCES ARE FOUND TO BE SIMILAR, THESE ALSO SHOULD BE TREATED SIMILARLY.

Bhāṣya.

There is the passage—'The horse has its origin in water, from water is born the *Vetasa*' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 5. 3. 12). The only form of injunction that could be derived from this would be 'the horse should be made to be born out of water'; and as this would be absurd, such an Injunction would be meaningless; and in that case it would be necessary to assume that the passage contains a commendation in the sense that 'the connection of the horse and the *Avaka* with the calm-producing water allays the troubles of the sacrificer'.

When other sentences are found to be similar, they also should be treated similarly. '*Tathātva*', 'similarity', means *similar circumstances*.—"What is the similarity?"—The similarity would consist in the (*a*) impossibility of being taken as an Injunction, and (*b*) the possibility of being taken as a commendation.

SŪTRA (24).

WHEN A CERTAIN TEXT IS CAPABLE OF BEING RIGHTLY TAKEN ALONG WITH ITS OWN CONTEXT, IT IS NOT RIGHT TO TRANSFER IT ELSEWHERE; SPECIALLY AS SUCH AN INJUNCTION WOULD BE MEANINGLESS IN REGARD TO THAT (PARTICULAR ACT).

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we hold that texts like those we have been discussing are commendations.—"For what reason?"—For the following

reason:—There is the text (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 6. 3. 4)—'That which is burnt belongs to the *Nirṛtis*; that which is uncooked belongs to *Rudra*; that which is cooked belongs to the deities; therefore one should cook things in such a way as not to burn them'.—If this is only a praise, then it means the praise of the substance cooked at the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* (in whose context the passage occurs). When this is possible, transference cannot be right—i.e. it will not be right to transfer the passage to another context (which would be necessary if the passage were treated as an Injunction). Then again, if the passage were taken as an Injunction, then the meaning would be that the substance is to be burnt at a sacrifice where *Nirṛti* would be the Deity (and not at the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*); and this would contravene the context; because Nirṛti not being a deity at the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, any injunction of 'burning' the substance would be meaningless. From this it follows that the passage must be taken as a commendation.

SŪTRA (25).

IN THE EVENT OF ITS BEING TAKEN AS AN INJUNCTION, THERE WOULD BE SYNTACTICAL SPLIT.

Bhāṣya.

If the text—'(*a*) *The post is to be made of Udumbara*..........(see *Taitti.-Saṁ.*, 2. 1. 1. 6), (*b*) *for bringing about strength*',—if both (*a*) and (*b*) were taken as Injunctions, then there would be syntactical split: the sense being '(*a*) the Post of Udumbara wood is excellent, and (*b*) the *strong* brings about *strength*'. [Thus there being two predicates, there would be syntactical split.]

From all this we conclude that all those *Arthavāda* passages also which resemble Injunctions serve the purpose of *commending* only.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *Treating of Passages which appear like the statement of reasons for a certain course of action.*

SŪTRA (26).

Pūrvapakṣa]—"It must be taken as the statement of reason, because of usefulness and plausibility."

Bhāṣya.

There are some assertions which have the appearance of statement of reasons; for instance—'(*a*) One should offer the libation with the winnowing basket, (*b*) *because food is prepared by it*' (See *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* 1. 6. 5). —In regard to such assertions as (*b*), there arises the question—Does their purpose lie in *commending* (what has been enjoined in the preceding sentence) or in *stating a reason* (for the Injunction)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The fact of Food being prepared by the Winnowing Basket must be the reason why the libation should be offered into Fire with that basket.—'But when the said causal relation (between the Basket and the Preparation of food) is not generally known, how could that be put forward as a reason?'—It may be true (that what is not generally known cannot be put forward as a reason) in common parlance; but in the Veda it could certainly be done by direct assertion; that is why the text in question puts forward the *preparation of food* as the reason for the offering being made with the Winnowing Basket.—'What is the purpose served by this?'—The purpose served is that it opens up the possibility of the offering being made with the Ladle, the Pan, and other things, which also are used in the *preparation of food*.—'How?'—Because they also have their use in the preparing of food, as food *can be prepared* by means of these also. In fact, it is this *possibility* of food being prepared (that it *can be prepared*) by the Winnowing Basket that is expressed by the word '*Kriyatē*', 'is prepared', in the text [and not that it *is* actually prepared]; because the ordinary meaning of the Present tense form '*kriyatē*', 'is prepared *at the present moment*', cannot fit in with the present context [as there is no 'preparing of food' going on *at the time* of the offering].—Further, if we take the sentence as a statement of reason, we accept what is directly asserted by the Veda; whereas if we take it as a commendatory declaration, we have recourse to indirect (or figurative) signification.—If it be urged that 'the Ladle, the Pan, and other things are not directly instrumental in the preparation of food, and these cannot be called the *means of preparing food* [so that there would be no possibility of the *Homa* being offered with these]',—then our answer would be that if the Ladle, etc., are useless in the preparing of food, then in that case, it would be meaningless to commend the Winnowing Basket as 'the means of preparing food', as the Winnowing Basket also is of no use in the preparing of food; and hence as what is asserted would not be applicable to the Basket, the commendation would be futile (not plausible)."

SŪTRA (27).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT IT IS A COMMENDATION (OF THE WINNOWING BASKET), AS THIS MATTER IS ONE THAT IS AMENABLE TO VERBAL AUTHORITY ALONE, AND THERE IS NO INJUNCTION OF ANY OTHER THING.

Bhāṣya.

The view propounded by the *Pūrvapakṣa* is not correct. The matter under discussion is one that is determinable only on the basis of authoritative texts. What the *Pūrvapakṣin* says regarding the *preparing of food* being a reason (for the *Homa* to be offered with the Basket) is also based by him upon the text ('By it is food prepared'); and when the text speaks of 'preparing food' as a *reason*, it is only a reason for offering the *Homa* with the *Winnowing Basket*, not for offering the *Homa* with the Ladle or the Pan or any other thing. So that what is spoken of by the text is the *Winnowing Basket only*. Nor is there any injunction of offering the *Homa* with the Ladle, the Pan or any such thing [as there is of offering it with the *Winnowing Basket* in the first sentence].

SŪTRA (28).

IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—"THE ASSERTION NOT BEING APPLICABLE (TO THE THING IN QUESTION), A COMMENDATION (OF THAT THING, BY THAT ASSERTION) WOULD BE ILLOGICAL;"—

Bhāṣya.

This argument has been urged [towards the end of the above statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, to the effect that "as the Winnowing Basket is of no use in the preparing of food, what is asserted would not be applicable to the Basket, and hence the commendation would not be plausible"]; and this has got to be refuted (which is done in the following *Sūtra*):—

SŪTRA (29).

(THEN OUR ANSWER IS THAT) AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER, THE ASSERTION *is* APPLICABLE,—BEING TAKEN AS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE INJUNCTION; AS IN COMMON PARLANCE.

Bhāṣya.

According to our view the assertion in question is quite applicable (to the Winnowing Basket); because according to our view, the assertion becomes auxiliary to the Injunction. And when taken as a commendatory assertion, the assertion becomes quite logical: the statement in the text 'food *is prepared* by the Winnowing Basket' being understood to mean 'as we know of food being prepared by the Winnowing Basket'; so that even though not actually *present*, the 'preparing' is spoken of as *present*, with a view to commending the Basket.—In your (*Pūrvapakṣin's*) view on the other hand, the weak point is this, that the assertion in question is an *injunction of the*

reason, and it is not permissible for a word in an Injunctive text to indicate any meaning other than the direct one [while such indirect indication is quite common in commendatory sentences]; so that when the Vedic Injunction spoke of the *present* (act of preparing food), it could not be taken as enjoining that (*preparing of food*) which *can be done*.—In our view, it would be quite possible to take the word directly denoting one thing as indirectly indicating another (this sort of thing being permissible in commendatory assertions).—We find instances like this in common parlance: when it is asserted that 'Devadatta is strong enough to meet Yajñadatta and others', though the term 'strong' means 'possessing superior strength', the *superiority* meant is not in comparison with the lion or the tiger or other strong animals, but in comparison with those whose strength is inferior to Devadatta's;—in the same manner, when it is said that 'food is prepared by it', it commends the Winnowing Basket as being a 'superior means of preparing food',—and the *superiority* is in comparison with those other 'means of food-preparation' which are inferior to the Winnowing Basket.

SŪTRA (30).

IF IT WERE A STATEMENT OF REASON, THE ASSERTION WOULD BE RESTRICTED (TO THE BASKET ONLY);—BECAUSE IT IS THAT WHICH IS SPECIALLY MENTIONED.—IF, THROUGH SIMILARITY (THE ASSERTION WERE TO APPLY TO THE OTHER THINGS ALSO),—THEN THERE WOULD BE AN INDEFINITENESS IN THE INJUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

Even if 'the preparing of food' were a reason which might be applicable to the Ladle, the Pan and other things,—(in the present context) it would be restricted to the Winnowing Basket;—because the fact that 'being the means of preparing food' is a reason (for the *Homa*) is learnt from the Vedic Word only, and the Vedic Word has asserted the said fact in reference to the Basket, not to the Ladle, the Pan and other things. —*Because it is that which is specially mentioned*,—the text declaring that 'because food is prepared by the *Winnowing Basket*, therefore the *Homa* should be offered with the *Winnowing Basket*'. For instance, when it is said that 'Because the Fire was blown strongly, therefore my house was burnt',—it does not mean that anything *other than Fire* also, when strongly blown, burns the house.—If it be held that 'what is meant is that by whatever thing—even other than the Winnowing Basket—food is prepared, even indirectly,—with that the *Homa* should be offered,'—then, in that case *there would be an indefiniteness in the Injunctions*; for there is nothing which, either directly or indirectly, does *not* help in the preparation of food. [The right reading is *na kenachit praṇāḍyā annanna kriyatē*—as is clear from the closing words of the *Tantavārtika* on this *Sūtra*].—So that to assert that 'one offers *Homa*' would be tantamount to saying that 'one offers *Homa* with the means of preparing food'.

According to our view, on the other hand, it is the Winnowing Basket (alone) that is commended; and the statement of the fact 'food is prepared by its means' is not for the purpose of proclaiming that fact, but for the purpose of persuasion.—Thus the conclusion is that *commendation* is the purpose served by those *Arthavāda* passages also which appear like Statement of Reasons.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *Treating of the use of Mantras.*

SŪTRA (31).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"(*a*) Because there are scriptural directions in connection with Mantras;"

Bhāṣya.

[It has been established that even such apparently absurd passages as some of the *Arthavādas* can have a bearing upon *Dharma*; now the question arises regarding the bearing upon *Dharma* of another kind of Vedic texts, which are known as '*Mantra*':—what is the particular purpose served by the Mantras? That they are not injunctions of action is clear from the fact that they contain no injunctive word. Expressing no commendation or disparagement, they cannot serve the purpose that is served by the *Arthavāda* passages. Before the use of the *Mantras* is discussed, the preliminary question to be discussed is—are the *Mantras* intended to convey any meaning? or are they merely recited verbally, without any reference to any meaning?—The idea underlying the discussion is that if the *Mantras* are not meant to convey any sense, then they cannot help in the knowledge of *Dharma*; and this would vitiate the *Siddhānta* doctrine that the purpose served by the *entire* Veda is to help us to know *Dharma*.]

The question that arises now is—Are *Mantras* intended to convey any meaning?—or are they *not* intended to be expressive of any meaning?—That is to say—Do they help the sacrifice by expressing some meaning, or by mere utterance?—If they help by mere utterance, then the *Mantra* '*Barhirdevasadanan dāmi*' ('I am chopping the grass for seating the Gods') (*Maitrāyaṇī-Saṁhitā* 1. 1. 2) would not necessarily always be used in the 'chopping of grass'. If, on the other hand, they help by expressing a meaning, then (inasmuch as the words express the *chopping of grass*, and) the context in which the *Mantra* is found indicates its auxiliary character, it could not be used anywhere else, so that even in the absence of any directions to that effect, it would always be used in *the chopping of grass* only.

Our view (the *Pūrvapakṣa*) is as follows:—"The *Mantras* help the sacrifice by their mere utterance;—why?—because *there are scriptural directions in connection with them*; that is to say, the scripture lays down the use of the *Mantra* in that same sense which is conveyed by the words of the *Mantra*. For instance, we have the scriptural direction '*Uruprathā uru prathasva—iti proḍāsham prathayati*,' (*Taitti. Brā*. 3. 2. 8. 4) which means—'*O Expanding one, may you become large*',—*uttering this Mantra he should enlarge the cake*' (*Taitti. Saṁ*. 1. 1. 8. 1); now, the direction 'one should enlarge the cake' would be superfluous if the *Mantra* came to help through the meaning expressed by it.—[If the words of the *Mantra*, 'O Expanding one, may you become large' were really meant to be expressive, then the Act of *enlarging the cake* would have been expressed by the *Mantra* itself, and therefore there would be no need for the direction that the *Mantra* is to be used in the *enlarging of the cake*].—On the

other hand, if the *Mantra* is intended to help by its mere utterance, then, it would be necessary to lay down its use; and this use has been laid down in the scriptural direction just quoted. For this same reason, the *Mantra* cannot help through the meaning expressed by it. For example, if a man with eyes is found to be led by another person, it is understood that he cannot see with his eyes.

[When a person who has his eyes intact but inefficient is found being led by another person, the irresistible conclusion is that he does not see with his eyes; exactly in the same manner, when a person comes across the text of a *Mantra* though his first impression is that it has a certain meaning, yet, as soon as he finds another sentence laying down its use, he naturally concludes that the *Mantra* itself has not the capacity to indicate its own use; and this distinctly shows that the meaning of the *Mantra* is to be disregarded altogether; for, if any significance were attached to the meaning, the use of the *Mantra* would be indicated by the *Mantra* itself, through that same meaning.—*Tantravārtika*-Trans., p. 81.]

"'The direction in question may be taken as serving the purposes of an *Arthavāda* [i.e. as commending the Injunction of the use of the *Mantra*, this Injunction being indicated by the indicative force of the words of the *Mantra* and by the context in which the *Mantra* occurs].'—But that cannot be; it has been explained above that that alone can be taken as *Arthavāda* which is supplementary to the sentence by which the Act is enjoined; in a case where the act is enjoined by an independent Injunction (which needs no supplementing), no useful purpose is served by the *Arthavāda*. Hence in the case in question the Direction cannot serve the purposes of the *Arthavāda*.

"The *Mantras* connected with the *Holding of the Spade* [i.e. the *mantras* beginning with '*Devasya tvā*' and ending with '*Gāyatreṇa chhandasā ādadē traiṣṭubhena jāgatena pāṅktēna*'] (*Taitti. Saṁ.* 1. 1. 3. 4) may be taken as another illustrative example. Here also, though the fact of the *mantras* being used in connection with the act of 'holding' is indicated by the indicative force of a word ('*ādadē*) in the *mantra* itself, yet the *mantras* are enjoined for such use in a subsequent direction—'*Tāñ chaturbhirādattē*' —'He holds the spade with the four *mantras*'. (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 5. 1. 1). [This direction would be superfluous if the words of the *Mantras* were intended to help by expressing their meaning.]—It might be argued that the direction would serve the purpose of pointing out (emphasising) the number *Four* (which is not indicated by any words of the *mantras*).—But that would not be possible; as there is no word to indicate that all the *mantras* are to be used collectively. [On the contrary, the indication would appear to be that the four *mantras* are to be used optionally,—and there is nothing to preclude the possibility of this *Option*—says the *Tantravārtika*.]

"Similarly the case of the text—'*Imāmagṛbhṇan rashanāmṛtasya—ityashvābhidhānīmādattē*' (*Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 13. 1. 2. 1; *Taitti. Saṁ.* 5. 1. 2. 1) provides another example. While the *holding of the leading string* is already expressed by the words of the *mantra* (*Mādhya-Saṁ.* 12. 2; *Tai-Sa.* 4. 1. 2. 1), we have the direction ('*ityashvābhidhānīmādattē*') laying down the same *holding of the leading string*; and this would not be right if the words of the *mantra* were meant to be expressive.—It might be

urged that the said direction (laying down the *holding of the leading string of the horse*) would still have its use in precluding the *holding* of the string *of the ass.*—But, as a matter of fact, it could not do this precluding; because if it were to do the *precluding*, (i.e. if it meant that 'the string *of the ass* should *not* be held') then, *firstly*, it would renounce its own meaning (that 'the string of the horse should be held'),—*secondly*, it would have a different meaning (that 'the string *of the ass* should not be held'),—and *thirdly*, it would set aside the *holding of the string of the ass* which is indicated (by the *Mantra* which uses the general term 'holding of the string' without reference to any particular animal).

"From all this it follows that *Mantras* are not intended to be expressive; and as such, they cannot serve as the authority for the using of the *mantra* '*Barhirdēavasadanan dāmi*' in connection with the *chopping of grass.*

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—" (*b*) BECAUSE THE ORDER OF THE WORDS (IN MANTRAS) IS IRREVOCABLY FIXED."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Mantras* have the order of their words irrevocably fixed; for instance, the order of the mantra '*Agnīrmūrdhā divaḥ, etc.*' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 1. 5. 5. 1) must be '*Agnīḥ—mūrdhā—divaḥ*', and not the reverse ('*Divaḥ-mūrdhā—agniḥ*');—if the words were meant to express a meaning, they would express it when placed in this latter order as well; and in that case, there would be no sense in the fixing of the exact order of the words.—It might be argued that the fixing of the order serves the purpose of securing the particular form of utterance (of word-sounds), which becomes altered when the order is reversed,—and that the restriction of the order is accepted on that account.—But in that case, the right view would be that under which the said restriction (of the order) would serve a distinctly useful purpose; [and this view would be only that under which the words are *not* meant to be expressive; because the only useful purpose that would be served by the *utterance* of the words in a particular order would be a *transcendental* one; and on such transcendental results proceeding from the order of the *word-sounds* alone, the *meaning* of the words could have no bearing at all; so that the explanation proposed lends support to the view that the words are *not* meant to be expressive].—It might be argued that even in the case of words expressive of meanings, we find restrictions regarding their order; for instance, in the compound '*Indrāgni*', (the term '*Indra*' must come first, according to the rules governing the order of terms in a Copulative Compound).—The restriction is quite right in that case; because a reversal of the order of the terms would make the compound word entirely inexpressive [as it would become grammatically *wrong*, and wrong or corrupt forms of words cannot be really *expressive*, according to the *Mīmāṁsaka*.]

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—" (c) BECAUSE THERE ARE DIRECTIONS ADDRESSED TO ONE WHO ALREADY KNOWS;"

Bhāṣya.

"We meet with such *mantras* as '*Agnīd agnīn vihara*'; now this *mantra* can express the meaning ('O *Agnīdhra* Priest, please attend on the Fires') only to a person who knows it (that it is the duty of the *Agnīdhra* Priest to attend on the Fires) already from his study (of the Veda);—and if this is already known, what is there (left to be expressed) which the *mantra* would (be required to express)?—If, on the other hand, the words are uttered (not for expressing any meaning, but) merely for the sake of a particular way of utterance, then the peculiar way in which the words are uttered may serve some useful (transcendental) purpose, even when addressed to one who already knows (his duty).—If you urge that "the reiteration (of what the man already knows) may serve to bring about a peculiar sanctification",—then you come over to our view of the case; 'reiteration' is the same as 'utterance'; and that may certainly be done (for some transcendental purpose); but what need not be done is the *expressing of the meaning*; because it is needless to do this latter when what is expressed is already known (to the person to whom the words are addressed). For instance, when a man has a shoe already on his foot, he does not, because he cannot, put another shoe on the same foot.

SŪTRA (34).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—" (d) BECAUSE THEY SPEAK OF THINGS THAT DO NOT EXIST;"

Bhāṣya.

"What has to be indicated (by Vedic texts) is something that helps in the performance of the sacrifice; but we find that certain *Mantras* speak of such things as do not exist at all; for instance, we have the *Mantra* beginning with '*Chatvāri shṛngāḥ, etc.*' (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 10. 10. 2; also *Ṛgveda-Saṁ.* 4. 58. 3); but there is no such thing among those that help the sacrificial performance as has 'four horns, three feet, two heads, and seven hands', [and it is such a thing that is denoted by the words of the *Mantra*]. Under the circumstances, if the *Mantra* were recited for the purpose of expressing its meaning, what is it that it would express?—On the other hand, if it is merely for the purpose of utterance, then its reciting would be possible (as tending to some transcendental end).

"Similarly, there is the *Mantra* '*Mā mā himsīḥ*' ['Do not, oh, do not hurt'] (which is addressed to the altar); as no '*hurting*' is there, if the *Mantra* were intended to convey a meaning, what is it that it would convey?

SŪTRA (35).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"(e) BECAUSE THEY ARE ADDRESSED TO INSENSATE THINGS ;"

Bhāṣya.

"There is the *Mantra* '*Oṣadhē trāyasvainam, etc.*' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 1. 2. 1. 1), which contains a request addressed to an insensate object, the *Herb* (*Oṣadhi*); if such *Mantras* were to help by conveying some meaning, then they would be preferring a request to the *Herb* ('*oṣadhē*') for *protecting* ('*trāyasva*') the *animal* ('*enam*'); certainly the Herb, which is insensate, could never understand the request.—There is no such incongruity if the *Mantra* is required to help by its mere *utterance*.—Hence *Mantras* must be only for the purpose of being uttered (recited).

"Another example of the same kind is the *Mantra* '*Shṛnota grāvāṇaḥ*' 'Listen, O ye stones!' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 1. 3. 13. 1)."

SŪTRA (36).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"(*f*) BECAUSE THERE IS SELF-CONTRADICTION IN WHAT IS EXPRESSED ;"

Bhāṣya.

"In what is expressed by the words, there is contradiction also: For instance, there is the *Mantra* '*Aditirdyauḥ aditirantarikṣam*' ('*Aditi is heaven, Aditi is sky*' (*Ṛgveda* 1. 89. 10); where the same *Aditi* is spoken of as 'heaven' and as 'sky'; and who could comprehend any such idea? If he did not comprehend it, what help could the *Mantra* render by conveying such an idea?—There is no such incongruity if the *Mantra* is meant only for utterance.—Hence *Mantras* must be taken as helping only by being uttered.

"Another example of the same kind (involving self-contradiction) is the *Mantra*—(*a*) '*Eko rudro na dvitīyo'vatasthē*' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā*, 1. 8. 6. 1), and then (*b*) *Asaṅkhyātā sahasrāṇi yē rūdrā adhibhūmyām*' (*Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka* 1. 12. 1; *Vājasanēya-Saṁhitā* 16. 54; *Taitti. Saṁ.* 4. 5. 11. 1) [where (*a*) asserts that 'There is but *one Rudra*, there never was a second'; whereas (*b*) speaks of '*the innumerable thousands of Rudras* on the earth'].

SŪTRA (37).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"(*g*) BECAUSE THERE IS NO TEACHING OF THE MEANING AS THERE IS OF THE TEXT (OF THE MANTRAS) ;"

Bhāṣya.

"At the time that the Veda is being read, a certain woman named *Pūrṇikā* is threshing corn, while the young student is learning the *Mantra* that is recited at the threshing of corn during a sacrificial performance; now when the student is learning the text of the *Mantra*, he is not learning its meaning; in fact, his sole effort is centred on getting up the verbal text only;—and as a rule, one learns only that which is of some use; hence from the fact that the student learns and practises the reciting alone, we conclude

that it is the reciting alone of the *Mantra* which serves a useful purpose. [Just as at the time of the *threshing* being done, the *threshing-mantra* is not recited for the purpose of conveying the idea of the *threshing*, so, in the same manner, at the time that the sacrifice is being performed, the *Mantras*, even though they may be expressive of things connected with the sacrifice, are recited, *not* for the purpose of conveying any idea of those things, but only for the purpose of the utterance.]

SŪTRA (38).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—" (*h*) BECAUSE (THE MEANING IS) UNINTELLIGIBLE ; "

Bhāṣya.

" Further, there are some *Mantras* whose meaning it is impossible to understand; for instance—(*a*) '*Amyak sā ta indra ṛṣṭirasmē*' (*Ṛgveda* 1. 169. 3); (*b*) '*Sṛṇyeva jarbhari turpharītū*' (*Ṛgveda* 10. 106. 6); (*c*) '*Indraḥ somasya kāṇukā*' (*Ṛgveda* 8. 77. 4).—Now what meaning could these *Mantras* convey ?—If they are taken as serving the purpose of mere recital, then there is nothing incongruous (in their being unintelligible).—From this also we conclude that *Mantras* are meant only to be recited.

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—" (*i*) BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE CONNECTION WITH EPHEMERAL THINGS :—THE MANTRAS CANNOT BE REGARDED AS CONVEYING ANY MEANING."

Bhāṣya.

" If the *Mantras* were to convey some meaning, then they would become connected with ephemeral things. For instance, there are the *Mantras*—'*Kintē kṛṇvanti kīkaṭēṣu gāvaḥ. . . . ā no bhara pramaṅgadasya vedo naichāshākham maghavan randhayā naḥ*' (*Ṛgveda* 3. 53. 14); '*Kīkaṭa*' is the name of a country (which has had a beginning in time);—'*Naichāshākha* is the name of a city; '*Pramaṅgada*'_the name of king. If such *Mantras* were meant to convey a meaning, then it would follow that this *Mantra* did not exist before the king *Pramaṅgada*.

" From all these reasons detailed in the *Sūtras* beginning with '*Tadarthashāstrāt* (*Sūtra* 31), it follows that *Mantras* are not meant to convey any meaning."

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE SIGNIFICATION OF SENTENCES (IN THE VEDA AND IN COMMON PARLANCE).

Bhāṣya.

The meaning of words used in the Veda and in common parlance is the same; and just as that meaning is meant to be conveyed in common parlance, so it should be in the Veda also.

The Opponent argues as follows: "That is not possible; because in common parlance, business is actually found to be carried on by means of the things comprehended as expressed by the words; in the case of the Vedic sentence, on the other hand, no help can be accorded to the sacrifice by a conversation carried on by the invisible deities and the insensate sacrificial implements. If a transcendental effect were assumed, then, that might follow from the mere recital (of the *Mantra*, without its conveying any meaning). The reciting of the *Mantra* would be done in either case,—whether it be for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result, or for the purpose of conveying the meaning;—but (there is this difference that) if no meaning is conveyed, the *Mantra* does not become useless; but if it is not recited or uttered, then its presence in the Vedic Text itself becomes useless (futile). Hence the right view is that there is to be recital of the *Mantra*, and that only for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result. This is what we have explained in the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, beginning with the *Sūtra* '*Tadarthashāstrāt*' (Sū. 31)."

Our answer to the above is as follows:—At sacrifices, there is recital of *Mantras* only for the purpose of conveying a meaning. As for the argument that 'there is no useful purpose served by a conversation between deities and sacrificial implements',—our answer is that in connection with sacrifices, the purpose served is the indication of the sacrificial details. Why?—Because until the sacrifice and the sacrificial details have been indicated, no sacrifice can be performed. Hence for the accomplishment of the sacrifice, the conveying of the meaning renders a great help to the act (of sacrificing); and this help is understood to be accorded by the *Mantra*. Thus there *is* a useful purpose served; and when this purpose is actually found to be served, it is not right to deny it by simply saying that 'the conveying of the meaning cannot be the purpose served by the *Mantra*'.

"But", says the Opponent, "if the Mantras help the performance by conveying a meaning, then such scriptural directions as 'Hold the *Abhri* with the four *mantras*' become absolutely meaningless (as shown by us under Sū. 31)."

Let it be meaningless—we reply; but we can never deny the perceived fact that help is actually rendered to the act by conveying a meaning.

"Then, do you mean that some scriptural directions are entirely meaningless?"

By no means (we reply); [what happens is explained in the following *Sūtra* (41)]—

SŪTRA (41).

THE REITERATION (OF THE DIRECTION) IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF QUALIFICATION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged above (*Text*; p. 55, l. 26) by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"as there is no word in the direction 'Hold it with the four *mantras*' indicating that the *mantras* are to be used collectively, it cannot be explained as having been added for the purpose of indicating the collective use of the *mantras*." But what we understand the sentence ('*Tām*

chaturbhirādattē') to mean is *the holding as qualified by the number 'four'*. If this were to be deduced from any single *Mantra* itself,—then this would mean that the *Mantra* is not comprehended in its direct meaning.

SŪTRA (42).

THERE IS PRECLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been further urged by the Opponent (*Text*, p. 56, ll. 4–6) that "in the case of the text '*Imāmagṛbhnan rashanāmṛtasya-ityashvābhidhānīmādattē*', (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 1. 2), if the latter sentence (which contains the direction) were taken as serving the purpose of precluding the reins *of the Ass*, —then there would be three incongruities—[(*a*) the sentence would lose its own meaning, (*b*) it would be assumed to have a totally different meaning, and (*c*) it would set aside the *holding of the reins of the ass*, which is already understood as indicated by the *Mantra* itself, which speaks of the *holding of reins in general*, which includes the reins of the *ass* also.]"—But in construing the direction '*Ityashvābhidhānīmādattē*', what is predicated (and stressed) is not the '*holding*' (*ādattē*), but '*the reins of the horse*' ('*ashvābhidhānīm*'; [so that in precluding the holding of the ass's reins, the sentence would not be relinquishing its own meaning];—and thus the fact of the *Mantra* being used in all kinds of *holding* (that of the reins of the *horse* as well as of the *ass* and other animals) would be indicated by the indicative force of the words of the *Mantra*, while the fact of its being used in the *particular* holding of the horse's reins would be got at directly from the words of the direction ('*ityashvābhidānīmādattē*). Then again, Indicative Force can indicate the use of the *Mantra* efficiently only with the help of a subsequent direction declaring such use of the *Mantra*; [and such a direction may be either actually present in the Veda or inferred from the context];—in the case in question, no such direction is (either present or) inferred from the context.—"What sort of a direction do you mean?"—A direction in the form that 'By this *mantra*, the holding of the reins should be done', which alone could make the *mantra* applicable to every kind of holding of the *reins* (of the Horse as well as of the Ass and other animals). As regards the reins of the *Horse*, on the other hand, we have the direction actually present in the text itself ('Holds the reins of the Horse'); and so long as this direct declaration is present, there can be no *Inference* of the other direction (relating to the holding of all kinds of reins); so that there is no chance of the *Mantra* being used in connection of the reins of the Ass. [Thus the Preclusion of the ass's reins would not involve the incongruity of the setting aside of what is already indicated.]

SŪTRA (43).

AND IT MAY BE A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION (ARTHAVĀDA).

Bhāṣya.

As for the text—'*Uruprathā uru prathasva—iti puroḍāsham prathayati*' (Taitti. Brā. 3. 2. 8. 4) (dealt with by the *Pūrvapakṣin* under Sū. 31),—here

the reiteration is by way of a commendatory declaration,—the sense of the commendation being that 'by enlarging the Cake, one enlarges, renders prosperous, the Master of the Sacrifice himself'. [That this is the sense is made clear by a subsequent sentence in the same Mantra-text '*Uru tē yajñapatiḥ prathatām*', 'May the Master of the Sacrifice prosper'. (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 2. 7).]

Objection:—"The sentence quoted (as indicating the commendation) is not syntactically supplementary to the *mantra* in question; nor is there any need for the commendation of what has been directly indicated."

Reply:—True; the sentence in question is not an injunction of the *Mantra*, nor a commendation of the *Mantra*; what is really commended is the act of *enlarging* (the cake). As for the *Mantra*, its use is indicated by its own words ('*Uruprathā uru prathasva*', which words, addressed to the Cake, request it to *become large*); and when it is mentioned in the text under consideration, it is only by way of being reiterated with a view to commending the act of *enlarging*;—the sense of the commendation being that 'the act of *enlarging* is so commendable that it is done with such an excellent *Mantra* as *Uruprathā uru prathasva*.' (Taitti. Saṁ. 4. 1. 2. 1.)—"What is the advantage gained by this?"—The advantage is that 'the Master of the Sacrifice becomes enlarged, prosperous, in regard to progeny and cattle'.—"Is this the reward that actually accrues to the man?"—We say, No; we say so only because how, otherwise, could the passage be commendatory? [An act is regarded as 'commended' only when it is spoken of as bringing a desirable result; it is for this reason that the *prosperity of the sacrificer* has been mentioned; and it does not mean that this *prosperity* is the result that actually follows from the act of enlarging the cake with the particular *Mantra*.]

Objection:—"But when, in reality, there is no *enlarging* (of the cake), why do you speak of the Priest *enlarging* it?"

Reply:—We deduce this from the words of the *Mantra*: What the words of the *Mantra* mean is that 'with the *Mantra*, the *Adhvaryu* Priest tells the Cake to *become large*'; now when some one tells another to 'become large', he is said to 'enlarge' it; just as when a man asks someone to 'do' a thing, he is said to 'make him do' it.

SŪTRA (44).

THE ASSUMPTION WOULD NOT BE INCONSISTENT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued under *Sūtra* 32 that—"inasmuch as the exact order of words in the *Mantras* is insisted upon as essential, it follows that *Mantras* are not intended to convey any meaning."—But the said insistence on the exact order may be baseless (we do not mind that); but we cannot reject the validity of what is actually perceived, [that is, the patent fact that the words do actually convey a meaning].—It might be argued that the insistence on the exact order of the words may be conducive to a transcendental result.—But the '*assumption*' of such transcendental result '*would not be inconsistent*,' with our view also, under which the meaning as conveyed by the words would bring about prosperity and success.

SŪTRA (45).

As regards the Directions, there should be no objection against the Act (of pointing out the duty); as it serves to bring about an additional qualification.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued under *Sūtra* 33 that—"In the case of such directions as '*Prokṣaṇīrāsādaya*' [Mādhya-Saṁ. 1-28; Tirtti. Brā. 3. 2. 9, '*Agnīdagnīn vihara*', and the like], it cannot be right to point out (the duty) to one who already knows it; hence the uttering of such words can serve only a transcendental purpose."—But this is not right. Even though the Priest might be knowing that such and such an act has to be done, it is necessary to remind him of it at the time of the actual performance; as this reminding could be done by other means also, the Text lays down the exact words to be used in the reminding; it is this emphasising of the exact wording that is done by the *Mantra*; and this *reminding* serves the purpose of '*adding to the qualifications*' (of the Priest; by making him more alert and efficient).

SŪTRA (46).

Being significant, the Mantra may be an Arthavāda.

Bhāṣya.

The *Mantra* cited under *Sūtra* 34 is '*Chatvāri shṛiṅgā*, etc.' (Ṛgveda 4. 58. 3); it is true that the thing spoken of directly by the words here has no existence; but the words could be taken in an indirect (figurative) sense; and such figurative expressions are accepted as correct (justifiable, authoritative); while there is no authority (or justification) for the assumption that a transcendental result follows from the mere recital of the *Mantra*. The figurative meaning of the words of the *Mantra* is as follows:—(*a*) The '*four horns*' stand for the four Hotṛ priests who are *like horns* of the *Sacrifice* (personified);—(*b*) the '*three feet*' stand for the three *Savanas* (Morning, Midday and Evening);—(*c*) the '*two heads*' stand for the Sacrificer and his wife;—(*d*) the '*seven hands*' stand for the metres;—(*e*) '*bound three-fold*' means *circumscribed by the three Vedas*;—(*f*) the '*bull*' (*vṛṣabha*) stands for the *Sacrifice* as bringing about (*varṣati*) desirable results;—(*g*) '*cries*' (*roraviti*) means *makes a sound*;—and (*h*) the phrase '*the Great Divinity entered the mortals*' means that *human beings are entitled to the performance of sacrifices*.

This figurative description (of the Sacrifice) is like such figurative descriptions as the following—'The river has the *Chakravāka* birds for her breasts, the swans for her teeth, reeds for her clothes and mosses for her hair';—where the River is described.

[Under *Sūtra* 35, the Opponent has cited the *Mantra*—(*a*) '*Oṣadhē trāyasva*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 2. 1), and (*b*) '*Shṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 3-13)].—(*a*) The words '*Oṣadhē*', etc. ('O Herb, please protect') addressed to the sacrificial accessories, which are insensate, are meant to indicate that

towards the accomplishment of the sacrifice, the accessories are as efficient as intelligent beings.—(*b*) Similarly the words '*Shṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ*' 'Listen, O, Ye, Stones') are meant to indicate that 'after this now will follow the reading of the Morning Hymn, which is so important that even the insensate stones will listen to it,—how much more, the learned Brāhmaṇas'; and it is for the conveying of this idea that even though they are insensate, the stones are thus addressed.

SŪTRA (47).

THE WORDS BEING FIGURATIVE, THERE WOULD BE NO INCONGRUITY.

Bhāṣya.

Under *Sūtra* 36, the Opponent has cited the *Mantra*—'*Aditirdyauḥ*, etc.'—But these words are '*figurative*', and hence there is '*no incongruity*'; just as we find in the case of such words as—'Thou art my Mother and thou my Father.'—Similarly, in connection with a sacrifice at which there is a single deity, *Rudra* is spoken of as '*one*', and in connection with that in which the deity consists of a hundred *Rudras*, *Rudras* are spoken of as 'a hundred'; so that there is '*no incongruity*' or self-contradiction involved in any such texts.

SŪTRA (48).

THAT THERE IS NO MENTION OF THE LEARNING (OF THE MEANING OF MANTRAS) IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT HAS NO BEARING (UPON THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE).

Bhāṣya.

Under *Sūtra* (37) it has been urged that—"at the time that the act (of *threshing*) is going on, and the young student is learning the *Mantra* that is recited at the time of corn-threshing at a sacrifice, there is no desire on the part of the student to convey (by means of the words of the *Mantra*) an idea of the threshing that is being done by the woman, Pūrṇikā;—[in the same manner at the time that the sacrifice is being performed and a *Mantra* is being recited by a Priest, there can be no desire on the part of the Priest to convey an idea of the sacrificial details by means of the words of the *Mantra*]."—The reason why the Priest does not wish to convey an idea of the meaning of the *Mantra* that he recites during the performance of the sacrifice lies in the fact that an indication of the meaning of the *Mantra*, having no bearing upon the performance, would be of no use.—"But the teaching and learning of the meaning has not been enjoined, while the teaching and learning of the verbal text has been enjoined."—The reason for this lies in the fact that the understanding and remembering of the meaning is easy, and hence there is no teaching or learning of it,—while the learning and remembering of the verbal text is difficult, and hence there are the teaching and learning of it.

SŪTRA (49).

THE MEANING IS THERE; ONLY THERE IS IGNORANCE OF IT.

Bhāṣya.

[Under Sūtra 38, the Opponent has urged that there are many *Mantras* whose words are entirely meaningless.]—The fact is that the *Mantras* have a meaning,—only it is not grasped, by reason of carelessness, idleness and some other causes; as a matter of fact, the meaning of every word can be deduced from its etymology, with the help of commentaries, lexicon and grammar. For instance, [one of the apparently meaningless *Mantras* cited by the Opponent is '*Jarbharī turpharītū*'; and here] the words '*jarbharī turpharītū*', having the form of words with dual endings, are understood to be names of the twin-gods Ashvins; and through this significance, the *Mantra* indicates the hymn to the Ashvins, ending with the words '*Ashvinoḥ kāmamaprāḥ.*' (Ṛgveda, 10. 116. 11)—Further, all these words—'*Jarbharī*' and the rest—can be taken as the names of deities; and their special significance is determined by their etymology and common usage.—[For these explanations, see *Tantravārtika*—Translation, pp. 100–101].—Similarly in other cases also.

SŪTRA (50).

THE MENTION OF EPHEMERAL THINGS HAS BEEN ALREADY EXPLAINED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been already explained under the *Sūtra*, 'There is only a similarity of Sounds' (*Sūtra* 1. 1. 31).

SŪTRA (51).

THE INJUNCTION (OF A MANTRA) BY AN INDICATIVE NAME SHOWS THAT IT SIGNIFIES THE SAME THING.

Bhāṣya.

We have the text 'One approaches the *Agnīd's* place with the *Āgnēyī*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 1. 6), which enjoins the use of a *Mantra* named '*Āgnēyī*'; it is only when *Mantras* are significant of some meaning that they are enjoined by such an indicative name: that is to say, the *Mantras* are called '*Āgnēyī*' because they are capable of signifying the deity *Agni*, and *not* because they contain the word '*agni*'.

SŪTRA (52).

THE MODIFICATION (OF MANTRAS SHOWS THAT THEY ARE EXPRESSIVE).

Bhāṣya.

Modification is possible in *Mantras* only if they are meant to be expressive.—"Where do you find this *modification*?"—We have the text '*Na pitā vardhatē na mātā*, 'The Father does not grow, nor the mother', [this is with

reference to the Mantra—'*Anvēnam mātā*, etc., Taitti Brā. 3. 6. 6. 1]: this means that beings other than these do grow; but as a matter of fact, the Mother and such persons also do 'grow',—through the several stages of childhood, youth and old age; hence what the text means is that the *word* ('mother') does not 'grow'.—"What would be the *growth* of the Word?" —It would consist in the taking of the Dual and Plural endings.—[It is this *growth* that is forbidden by the text; and such forbidding has some sense only if the *Mantra* is taken as conveying some meaning—says the *Tantravārtika*.—The *Mantra*-text quoted precludes the possibility of nouns in the singular number being *modified* into those in the Dual or the Plural. The sense of the prohibition is that if a certain *Mantra* contains the word '*ēnam*' in the singular, as referring to the sacrificial animal, this singular pronoun should not be changed into the Plural form '*enān*', in a case where there is a large number of animals.]

SŪTRA (53).

THERE ARE ALSO CERTAIN POSITIVE BRAHMAṆA-TEXTS (WHICH CLEARLY POINT TO THE EXPRESSIVE CHARACTER OF MANTRAS.)

Bhāṣya.

There are certain '*Brāhmāṇā*-Texts' [according to the *Tantravārtika* '*vidhi*' here is used in the sense of *Brāhmaṇa*] which refer to *Mantras* in such a way as to indicate that they are intended to convey a meaning. For instance, we find the Brāhmaṇa-text '*Shatam himāḥ shataṁ varṣāṇi jīvyāsam ityetadevāha*' (Shata-Brā. 2. 3. 4. 21) [which says that 'When the *Mantra* uses the phrase *Shatam himāḥ* in the Mantra '*Agnē gṛhapatē*, etc.,' (Vājasa saṁhitā 2. 27) what it means is '*Shatam varṣāṇi, a hundred years*'; and in this passage the words occurring in the *Mantra* are explained as having a definite meaning].

Thus ends Pāda II of Adhyāya I.

ADHYĀYA I.

PĀDA III.

Treating of the Authority of Smṛti and Custom.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The Authority of Smṛtis in general.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS DHARMA IS BASED UPON THE VEDA, WHAT IS NOT VEDA SHOULD BE DISREGARDED."

[The authority of *Injunctions*, *Arthavādas* and *Mantras* having been dealt with, what calls for consideration next is the character of such words and expressions as are *Names*, *Nāmadhēya*, of sacrifices. But before taking up this latter, we take up the case of *Smṛti* and *Custom*; and the propriety of introducing this discussion here has been explained in several ways:—(1) We can form no idea of the authority of the Veda until we have understood it in all its bearings; and as it is only with the help of *Smṛti* and *Custom* that it can be so understood, it is necessary that the exact nature of these latter should be investigated.—(2) Finding that *Smṛti* and *Custom* are treated as authorities for *Dharma*, we might take exception to the conclusion arrived at under *Sūtra* 1. 1. 2 to the effect that Veda is the only authority for *Dharma*; and in order to guard against this, and to ascertain how far *Smṛti* and *Custom* may be allowed to interfere with Veda, in matters relating to *Dharma*, it has to be shown that these are based upon Veda, from which alone they derive their authority.—(3) The subject-matter of *Mīmāṃsā* has been declared to be 'Investigation of the nature of *Dharma*', and after the first authority on Dharma in the shape of the Veda has been dealt with, it is only right that the nature of its other authorities should be considered.—The consideration of *Smṛti* and *Custom* comes before that of *Nāmadhēya* (Names), which is a part of the Veda, because while the *Nāmadhēya* does not affect the *Smṛti*, the *Smṛti* does at times help in the comprehension of the *Nāmadhēya*.—Before considering those cases where there is conflict between *Veda* and *Smṛti*, we deal with the more general preliminary question—Is *Smṛti* to be regarded as having any authority in matters relating to Dharma?]

Bhāṣya.

So far we have explained the authoritative character of the whole Veda. Now we are going to consider cases where we do not find any Vedic texts and yet there are *Smṛtis* to the effect that 'this act should be performed in such and such a manner, and for such and such a purpose';—the question to determine in this connection being, whether or not similar authority attaches to these *Smṛtis*. As examples of such *Smṛtis* we have—(*a*) 'The *Aṣṭakā* should be performed', (*b*) 'The Teacher is to be followed', (*c*) 'Tanks should be dug', (*d*) 'Drinking booths should be set up', (*e*) 'One should keep a tuft of hair on the head', and so forth.

[The grounds for doubt regarding the authoritative character of such rules have been thus set forth in the *Tantravārtika*, Translation, p. 105—In as much as these *Smṛtis* are the work of human authors and are dependent upon their memory, which cannot be infallible, their authority is not inborn or self-sufficient, like that of the Veda;—yet on the other hand, they are found to be accepted as authoritative by an unbroken line of Vedic Scholars from time immemorial; hence they cannot be altogether wrong or untrustworthy. Hence the doubt.]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"*Inasmuch as Dharma is based upon the Veda, what is not Veda should be disregarded.* That *Veda* is the only right means of knowing *Dharma* has been made clear under *Sūtra* 1. 1. 2, where it has been declared that '*Dharma* is that which is indicated *by means of the Veda* as conducive to the highest good'; hence all that has been cited (being not Veda and hence) having no sound basis, should not be heeded."

[The supporter of *Smṛti* says]—Those persons (Smṛti-writers) who knew that such and such an act *should be done* in this manner,—how could they say that the Act should not be done at all? [That is, there is no reason for suspecting the veracity or authority of the Smṛti-writers. The *Tantravārtika* puts the reasoning in a better form—'If the Smṛti-writers knew a certain action, for instance, the *Aṣṭakā*, as one that should *not* be done, how could they declare it to be one that *should* be done, and thereby lead astray the people of the present day?']

[The *Pūrvapakṣin* continues]—"The answer to this is that the false or wrong declarations might be made by the writers by reason of the impossibility of their having any *remembrance* (of the *acts* concerned). As a matter of fact, no one ever *remembers* any such thing as has not been apprehended or heard by him; and the subject in question (the *Aṣṭakā* offering) is not mentioned in the Veda and is something super-physical (and hence not cognisable by any other means of cognition); [so that it could not have been previously known to the Smṛti-writers at all;], and no *remembrance* (of the Act) is possible for the Smṛti-writers, for the simple reason that they have not had *previous cognition*, which is what brings about Remembrance. Remembrance under the circumstances would be just like the remembrance that a barren woman might have to the effect that 'such and such act was done by my daughter's son'; if she ever had such a remembrance, then, knowing as she does that she has had no daughter, she could never believe that remembrance of the son's act to be correct.

"The Opponent may say—'Even so, just as in the case of the Veda, we accept as authoritative the *remembrance* (or tradition) of these Smṛti-writers by reason of there being an unbroken tradition among them regarding *what is Veda*,—in the same manner we may accept as authoritative their *remembrance* regarding the matter under consideration (the *Aṣṭakā* and the rest).'

"But this is not possible; because in the case of the Veda, the compilation being there, the previous Cognition (necessary for *remembrance*) is not impossible; in the case of the *Aṣṭakā* and the rest, on the other hand, as these are imperceptible things, there could be no means of any previous Cognition of them, and hence it follows that any *remembrance* regarding these

must be wrong. In fact, this case would resemble the case where a person born blind says 'I remember this particular colour',—and being asked, 'How could you have any Cognition of colour?', he points to another person blind from birth,—it being asked from where this latter derived his Cognition, another person blind from birth is pointed out; so that even though there is an unbroken line of tradition of persons born blind, no sensible people can ever regard this remembrance as right Cognition.

"Thus we conclude that a *Smṛti* like those we have been considering is not to be treated with respect, it is to be '*disregarded*'."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT (SMṚTI) IS TRUSTWORTHY, AS THERE WOULD BE INFERENCE (ASSUMPTION, OF THE BASIS IN THE VEDA) FROM THE FACT OF THE AGENT BEING THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('but') implies the rejection of the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

The *Smṛti*, (Remembrance), is '*pramāṇa*', '*trustworthy*';—because it is a kind of *Cognition*; and how can *Cognition* be wrong?—It might be argued that—"as there could have been no means available for the previous Cognition (of such things as *Aṣṭakā* and the like), there could be no previous Cognition of them (on which the Remembrance would be based)."—Our answer is—'*Anumānam*', ('*there would be inference*');—i.e. we would infer the reason for the reliability of the Remembrance. Of course the ground of this reliability could not be any previous direct apprehension, as (in the very nature of the things concerned) no direct apprehension is possible; human beings do not, in their present life, have any direct apprehension of things like *Aṣṭakā*; and what may have been apprehended in a previous life is not remembered during the present life. But what we could infer (as the ground for reliability) is the Text (Vedic) itself [which would have provided the Smṛti-writers with the previous Cognition necessary for the *Remembrance*, *Smṛti*, which would thus have its basis in that inferred Vedic text];—this inference being drawn from the fact (premiss) that '*the agent is the same*';—i.e. the '*agent*', *author*, of the *Smṛti* is the same as the '*agent*', *performer*, of the acts prescribed in the Veda.—Thus it becomes established that in the case of the *Smṛti*, *Remembrance*, of men of the three higher castes, there is actual connection (support, basis) in the Veda.

Says the Opponent—"But people do not find any such Vedic Text as you would infer (as the basis for *Smṛti*)."

Even if they do not actually find it, they would infer it. It is quite possible also that the text upon which the Smṛti is based was actually known to the Smṛti-writer, but has since been forgotten.

Thus in the case of the 'remembrance' of men of the three higher castes, the necessary 'previous cognition' being traceable,—and it being possible that the texts from which that Cognition proceeded have been forgotten,—the inference of the text becomes justifiable; consequently '*Smṛti is trustworthy*'.

Then again, we do find in the Veda, texts indicative of the *Aṣṭakā* ;—e.g. '*Yāñjanāḥ pratinandanti*, etc.' [*Pāraskara-Gṛhya-Sūtra* 3. 2. 2; *Āpastamba-Mantrapaṭha* 2. 20. 27.]

[The whole passage reads thus—' *Yāñjanāḥ pratinandanti rātrindhēnumivā-yatīṁ saṁvatsarasya yā patnī sā no astu sumaṅgalī aṣṭakā yaistu rādhasē svāhā* ';—here *Aṣṭakā* is spoken of as the Divinity of the Night, eulogised as the 'Consort of the Year'; here we have a Vedic text speaking of *Aṣṭakā* as an object of adoration; and this is taken as indicative of the desirability of performing the rites of the *Aṣṭakā*.]

As regards the other instances of *Smṛti*,—rules of conduct quoted above, (relating to the 'following of the Teacher', 'the digging of tanks', 'establishing of drinking booths', and so forth), their authority (reliability, trustworthiness) rests in the fact of the apparently useful purposes served by them; for instance,—(*a*) if one follows his Teacher, the Teacher becomes pleased and teaches him with care, and also being satisfied with the pupil, explains to him the reasonings that go to solve the various difficulties that present themselves in the course of the study of the texts. This rule of following the Teacher derives support also from the Vedic text—'Therefore the inferior always walks behind the superior walking ahead' (which speaks of the *Ass* following after the *Horse*, and hence indicates the propriety of the Superior Person being followed by the Inferior);—(*b*) Drinking Booths and Tanks are philanthropic works, conducive to the benefit of the people, and not conducive to Dharma (merit only, and hence directly cognisable *only through the Veda*); as indicatives of such acts, we have the text—'*Dhanvanniva prapā asi*' (*Ṛgveda* 10. 4. 1) [which indicates the establishing of Drinking Booths],—and '*Sthalayodakam parigṛhṇanti*' [which indicates the digging of water-reservoirs, Tanks].—(*c*) As for the keeping of a tuft of hair on the head, this serves the purpose of indicating the *gotra* (Clan) to which one belongs; and as indicative of this we find the text '*Yatra bāṇāḥ sampatanti kumārā vishikhā iva*' (*Ṛgveda* 6. 75. 117. 7) [which cites the case of 'young boys with various top-knots' as a simile, and this indicates the practice of keeping tufts of hair as indicative of *gotra*].—Thus then, those rules (*Smṛti*) that serve apparently useful purposes are trustworthy on that account, and in the case of those that pertain to transcendental purposes, we shall infer Vedic texts as their basis (and on this basis will rest their trustworthy character).

[The *Prābhākara* presentation of the Adhikaraṇas in this Pāda is somewhat different. According to him, the question of the authority of *Smṛti* or *Custom* does not concern us; the subject-matter of the Adhyāya is the *Means of knowing Dharma*, and it having been established that the Veda is the only means of knowing *Dharma*, the whole Adhyāya should deal with the authority of the Veda only.—Thus then, the *viṣayavākya* of the present *Adhikaraṇa* is the Vedic text that has been cited above as indicative of the *Aṣṭakā* : '*Yāñjanāḥ pratinandanti, etc.*'; and *not* the *Smṛti*-rule relating to *Aṣṭakā*. This Vedic Text is found to speak of the Divinity of the Night, and thus becomes connected with the *Aṣṭakā*-Rite *laid down in the Smṛti*, in which the Night figures as a deity.—Now in regard to the trustworthy character of this rule regarding the *Aṣṭakā*, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The Smṛti-rule that 'the *Aṣṭakā* should be performed' is found to accomplish its purpose of enjoining the Rite, only through the help of the Vedic text quoted;—the Vedic text also, as indicating the Divinity of the Night, must

have had in view that same Aṣṭakā-Rite in which Night figures as a deity, and which has been enjoined only in the work of a human author;—and thus this Vedic text is found to be dependent upon the work of a human author, which therefore shakes its inborn self-sufficient authority; and thereby the authority of the entire Veda becomes shaken."—The *Siddhānta* view is as follows:—When we have found that the persons who wrote down the rule that 'the *Aṣṭakā* should be performed' must have found a basis for the rule in the Veda itself,—then the injunction of the *Aṣṭakā* must be regarded as emanating from (based upon) the Veda itself; so that the text '*Yāñjanāḥ, etc.*', also refers to a divinity that figures in an act enjoined originally in the Veda itself; and thus the *mantra*-text is not dependent upon the *Smṛti*-rule at all; it is based upon the Vedic text upon which primarily the *Smṛti-rule* is inferred to rest.—*Ṛjuvimalā*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *Shruti* (*Veda*) *more authoritative than Smṛti.*

SŪTRA (3).

WHEN THERE IS CONFLICT (BETWEEN VEDA AND SMṚTI), THE SMṚTI SHOULD BE DISREGARDED; BECAUSE IT IS ONLY WHEN THERE IS NO SUCH CONFLICT THAT THERE IS AN ASSUMPTION (OF VEDIC TEXT IN SUPPORT OF SMṚTI).

Bhāṣya.

[The authority of *Smṛtis* in general having been established, the author next proceeds to point out exceptions.]

The question that arises now is—How would it be in cases where there is a conflict between *Smṛti* and *Shruti*? For instance—(*a*) The *Smṛti* rule that the *whole* of the Udumbara-Post should be covered—is in conflict with the *Shruti*-rule that 'one should sing a *Sāman*, *touching* the Post' [no touching of the Post is possible when the whole of it is covered with cloth];—(*b*) The *Smṛti*-rule that 'one should remain a Vedic Student for forty-eight years' is in conflict with the rule that 'one should instal the Fire when a son is born to him and his hair is still black'. [If a man is to remain a student for 48 years, he would not marry before he is 55 or 56 years old, by which time his hair would cease to be black,—and he could not instal the Fire before marriage];—(*c*) the *Smṛti*-rule that 'one should not take food at the place of one who has purchased *Soma* (for the Soma-sacrifice)' is in conflict with the *Shruti*-rule that 'on the completion of the *Agniṣṭoma* stage (of the Soma-sacrifice) one should dine at the house of the sacrificer' [at the time mentioned here, the sacrificer will have purchased the *Soma*].

[Now the question arises—are these Smṛti-rules authoritative?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "all this *Smṛti* is authoritative, *because the agent is the same* (as declared in the preceding *Sūtra*)."

In answer to this, our *Siddhānta* view is as follows:—Inasmuch as the *Smṛti* lays down something that cannot be done, it must be regarded as wrong.—"But why can it not be done?"—Because the *touching* of the Post has been enjoined, therefore it cannot be entirely covered up and yet touched by the singing priest. For when we understand that the Post is to be *touched* by the singing Priest, what is there that would obstruct this notion of ours? It would be obstructed by the *Smṛti* laying down the covering up of the whole Post. [Thus this is a clear case of conflict between the two].—"The only reason that would make the *Smṛti* wrong would be the fact of its having no basis in the Veda; but it could have a Vedic text for its basis."—It could have a Vedic text (assumed by us) for its basis only if the idea of *touching* the Post were wrong; if this idea of *touching*

is not wrong, then the idea of *covering up*, being impossible, must be wrong; and just as no direct Apprehension is assumed, merely because (without it) something is not possible, in the same manner no Vedic text can be assumed (simply because the 'covering up of the whole post') would be wrong without such a text.—"In that case, how about the *Smṛti* laying down the covering up of the whole Post?"—Well, it is wrong.—"But why should we assume it to be wrong?"—Because it conflicts with an idea founded on the Veda.

"But why cannot we regard the two rules (*Smṛti* and *Shruti*) as optional alternatives,—like *Vrīhi* and *Yava*, or like the two *Sāmans*, *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*?"

That cannot be; as option is admitted in only those cases where neither of the two courses is known to be wrong.—[There is some obscurity attaching to this passage, due mainly to the explanation provided in the *Tantravārtika*, where the *Kārikā* beginning with '*Pūrvoktēnaiva mārgēna, etc.*,' clearly means that in every case of Option, one of the two alternatives must be regarded as wrong; and according to this the Bhāṣya should be translated as—'*Until one of the two is definitely recognised as wrong there can be no option*'; the negative particle '*na*' in this case is construed along with what follows. As a matter of fact however, if either of the alternatives is definitely recognised to be *wrong*, then it is rejected altogether, and it is not taken as an acceptable alternative; it is only when neither of the alternatives is definitely recognised as wrong, that both are recognised as equally right. The only way in which the Bhāṣya could possibly be explained in accordance with the *Vārtika* is to take the '*wrongness*' of one of the alternatives to mean the *partial wrongness* which attaches to every alternative option, involved in the fact that when one accepts the first alternative, it means the *rejection* of the other, and this rejection implies that the alternative so rejected must be taken as *wrong at least for that occasion*.—But from what follows in the *Bhāṣya*, it appears better to take the negative particle '*na*' as separate, and to accept the translation as given above in the body of the text.]—As a matter of fact however, if 'the covering up of the whole post' is right, 'the touching of it' must be wrong,—and if the 'touching' is right, then the 'covering up of the whole' mentioned in the *Smṛti* must be wrong. But when the other party talks of this being a case of 'Option', he admits that the 'touching' is *partly* right [i.e. it is right in the event of the performer adopting that alternative]; this 'Touching' however has its source in the Veda;—and if the authority of this Veda is admitted, it cannot be *partial*;—as regards the 'covering up of the whole'—which according to the other party, is the second alternative in the option—that also would (according to him) be only *partly* right [i.e. only in the event of the performer adopting that alternative]; and what is only *partly right* can never justify the assumption of a Vedic text in support of itself; as any such assumption would be obstructed by the idea of 'touching' [which, as derived directly from the Vedic text, would be *absolutely* right, and hence very much more powerful than the 'covering up of the whole' which is admitted to be only *partly* right].—Hence unless it is recognised as *right, not wrong*, no Vedic text in its support, can be assumed.—Nor will it

be right to hold that the same alternative (of 'covering the whole') is *wrong* in one case and *right* in another;—because its source (or basis of authority) would be the same in the one case as in the other; if then it is *not wrong* in one case, it cannot be wrong in the other, as the authority of the Vedic text (on which the *Smṛti* is based) would be the same in all cases; the Vedic text cannot be operative in only one case, as a text is always found in the form of a *composition of words*; and this cannot be regarded as *wrong reading* in one case (and *right* in another). From all this it follows that the idea (of *covering of the whole post*, which is derived from *Smṛti*), in one case, can have no status other than that of a *mistake*; and consequently on account of its being in conflict (with the direct Vedic text), the idea of 'covering up the whole post' is held to have its source in either wrong learning or dream or some such other source of wrong cognitions. For so long as the said conflict is there, there can be no reason to justify the view that the idea of 'covering up the whole' is right. Hence the conclusion is that, just as (according to the other party also) no Vedic text (in support of the 'covering up of the whole') can be assumed in one case (i.e. in the case of the other alternative of 'touching' being adopted by the performer), so it cannot be assumed in the other case also; as the reason [for not assuming the Vedic text, i.e. the conflict with a direct Vedic text] remains the same in both cases.

Then again, there being a mutual interdependence, (the *Smṛti* regarding the 'covering up of the whole' cannot be right), because its significance would be dependent upon something extraneous to itself.—"What is this *mutual interdependence*?"—If the Smṛti-rule (regarding *covering up the whole*) is right, then the *touching* (laid down in the *Shruti*) is wrong,—and if the *Touching* is right, then the *Smṛti* is wrong; it is in this way that there is *mutual interdependence*.—Now as between these two (the *Shruti* laying down *Touching* and the *Smṛti* laying down *Covering up the whole*), the source of the *Touching* is fully recognised (in the Vedic text), while the source of the *Smṛti* has got to be found (assumed):—this is what is meant by the *Smṛti-rule* having 'its significance dependent upon something extraneous to itself'. Thus then, the source of the *Smṛti* being yet to be found, its authority is far from being established; and if the *Smṛti* is not authoritative, then the *Touching* (laid down in the *Shruti*) cannot be wrong;—and if the *Touching* is not wrong, then there can be no reason for assuming a Vedic text in support of the *Smṛti-rule*, for the simple reason that no validity (authority, trustworthiness) attaches to this latter.

Says the Opponent—"By this same process of reasoning, in so far as the notion of *Vrīhi* being the material for the sacrifice is right, there can be no room for the Vedic text laying down *Yava* (as the other optional alternative)".

Certainly there would be no room for such a Vedic text, if it did not exist there already; as a matter of fact however, the Vedic text prescribing *Yava* (as an optional alternative) is already there (and has not got to be *assumed*); and certainly when the text is there already, nothing can be said against it. In this case both the texts are there;—and the two are two distinct sentences; one of these speaks of the *Yava* only as the

substance for the sacrifice, and the other speaks of the *Vrīhi* only as the substance for it; and when something is distinctly mentioned by a sentence, it cannot be put aside. For this reason, in the case of *Yava and Vrīhi*, it is only right that Option should be admitted.—Similarly in the case of the two *Sāmans, Bṛhat and Rathantara*.

It is for the reason that it has been declared that *Smṛti* conflicting with *Shruti* is not trustworthy; consequently what has been said in the *Smṛti* regarding the 'Covering up of the whole Post' has to be disregarded.

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND MOTIVES.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) Some greedy priests being desirous of having a large piece of cloth, covered up the whole of the Post at a certain performance; this was what gave rise to the Smṛti-rule (that the whole post should be covered up).—(*b*) Some greedy Priest took food at the house of the Sacrificer after he had purchased the *Soma* [and this gave rise to the *Smṛti-rule* permitting such eating].—(*c*) Some people, with a view to conceal their want of virility, remained Religious Students for forty-eight years; and this is what gave rise to the Smṛti-rule permitting such a course.—[For this reason also, no authority can attach to the *Smṛti* which is found to have its source in such motives.]

This *Sūtra* (4) may also be taken by itself as embodying a separate independent *Adhikaraṇa*, as follows:—

ADHIKARAṆA (3) : *No authority attaches to Smṛtis prompted by worldly motives.*

SŪTRA 4.

IF WORLDLY MOTIVES ARE DISCERNIBLE THE SMṚTI-RULES CANNOT BE REGARDED AS TRUSTWORTHY.

[The foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* dealt with those Smṛti-rules that are in conflict with Vedic texts; the present *Adhikaraṇa* deals with those Smṛti-rules which are not in conflict with any Vedic texts, but which are found to be prompted by greed and other motives.]

Bhāṣya.

There are such *Smṛti-rules* as (*a*) 'The cloth used at the *Vaisarjana Homa* is to be taken by the Adhvaryu priest',—and (*b*) 'They should give away the cloth covering the Post'.—In regard to the authoritative character of these, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "they are authoritative, *because the agent is the same* (as declared in *Sūtra* 1. 3. 2)."—The *Siddhānta* view however is that such *Smṛti-rules* cannot be regarded as authoritative; because at the root of these there is something totally different (from motives of *Dharma*);—the fact being that some people did such an act through greed, and this gave *rise* to the *Smṛti*. This view (rejecting the authority of such *Smṛtis*) is more reasonable than the assuming of Vedic texts in their support.

[Kumārila does not accept the view propounded in these two *Adhikaraṇas*, whereby certain *Smṛti*-rules are held to be absolutely devoid of authority. According to him the form of the Siddhānta as embodied in Sūtra (2) should be as follows—'When there is a conflict between the ideas expressed by the Vedic text and the Smṛti it is the Vedic text that should be regarded as authoritative',—which means that in cases where the *Smṛti-texts* have expressed in other words the sense of certain *Vedic texts*, without quoting the exact words of these latter,—they make their own authority dependent upon the assumption of those texts whose sense they are meant to express; while the Vedic text, which declares what is not in agreement with what has been declared in the *Smṛti*, is self-sufficient in its authority; and as such this latter inspires greater confidence, and leads people to adopt the course laid down in it, in preference to the other course laid down in the *Smṛti*. But this does not mean that the *Smṛti* has no authority at all.—*For a full discussion, see Tantravārtika—Translation, pp. 154–165.*—On pp. 165–168 Kumārila suggests another interpretation of the Adhikaraṇas, whereby what are declared to be untrustworthy are, not the *Smṛtis* admittedly based upon the *Veda*, but those so-called '*Smṛtis*' which have been propounded by *Bauddhas*, *Jainas* and other heretical sects.]

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *What deals with the Act is more authoritative than what deals with its accessory.*

SŪTRAS (5-6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" IF IT BE HELD THAT WHEN THERE IS NO DISTURBANCE OF THE VEDIC TEXT, THE SMṚTI-RULE IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE VEDA,—OUR ANSWER IS THAT THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT, BECAUSE THE LIMIT HAS BEEN FIXED BY THE SCRIPTURES ".

[The case of *Smṛti* texts dealing with acts to be done for accomplishing certain results desired by man has been dealt with so far; it has been shown that they are accepted or disregarded according as they are found to be in agreement or in conflict with the Veda. We are now going to deal with those *Smṛti*-texts which bear upon such small acts as are not performed for accomplishing any definite purpose, but only come to be performed on certain occasions during a sacrificial performance.]

Bhāṣya.

The *Smṛti*-rules dealt with here are such as—(*a*) 'An act should be done after rinsing the mouth',—(*b*) 'An act should be done by one wearing the *Yajñopavita*',—(*c*) 'One should perform the acts with the right hand' and such others.

The question that arises in regard to these is—Are these *Smṛti*-rules in conflict with the Veda and hence should not be followed? Or, are they *not* in conflict with the Veda and therefore should be followed?

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*:—

"In this connection if it be held that—'Inasmuch as the following of the rules does not militate against anything declared in the Veda, they are *not* in conflict with it' (Sū. 5),—then, our answer to this is that it is not so; because if these rules were followed, then they would militate against the *Order* (of acts) laid down in the scriptures.—How?—Well, if one were to perform the *mouth-rinsing* and other acts (mentioned in the said rules) between the making of the *Veda* (a bundle of *kusha-grass*) and the making of the *Vedi* (a four-inch deep altar between two Fires),—it would militate against the Vedic text 'One should make the *Vedi* after making the *Veda*' [where the *order* prescribed is that the making of the *Veda* should be followed by the making of the *Vedi*; and if the rinsing of the mouth were to be done between the two, then that order would be infringed].—Similarly if one were to do all the acts with the right hand only (as laid down in the *Smṛti-rule*), sometimes the performance of the primary act might go beyond its prescribed time (by reason of the delay due to every act being done with the right hand only, which must get tired very soon); while by using both hands, the Primary Act would be completed well within its prescribed time."

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT WHEN NO MOTIVE CAN BE DETECTED, THEY SHOULD BE RECOGNISED AS USEFUL.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('but') serves to reject the view stated above.

The right view is that when *Smṛti*-texts like those under consideration are such as are not found to have been prompted by an improper motive, they must be accepted as authoritative.—"But they are found to militate against the prescribed *order* of sequence and the prescribed time."—Let them militate against it; that does not vitiate their authority; because the *rinsing of the mouth* is an *act*, while the *order of sequence* is only a quality of (accessory to) the act; and an *act* cannot be omitted for the sake of an *accessory*.—Further, it is only when the *acts* are already done that the *order of sequence* comes in subsequently; so that at the time that the *acts* appear there is no *order* present,—with what then will the acts be in conflict? [Hence there is nothing against the authority of the *Smṛti-rule* in question.]

Similarly, if with a view to guard against the transgression of time, one were to cease to act with the right hand only,—in this case also considerations of time should not alter the form of the act [i.e. the act to be done by the right hand should not be done by the left]; because Time is only a subsidiary factor in the performance and auxiliary to it; and hence for the sake of the Time, the Act should not be disturbed.

Further, *acting with the right hand* and *wearing the sacrificial thread* constitute purity (or cleanliness), and such things are not regarded as *interruptions* at all; because purity or cleanliness is a necessary adjunct to all actions. [And a necessary adjunct cannot be regarded as an interruption—says *Ṛjuvimalā*.]

From all this it follows that the Smṛti-rules relating to all these acts—Rinsing, Using the Right Hand, Wearing the Sacrificial Thread and the like—are authoritative (trustworthy).

[On this *adhikaraṇa* also, Kumārila holds an entirely different opinion. His contention is that none of the *Smṛti-rules* dealt with here are in any way against any Vedic texts; and as such there need be no separate *Adhikaraṇa* devoted to their consideration. According to him therefore, *sūtras* 5 and 6 form part of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, and *sūtra* 7 forms a distinct *adhikaraṇa* by itself. By this interpretation the sense of *sūtras* (5) and (6) is held to be as follows:—'If the Opponent argues that—" a rule emanating even from a heretic should be accepted as authoritative when it is found that it is not contrary to the Veda,—such rules for instance as that *one should be truthful, charitable* and so forth ", [sū. 5],—then we deny this, because the extent and number of authoritative scriptures is limited' [sū. 6];—the conclusion therefore is that '*Dharma* can bring about its results only when it is understood with the help of those scriptures which are recognised as having their basis in the Veda.'—As for *sūtra* (7), it stands, by itself embodying the *Adhikaraṇa* treating of the authoritative character of the *Practices of Good Men*; the sense of the *sūtra* being that 'those acts which cannot be ascribed to any worldly motives, and which are yet performed (by good men), must

be recognised as *dharma* '; this would be the *Siddhānta* as against the *Pūrvapakṣa* that "many practices are found to be such as are repugnant to the Veda, consequently no authority should attach to Practices." The meaning of the *Siddhānta* is that when, in regard to any particular Practice, we find that it is current among good men,—and we cannot attribute it to greed or any such sordid motive,—we should accept it as authoritative, as *Dharma*.

There is another interpretation suggested by Kumārila, by which Sūtra (5) is to be taken as part of *Adhikaraṇa* (4), and *sūtras* (6) and (7) as embodying the *Adhikaraṇa* dealing with the Practices of Good Men; under which *sūtra* (6) embodies the *Pūrvapakṣa* in the sense that "those practices cannot be regarded as authoritative in matters relating to *Dharma*, because the number and extent of authoritative scriptures is limited to the Veda and its auxiliaries;" and the *Siddhānta* in answer to this is found in *Sūtra* (7), in the sense already explained in the preceding paragraph.

There is yet another interpretation suggested by Kumārila, whereby all these three *sūtras* (5), (6), and (7) are taken as embodying the *Siddhānta* in answer to a *Pūrvapakṣa* from without, bearing upon the Practices of Good Men. The sense of the three *sūtras*, in this case, would be as follows—'That which is taught in the *Veda* and the *Smṛti*,—if this is not contradicted by the Practices of Good Men,—such practices can be accepted as authority on *Dharma*; but whenever there is the least thing repugnant to the teachings of the *Veda*, then, as there would be a conflict of authorities, the Practices cannot be accepted to have any authority at all.—

See *Tantravārtika*—Translation, pp. 173–203.]

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *A word should always be understood in the sense assigned to it in the scriptures.*

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" INASMUCH AS NO INCONGRUITY IS FOUND IN ANY OF THEM, THE SEVERAL SIGNIFICATIONS SHOULD BE EQUALLY (ACCEPTABLE)."

[It has been established that *Veda* and *Smṛti* are authoritative means of knowing *Dharma*. Now arises the question of the right comprehension of the meanings of words occurring in Vedic and Smṛti texts.]

Bhāṣya.

In such texts as—(*a*) 'The cooked offering consists of *Yava*', (*b*) 'Shoes of *Varāha*-skin', (Taitti. Brā. 1. 7. 9. 4; Maitrā. Saṁ. 4. 46; cf. Shata. Brā. 5. 4. 3. 19), (*c*) 'One collects the *Prājāpatyas* on the *Vetasa*-mat',—we find the words (*a*) '*yava*', '*varāha*' and '*vētasa*'.—Now (*a*) some people use the word '*yava*' in the sense of *Barley-corn*, others in the sense of *Long-pepper*;—(*b*) the word '*varāha*' is used by some in the sense of the *Hog*, by others in the sense of the *Black Bird*;—(*c*) some people use the word '*vetasa*' in the sense of the *Bañjula-creeper*, and others in the sense of the *Black-berry*.—Since the words have both significations, these latter should be regarded as options, and we may accept the one or the other as we choose.

[The question being as to which of the two significations is the right one, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that]—"Since both the meanings are found to be signified by the word, the acceptance of one or the other is optional (we may accept whichever we choose)".

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THAT WHICH IS BASED ON THE SCRIPTURES (IS TO BE REGARDED AS MORE AUTHORITATIVE); BECAUSE THE SCRIPTURES ARE THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY. [OR, THAT SENSE IN WHICH THE WORD IS USED BY PERSONS WHO TAKE THEIR STAND UPON THE SCRIPTURES IS TO BE ACCEPTED AS THE MORE AUTHORITATIVE; BECAUSE IT IS MORE RELIABLE THAN ANY OTHER.]

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*' ('in reality') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.

(*a*) As regards the word '*yava*' (the explanation of the two-fold usage lies in the fact that), if the word denotes the *Barley-corn*, then it can be

applied (indirectly) to the *Long-pepper*, by reason of its similarity to *Barley*; and conversely, if it denotes the *Long-pepper*, it can be applied to the *Barley*, by reason of its similarity to the *Long-pepper*.—"What is the similarity between the two?"—The similarity between the two consists in the fact that both *Barley* and *Long-pepper* plants grow after previous corn-plants are over.—"What then is the factor that determines which is the right signification of the term?'—That signification is the right one which is accepted by persons who *rely upon the scriptures*.—'Who are the persons that *rely upon the scriptures*?'—They that are cultured and learned; because such persons are conversant with the unbroken tradition bearing upon words and the Vedas; that is the reason why cultured persons are the 'basis', means, for ascertaining the sense of Vedic and Smṛti texts.

In regard to the subject under consideration,—following upon the injunction that 'the *Karambha*-vessel should be filled with *Yava*,' the declaration (of the scriptures) is to the effect that the '*Yava*-plants flourish merrily when all other plants are withering', where the Veda shows that the word '*Yava*' stands for Barley [as the Barley-plant flourishes just before the spring when all other plants shed their leaves]. And since we find this indication in the Veda, we conclude that there is a long unbroken tradition behind the use of the word '*Yava*' in the sense of *Barley*; from which it follows that the word can be applied to the *Long-pepper* only indirectly (figuratively);—hence the conclusion is that the cake is to be made of Barley-meal.

(*b*) In regard to the word '*varāha*', the Vedic text 'therefore cows run after the *varāha*' (Shata. Brā. 4. 4. 3. 19) shows that the word '*varāha*' denotes the Hog, as it is the Hog that cows run after [at a festival held along with the *Dīpāvalī*].

(*c*) In regard to the '*vetasa*', the Vedic text 'the *Vetasa* is water-born' indicates that the word '*vetasa*' stands for the *Bañjūla*-creeper, as it is the *Bañjūla*-creeper that grows in water, while the Blackberry-tree grows either on dry ground or on hill-streams.

[Kumārila takes exception to the above presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa*; for reasons, see *Tantravārtika*, Translation, pp. 207-208. He therefore takes the *Adhikaraṇa* as discriminating between the usage of words among *Āryas* and among *Mlechchhas*. The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"In regard to all visible things, the signification accepted by the *Ārya* and the *Mlechchha* is equally authoritative (Sū. 8); it is only in regard to superphysical things that the usage of the *Ārya* has superior authority; in the case of ordinary things the expressiveness of all words has to be accepted as equally eternal,—from the mere fact of their being expressive; consequently, so long as the word denotes a certain meaning, it does not make any difference whether the signification is known among *Āryas* or *Mlechchhas*."—In reply to this we have the *Siddhānta* in Sū. (9) in the sense that that sense has to be accepted as more authoritative which is accepted by people who take their stand upon scriptures—i.e. the *Āryas*.

Kumārila offers another interpretation of the *Adhikaraṇa* as dealing with the comparative authority of *Smṛti* and *Custom*. In cases where a *Custom* is repugnant to a *Smṛti-text*, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "*both are to be regarded as equally authoritative* (Sū. 8); because both equally derive their authority from the

Veda ".—The *Siddhānta* in answer to this says that the *Smṛti* is possessed of superior authority, because it is the *Smṛti* that is based directly on the Veda (Sū. 9). In the case of the *Smṛti*, the corroborative Vedic text is assumed directly from the fact of its being compiled by people learned in the Veda; whereas in the case of *Custom*, we have first to assume a corresponding *Smṛti-text*, and then on the strength of this assumed *Smṛti-text*, we have to assume the corroborative Vedic text; the support of the Veda thus in this case is one step further removed.

There is yet another interpretation of the *Adhikaraṇa* suggested by Kumārila, by which it deals with the comparative authority of the sense conveyed by words in the Veda and that conveyed in common parlance. The word '*ashvavāla*', for instance, used in the Veda, denotes *reed*, while in common parlance, it denotes *horse's hair*;—the question arising which of these should be accepted as authoritative, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "*both are of equal authority* (Sū. 8), because in the matter of the signification of words, the Veda does not in any way differ from other sources of verbal knowledge; its superior authority being restricted only to things pertaining to *Dharma* ".—The *Siddhānta* in answer to this is that that signification of words which is based upon the scriptures is decidedly more authoritative, because the knowledge of *Dharma* is obtained by means of the scriptures alone (Sū. 9). A signification accepted and sanctioned by the Veda is irrevocably fixed and can never be set aside, while that sanctioned by ordinary usage is variable and liable to change.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The usage of words current among Mlechchhas is also authoritative.*

SŪTRA (10).

THE MEANING IMPARTED (BY THE MLECHCHHA, TO A WORD) WOULD BE DULY COMPREHENDED BECAUSE IT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY AUTHORITY [OR, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS SANCTIONED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE VEDA, BECAUSE IT IS NOT INCONGRUOUS].

Bhāṣya.

[It has been established that that meaning is to be regarded as more authoritative which is accepted by persons who take their stand upon the scriptures.] Now in the Veda we meet with certain words which are not used by the *Āryas* (who are the people that take their stand on the scriptures) in any sense at all, but are in use among *Mlechchhas*; such are the words '*pika*', '*nēma*', '*sata*', '*tāmarasa*' and such others. In regard to these, there arises the question—Are we to deduce their meaning from their etymology, commentaries and roots with the help of lexicons and grammar? Or should we accept that as their meaning in which sense they are used by the *Mlechchhas*?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"What has been established as authoritative is the usage of *cultured* people, not the *Smṛti* (Remembrance) of *uncultured* people (like the *Mlechchhas*). Hence it should be necessary to assume the meaning through explanations, etymology and grammar; and it is only thus that these latter would be of use. Further, uncultured people are not very careful in regard to words and their meanings, while the others (i.e. the cultured people) are very careful. From all this it follows that in the case of the words mentioned, their meaning should be deduced from the roots from which they are derived."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*—The *meaning that is imparted to a word* even by uncultured people,—even though not known to the cultured,—*would be comprehended*,—and it would not be right to reject what has been comprehended and which is *not incompatible with any authority*.—The argument has been urged that "what can be accepted as authoritative is the usage of cultured people only".—But that refers to such things as are not amenable to sense-perception.—The other argument urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) is that "it is only cultured people that are careful regarding the use of words".—In answer to that we say that there are some things in which the *Mlechchhas* are more careful (and reliable); for instance, in the catching and rearing of birds.—The third argument urged is that "it is only thus that explanations, etymologies and grammar would be of use".—But these will have their use in regard to those words whose meaning is not known even to the *Mlechchhas* (and so we have not even

that usage to guide us).—Further, if we were to deduce the meanings of words from their etymology, etc., then, there would be no fixity (and definiteness) regarding the meaning of words, and there would always be uncertainty.—From all this we conclude that (according to the usage of the *Mlechchhas*), the word '*pika*' should be taken in the sense of the *cuckoo*,—the word '*nēma*' in the sense of *half*,—the word '*tāmarasa*' in the sense of *lotus*,—the word '*sata*' in the sense of '*wooden vessel, round in shape* and *with hundred-holes*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The authority of the Kalpasūtras is not self-sufficient.*

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—IF IT BE URGED THAT "[THE KALPASŪTRAS CONSTITUTE] THE SCRIPTURE OF RITUALS",—

Bhāṣya.

[The case of the *Kalpasūtras* stands on a different basis from that of the *Smṛtis*; they contain nothing more than the Vedic Ritualistic Procedure in a systematised form; there is nothing in their contents beyond what is actually found in the Vedic texts available. In the *Smṛtis*, as we have found, there are many things which are not found in the Veda, and for which corroborative Vedic texts have got to be assumed. With all this however, the *Kalpasūtras* are compilations made by human authors, and to this extent their authority is open to doubt.—Kumārila (*Tantravārtika*—Translation, p. 224) has explained the term '*Kalpa*' in this connection as 'treatises that point out the method and procedure of sacrifices in the form of definite regulations'. These Sūtras are the work of Baudhāyana, Varāha, Mashaka, and others—says Kumārila.]

What are treated of here are the *Kalpasūtras*—by Mashaka, Hastika, and Kauṇḍinya.—The question is—Are these authoritative (in themselves) or not authoritative?

On this we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"Inasmuch as these Sūtras constitute the '*Ritualistic scripture*', they must be authoritative,—we assert. These are statements made by truthful persons.—'How is that known?'—We know this from the fact that there is perfect agreement between these statements and those contained in the Vedas. For instance, the 'cups' mentioned in these are the same as those mentioned in the Veda; the 'bricks' mentioned in these are the same as those mentioned in the Veda. From this it follows that the teachers (who compiled the *Kalpasūtras*) were truthful persons; and the *Shruti* also declares that 'the word of the Teacher is authoritative'.—It might be argued that 'the authoritative character of these *Sūtras* is not directly perceived (to be inherent in themselves, as is done in the case of the Veda)'.—But this objection would have no force; as the said authoritative character is ascertained by another means of cognition, in the shape of a verbal assertion. [This assertion being in the form of the text quoted above regarding 'The Teacher's Word' being authoritative, and also in the form of the text wherein the *Kalpas* are mentioned along with the *Mantra* and the *Brāhmaṇa* as to be read daily.]—Lastly, the *Kalpas* are actually treated with the same regard as the Vedic texts.—For these reasons, the *Kalpasūtras* are authoritative (by themselves)."

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THERE IS NO PROPER COMPOSITION.

Bhāṣya.

What has been asserted in the *Pūrvapakṣa* is not possible, *because there is no proper composition*; as a matter of fact, the *Kalpasūtra* is not composed in the proper manner, there being no accentuation in it (and hence it cannot be treated on the same footing as the Vedic text).

SŪTRA (13).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE ARE NO SUPPLEMENTARY PASSAGES.

Bhāṣya.

[In the *Kalpasūtra*] we meet with such texts as 'He appoints the Priests;—the Priests thus appointed perform the sacrifice;—they take their seat on the sacrificial ground'. In all this no *injunctive* word is found, because throughout it is the Present Tense ending that has been used. Nor is there any valedictory supplementary passage (from which the Injunction could be deduced). For this reason such a text can have no authority (regarding *Dharma*).—As for the 'regard' that people have been spoken of (in the *Pūrvapakṣa*) as having for the *Kalpasūtra*,—that is due to concomitance; i.e. to the fact that *Kalpa*-texts are interspersed with Vedic texts.—As regards the Vedic text (quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣa*, that 'the Teacher's word is authoritative'),—that means nothing; as it is a purely commendatory statement.—"Why should it be treated as a commendatory statement?"—Because in the context where this text occurs there is a totally different Injunction—to the effect that 'the cake dedicated to Agni is baked upon eight pans'; and it is in this connection that we have the said text ('The Words of the Teacher, *Āchārya*, is authoritative'), where the term '*āchārya*' is meant to stand for the *Veda*, in its etymological sense of 'strengthening the intellect' ['*āchinoti buddhim*']. Or, what the said text means is that 'the word of the Teacher is authoritative '*through its dependence upon something*';—"what is that something?"—it is that which is itself rightly recognised as self-authoritative (i.e. the Veda).

As for the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument that the *Kalpasūtras* are the work of truthful persons,—our answer is that—*that is not so*, because—

SŪTRA (14).

THE WORD 'ALL' HAS BEEN USED (IN THE KALPASŪTRA), WHILE THERE IS AT HAND A SCRIPTURAL TEXT (TO THE CONTRARY).

Bhāṣya.

The words of the Pūrvapakṣin's '*āchārya*', 'Teacher' (the author of the *Kalpasūtra*) are—'The *Amāvāsyā* (*Darsha*) sacrifice is to be performed on *all days*'; while there is at hand the scriptural (Vedic text)—'The *Paurṇa*-

masa is to be performed on the Full-moon day and the *Amāvāsya* (*Darsha*) on the Moonless Day'.—Thus, inasmuch as these authors have made statements contrary to the Veda, they cannot be 'truthful'; and hence their work (the Kalpasūtra) cannot be authoritative.

[From Sūtras 11 and 12, Kumārila has deduced two additional *Adhikaraṇas*:—(1) That the Smṛtis and the six subsidiary sciences of the Veda, like the Kalpasūtra, have no authority independent of the Veda; and (2) that no authority attaches to the non-Vedic scriptures—such as those of the *Bauddha* and other heretical sects.]

Adhikaraṇa (8): *Holākādhikaraṇa—The Authoritative Character of Popular Customs.*

SŪTRA (15).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Inasmuch as all assumption is limited in its scope, the authority (of Customs, based upon the assumption of Vedic texts) must be qualified by that limitation".

Bhāṣya.

[The authority of Usages and Customs having been established in a general way, the question is raised regarding the extent of the authority of particular customs—Is this authority local or universal ?]

"The authority of *Smṛti* and *Custom* is held to depend upon the assumption (of corroborative Vedic texts);—the very fact that establishes their authority also proves that that authority is limited (localised). Hence such customs as *Holākā* and the rest should be practised by 'easterners' only; —the *Āhnīnaibuka* and the like, by 'southerners';—the *Udvṛṣabha-yajña* and the rest by the 'Northerners' only; just as the practice regarding the various numbers of Hair-tufts on the head is local,—some people keeping three, some five."

SŪTRA (16).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the Duty should be universal, as all Injunction has that (universal) character.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*', 'in reality', serves to set aside the view expressed above.

Customs like those mentioned should be '*dharma*' (Duty) for all;—why ?—because *all Injunction has that character*;—the term '*vidhāna*' 'Injunction' (in the *Sūtra*) stands for *that by which the enjoining is done*, i.e. the *injunctive word*;—it is the injunctive word that is assumed in support of the *Smṛti*;—and the injunctive word cannot denote either the *Class* (universal) or the *Individual* (particular);—in fact, there is no one single word that denotes the universal character common to all persons (performers of actions) which could be assumed (as part of the Vedic text in support of the Custom).—Hence the only reasonable view to take is that the Injunction applies to *all persons*.—[The Vedic text assumed cannot refer to any particular *Class*, like the 'Easterner', etc.; or to any *individual* person; nor is there any such universal class-character as would include *all persons*;—hence the absence in the assumed Vedic text of such an all-comprehensive word cannot be rightly urged as a reason for restricting the authority of the particular Customs.—*Ṛjuvimalā*].—Why so ?—Because all that the basic authority (i.e. the assumed Vedic text) says is that 'such

and such an act should be done', and there is no authority for restricting its application (to any particular persons).

The *Pūrvapakṣin* has cited the case of the variety in the custom relating to the number of Hair-tufts on the head.—The answer to this is given in the following *Sūtra* :—

SŪTRA (17).

RESTRICTION COULD ONLY BE DUE TO DIRECT PERCEPTION.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of the Hair-tufts, we clearly perceive that the restriction is due to restrictions of the *Gotra*. [Persons belonging to one *Gotra* keeping three tufts, those belonging to another keeping five, and so on.]

SŪTRA (18).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO SUCH INDICATIVE MARK AS WOULD INCLUDE ALL (THOSE PARTICULAR PERSONS TO WHOM THE CUSTOM MAY BE SOUGHT TO BE RESTRICTED).

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* is to be prefaced by a few words.—"What are those words ?"—(These words are)—"Why cannot there be a restriction through indicative marks,—such as we have in such rules as 'the white man shall be the *Hotṛ* priest' [where the work of the *Hotṛ* priest is restricted to such men as are *white*] ?"—[It is in answer to this question that we have the *Sūtra* which means as follows:]—*There is no such indicative mark as would include all* those who are actually found to follow a particular custom.—As for such characteristics as 'dark, large-bodied, red-eyed' (which have been mentioned as the indicative marks of persons following the *Āhnīnaibuka* rites), we find, as a matter of fact, that all men possessing these marks do not follow that custom, and also that persons who do not possess these marks do actually follow it.—For this reason there can be no restriction.—As for the instance cited of 'the white *Hotṛ*', that is a clear Vedic text (and so we have to accept it).

SŪTRA (19).

THE NAME ALSO IS DUE TO CONNECTION WITH (RESIDENCE IN) A COUNTRY.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the restriction be due to the name ? Those who are *named* 'Southerners' would perform the *Āhnīnaibuka* ; those who are *named* 'Northerners' would perform the *Udvṛṣabha-yajña* ;—those who are *named* 'Easterners' would perform the *Holākā* ; just as in the case of the *Rājasūya* sacrifice, we have the restriction that 'the *Rājā* shall perform the *Rājasūya* sacrifice' (where the restriction is due to the name '*rājā*', which can apply to the *Kṣattriya* only)".

This cannot be; the names (mentioned) are due to connection with a particular country [i.e. the name 'Southerner' applies to the person connected with, living in the Southern country]; but as a matter of fact, we find that a man who has gone out of the Southern country (and his connection with that country has ceased) and is residing in the East or in the North (and hence entitled to the name 'Easterner' or 'Northerner') still continues to perform the *Āhnīnaibuka*. Similarly, the 'Northerners' though residing in other countries, still continue to perform the *Udvṛṣabha-yajña*; and the 'Easterners' residing in other countries still continue to perform the *Holākā*. In fact, when a man migrates from one country to another, he does not necessarily follow the customs of the latter.—From all this, we conclude that there can be no restriction (in the authority of the Popular Customs).—As for the case of 'the *Rājasūya* being performed by the *Rājā*' only,—'*rājā*', *Kṣattriya*, *is* a definite caste, restricted within well-defined limits.

SŪTRA (20).

IF THE OPPONENT SHOULD URGE THAT—"[IF THE NAMES WERE DUE TO ACTUAL RESIDENCE IN A COUNTRY, THEN] IT COULD NOT BE APPLIED TO ONE WHO HAS GONE AWAY FROM THAT COUNTRY TO ANOTHER COUNTRY",—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE NEXT *Sūtra*.]

Bhāṣya.

If you think that—"if the names were due to actual residence in the country, then the name could not be applied to one who has gone to, and is residing in, another country; as a matter of fact however, we find that the name '*Māthura*' (which according to the *Siddhānta* would be a name for one actually resident in *Mathurā*) is actually applied to a man who has no connection with (is not resident in) *Mathurā*, and is residing in another country; from this it follows that the name is not due to *residence* in the country";—if such is the argument of the Opponent, then our answer is as follows:—

SŪTRA (21).

THE NAME WOULD BE DUE TO CONNECTION (RESIDENCE), AS IN THE CASE OF THE NAME '*Māthura*'.

Bhāṣya.

Even when the name is due to connection with the country, the name would *not* be inapplicable to one who has gone out of that country; because the name is '*due to connection*'—i.e. due to *mere* connection, not due to connection in the past only, or in the present only, or in the future only. Because we actually find the name '*Māthura*' applied—(*a*) to one who has started for Mathurā (his 'connection' thus being in the future), (*b*) to one who is residing in Mathurā (his 'connection' being in the present), and (*c*) to one who has migrated from Mathurā (his 'connection' being in the past); and it is only when a man has none of these 'connections' with Mathurā that he is not called '*Māthura*'.

From this it is clear that there could be no restriction based upon name.

SŪTRA (22).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"[THE COUNTRY IN WHICH A CERTAIN PRACTICE IS PREVALENT] MAY BE THE QUALIFICATION OF THAT CUSTOM ITSELF,—JUST AS 'SLOPING' (WHICH QUALIFIES THE GROUND)."

Bhāṣya.

"Why cannot the *country* be subsidiary (qualification) to the act or practice? For instance, that country where the soil is mostly black is the one where the *Āhnīnaibuka* is performed.—Just as in the text 'One should perform the *Vaishvadeva* sacrifice on ground sloping eastward' (Mān. Shr. Sū. 1. 7. 1. 5) (where the particular sloping ground qualifies the sacrificial act)".

SŪTRA (23).

BUT THAT (SPECIFICATION) WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THAT BY A QUALIFICATION OF THE PERFORMER.

Bhāṣya.

It has been shown above that such indicative qualifications as 'dark-skinned', 'red-eyed' and the like as belonging to the performer, are indefinite, and are not in keeping with the actual state of things;—any indication by the name of a country would be equally indefinite. Because as a matter of fact, even in the country 'where the soil is dark', there are many people who *do not* perform the act (of the *Āhnīnaibuka*),—and conversely men residing in a country with other characteristics (than the *dark soil*) actually do perform it.—Thus then, there could be no restriction through the name of the country.

As for the 'ground sloping eastward', its connection with the *Vaishvadeva* sacrifice has been fixed by the Veda itself (hence its case is not analogous to that of the Customs under discussion).

[Sūtras 15 and 16 have been taken by Kumārila as also embodying an independent *Adhikaraṇa*, dealing with the authority of such locally-accepted *Dharmashāstras* as those of Gautama, Shaṅkha-Likhita and the like. There arises a doubt regarding the exact nature of the authority of these,—because in actual practice the work of Gautama and of Gobhila are followed only by *Sāmavedins*,—the work of *Vashiṣṭha* only by *Ṛgvedins*,—those of Shaṅkha-Likhita only by the *Vājasaneyi-Shukla-Yajurvedins*.—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "these works cannot be put in the same category as the universally recognised Smṛtis of Manu and others; their authority must be limited."—The *Siddhānta* is that on account of the universal character of the injunctions contained in the works in question, these must be accepted as applicable to all persons who are capable of acting up to them; as the said *Smṛtis* themselves do not contain any words that would limit their operation, the Vedic texts also that would be assumed in support of them would not contain any such restrictive word; hence there can be nothing to justify any restrictions being placed upon the *Smṛti*-works in question.]

ADHIKARAṆA (9) : *Treating of the Grammatical Smṛtis.*

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO INJUNCTION REGARDING THEIR USE, THERE SHOULD BE NO RESTRICTION IN REGARD TO WORDS."

[Works dealing with grammar have also been classed under '*Smṛtis*'. The use and authority of these is now discussed. The *Bṛhatī* has raised an objection against introducing this topic here. It says—'What has the authoritative or unauthoritative character of the Grammatical rules got to do with the *authority of the Veda*, which is the sole subject-matter of the present *adhyāya* ?—Even if the corrupt forms of words, as '*gāvī*', etc., were really expressive and eternal, what effect would that have upon the Vedic Injunction ?—The answer that the *Bṛhatī* supplies is that if there were no restrictions regarding the exact form in which a word denotes a certain thing, then the comprehension of Vedic texts would be vague and indefinite, and there would be no certainty regarding a certain word being expressive of a certain thing; and this vagueness and uncertainty would shake the authority and trustworthy character of the Veda itself. The rules of Grammar however help us to know in what particular form the word—'horse' for instance—really denotes the particular thing, horse; and thus they help us to obtain a definite idea of the meaning of Vedic Texts.]

Bhāṣya.

This *Adhikaraṇa* is going to deal with the case of such words as '*gauḥ*' (the grammatically correct Sanskrit word) and '*gāvī*', '*goṇī*', '*gopotalikā*' and other corrupt (Vernacular) forms of the Sanskrit word.

The question to consider is—Are, *or are not*, the corrupt forms '*gāvī*; and the rest rightly expressive of the *animal with the dewlap* (the cow), in the same manner as the correct form '*gauḥ*' is ? That is, is it only the one (Sanskrit) word, which has behind its use an unbroken tradition, that is rightly expressive of the thing and all the rest are mere corrupt forms of it ? Or are they all equally eternal (in their expressive potency)!?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—" They are all equally expressive and eternal.—Why ?—Because there is actual cognition; the *animal with the dewlap* is cognised through the corrupt words '*gāvī*' and the rest; this shows that even a hundred years back the expressive relation between these words and the said animal was there; and so on and on backwards which establishes their beginningless (eternal) character. Nor is there any originator of this relationship (between the corrupt word and its meaning),—as has been fully established.—From all this it follows that all the words (the original Sanskrit and the corrupt Vernacular) are correct,—people should make use of all of them,—because they all serve the purpose

of expressing the meaning; and they are to be treated as synonymous in the same manner as the *Sanskrit* words '*hasta*', '*pāṇi*' and '*kara*' are.—In fact words are used for a definite purpose (that of expressing their meaning), and not for any transcendental result. Nor is there any injunction regarding their use. Hence there can be no such restriction as that only one is correct and the others incorrect".

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BECAUSE ITS UTTERANCE IS DUE TO (HUMAN) EFFORT, THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF SLIPS.

Bhāṣya.

It is with a considerable effort that people pronounce words: for instance, (in every act of utterance) the wind rises from the navel, expands in the chest, undergoes evolutions in the throat, strikes the head, turns back and spreading over the regions of the mouth, renders manifest the various sounds. In this (long drawn-out process) there is every possibility of the utterer making slips; just as a man falls in the mud, when he thinks that he is falling on dry ground; or he touches a thing *twice* while he thinks of touching it only *once*.—The utterance and use of the corrupt words may have originated from such slips,—and they need not necessarily be taken as having an unbroken tradition behind them.

SŪTRA (26).

IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO HAVE SEVERAL WORDS (TO DENOTE THE SAME THING).

Bhāṣya.

It is not reasonable to hold that 'there are similar words having the same meaning and all having an unbroken tradition (of usage) behind them'. Because this view is held entirely on the strength of the fact that we find the corrupt words bringing about the cognition of the thing denoted;—but this cognition can be explained as coming about through the *correct* word itself which is brought to the mind by its similarity (to the corrupt word pronounced); [the word '*gāvī*', e.g. brings to mind the correct word '*gauḥ*' or '*gāvaḥ*', which brings about the cognition of the thing denoted, *cow*.]—Thus then, we conclude that among all the words cited, there is only one ('*gauḥ*') which is *beginningless* (eternal), all the rest are corrupt forms.

In the case of the synonyms '*hastaḥ*', '*karaḥ*', '*pāṇiḥ*', the connection of every one of them with the thing denoted is beginningless,—such being the teaching of authoritative teachers [according to whom all these words are grammatically correct; while '*gāvī*', '*goṇī*', etc., are *not* grammatically correct].

SŪTRA (27).

ON THIS POINT, THE TRUTH CAN BE ASCERTAINED 'THROUGH CLOSE ATTENTION' [OR, 'THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF CERTAIN GENERAL PRINCIPLES'—ACC. TO *Tantravārtika*].

Bhāṣya.

"But how are we to ascertain the truth in this matter (as to which word is correct and which incorrect)?"

The *Sūtra* says that this can be ascertained (easily).—People desirous of gaining an end are found to be prone to close attention; (in the case of persons desirous of retaining the correct form of a word) we find that those who give close attention keep on repeating (that word), and thus it becomes possible for them to retain it in their memory. It is a fact that we see in our experience that what is frequently repeated is not lost hold of (forgotten).—Hence that form of the word is to be accepted as 'correct' which is declared to be 'correct' by people who have given this close attention to it.

SŪTRA (28).

PEOPLE ARE UNABLE (TO PRONOUNCE THE CORRECT WORD;—AND YET THE MEANING IS EXPRESSED) BECAUSE OF THE SIMILARITY (OF THE CORRUPT TO THE CORRECT WORD).

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that "as a matter of fact, even from the corrupt words '*gāvī*' and the rest, the meaning is comprehended, consequently, the relationship of these also to that meaning should be regarded as eternal."—But the fact of the matter is that when a corrupt word is uttered, it is a sign of *incapacity*; that the man desiring to pronounce the word '*gauḥ*', pronounces it, through some incapacity, as '*gāvī*', and yet the other person hearing the word thus pronounced realises that this man wishes to speak of the *animal with the dewlap*, and to that end he wishes to utter the word '*gauḥ*', but pronounces it as '*gāvī*'.—Now other people who have heard the word thus uttered and understood as denoting the *animal with the dewlap*, come to use the form '*gāvī*' when they themselves wish to speak of that animal;—and it is thus that the corrupt words '*gāvī*' and the rest come to bring about the cognition of the *animal with the dewlap*;—this is rendered possible by the fact that the word '*gāvī*' is similar to the correct word '*gauḥ*'.

SŪTRA (29).

In the case of the wrong use of affixes, (the comprehension of the meaning of the word) is due to the fact of a part (of the incorrect word, i.e. the base) being the same (as that of the correct word).

Bhāṣya.

In those cases also where a word is used with a wrong affix, the comprehension of the meaning is due to the same (similarity); e.g. when one says '*ashmakaiḥ āgachchhāmi*' (instead of '*ashmakēbhyaḥ āgachchhāmi*" in the sense of 'I am coming from the *Ashmaka* country'), the fact of the basic term '*ashmaka*' being common brings to the mind of the hearer the correct word '*ashmakēbhyaḥ*' (with the Ablative affix), and then only does he comprehend the right meaning ('I am coming *from the Ashmaka* country').—Similarly when we come across the corrupt form '*gāvī*', we are reminded of the correct term '*gō*', and thence *the animal with the dewlap* becomes comprehended.

ADHIKARAṆA (10 A): *The Word in the Veda and the thing spoken of by it are the same as those in common parlance.*

SŪTRA (30).

[(*a*) SIDDHĀNTA OF ADHIKARAṆA *A*]—THE MEANING (AND THE WORD) MUST BE ONE AND THE SAME, AS THUS ALONE ARE INJUNCTIONS OF ACTIONS POSSIBLE; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENTIATION (BETWEEN THE TWO).

Bhāṣya.

Now there arises the question—Are the words '*gauḥ*' and the rest expressive of the *Class* or of the *Individual*?

(Before this question can be answered) we have to investigate the question—are the words in the Veda the same as those used in common parlance or different? Are they denotative of the same things as in common parlance or different ones?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—"The words in the Veda are different from those in common parlance, and their meanings also are different.—Why?—Because they are named differently and their forms also are different. The difference in their naming is apparent in such statements as 'These words and expressions are *Vaidika* and those others are *laukika*'. In the Veda we find the statement that '*Agni* killed the *Vṛttras*' (*Ṛgveda* 6. 16. 34); and the form of this word '*agni*' (as denoting *Indra*) must be different from that of the word '*agni*' as used in common parlance (as denoting *Fire*).—The words being different, the things spoken of (by means of those words) must also be different. Further, we meet with the statement that '*Uttānā vai devagavā vahanti*' (Āpastamba—*Shrauta-Sūtra* 11. 7. 6),—which means 'the cows that belong to the deities move on their backs'; and from this statement it follows that the animals spoken of by the word '*go*' (in '*gavā*') are those *that walk on their backs*; and thus it is clear that the thing denoted by the word '*gauḥ*' in the Veda is different from that spoken of by that word in common parlance. Similarly, there is another statement—'*Dēvēbhyo vanaspatē havīṃṣi hiraṇyaparṇa pradivastē artham*' (*Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* 3. 6. 11. 2), from which it follows that the thing spoken of in the Veda by the word '*vanaspati*' is *a divinity with golden leaves*. Again, we have the statement '*Ētat vai daivyam madhu yad ghṛtam*', where the word '*ghṛta*' has been used in the sense of *Honey*.—From all these it is clear that the meanings of words used in the Veda are different (from those of the same words as used in common parlance)."

The *Siddhānta* in answer to the above is as follows:—

The words in the Veda are the same as those in common parlance, and the things expressed by them are also the same.—Why?—Because *thus*

alone are injunctions of actions possible; it is possible to have an injunction of action, only when the words are the same and the things denoted by them are the same. If the two sets of words were different, then their meanings could not be understood (by ordinary men). Hence the two sets of words must be the same.

"What you are pointing out is the useful purpose served by the two being the same; please point out some reason for regarding them as the same."

This reason is provided by the next clause in the *Sutra*—'*avibhāgāt*', '*because there is no differentiation between the two*'; that is, we do not perceive any difference between the words in the Veda and those in common parlance; hence it follows that the words are one and the same. Similarly we comprehend the same things denoted by the words in the Veda as those denoted by those in common parlance; and hence we declare that these also are not different.—As regards the argument that (*a*) (in the Veda) those animals are called *cows which move on their backs*—(*b*) *honey* is called '*ghṛta*'—and (*c*) '*vanaspati*' is the name given to *that which has golden leaves*,—there are no such statements (in the Veda) as that 'those animals are to be called *go* which move on their backs'; all that the statement says is that 'the cows move on their backs'. If this statement were taken as predicating the '*gotva*' (the character of *cow*, of those that move on their backs), then the clause 'move on the backs' would be a mere reiteration (a reference to something already known); and yet no such animals are known as 'move on their backs'; [any *reference* to those therefore being not possible] it will thus be necessary to take this 'moving on the back' as the predicate of the sentence; and if that is the predicate, then the 'character of the cow' could not be the predicate (of the same sentence); as in that case there would be a syntactical split.—Further, if the words of the Veda were different from those in common parlance, then we could not ever comprehend the meanings of the words '*uttānāḥ*' (on their backs) and the rest found in the Veda; so that it would be all the more impossible for us to comprehend the 'character of the cow', which also is unknown to us (and which forms the predicate of the Vedic sentence containing the words '*uttānāḥ*', etc.).—Nor is the statement of the 'cows moving on their backs' quite meaningless and useless; because it could be taken as serving the useful purpose of commendation.—These same considerations apply to the case of the other two statements—regarding *Honey* being spoken of as *Ghṛta*, and the *golden-leafed* thing being spoken of as '*Vanaspati*'.—From all this it follows that the words and their meanings are the same in the Veda and in common parlance.

[This same *sūtra* 30 is also taken as embodying the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the following *Adhikaraṇa* 10 B.]

ADHIKARAṆA (10 B): *Words denote Classes.*

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—" (a) [WORDS CANNOT DENOTE CLASS], AS IF THEY DID SO, NO INJUNCTION OF ACTIONS WOULD BE POSSIBLE;— (b) [NOR CAN WORDS DENOTE BOTH CLASS AND INDIVIDUAL, BECAUSE] A WORD CAN HAVE ONLY ONE MEANING;—(c) [AS FOR THE NOTION OF CLASS THAT ARISES FROM THE WORD] THAT IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE TWO [CLASS AND INDIVIDUAL) ARE INSEPARABLE".

Bhāṣya.

If (i.e. admitting that) the things denoted by words in common parlance are the same (as those denoted by them in the Veda), there arises the further question—Is it the *Class* or the *Individual* that is denoted by the word ?

But first of all we have to consider—what is 'Class' and what is 'Individual' ?

Among Substances, Qualities and Actions—that factor which is *common* to several individuals is the 'Class', and that which possesses certain specific (uncommon) characteristics is the 'Individual'.

"Why then should there be a doubt (regarding the meaning of words)?"

Because when the word '*gauḥ*' ('cow') is pronounced, there appears the notion of the *Class*, and yet it is the *Individual* that is connected with actions.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—

"It is the *Individual* that is denoted by the word—Why ?—Because *if they did, no injunction of action would be possible*; i.e. if words denoted the *Class*, there could be no injunction of such actions as *killing, washing, cutting* and so forth [as none of these actions could be done to the entire *Class*].

It might be argued that "in cases where the utterance of the word would otherwise become entirely useless, the word may be taken as denoting the *Individual*, but in all other cases it should be taken as denoting the *Class*".—But it has been already pointed out (as the conclusion of Adhikaraṇa 10 A) that it is not right to have the same word denoting several things.

"'How then does the notion of the *Class* appear (when a word is pronounced)?'

The answer to this is that the *Class* would be the distinguishing feature

of the *Individual* denoted by the word, the idea being that 'the animal that has this *Class* (*Commonalty* or generic character) is the *cow* (*gauḥ*);'—Just as we have the idea that 'the man who has the stick is the *stick-er*', and yet the word '*stick-er*' does not denote the *stick*, so also in the case in question (though we have the idea that 'the animal that has this *Class* or generic character is the cow', yet the word 'cow' does not denote the said *Class*)."

SŪTRA (31).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE NO WORDS EXPRESSIVE OF (QUALITIES AS) SUBSISTING IN SUBSTANCES."

Bhāṣya.

"The term '*dravyashabda*' (in the *sūtra*) stands for '*dravyāshraya-shabda*', i.e. 'word for,—i.e. expressive of—that of which substance is the substratum,—i.e. the Quality, [which is what subsists in substances].'—If words denoted the *Class*, then there would be no word expressive of qualities,—such as we have in the expressions '*six* cows are to be given', '*twelve* cows are to be given', '*twenty-four* cows are to be given'; here, (if the word 'cows' denoted the *Class*) no connection with such a *Class* of the numbers *six* and the rest would be possible.—From this it follows that words do not denote the *Class*."

[The *Tantravārtika*—Trans. p. 340—has construed this *Sūtra* somewhat differently.]

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*concluded*]—"AND ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THE WORD 'ANOTHER' USED."

Bhāṣya.

"We meet with such Vedic texts as—'If the animal consecrated runs away, then one should secure *another* animal of the same colour and of the same age'.—Now, if words denoted the *Class*, then there could be no 'securing of *another* animal', as the *other* animal also would belong to the same *Class* as the one that has run away [and hence it should be spoken of as the *same*, not as *another*].

"From all this it follows that Words denote *Individuals*."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS THE CLASS (THAT IS DENOTED), AS IT IS THAT WHICH SERVES THE PURPOSES OF ACTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*', 'in reality', sets aside the aforesaid view.

It is the Class that is denoted by the word.—Why?—Because *it is that which serves the purposes of actions.* The injunction '*Shyēnacitam chinvīta*' 'one should erect the altar like the Shyena' is possible only with reference

to the *class* (the *commonalty*); i.e. if the word '*Shyēṇa*' denotes the *class*. If it denoted an *individual shyena* bird,—then, inasmuch as it would be impossible for the performer to make or produce any individual bird,—the injunction would be laying down something impossible, and hence it would be meaningless or futile. Hence the word '*Shyeṇa*' must denote the *Class*.—[In this context, the term '*ākṛti*' could best be rendered as '*configuration*' and as this also is a factor that is common to all individuals, we would have adopted it; but the *Tantravārtika* having declared (Translation, pp. 330 and 331) that '*ākṛti*' does not stand for the *shape*, it has been thought advisable to stick to the one uniform rendering 'class'.]

Says the Opponent—"It would be possible (according to the Injunction quoted) to perform the *erecting* of the altar by means of the individual birds (killed and collected together)".

But the sentence does not speak of the *Shyēṇa* as the *instrument*; in fact, the word '*Shyēṇa*' speaks of *what is desired to be brought about*;—the meaning of the injunction being that 'the *Shyēṇa* should be brought about by the erecting'; and this would give sense only if the word '*shyēṇa*' denoted the *class*.

Says the Opponent—"In fact in both cases, the accomplishment of the action is equally impossible.—For instance, (*a*) the *class* cannot be taken as denoted by the word;—why?—because if the *class* were denoted, then no action would be possible—in the case of such injunctions as 'one should sprinkle water on the *Vrīhi-corn*' (cf. Taitti. Brā. 3. 2. 5. 4); [it would be impossible to sprinkle water on the entire *class* of the corn];—(*b*) the Individual also cannot be taken as denoted by the word;—if the word denoted individuals, no action would be possible,—as we find in the case of the injunction '*Shyēnachitam chinvīta*', 'one should erect the altar like the Shyena'.—If it be urged that in the case of the *sprinkling of water on the corn*, the *Class* (directly denoted by the word) indirectly indicates the *individual* corns,—then in the case of the *erecting of the altar* also, we could say that the *Individual* (directly denoted by the word) indirectly indicates the *Class*.—Under the circumstances, which of the two views is more reasonable?"

Our answer is that it is more reasonable to take the word as denoting the *Class*.—If the word denoted an *Individual*, then it could not be used in reference to another Individual;—if it could be used in reference to another Individual, then it cannot be held to denote an Individual;—because an *Individual* is that which is free from all those characteristics that are *common*; [so that if a word is applicable *in common* to two things, then those things cannot be regarded as *Individuals*, in the real sense of the term].

Says the Opponent—"Our answer is that what has been urged does not vitiate our position: because when the word would be applied to another Individual, it would apply to it only as *free from all common characteristics*".

But if it does apply to another individual even as *free from all common characteristics*, then that (application of the one word to the two individuals) itself would constitute two common characteristics (belonging to the two individuals).

"Not so",—says the Opponent,—"that thing is an *Individual* which is the substratum of generic properties as well as of certain specific properties; and the word that denotes an *Individual* is not applied either to the generic property or to the specific property; it denotes only the substratum of these two; and hence there is nothing incongruous in the word being applied to another Individual; and yet it does not become a generic property; [when the word 'cow' is applied to one cow, it denotes that particular as the substratum of the generic character 'cow-ness', as also of the specific properties of that particular cow; similarly when it is applied to another cow, it denotes that second cow as the substratum of the same generic property 'cowness,' as also of the specific properties of that second cow; in this way the denotation of the word varying with each particular cow, the word or its application cannot constitute a *common characteristic*.]"

If the word 'cow' could be applied to another cow also, [because it is something *free from all common characteristics*] then, why is not that same word 'cow' applied to an individual *horse*, which also is something *free from all common characteristics*?

Says the Opponent—"The word would be applied only to such things to which it has been found to be applied in actual usage, and not to any and everything; and as a matter of fact, the word 'cow' has never been found to be applied to any individual *Horse*; for that simple reason the word 'cow' could not be applied to the Horse".

If a word is to be applied to only that thing to which it has been found to have been actually applied in usage,—then the word 'cow' could not be applied for the first time to the cow (calf) just born, as the word has never before been found to have been applied to *that particular calf*. Nor in this case, would it be possible to have any such comprehensive (or common) notion as 'this is a cow,—*and* that also is a cow'; the notion that we would have would be 'this is a cow—*or* that is a cow'.—As a matter of fact, we have the comprehensive notion (of 'cow') even with regard to the particular cow that we have never seen before. From this it follows that it cannot be accepted that the application of the word 'cow' to the Individual is dependent upon actual usage.

Says the Opponent—"In that case, (our explanation would be that) it is the nature of the potency (of the word) that it is applicable to one individual and not to another individual. Just as it is in the nature of things that Fire is hot and Water is cool, so would it be in the case in question also."

This will not do, we reply. Certainly a word is never understood to be applicable to one individual and not to another (without any determining factor).

"But the '*cow-ness*' (the class 'cow') would be the determining factor (in the case of the word 'cow'); the word 'cow' being applicable to only that individual wherein '*cow-ness*' (class 'cow') subsists."

If that is so, then, what would be cognised (as denoted by the word) would be a *qualified Individual* (i.e. the Individual qualified by the class 'cow'); and if it is *the qualified* Individual that is denoted, then, the qualifying factor (class 'cow') should be one that has been already cognised

before; because until the *qualifying factor* has been already cognised, people can never have any notion of the thing *qualified* by that factor.

"All right; the *word* will denote the *Class* as the *qualifying factor*, and the *Individual* as the *qualified* factor; there is no such law that the Individual cannot be denoted by the word that denotes the *Class*, or that the *Class* cannot be denoted by the word that denotes the *Individual*; so that both could be denoted by both; which of the two, *Class* or *Individual*, is the primary factor in the connotation, and which the secondary, will depend upon the intention of the speaker; if one intends to speak of the *Class* as the secondary factor, then he would speak of the *Individual* as the primary factor."

This cannot be so; between the two (Class and Individual) there could be a relation of primary and secondary only if both were denoted by the word. But if the Class is really comprehended as denoted by the word, then we cannot say that 'the Individual also is denoted by the word'.—Why?—Because the *Class* is permanently related to the *Individual*; so that when the *Class*, as the one relative, is cognised, the cognition of the other relative (*Individual*) would naturally follow. That the *Individual* is cognised on the utterance of the word is a fact evident to everyone; but what is not evident is the distinction as to whether the cognition of the *Individual* follows directly from the *Word* itself, or from the *Class* (which is first denoted by the Word). This can be ascertained only by induction (by reasoning based upon affirmative and negative premises), as follows:—(*a*) Even without the Word being uttered, if one cognises the *Class*, he necessarily cognises the *Individual* also (affirmative premise); (*b*) even on the word being uttered, if, by reason of some mental derangement, the man fails to cognise the *Class*, then he fails to cognise the *Individual* also (negative premise);—[and the irresistible conclusion from these premises is that it is the *Class* that is denoted by the Word, and the cognition of the *Individual* follows only from the cognition of the *Class*.]

"Well, the meaning of the Word may consist in the *Class as qualified by the Individual*."

In that case, if the *Class* were cognised as qualified by one *Individual*, it could not be cognised as qualified by another *Individual*.

From all this it follows that the Word is the direct cause of the cognition of the *Class*, and that the cognition of the *Class is* the cause of the cognition of the *Individual*.

"[We do not deny that the *Class* is denoted by the word], what we mean is that it is denoted as the secondary factor (the *Individual* being denoted as the primary factor)."

The fact of the *Class* being the secondary factor does not militate against our view; all that we mean is that in every case the *Class* is denoted; whether it is denoted as the secondary or the primary factor depends upon the purpose (and intention) of the speaker: if the *Class* is spoken of with a view to itself, then the *Class* is the primary factor; if, on the other hand, it is spoken of, not with a view to itself, but to something else, then it is of course the secondary factor. But the *Word* has got

nothing to do in this matter (of the Class being the primary or the secondary factor).

The Opponent takes up another position.—"In the case of the word '*daṇḍī*' ('stick-er', 'the man with the stick') we find that the word '*daṇḍī*' does not denote the *stick*, and yet what is comprehended as denoted by the word is *one qualified by the stick*; in the same manner, in the case in question also, even though the *Class* is not denoted by the Word, yet what would be comprehended as denoted by the Word would be the *Individual qualified by the Class*".

This is not well said. It is true that the *stick* is not denoted by the word '*daṇḍī*'; but there is no cognition of the *daṇḍī*, *the man with the stick*, until the *stick* has been cognised; then again, the term '*daṇḍa*' ('*stick*') forms part of the term '*daṇḍī*' ('the man with the stick'), and it is this term '*daṇḍa*' which has brought about the cognition of the *stick*; so that the statement remains unchallenged that 'the qualified is cognised only on the cognition of the qualifying factor'.—But in the case of the word '*go*' ('cow'), there is no part of the word which would be denotative of the *Class*, and another (part or whole) would be denotative of the *Individual*,—on the strength of which it could be said that "the class is comprehended from that *part of the word*, and the whole word '*go*' is not expressive of the *Class*".—Further, in the case of the word '*daṇḍī*', it has been found that the word '*daṇḍī*' ('man with the stick') is never used in the sense of the *stick*; in the case in question, on the other hand, it is *not* that the word '*go*' is never used in the sense of the *Class*. It is with a view to this that it has been shown above (*Text*, p. 80, line 21) that the word '*Shyēna*' denotes the *Class* only.

Thus then, (*a*) from affirmative and negative premises, and (*b*) from the fact that the word '*shyēna*' is used even when there is no connection with any *individual shyēna*,—it follows that the Word is expressive of the Class.

In the case of the word '*Vrihi*' (Corn) also, the word is never found to be used with reference to any *individual Vrīhi*, without some connection with the *Class* '*Vrīhi*'.

From all this we conclude that the view that *the Word denotes the Class* is the most reasonable one.

SŪTRA (34).

IF IT IS URGED—(*a*) THAT "NO ACTION WOULD BE POSSIBLE",—(*b*) THAT "THERE COULD BE NO INJUNCTION OF 'ANOTHER'",—AND (*c*) THAT "THERE WOULD BE NO WORDS EXPRESSIVE OF QUALITIES AS RESIDING IN SUBSTANCE",—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING *Sūtra*.]

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged above by the Pūrvapakṣin—(*a*) that "there would be no action consequent upon the injunction 'sprinkle water on *Vrihi*'"

(*Sūtra* 30),—(*b*) that "there would be no word expressive of qualities as subsisting in substances" as we find in the texts 'Six cows are to be given, etc.'—(*Sūtra* 31),—and (*c*) that "there would be no injunction of 'another',—as we find in the texts, 'another animal of the same colour, etc.' (*Sūtra* 32)".—All this has got to be answered. [And this is what is going to be done in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (35).

AS WORDS DENOTE CLASSES [AND THROUGH THESE, ALSO INDIVIDUALS] THERE WOULD BE NO DISSOCIATION (OF INDIVIDUALS FROM ACTIONS).

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) Inasmuch as the Word denotes the *Class*, the action would pertain to that *Individual* which is related to that *Class*; for instance, in the case of the sentence 'sprinkles water on *Vrīhi*' what is enjoined as to be done is the *sprinkling with water*, of a certain substance;—over which substance?—over that substance which is conducive to the accomplishment of the sacrifice; because the *sprinkling* is for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result. The *sprinkling* could not be enjoined as to be done over the *Class*, because no sprinkling of a *Class* would be possible. So what happens in this case is that the word '*Vrīhi*', which is really expressive of the *Class*, is used for the purpose of qualifying (indicating) the receptacle of the action of *sprinkling water*: and the word will naturally denote the *Class*, and this Class, on being cognised, would qualify (and indicate) the receptacle of the action of *sprinkling water*. Thus there would be nothing incongruous in regarding the Word as denoting the *Class*.

(*b*) Similarly in the case of the text 'Six cows are to be given as the sacrificial fee', what it is intended to be declared is the *number* of that substance which is to be given as the sacrificial fee, and the word 'cows', as denoting the *Class*, serves to qualify (and indicate) that *substance*.

(*c*) Lastly, in the case of the injunction of 'another animal', what is meant to be spoken of as 'another' is the substitute for what has been lost, and hence the word 'animal', which denotes the *Class*, serves to qualify (and indicate) by that *Class*, the said substitute.

Thus it is established that all such words as 'cow', 'horse' and the like are denotative of the *Class*.

Thus ends Pāda iii—the Smṛtipāda—of Adhyāya I.

ADHYĀYA I.

PĀDA IV.

Treating of the Names of Sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Words like 'Udbhid' are names of sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT THE VEDA SERVES THE PURPOSE OF ACTIONS; THEREFORE THE WHOLE (VEDA) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS SERVING THAT PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

[It has been established that the Veda is the only means of knowing *Dharma*: that is, the knowledge of what we ought to do can be obtained only from the Vedic texts. Of Vedic texts, there are several kinds—(*a*) there is one which directly enjoins the act to be done or forbids the act to be avoided;—(*b*) there is the declamatory (commendatory or condemnatory) declaration, which has been shown to be useful in helping us to obtain a knowledge of our duty by commending the act enjoined or condemning the act forbidden, and thereby prompting us to activity;—(*c*) then there are the *Mantras* (Invocations), which have been shown to serve the purpose of indicating certain details of the act that has been enjoined;—(*d*) in addition to these we find in the Veda certain words and phrases the exact purpose and meaning of which are not so clear as those of the texts dealt with under the above three heads. For instance, there is the text '*Udbhidā yajēta*'; the meaning of this sentence is not clear; as the exact signification of the term '*Udbhid*' is doubtful.—The present *Pāda* is going to deal with texts of this latter kind.]

We meet with such Vedic texts as—'*Udbhidā yajēta*', 'one should sacrifice with the *Udbhid*' (*Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa* 19. 7. 2); '*Balabhidā yajēta*,' (Ibid. 19. 7. 1): '*Abhijitā yajēta*', '*Vishvajitā yajēta*'.—In regard to these there arises the question—Are these terms, '*Udbhid*', ('*Balabhid*', '*Abhijit*', and '*Vishvajit*') meant to enjoin certain sacrificial accessories? Or are they the *names* of certain sacrifices?—"Why should such a question arise at all?" —Because from the sentence as it stands, both the meanings are deducible; from the syntax of the sentence, the term '*Udbhidā*' ('with the *Udbhid*') is related to the verb '*Yajeta*' ('should sacrifice'); now this syntactical connection between the two words may be either *appositional*,—the meaning being that 'one should sacrifice with the *sacrifice* named *Udbhid*',—or *non-appositional*,—the meaning being that 'one should perform the sacrifice with the *Udbhid* as the substance offered'.—The sentence thus admitting of both these constructions, there naturally arises a doubt (as to which is the correct interpretation).

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*It has already*

been explained by us that the Veda serves the purpose of actions; one part of it consists of *Vidhi, Injunction*, which makes known things not already known; e.g. '*Somena yajēta*' ('One should sacrifice with the Soma');—(*b*) another part of it consists of the *Arthavāda, Declamatory Passage*, which eulogises and commends the Injunction; e.g. 'Vāyu is the eftest deity' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 1. 1. 1);—(*c*) another part is *Mantra*, the Invocational Passage, which indicates (brings to mind) the enjoined thing at the time of the performance; e.g. '*Varhirdevasadanan dāmi*', ('I am lopping grass, the seat of the gods'—Maitrā. Saṁ. 1. 1. 2. 1), and so forth.—From this it follows that the terms in question—'*Udbhid*' and the rest—should serve one of these three purposes. But they cannot be *Arthavādas*, because an *Arthavāda* always appears as a supplement to something that has been enjoined.—Nor can they be *Mantras*, as there is no such thing to be indicated (at the time of performance) as is spoken of in the words under consideration.—The only possible alternative left by elimination thus is that the words be taken as *injunction of accessories*; i.e. what is enjoined (by the word '*Udbhidā*') is that 'the sacrifice is to be performed *with Udbhid as an accessory* (i.e. substance of offering)'; and the reasons for the acceptance of this alternative are—(*a*) that it is in keeping with a well-recognised fact, (*b*) that the injunction of accessories serves a distinctly useful purpose, and (*c*) that it serves to prompt men to the particular course of action. [It also fulfils the condition of Injunctions, in that it makes known something not already known, as] the fact of the *Udbhid* being of use in a sacrifice is not known among people; nor has it been declared in the Veda (anywhere else).—Hence the texts in questions must be injunctions of accessories.—An objection may be raised—'If the sentence in question is the injunction of an accessory, then there is no injunction of the action (of *sacrificing*) itself (whereat the accessory could be used); and so long as the *action* itself is not enjoined, any injunction of accessories for that action would be entirely useless.'—Our answer to this is that it is not so; the injunction of the accessory (by the sentence in question) would be useful, in so far as it would be enjoining the particular accessory for the Primary Sacrifice *Jyotiṣṭoma* (which is the archetype of all *Soma*-sacrifices). If the word in question ('*Udbhid*') were only the *name* of the sacrifice, then '*Udbhidā yajēta*' ('should offer the *Udbhid*-sacrifice') would be synonymous with '*Yajēta*' ('should sacrifice'); [as *Udbhid* would be only the name of the sacrifice]; so that the presence of the word '*Udbhidā*' in the sentence would make no difference in the activity prompted by the injunction. If, on the other hand, the word is taken as enjoining an accessory, then through the addition of this accessory, the words '*Udbhid*' and the like would be providing additional information and thus serve a distinctly useful purpose.—From all this it follows that all these words are injunctions of accessories."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following *Siddhānta*—

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THAT TERM MUST BE A NAME 'WHICH, AT FIRST, APPEARS AS NEW' [OR, 'OF THAT SACRIFICE WHICH BRINGS ABOUT AN *Apūrva*, A TRANSCENDENTAL RESULT'],—BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE INJUNCTIVE (OF ANYTHING).

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*', '*in reality*', rejects the above *Pūrvapakṣa.*

The term must be a name—we declare;—because it is only thus that the term would enjoin something not already enjoined,—i.e. a sacrifice other than the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—and the Vedic text also would directly mention a sacrifice. Otherwise, (i.e. if the term were not a *name*, but an injunction of accessories), the text speaking of the '*Udbhid*' and other things would indirectly indicate *that act at which the Udbhid is used*, the meaning of the sentence '*Udbhidā yajēta*' being that 'one should bring about (the result) by means of that sacrifice at which the *Udbhid* is used';—that 'one should bring about the result by means of the sacrifice' is what is meant by the term 'should sacrifice' ('*Yajēta*');—'*Yāga*,' 'the sacrifice,' is an instrument;—the *Udbhid* also is an instrument, as it is spoken of by means of a word with the instrumental ending ('*Udbhidā*'). Thus then, if we construe '*Udbhidā yajēta*' as '*Udbhidā yāgena kuryāt*', and take the term '*Udbhid*' occurring in the term '*Udbhidā*' with the Instrumental ending, as the name of the sacrifice, *Yāga*, which is expressed by the term '*Yāgena*', which also has the instrumental ending,—then the co-ordination between the two terms ('*Udbhidā*' and '*Yāgēna*') becomes quite logical. On the other hand, if the term '*Udbhid*' were taken as denoting a substance (to be used at the sacrifice), then the requisite co-ordination (between '*Udbhidā*' and '*Yāgēna*') would be possible only by having recourse to *possessive indication* (in the term '*Udbhidā*', taking it as equivalent to '*Udbhidvatā*', 'one that *possesses*, i.e. uses, the *Udbhid*').—And certainly when there is a doubt as to the acceptability of *direct assertion* and *indirect indication*, it is *direct assertion* that is more acceptable.—From all this it follows that the term '*Udbhid*' is the *name* of a sacrifice.

Says the Opponent—"In that case, the well-known fact of the term '*Udbhid*' denoting a substance would be ignored and the entirely unknown fact of the word denoting an action (i.e. sacrifice) would be assumed".

The answer to this is that the fact of the term '*udbhid*' being the name of an action is deduced from the force of the Instrumental ending in '*Udbhidā*'—"How?"—The Instrumental ending is added to only such noun-bases as denote an *Instrument*, and in the sentence in question it is the '*Yāga*', *Sacrifice*, that is the instrument; consequently we infer that the word '*udbhidā*', with the instrumental ending, being in the same case as '*yāgena*', the term '*udbhid*' must denote the *sacrifice*.

Says the Opponent:—"This is not right. It could be as explained only

if the presence of the Instrumental ending had enabled the term '*udbhid*' *to bring about the notion of* (i.e. to denote) the *sacrifice*;—as a matter of fact, however, no such notion of the sacrifice arises out of the word '*udbhid*';—hence what has been asserted is not right.—It might be argued that—'The Instrumental ending would be inexplicable except on the basis of the explanation just provided'.—Let it be inexplicable; when, as a matter of fact, the *sacrifice* is *not* understood to be denoted by the term '*udbhid*', this term cannot be regarded as expressive of it (simply for making the Instrumental ending explicable).—For these reasons, the words in question ('*udbhid*,' etc.), must be taken as *injunctive of accessories*.—It might be urged that 'this involves recourse to *indirect indication*'.—But it is better to assume an *indirect indication* than to assume the denotation of the *sacrifice* (by a word that does not denote it). Because recourse to *indirect indication* is an ordinary every-day process, while the assuming of an entirely unknown thing is sheer perversity.—Further, if the text '*Udbhidā yajēta*' enjoins the *name*, it cannot enjoin the *sacrifice*; and if it enjoins the *sacrifice*, then it cannot enjoin the *name*; if it enjoins both, then there is syntactical split."

The answer to this is as follows:—The *Name* is not enjoined by the text in question; what we mean is that the word '*udbhidā*' contains a *reference* (by *name*) to the sacrifice.—"But where is that sacrifice enjoined, (to which reference is made in the term '*udbhidā*')?"—Our answer to this is that the term '*udbhid*' denotes the *act of sacrifice* through the force of its constituents, '*ut*' and the root '*bhid*', which together express *manifest, bring about*; so that the particular sacrifice is referred to as '*udbhid*' in the sense that it *manifests, brings about*, 'cattle' (the declared result of the sacrifice). Thus it is that this particular sacrifice is named '*udbhid*'.

Similarly, the *Abhijit*-sacrifice is so called in the sense that it brings about *straight victory*.—The *Vishvajit*-sacrifice is so called in the sense that it brings about *conquest of the world*. And so in the case of other names of sacrifices.—For these reasons we conclude that all these words are names of so many sacrifices.

As regards the argument urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* to the effect that—"If taken as a *name*, the word would not lead to any special activity on the part of the agent, and hence it would be useless",—the *name* also would be useful, inasmuch as it would serve to connect the sacrifice with particular accessories and results; [for instance, the *sacrifice* having been enjoined in some other text, the text '*udbhidā yajēta pashukāmaḥ*' serves to connect that sacrifice, here referred to by the name '*udbhid*', with the particular result in the shape of *Cattle*; similarly in other cases, the text may serve the purpose of connecting the sacrifice with a particular accessory in the shape of substance or deity, etc.].

From all this it becomes established that words like those under discussion are *names* of sacrifices.

[Kumārila has not accepted this interpretation of Sūtras 1 and 2 as embodying the single *adhikaraṇa* that words like '*udbhid*' are names of sacrifices.—According to him Sūtra (1) contains nothing that cannot be accepted by the *Siddhāntin*, and therefore it need not be taken as a *Pūrvapakṣa sūtra*. By his interpretation

Sūtra (1) embodies the *Adhikaraṇa* leading to the conclusion that words like '*udbhid*' also are means of knowing *Dharma*; and *Sūtra* (2) embodies another *adhikaraṇa* leading to the conclusion that the said terms are *names* of sacrifices. The *Pūrvapakṣa* of both these *Adhikaraṇas* is, in this interpretation, to be supplied from outside the *Sūtras*.]

Adhikaraṇa (2): *Words like* 'Chitrā' *are names of sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (3).

[Siddhānta]—That word wherein there would be an injunction of an accessory detail must be related to the principal factor.

Bhāṣya.

[The foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* has dealt with such words as have no commonly recognised meaning, and whose meaning had, in every case, to be deduced from their etymology. The present *Adhikaraṇa* deals with such words as have common well-recognised meanings of their own.]

The texts to be dealt with here are—(*a*) '*Chitrayā yajēta pashukāmaḥ*' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 2. 4. 6. 1),—(*b*) '*Trivṛt bahiḥ pavamānam*' (*Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa* 20. 1. 2),—(*c*) '*Pañchadashānyājyāni*' (*Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa* 19. 11. 2],—(*d*) '*Saptadasha pṛṣṭhāni*' (*Tāṇḍya-Brāhmaṇa* 19. 1. 2).

The question in regard to these is—Are the words (*a*) '*Chitrā*', (*b*) '*Pavamāna*', (*c*) '*Ājya*', and (*d*) '*Pṛṣtha*'—injunctive of accessories, or names of sacrifices ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—"These words must be taken as injunctive of accessories,—(*a*) because such is their well-recognised meaning, (*b*) because it is only in that sense that they could serve a useful purpose, and (*c*) because it is only in that sense that they would lead to a particular kind of activity. These words are not known as denoting any acts (sacrifices); nor have they any etymological meaning; they are ordinary common nouns (denoting classes). For instance, the word '*Chitrā*' is an adjective, expressing quality; the sentence '*Chitrayā yajēta*' is a *reference* to a sacrifice, and not the *injunction* of the sacrifice, as the sacrifice is one already known; in fact, what the sentence is meant to express is the fact of a particular result (acquisition of cattle) following from certain accessory details in relation to the sacrifice; and hence it is not necessary for this sentence itself to enjoin the *sacrifice*.—Similarly also in the case of the sentences '*Pañchadashāni ājyāni*' and '*Saptadashāni pṛṣṭhāni*'.—Nor is it necessary to have recourse to indirect indication, even when the words are taken as injunctive of accessories.—Hence the words must be taken as injunctive of accessories."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*That word*—in regard to which there is a doubt as to whether it is *injunctive of accessories* or a *Name*—*wherein would be enjoined* another *accessory detail*, —*must be related to the principal factor*, i.e. the action.—That is to say, such a word must be taken as the *Name of an action* (sacrifice).—If it were taken as *injunctive of an accessory*, then there would be syntactical split. For instance, (in the case of the text '*Chitrayā yajeta pashukāmaḥ*' if the word '*Chitrayā*' were taken as *injunctive of an accessory*, the meaning of the

whole sentence would have to be that) there being a possibility of a male animal being used, (1) 'the animal that is used (2) should be a *female one*, (3) with the additional qualification of being *of variegated colour*, and (4) from using such an animal at the sacrifice, *cattle* will follow as the result'.—Certainly no single sentence can enjoin so many things. Thus then, [it being possible to enjoin only one thing at a time], if the *variegated colour* were enjoined, it could be enjoined (or predicated) only in reference to the *female animal* (which will have to be already enjoined elsewhere, in order to be able to be *referred* to here);—as a matter of fact however, no *female animal* could be enjoined either in reference to the *Agniṣomiya* (animal dedicated to Agni-Soma), or in reference to *the desire for cattle*; nor could this latter be enjoined in reference to the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*.

Similarly in the case of the text '*Pañchadashani ājyāni bhavanti*', what is meant is that the *number fifteen* pertains to the '*Ājyas*'. Now, until the '*Ājyas*' have been enjoined, they cannot be used in connection with the *Stotra-Chants*;—but there is no other text injunctive of the *Ājyas*;—hence the text in question (according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*) would have to enjoin the *Ājyas*, and to enjoin also the *number fifteen* in regard to the *Ājyas* thus enjoined; and a connection between these two—the '*Ājyas*' and the '*number fifteen*' is clearly recognised (in the text under consideration); but the connection of the '*Ājyas*' with the *Stotra-chant* has been hitherto unknown;—so also the connection between the *Ājyas* and the *number fifteen* has been unknown (apart from the text under consideration); and yet it is impossible for both these connections to be enjoined (and predicated) by the single sentence ('*Pañchadashani ājyāni bhavanti*').—On the other hand, if '*Ājya*' is taken as the *name* (of an act), there is no such incongruity (of double predication); as in that case the only connection to be predicated is that with the *number* (fifteen).—Further, the idea that '*Ājyas are Stotra-chants*' could be obtained from the text under consideration, only by recourse to *indirect indication*.—From all this it follows that words like '*ājya*' are *names* of actions (chants)—these actions being enjoined by other texts such as '*Ājyaiḥ stuvatē*' ('pray with the *Ājyas*'), '*Pṛṣṭhaiḥ stuvatē*' ('Pray with the *Pṛṣṭhas*').

As regards the *Pūrvapakṣa*-argument that "no such *name of action* is known (as '*ājya*' or '*Pṛṣṭha*')",—our answer is that the particular chants would be named '*ājyas*', through the etymological signification of this word which signifies 'going to the battle' (*āji-gamana*).—"What would be this *going to battle* (in regard to the chants)?"—The explanation is supplied by the subsequent *Arthavāda* passage, which declares that 'The *Ājya*-chants are so called because the deities *went to battle* after reciting these chants'.—Similarly the '*Pṛṣṭha chants*' are so called because they speak of *touching* (*sparsha*), [the *Rathantara-sāma* is described as having come out of the water *touched* by Vāyu].—Similarly also the *Bahiṣpavamāna* chant is so called because its *mantra-texts* are expressive of the *Pavamāna*, and because it has some connection with the *outside* (*bahiḥ*).—A particular sacrifice is named '*chitrā*' (lit. *multi-coloured*), because several kinds of substances are used thereat, such as 'curds, honey, milk, clarified butter, fried grains, rice and water'.

From all this it follows that all such words (as '*chitrā*') are *names* of actions.

Question :—"Why cannot the text '*Pañchadashāni ājyāni bhavanti*' be taken as enjoining the *Ajyas qualified by the number Fifteen* with reference to the act of *chanting* [thereby avoiding a syntactical split] ?"

Answer :—For the simple reason that in the text there is no word expressive of the *qualified Ājyas*.

"But there are the two words '*pañchadashāni*' and '*ājyāni*', which together express the *Ājyas qualified by the number Fifteen*, and it would be these that the text would enjoin with reference to the *Stotra*-chants."

Both these words cannot be injunctive; only one can be injunctive (predicative) and the other must be the *subject* (of the proposition); if both were predicative, then they could not be related to one another; if neither of them were injunctive, then there could be nothing to enjoin (or predicate) connection with the *Stotra-chant*. Nor will it be possible to take one of the two words ('*ājyāni*') as the *subject* in reference to the qualification (number 'fifteen') and as *injunctive* (predicative) in reference to the *Stotra-chant* ; as such a construction would involve two distinct sentences. Hence the answer proposed is no answer to the *Siddhānta*.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *Words like 'Agnihotra' are names of Actions (Tatprakhyanyāya).*

SŪTRA (4).

[Siddhānta]—There is another text injunctive of that accessory.

Bhāṣya.

[Adhikaraṇa (1) has dealt with words whose etymological signification pointed to the sacrificial accessory only indirectly; '*udbhidā*' for instance, had to be taken by the *Pūrvapakṣin* as '*udbhidvatā*' before it could be construed as laying down the offering-material; and it was this necessity of having recourse to indirect possessive indication that was found to be the weak point in the *Pūrvapakṣa*. The present *Adhikaraṇa* is going to deal with those words whose direct signification itself points to a sacrificial accessory and no recourse to indirect indication is necessary.]

We meet with such Vedic texts as—(*a*) '*Agnihotram juhoti svargakamaḥ* (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 1. 5. 9), (*b*) '*Āghāramāghārayati*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 3. 7. 3; *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* 3. 3. 7).—In regard to these there arises the following question—Are the terms '*agnihotra*' and '*āghāra*' injunctive of accessories, or *names* of actions?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"(*a*) The term '*agnihotra*' (taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound) signifies 'that in which the libation is offered to *Agni*'; (*b*) and the phrase '*āghāramāghārayati*' signifies that 'one pours the *Āghāra*, i.e. a *fluid substance*', such as Clarified Butter. By accepting these significations, we accept the well-recognised meanings of the terms. And with these significations, (*a*) the term '*agnihotra*' is *injunctive of the accessory* (Deity, *Agni*) of the *Darvihoma* offering, and (*b*) the term '*āghāra*' is *injunctive of the accessory* (offering material, *a fluid substance*) of the *Upāṁshuyāja-offering*;—and in this manner, both these terms serve a distinctly useful purpose and are also conducive to particular forms of activity (on the part of the performers).—Nor does the view that these terms are injunctive of accessories involve any necessity for having recourse to indirect indication, as was found necessary in the case of the sentence '*udbhidā yajēta*' [under Adhikaraṇa (1)]; because (*a*) in the case of the term '*agnihotra*', the injunction of the accessory (Deity) is got at from the compound itself, and (*b*) in the case of the term '*āghāra*', the injunction of the accessory (material) is got at directly (from the accusative ending in '*āghāram*'); just as in the case of the sentence '*āghāraṁ nirvartayati*' ('prepares the fluid substance').—From all this it follows that the two terms are injunctive of accessories."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*There is another text injunctive of that accessory.* (Sū.)—That is to say, the two accessories that might be suspected of being enjoined by the two terms under discussion are such as have been already learnt from other texts. For instance, (*a*) the deity, (*Agni*, for the *Darvihoma*) is already enjoined in

the text '*Yadagnayē cha prajāpatayē cha sāyam juhoti*' (cf. Maitrā. Saṁ. 1. 8. 7); and (*b*) the material (Clarified Butter) for the *Āghāra* also is already enjoined in the text '*Chaturgṛhītam vā ētadabhūt tasyāghāramāghāryā*' (where '*chaturgṛhītam*' stands for *Clarified Butter* taken up in the *Sruva* four times).—An Injunction is a real injunction only when it makes known something not already known;—in the present instance, we find that the two accessories have been already enjoined by other texts;—hence it follows that the words in question cannot be injunctive of these accessories.—On the other hand, it is quite possible for the two terms to be *names* of actions: (*a*) '*Agnihotra*' being that act in which *the libation* (*hotra*) is *offered to Agni* (*agnayē*), and (*b*) '*Āghāra*' is well-known as signifying *the act of pouring a long stream*. Thus both the terms are *names of actions*.—As regards the argument that "the well-known meaning of the terms is preserved if they are taken as injunctive of materials",—this has been already answered (under *sūtras* 1, 2 and 3).

[In answer to the *Siddhānta* argument that *Agni* having been already enjoined by another text as the deity of the *Darvihoma*, there would be a superfluity if the term '*agnihotra*' also were taken as injunctive of the same] the *Pūrvapakṣin* says that—"the injunction of Agni over again as the deity of *Darvihoma* would serve the useful purpose of precluding the possibility of *Prajāpati* being regarded as the deity of that offering."

Our answer to this is that that cannot be; the text in question ('*Agnihotram juhuyāt*') is capable of enjoining *Agni*, it is not capable of precluding Prajāpati; specially as if Prajāpati were precluded, then the enjoining of that Deity (by another text) would be entirely futile,—when Prajāpati is understood (from a certain text) to be the deity (of a certain offering); and what is so understood cannot be regarded as false (or wrong, which is what the alleged *precluding* would mean). Hence what the *Pūrvapakṣin* says does not meet our argument at all.

[The Pūrvapakṣin next urges an objection against the *Siddhānta* view regarding the term '*āghāra*' being the name of an act]—"(*a*) The sentence '*āghāramāghārayati*' is the injunction of a *material*;—(*b*) according to the rule '*Yaistu dravyam chikīrṣyatē, etc.*,' (Sū. 2. 1. 8), an act which tends to bring about a *material* is an *Accessory*;—(*c*) by the act of *Pouring* herein enjoined, the material (*Āghāra*) is brought about;—(*d*) being thus *poured out*, the said material accomplishes the sacrifice;—such being the case, what is that principal act of which '*Āghāra*' would be the *name* [the Pouring out having been found to be only an Auxiliary or Accessory]. ?"

Answer:—This '*āgharaṇa*', *Pouring out*, itself is the principal act.

Objection:—"But there is neither a material nor a deity for any such act (and in connection with every Principal Act, there should be a material and a Deity)."

Answer:—We say that there are both; from the text '*Tasyāghāramāghāryā*', it is clear that Clarified Butter is the material used at the offering; and the Deity is indicated by the words of the *Mantra* '*Indra urdhvoddhara—ityāghāramāghāryatē*' (cf. Shata. Brā. 1. 5. 1. 4; Taitti. Brā. 3. 3. 7. 7; for *Mantra*, see *Mādh. Sam.* 2. 8 and *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 1. 1. 12);—a *mantra* which speaks of an act, or of the means of accomplishing the act,

becomes an integral part of that act;—and the *mantra* just quoted is found capable of speaking of the deity *Indra*;—so that, if this *Indra* were a means of accomplishing that act (of *pouring out*), the said *mantra* could be used in that act of *Pouring out*; and this *Indra* being the required deity [and Clarified Butter the required material], the act of Pouring Out is one with a definite deity and a definite material; hence it is an act of 'sacrifice'; and it is of this *sacrifice* that '*Āghāra*' is the name.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *Words like* '**Shyēna**' *are names of Sacrifices: Tadvyapadeshanyāya.*

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT ALSO (SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE NAME OF AN ACTION) WHICH IS SPOKEN OF (AS SIMILAR TO SOMETHING WELL-KNOWN).

Bhāṣya.

[*Adhikaraṇa* (1) has dealt with words like '*udbhid*', which are taken in their etymological sense both in the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Siddhānta*; in the case of the word '*Shyēna*' dealt with in the present *Adhikaraṇa*, in the *Siddhānta* view it would have to be taken in its etymological sense, while in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, it is taken in its ordinary popular sense.—Then again, *Adhikaraṇa* (2) has dealt with those words which, though being taken directly as injunctive of accessories, give rise, if so taken, to unnecessary syntactical splits; while the present *Adhikaraṇa* takes up the case of those words whose direct signification points to things that can be used as materials for offering, etc., and which, when taken in this sense, do not occasion any syntactical split.]

We meet with such Vedic texts as—(*a*) '*Athaiṣa shyenēnābhicharan yajēta*, (see Ṣaḍviṁsha-Brā. 3. 8. 1), (*b*) '*Athaiṣa sandaṁshenābhicharan yajēta*', (*c*) '*Athaiṣa gavābhicharan yajēta*'—The question that arises in connection with these is—are the words (*a*) '*shyena*', (*b*) '*sandaṁsha*' and '*gauḥ*' injunctive of accessories or names of acts?

The *Pūrvapakṣa*, as in the case of the word '*udbhid*', is based upon the well-known meanings of the words; the only difference between the two cases being, that while the word '*udbhid*' (being derived from a verbal root and hence) expressive of *actions*, is capable of indicating the sacrifice, the words being considered now are nouns expressive of *classes* and hence unable to indicate the sacrifice. The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that words like '*Shyēna*' are injunctive of accessories.

The *Siddhānta*, in answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—*That also should be taken as the name of an action which is spoken of as similar to something well-known*;—i.e. that which is spoken of as similar to the well-known, (*a*) *bird, kite* [(*b*) *pincers* and (*c*) *cow*] is the name of an action; because in support of its being a name, we have the direct assertion (of the Shruti text which speaks of the act as similar to the Kite), while it is only through indirect indication that it could be taken as injunctive of accessories.—As for the argument that "these words are common nouns (expressive of classes) and cannot indicate the sacrifice",—they can certainly indicate the sacrifice through the mention of similarity (in Vedic texts); for instance, we find the similarity mentioned in the text—'Just as the kite falls upon and seizes its prey, in the same manner does one fall upon and seize his enemy against whom one sacrifices with the *Shyēna*' (Ṣaḍviṁsha-Brā. 3. 8. 3);

which shows that through the similarity of the act of 'falling upon and seizing', the term '*shyēna*' becomes applicable to the sacrifice; just as the term 'lion' becomes applicable to *Devadatta* (through the similarity of such qualities as courage, nobility and so forth).—Hence the term '*shyēna*' should be taken as the name of a sacrifice.—(*b*) In regard to the '*sandaṁsha*' also, there is the similarity expressed in the words 'Just as by means of the pincer one picks up something that cannot be picked up, etc.';—and (*c*) in regard to the '*go*' the similarity is 'just as the cow preserves, etc.' Hence the terms '*sandaṁsha*' and '*go*' also should be taken as names of sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *Words like* 'vājapēya' *are names of sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF (WHAT APPEARS TO BE) A NAME,—INASMUCH AS THERE IS DIRECT MENTION OF AN ACCESSORY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AN INJUNCTION (OF THAT ACCESSORY)",—IF THIS IS URGED (THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS IN THE NEXT SŪTRA).

Bhāṣya.

[What is said in this *Adhikaraṇa* applies to all those cases where words appear to be names of sacrifices; hence it is applicable also to the case of '*udbhid*' and other words already dealt with. And yet the *Bhāṣya* has cited in particular the case of the term '*vājapēya*' only with a view to discuss and ascertain the exact meaning of the text '*Vājapēyēna svārajyakāmo yajēta*',—and also because in regard to this term and passage, there is available the additional argument set forth under *Sūtra* 7.]

We find the text—'*Vājapēyēna svārajyakāmo yajeta*' (see Taitti. Brā. 1. 3· 6. 9). In regard to the term '*vājapēya*', there arises the question as to its being injunctive of an accessory or a Name.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"If such is the question, then there can be no question or doubt at all on the point, since it is clearly seen that it is injunctive of an accessory; as a matter of fact we find an accessory directly mentioned [in the word '*vājapeya*', which means 'that at which *vāja* is *peya*', where the material *vāja, food-grains*, is distinctly mentioned]; and when that accessory is duly recognised, it cannot be said that it is not (expressed) there.—Hence the name '*vājapēya*' must be taken as injunctive of an accessory."

SŪTRA (7).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS TWO ACTIONS WOULD BECOME IDENTICAL.

Bhāṣya.

What has been asserted in the *Pūrvapakṣa* cannot be right; as, in that case, the *two acts*—of *Vājapēya* and of *Darshapūrṇamāsa*—*would become identical*; as both would have exactly the same detailed procedure as that which has been laid down in connection with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*; and the result of this would be that the *Dīkṣās* and the *Upasads* would disappear from the *Vājapeya*, in connection with which they have been specially prescribed in such texts as—'In the *Vājapēya* there are seventeen *Dīkṣās*', 'In the *Vājapēya*, there are seventeen *Upasads*'.

Or, the meaning of the *Sūtra* may be that if the word '*Vājapēya*' were

injunctive of an accessory, then the *Vājapēya* sacrifice would be identical with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice,—thus alone would the presence of the *Dīkṣās* and the *Upasads* be possible.

From all this it follows that the term '*Vājapēya*' is the *name* of a sacrifice.

[If the word '*Vājapēya*' signified and enjoined a material, the only material it could signify would be the *Vāja* which is a preparation of *flour*, sugar and some other ingredients; and the sacrifice at which such a material would be used would become an *Iṣṭi*, as at an *Iṣṭi* alone is a food-grain-offering made; and as the archetype of all *Iṣṭis* is the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, it would be the procedure of this latter that would be adopted at the sacrifice at which *Vāja* would be offered; whereas as a matter of fact, the procedure actually followed at the *Vājapēya* sacrifice is that of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, as is clear from the fact that the *Dīkṣās and Upasads* have been specially enjoined for the *Vājapēya* and those *Dīkṣās* and *Upasads* form part of the procedure of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, not of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*—*Tantravārtika*.]

What we have said so far in answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* is only an (inferential) argument against it; the real *Siddhānta* position is as set forth in the following *Sūtra*.

SŪTRA (8).

A SINGLE WORD WOULD HAVE (ITS OWN AS WELL AS) AN EXTRANEOUS SIGNIFICATION.

Bhāṣya.

If the word '*vājapēya*' were injunctive of an accessory, then the single word '*yajēta*' *would have its own as well as an extraneous signification*; and this would be an incongruity. That is to say, the intrinsic signification of the text '(*vājapēyena*) *svārājyakāmo yajēta*' is that it *enjoins* a sacrifice for the person desiring 'world-wide sovereignty'—[the term '*svārājya*' has this technical signification attached to it in *Aita. Brā.* 8. 14]—and that being so, the same word '*yajēta*' could not have the extraneous signification whereby it could be only *referring* to the *sacrifice* for the purpose of connecting it with the material '*vājapeya*',—the meaning of the sentence, in the latter case, being 'by means of the sacrifice at which *Vājapeya* is used as the material'. If the words were to have those two (mutually incompatible) significations, there would be a syntactical split.

Says the Opponent:—"In the text in question, we distinctly perceive two separate sentences—the first sentence consisting of two words is—'*svārājyakāmo yajēta*' ('one desiring world-wide sovereignty should sacrifice'), and the second sentence equally distinctly perceptible is '*yajēta vājapēyēna*' ('should sacrifice with the *Vājapēya*') [and as there are two distinct sentences, this cannot be regarded as a case of *syntactical split*]."

This is not so, we reply. If there were two distinct sentences, as first mentioned, then there would be four words in the sentence, while in reality we find only three words.

"Our explanation is that the word '*yajēta*' could be construed with both the words ('*svārājyakāmaḥ*' and '*vājapēyēna*') separately."

How can the word occurring once only be construed with both the words?

"That would be possible because the form of the word remains the same

in both cases; its form when construed with '*svārājyakāmaḥ*' is precisely the same as that in which it is construed with '*vājapēyēna*'; and hence it would be construed with both the words by what is technically known as 'simultaneous relationship'."

That cannot be; if the exact nature of the act expressed by the word '*yajēta*' is not known already, then alone can the word be an injunction of it (as in '*svārājyakāmo yajēta*'); and if that exact nature is known already, then the word could be only a *reference to* that act (as '*yad yajēta tad vājapēyēna*'); but it is not possible for the same act (*sacrifice*) to be *known* as well as *not known* at one and the same time [and this is what it would be if the sentence '*vājapēyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta*' were construed as suggested by the *Pūrvapakṣin*].

Says the Opponent—"It has been argued by the *Siddhāntin* that 'if the word *vājapēyēna* were injunctive of an accessory, the word *yajēta* would contain a mere *reference* to the *sacrifice* already enjoined elsewhere'.—But if the word '*yajēta*' contained a mere *reference*, which word would be there that would enjoin the accessory? [There is no other injunctive verb in the sentence].—Do not say please that the accessory (Material) would be enjoined by the word '*vājapēyēna*'; because unless there is a verb, there can be no injunction of *something to be done* as expressed by a word. The only verb in the sentence is '*yajēta*' and it has been declared (by the *Siddhāntin*) to be a mere *reference* (to a previously enjoined sacrifice); which word then is there that would enjoin the act spoken of by that word ('*yajēta*')? Hence it follows that '*yajēta*' is an Injunction that goes with 'the man desiring world-wide sovereignty' (*svārājyakāmaḥ*), as well as with the accessory, *Vājapēya*; and in this manner '*yajēta*' could be construed with both the words."

If there are two independent injunctions (one to the effect that 'one desiring world-wide sovereignty should *sacrifice*' and 'one should offer the sacrifice with the material *vājapeya*'), then there would be no connection between the *Vājapeya* and *the sacrifice performed by the man desiring world-wide sovereignty*; and according to the explanation suggested by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, there would be no separate sentences; and therefore *the sacrifice performed by the man desiring sovereignty* could not be syntactically connected with *the injunction of the accessory* (*Vājapēya*).

"But the connection of *the sacrifice performed by the man desiring world-wide sovereignty* (with the *injunction of the accessory*) would be got at through the force of the *Context* (i.e. though the fact of the two injunctions occurring in the same context)."

That is not right; as all that the syntactical connection (of the sentence '*vājapēyēna yajēta*') does is to enjoin the material, *vājapēya*, in reference to the *sacrifice* only (without any reference to the desire for *world-wide sovereignty*).

"All right, let there be connection (of the material, *Vājapēya*) with the *sacrifice* only."

[But that would not be correct, as] in reality the connection between the material *Vājapēya* and *the sacrifice performed by one desiring world-wide sovereignty* is also implied by the two sentences being construed together.

From all this we conclude that if the term '*vājapēya*' is the name of a sacrifice, then we can safely discard both Context and Syntactical Connection. [i.e. if '*vājapēya*' is the name of the sacrifice, then, even without calling in the aid of Context and Syntactical Connection, we could have all that we desire in the shape of the notion that 'The man desiring world-wide sovereignty should accomplish his purpose by means of the sacrifice named *Vājapēya*.]—If on the other hand, the term '*vājapēya*' is taken as injunctive of an accessory, then there crop up all those incongruities of Syntactical split and the rest.

Thus it is established that the term '*vājapēya*' is the *name* of a sacrificial act.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *Words like* 'āgnēya' *are not names of sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE ACTION AS WELL AS ITS ACCESSORIES SHOULD BE (TAKEN AS) ENJOINED;—AS THEY ARE NOT DIVORCED IN THE INJUNCTIVE WORD;—SPECIALLY IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ALREADY ENJOINED BY ANOTHER (TEXT).

Bhāṣya.

[The general character and functions of Names have been discussed so far; with the present *Sūtra* begins the consideration of certain exceptions to the general principles set forth above.]

We meet with such texts as—'*Yadājnēyo'ṣṭākapālo'māvāsyāyām paurṇamāsyāñchāchyuto bhavati*' (*Taittirīya-Saṁhitā* 2. 6. 3. 3).—In regard to the term '*āgnēya*' here, there arises the question—Are words like '*āgnēya*', '*agniṣomīya*' and the rest injunctive of accessories or names of actions?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"If the word '*āgnēya*' were injunctive of accessories, then it would have to be taken as enjoining more than one accessory,—such as *Agni*, the *Cake* and the *Eight Pans* (which would not be right); hence such words should not be taken as injunctive of accessories".

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The action, as also its accessories, should be taken as enjoined* (by the word),—*as they are not divorced in the injunctive word*;—i.e. in the word '*āgnēya*', which ends with the nominal affix '*ḍhak*'. In fact, what is enjoined is the fact of *the cake baked on eight pans* being '*āgnēya*'; and it becomes '*āgnēya*' only when it is *dedicated and offered to Agni*; and thus in this manner, the *act of offering* (sacrifice) also becomes enjoined by the word;—when this act of *offering* is enjoined, it cannot be enjoined without *Agni* and *the Cake baked on eight Pans* also being enjoined; because when a relationship is enjoined, it cannot be said to be 'enjoined' unless it enjoins the relatives themselves. Hence words like '*āgnēya*' must be injunctive of accessories.

As regards the term '*aṣṭākapāla*', it is a well-known fact that it is the cake made up of *vrīhi* or *yava* when baked on eight pans, that becomes '*aṣṭākapāla*';—consequently it is to be taken as mentioned here only by way of *reference*; because what is spoken of by the word is the well-accomplished entity, 'cake baked on eight pans', which has been already enjoined in such texts as 'cooks upon pans' (Taitti.-Saṁ. 2. 3. 6. 2); whereby they do not use a cake prepared in any other manner; so that this interpretation does not involve any syntactical split.

'*If they have not been already enjoined by another text*' (Sū.); that is to say, in a case where the accessories in question have been already enjoined by another text, the word in question has to be taken as a *name*, as we have found in the case of the text '*agnihotrañjuhoti*' (under Sū. 4, above).

Adhikaraṇa (7): *Words like* 'varhiḥ' *denote the common things.*

SŪTRA (10).

[Siddhānta]—Inasmuch as the terms 'varhiḥ' and 'ājya' are found to be applied even when there has been no consecration, they cannot be taken as signifying only consecrated things.

Bhāṣya.

[In connection with *Names*, we proceed to consider the exact signification of the names of certain substances.]

In regard to such names of substances as '*varhiḥ*' (grass), '*ājya*' (clarified butter) and '*puroḍāsha*' (cake),—there arises the question—Are these expressive of consecrated things only? or of common things?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"They are words expressive of the consecrated things; in all cases, we find people using the term '*varhis*' in the sense of *consecrated grass*, not to the unconsecrated common grass;—similarly they use the term '*ājya*' only in the sense of *consecrated clarified butter*;—and they use the term '*puroḍāsha*' only in the sense of the *consecrated flour-cake*.—'But in some places, the terms are applied to unconsecrated things also; e.g. we find people saying—*The cows have run away after having eaten varhis* (*grass*);—similarly they speak of the *Ājya* as *to be purchased*;—and also of *my mother giving me sweets made of Puradāsha*.'—But all such use is due to similarity (between the consecrated and the unconsecrated article); just as the term '*yūpa*' is sometimes applied to the unplaned log of wood.—'But why should this usage be regarded as *secondary* or *figurative* (based upon similarity)?'—Because such usage is found only in a few places [and not in all places; and it is only *universal usage* that counts as direct or primary signification].—From all this it follows that the words in question are expressive of consecrated things only."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following *Siddhānta*:—Inasmuch as words like '*varhis*' are found to be applied to the unconsecrated things also, they cannot be taken as expressive of the consecrated things only.—"It has already been pointed out that such use is only local, and it is based upon similarity."—But that is not right; if it were generally recognised that the term denotes the consecrated thing only,—then alone could it be said that when the term is applied to the unconsecrated thing, it is only through similarity. In reality, however, the said fact is not invariably recognised.—"How so?"—Because we find certain consecrations prescribed for things spoken of by such names as '*varhis*' and the like;—this shows that the consecrations are to come when the words are there already (to express the things themselves); under the circumstances, if the

words were taken to be applicable only when the consecrations were there,—there would be an objectionable interdependence (consecration depending upon the use of the word, and the use of the word depending upon the consecration). Nor is it possible to have any consecrations that have not been prescribed (by words); so that the use of the words by people could not be based upon such (unprescribed) consecrations.—It is for this reason that people do not apply words like '*varhis*' to the consecrated things only. And when we find the words being applied to common (unconsecrated) things in one place, it is natural that they should denote the same in all places. Even when we have a number of words expressive of super-physical things, (like *consecration*, for instance), it is not possible for us to attribute to such words significations assumed entirely upon the basis of the Veda, without paying any heed to the signification of the ordinary words that precede and follow the aforesaid words (denoting super-physical things); for in reality the only justification for the assuming of a super-physical signification for those words lies in the fact that, in the absence of such assumption, the ordinary words (with well-known meanings) occurring in the same sentence—either before or after the words whose meanings are to be assumed—would become meaningless;—and it is not possible to assume what is not known; as a matter of fact, the ordinary words that precede and follow (the words in question) would thus have their use in their being applied to unconsecrated things.—Hence the conclusion is that all such words are expressive of common (unconsecrated) things.

The purpose served by this discussion is that when we have the direction that 'the pit of the sacrificial post is to be covered over with grass',—it would have to be covered with *consecrated grass* if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view were correct, but with common (unconsecrated) grass, if the *Siddhānta* is the correct view.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *Words like 'Prokṣaṇī' are to be taken in their etymological signification.*

SŪTRA (11).

Inasmuch as, in the case of such words as 'prokṣaṇī', the etymological signification is applicable [the word is to be taken as used in its etymological sense].

Bhāṣya.

[The foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* has dealt with the question of certain words being expressive of common things or of consecrated things, and it was found that they were expressive of common things,—and in both cases the words were used in the ordinary conventional, not the etymological, sense. The present *Adhikaraṇa* proceeds to deal with words that are found to be taken in their etymological sense.]

We meet with the text '*Prokṣaṇīrāsādaya*' (*Taittirīya Brā.* 3. 2. 9. 14). In regard to the term '*prokṣaṇī*' there arises the question—Does it denote *consecrated* water or *common* water? Or is it to be taken in its etymological sense (of 'sprinkling fluid')?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows—"It being understood that a word can be regarded as expressive of the *consecrated* thing only if it is found that it is always applied to the *consecrated* thing,—inasmuch as in the case of the word '*prokṣaṇī*', it is found that it is used in the sense of the *unconsecrated thing*, it is taken as denoting the common thing; specially as in some places we find people making use of such expressions as 'we are very much disturbed by the *Prokṣaṇī* (water-splashing)', where the term is used in the sense of the *unconsecrated* (common) water. From all this it follows that the word denotes the *common water*. [This conclusion is in accordance with the principle of the foregoing to *Adhikaraṇa*.]"

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The word is to be taken in its etymological sense;—why?—*Because the etymological signification is applicable*; that is to say, from actual usage we deduce the fact that the prefix (*Pra*), the verbal root ('*ukṣa*' to sprinkle) and the affix (active '*lyuṭ*'), that go to constitute the term '*prokṣaṇī*', is expressive of the *common* thing (*sprinkling fluid in general*);—but if the word—consisting as it does of the particular Prefix, Root, and Affix,—is applied to *water*, on account of its connection with the act of *sprinkling*,—then the universally recognised meaning of the word becomes accepted (and this entirely on the basis of the etymology of the word). Inasmuch as we find other *sprinkling substances* also spoken of as '*prokṣaṇa*',—on the ground of their connection with the act of *sprinkling*,—it may be concluded that to *water* also the term is applied on the same ground of its connection with the act of *sprinkling*; so that there is no occasion for assuming any conventional meaning for the word *as a whole* (independently of its etymology): and the conclusion is that the word is to be taken in its etymological sense.

The purpose served by the *Adhikaraṇa* is that the term '*prokṣaṇa*' becomes applicable to clarified butter also; (*a*) If the term '*prokṣaṇī*' were expressive of the *consecrated substance*, then the form of the direction would be, in every case, '*Prokṣaṇīrāsādaya*';—(*b*) if it were expressive of the *common water* only, then (in the case of *clarified butter* being used) the form of the direction would have to be '*ghṛtam āsādaya*' (the denotation of '*prokṣaṇī*' being restricted to *water*);—(*c*) lastly, if the term is to be taken in its etymological sense, then the form of the direction would be '*prokṣaṇam āsādaya*'. [In the case of clarified butter being used, as '*ghṛtam*' being a word of the neuter gender, the gender of '*prokṣaṇa*' would have to be neuter; in the case of water, the same term would take the form *prokṣaṇīḥ*' in keeping with the feminine gender of '*āpaḥ*', water].

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The word* 'nirmanthya' *is to be taken in its etymological sense.*

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—SO ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE TERM 'NIRMANTHYA'.

Bhāṣya.

We have the text '*Nirmanthyēna iṣṭakāḥ pachanti*' ['they bake the bricks in *Nirmanthya* (Fire)]'—[and in regard to the term '*nirmanthya*' there arises the question—Is it to be taken as expressive of the *consecrated* Fire? or is to be taken in its etymological sense (of *fire produced by friction*)?].

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is that "in the text quoted, it is clear that the term '*nirmanthya*' has been used in the sense of the *consecrated* fire; hence the conclusion is that the term '*nirmanthya*' is expressive of the *consecrated* Fire only".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—As a matter of fact, we find the term used in the sense of *unconsecrated* fire also, in such expressions as 'Bring *nirmanthya*, we shall cook rice' (where the word must stand for the ordinary Fire). From this it becomes established that like the term '*prokṣaṇī*', the term '*nirmanthya*' is to be taken in its etymological sense.

The purpose served by the *Adhikaraṇa* is that—(*a*) if the word denoted *consecrated* fire, then the Bricks would have to be baked in consecrated fire only;—(*b*) if it denoted *Fire in general*, then they could be baked in fire kindled in any way available; (*c*) if it is to be taken in its etymological sense, then the bricks have to be baked in fire recently *kindled by friction*; just as when one is spoken of as 'eating with *navanita* (Butter),' the sense is that the Butter meant is one that has been *freshly prepared* (*nava*, fresh—*nita*, prepared).

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *Words like* 'Vaishvadēva' *are Names.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE TERM '*Vaishvadēva*' THERE IS OPTION",—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE NEXT SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

[The case of the term '*vaishvadēva*' differs from that of all others that have been dealt with:—For instance, (*a*) if it is taken as laying down the deity, we find that sense following directly from the word, without recourse to any indirect indication, as was found necessary in the case of the term '*udbhidā*;—(*b*) it does not enjoin any accessories and hence causes no syntactical split,—as the word '*chitrā*' does;—(*c*) there is no ambiguity in the meaning of the term as pointing to the Deity,—as was found in the case of the word '*agnihotra*';—(*d*) the term '*vaishvadēva*' does not point to any particular sacrifice, like the term '*shyēna*': (*e*) there being no mention of any result in this case, there could be no difficulty in regard to the construing of the verb '*yajēta*', as we found in the case of the '*Vājapēya*'].

In connection with the first part of the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice, we have the text '*Vaishvadēvēna yajēta*' (Maitrā. Saṁ. 1. 10. 8; Taitti. Brā. 1. 4. 10. 1; Shata. Brā. 5. 2. 4. 1); and in regard to the term '*vaishvadēva*', there arises the question—Does it enjoin an accessory? or is it the *Name* of an action?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"If that is the question, then no such question can arise, because *in the case of the term* 'vaishvēdeva' *there is option*; that is, the term '*vaishvadēva*' is injunctive of an accessory, because we actually find in it the injunction of the accessory—in the shape of the *Vishvēdēvas* as the deity of the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices; and as, for these sacrifices there are other deities in the shape of *Agni* and the rest (already indicated by other sources), these latter, *Agni and the rest*, are regarded as optional alternatives to the *Vishvēdēvas* (i.e. it is open to the performer to make the offerings to *Agni and the rest* or to the *Vishvēdēvas*); as it is only thus that the well-recognised meaning of the term would be followed, [so that the conclusion is that the term '*vaishvadēva*' is injunctive of an accessory]."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT [BEING THE SOLE AUTHORITY FOR REGARDING THE WORD AS POINTING OUT THE DEITY],—WHILE THERE IS A DIRECT INJUNCTION [OF ANOTHER DEITY]; AND CERTAINLY THE CONTEXT CANNOT SET ASIDE THE THING [LAID DOWN BY DIRECT INJUNCTION].

Bhāṣya.

What the *Pūrvapakṣa* has declared is not possible; for the sacrifices in question, *Agni* and others have been enjoined as Deities by *direct Vedic In-*

junction; while the indication of the *Vishvēdēvas* could be got at only by *Syntactical Connection*, and through that, by Context. [The *Tantravartika*, Trans., pp. 425-426, explains this passage as follows:—The process of connecting the *Vishvēdēvas* with any particular sacrificial material would be a highly complicated one: we shall have to assume a word signifying the connection of the deity *Vishvedēvas* with a certain material that will have to be taken as indirectly indicated by the verb '*yajēta*'; all that we can say is (*a*) that the co-ordination of the term '*vaishvadēvēna*' with the term '*yagēna*' (as implied in the word '*yajēta*') points to the syntactical connection—'*By means of the sacrifice* which is *vaishvadēva*,—i.e. has *Vishvēdēva* for its deity, etc., etc.',—and (*b*) that as there can be no *sacrifice* without a *material*, the only material that could be connected with the *Vishvēdēvas* would be just that which is indicated by the requirements of the sacrifice. But the said *syntactical connection* indicates only the relationship of the sacrifice with the Deity; so that the relationship of the *material* with the Deity (*Vishvēdēva*) could be assumed only by means of the exigencies of the *Context*, and such an assumption could be only in this form—'when offering the *Āgnēya* sacrifice, one should offer it as a sacrifice of which the *Vishvēdēvas* are the deity'.]—Thus then *Vishvēdēvas* as the deity being pointed out by a means which is not equal in authority (to the Direct Injunction pointing out *Agni* and other deities), the former cannot be accepted as an optional alternative to these latter; and this for the simple reason that the Context can never aside the thing (i.e. the Deity) that is directly enjoined.—Hence it follows that the term '*vaishvadēva*' is the name of a sacrifice.

SŪTRA (15).

THERE CAN BE NO MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP.

Bhāṣya.

The Opponent might urge the following:—"The term '*vaishvadēva*' directly indicates the group of sacrifices of which Agni and others are accessories (i.e. Deities),—on the ground that the material used at these latter is the *vaishvadēvī āmikṣā* (the Āmikṣā *dedicated to the Vishvēdēvas*)."

But if the term '*vaishvadēva*' indicates the *group of sacrifices*, then it cannot enjoin the *Vishvēdēvas* as the deity;—for how could the word '*vaishvadēva*' pronounced once only indicate the group of sacrifices and also enjoin the *Vishvēdēvas* as the deity? Consequently, it is not possible to connect the term '*vaishvadēva*' with the *Vishvēdēvas*. Hence the term must be taken as a *Name*, and not as injunctive of an accessory.

SŪTRA (16).

BECAUSE ACCESSORIES ARE SUBSERVIENT TO OTHERS (AND OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE).

Bhāṣya.

Further, accessories are only subservient to other things; hence they cannot justify the repetition of the principal factor (Act of offering);

hence (according to the Pūrvapakṣa view, by which the term '*vaishvadēva*' lays down the common deity for the offering of all materials), the right course to adopt would be to make a single offering (consisting all the various materials *āmikṣa*, *vājina* and so forth), and we should not repeat the act of *offering* in accordance with the number of materials;—there would be no incongruity in this joint offering as the deity for all is one and the same (i.e. Vishvēdēva). The result of this would be that all the thirty libations (that have been laid down as to be offered) would be offered (as included) in the *single* Principal Libation, and thus there would be no completion of the number 'thirty' in regard to the offerings into the Āhavanīya Fire. [This being the inevitable result of taking the term '*vaishvadēva*' as injunctive of an accessory] it becomes established that the term is the Name of a sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *In connection with the* Vaishvānara, *the mention of the number 'eight' is only an* Arthavāda.

SŪTRA (17).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IT IS ONLY WORDS EXPRESSIVE OF WHAT IS ALREADY KNOWN THAT CANNOT BE TAKEN AS INJUNCTIONS; IN THE TEXT IN QUESTION THE CAPACITY TO BE TAKEN AS AN INJUNCTION IS THERE".

Bhāṣya.

[Hitherto we have been considering the question as to certain words being names of sacrifices or injunctive of accessories. We are now going to consider the question as to whether or not certain words are injunctive of accessories, without considering whether or not they are names of sacrifices.]

We meet with the text '*Vaishvānaram dvādashakapālam nirvapēt putrē jātē*' ['On the birth of a son one should offer the Vaishvānara cake baked on twelve pans'] (*Taitti Saṁhitā* 2. 2. 5. 3; also *Vājasa. Saṁ.* 29. 60);—in connection with this same offering we find laid down several alternatives regarding the number of *Pans* to be used—'*Yadaṣṭākapālo bhavati gāyatryaivainam brahmavarchasēna punāti*' ['If the Cake is baked on *eight* pans, *Gāyatrī* herself sanctifies him with Brahmic glory'] and so forth.—In regard to these latter, there arises the question—Is the mention of 'eight' and other numbers injunctive of accessories, or only *Arthavāda* (commendatory declaration)?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"All these are injunctive of accessories;—why?—because only *those words that are expressive of what is already known*—i.e. which speak of things already known—*cannot be taken as injunctions*; but the sentence in question has this capacity that it speaks of things not already enjoined;—what is that capacity?—it is the capacity of enjoining things; i.e. it will be able to enjoin something not already enjoined; otherwise all such texts would be merely *Arthavāda*, declamatory, and as such, serving no useful purpose. Nor can the number '*eight*' be taken as already included in the number 'twelve' (mentioned in the first sentence) [and hence not needed to be enjoined again]; because the commendation of the '*eight pans*' is found in a clear direct assertion of the Veda ('*yadaṣṭākapālo bhavati, etc.*'), while the commendation of the '*twelve* pans' can be only indirect; and the *indirect* can be accepted only in the absence of the *direct*.—From all this it follows that the numbers are injunctive of accessories."

SŪTRA (18).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IF THE WORDS ENJOINED ACCESSORIES, THESE ACCESSORIES, NOT BELONGING TO THE SACRIFICE, WOULD BE USELESS IN ITS ACTUAL PERFORMANCE; AS THEY COULD NOT SERVE ANY USEFUL PURPOSE WITH REGARD TO IT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the words in question should be taken as injunctive of accessories. If they were injunctive of accessories, all they could do would be to lay down a particular number in regard to the pans on which the cakes would be baked; and they could not enjoin anything in regard to the actual performance of the sacrifice. The connection of the number 'twelve' with the sacrifice is indicated by the syntactical connection (of the sentence '*Vaishvānaram dvādashakapālam, etc.*'), while that of the other numbers, 'eight' and the rest could, at best, be indicated only by Context; consequently these latter could not enter into the sacrificial performance at all. Further, these other numbers, 'eight' and the rest, having become connected with the Cakes, by direct *syntactical connection*, would naturally set aside the indication of the *Context*, and the indication of the *Context* being set aside, the said numbers could not become connected with the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice (for connection wherewith, the said Context would be the sole authority, and that has been set aside);—and not being connected with the *sacrifice*, they would be useless; as no results could follow from their connection with the *Cakes* only.—On the other hand, if the words are taken as *Arthavāda*, it is possible for them to be taken as commendatory of the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice. Hence they should be taken as *Arthavāda*.

SŪTRA (19).

Objection: "IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE NUMBERS 'EIGHT' AND THE REST TO BE SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE INJUNCTION (OF THE VAISHVĀNARA)".

Bhāṣya.

This objection has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* and has to be refuted. This *sūtra* ends with the mere statement of the objection. ["The Injunction lays down baking on *twelve* pans; while the words in question speak of *eight* pans only. How then can the latter be supplementary to the former? And if it cannot be so supplementary, then it cannot be an *Arthavāda* commending what has been laid down in the Injunction."]

SŪTRA (20).

[ANSWER]—INASMUCH AS [THE SMALLER NUMBER] IS NOT EXCLUDED [FROM THE GREATER NUMBER], IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE FOR THE WORDS IN QUESTION TO SERVE THE PURPOSE OF COMMENDING WHAT HAS BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

When it is clearly understood that any commending of the 'eight pans', etc., is useless (for the simple reason that these numbers, 'eight' and the rest, have not been enjoined, and it is only the commendation of what has been enjoined that can serve the useful purpose of prompting men to the enjoined act), then the words in question must be taken as indirectly eulogising 'the cake baked on *twelve* pans', and thereby serving to commend the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice (at which the cake baked on *twelve* pans is used); and this indirect eulogising would be done through the fact that the numbers 'eight' and the rest are included in, '*not excluded from*', the number 'twelve'; and hence the eulogy of the part (*eight*) could very well serve as the eulogy of the whole (*twelve*);—just as in praising the wheel, we praise its parts—'How beautiful are its felly and nave!'—or as in praising the army we praise its parts—'How beautiful are the elephants, horses, chariots and infantry in this army!'—Thus it is quite possible for the words in question to be taken as commendatory declarations.

SŪTRA (21).

[OBJECTION]—"IT MIGHT BE THE INSTIGATING MOTIVE",—IF THIS IS URGED, [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA.]

Bhāṣya.

You (*Pūrvapakṣin*) may argue as follows—"The texts in question are regarded (by the *Siddhāntin*) to be *Arthavāda* (commendatory of the *Vaishvānara*); but why cannot the *Brahmic glory* and other desirable things (mentioned in the text in question) serve as the prompting motive for adopting the other numbers 'eight' and the rest? The meaning would be that if the sacrificer desires *Brahmic glory*, he should bake the cake on *eight* pans, and so on; the same may be said in regard to the other desirable results that are mentioned in connection with the other numbers; ['Vigour' resulting from *nine*, 'Food' resulting from *ten*, efficient sense-organs resulting from *eleven*, 'cattle' resulting from *twelve*].—What would be the advantage of taking the texts in this manner?—The advantage would be that the enjoining of the accessory (number) of the cake would not be useless (as has been urged by the *Siddhāntin*, under Sūtra 18 above), and also there would be no need to assume the texts to be indirect commendations of the 'cake baked on *twelve* pans'. Hence the texts should be taken as enjoining things (the different numbers) for the purpose of the fulfilment of certain desirable results."

SŪTRA (22).

[ANSWER]—THEY CANNOT BE TAKEN AS INSTIGATING MOTIVES; AS IN THAT CASE, THEY WOULD BE USELESS;—MOTIVES APPERTAIN TO THE PERFORMER; WHILE WHAT IS STATED IN THE TEXTS IS ONLY WITH A VIEW TO EULOGISING THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

If the texts in question were taken as enjoining things for the fulfilment of certain desirable results, then they should be so many distinct sentences;—as a matter of fact, however, we find that the whole comprises a single sentence—beginning with the words (*a*) 'on the birth of a son, one should offer the *Vaishvānara* cake baked on twelve pans', and ending with the words—'if it is baked on twelve pans, the *Jagatī* bestows upon him cattle,—if this sacrifice is performed on the birth of a son, that son becomes sanctified, glorious, partaker of food, endowed with efficient sense-organs and possessed of cattle' (*Tai. Saṁ.* 2. 2. 5. 3); and between these two passages in the beginning and in the end, we have the texts speaking of the 'cake baked on *eight* pans' and so forth;—now if these latter were not syntactically connected with opening and closing passages (quoted above), they would be so many distinct sentences.—Then again, all motives such as becoming *sanctified* and the like—would always appertain to the performer; while what is stated in the texts in question here regarding 'becoming sanctified' and the rest is clearly for the purpose of eulogising the *Vaishvānara* sacrifice; and the intervening texts speaking of the numbers 'eight' and the rest become connected with this same eulogy, as supplying so many reasons for the eulogy;—the sense of the entire passage being—'*Because* the *Gāyatrī* sanctifies him with Brahmic glory, *therefore* he becomes sanctified;—*because* the *Trivṛt* bestows upon him vigour, *therefore* he becomes vigorous;—*because* the *Virāj* bestows upon him food, *therefore* he becomes partaker of food;—*because* the *Triṣṭub* bestows upon him efficient sense-organs, *therefore* he becomes endowed with efficient sense-organs;—*because* the *Jagatī* bestows upon him cattle, *therefore* he becomes rich in cattle'.

Thus then, we find that, as the texts cannot be taken as enjoining things for the accomplishment of certain desirable results,—if they were not taken even as *Arthavāda* (commendatory), they would become entirely useless.

From all this we conclude that 'Brahmic glory' and the rest cannot be taken as motives instigating the use of the numbers 'eight' and the rest. These numbers, 'eight' and the rest, therefore must be taken as purely commendatory.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The word 'yajamāna' serves to eulogise the grass-bundle.*

SŪTRA (23).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—(*a*) THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

[In connection with *Arthavādas*, declamatory declarations, it is to be noted that they are helped by figurative descriptions; we now proceed to explain and exemplify the various factors that serve as the basis of these descriptions. Sūtras 23–28 enumerate six such bases for Figurative Description.]

We meet with such texts as '*Yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ*' ('The Sacrificer is the grass-bundle') [*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 2. 6. 5], '*Yajamana ekakapālaḥ*' ('The Sacrificer is the cake baked upon one pan') (*Taitti. Brā.* 1. 6. 3. 4). In regard to these there arises the question—Is the statement 'The sacrificer is the grass-bundle' injunctive of accessories or mere *Arthavāda*? Similarly with the other statement—'The sacrificer is the cake baked upon one pan.'

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is as follows:—"The statement is injunctive of an accessory.—What would be the effect of this?—The effect would be that in this manner the statement would enjoin something not already known; otherwise, if it were taken as an *Arthavāda*, it would serve no useful purpose; and it is more reasonable to have the text serving a useful purpose. Hence it should be taken as an Injunction".

[In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is as follows]:—It cannot be so; if the text were an Injunction, then (as a result of it) the *Sacrificer* would have to be used to serve the purpose that is served by the *Grass-bundle*, or the *Grass-bundle* would be used to serve the purpose that is served by the *Sacrificer*. So that the purpose served by the Grass-bundle being that the *Juhū* or all the *Sruks* are kept upon it,—this *Juhū* and *Sruks* would be kept upon the Sacrificer (as a result of the said injunction)! Under the circumstances, the Sacrificer would be unable to perform the duties of the Sacrificer,—such duties for instance as are laid down in such texts as 'The Sacrificer and the Brahman-priest sit down to the south (right) of the rite that is being performed (i.e. the altar)'. Nor is it possible for the Grass-bundle to carry on the duties of the *Sacrificer*.—Similarly if the Sacrificer were employed to serve the purpose that the 'cake baked on *one* cake' is meant to serve,—then, he would have to be entirely offered as an oblation (as this is what is meant to be done by the said cake);—and when the Sacrificer will have been offered into the fire, all the rest of the Ritual would disappear.—Nor again is the *cake baked on one pan* capable of performing the duties of the Sacrificer.—For these reasons, the texts in question cannot be taken as Injunctions.

Then again, there is another injunction in regard to the Grass-bundle—'He keeps the Grass-bundle upon the *Barhiṣ* grass',—and also in regard to

the Cake baked on one Pan—'He makes one entire oblation of the cake baked on one pan'.—For this reason also, the texts cannot be injunctions.

If the texts are taken as *Arthavāda*, the meaning is that 'the Sacrificer is to be known as the Grass-bundle,—and also as the Cake baked on one pan'.

"But what sort of co-ordination can be recognised between the Sacrificer and the Grass-bundle or the Cake? Neither the Grass-bundle nor the Cake can be the Sacrificer; nor can the Sacrificer be the *cake baked on one pan* or the *First Bundle of grass*.—How then can a word expressive of one thing be applied to what is expressed by another word? And for what purpose should there be a description of what is already known?"

The reply to the above is as follows:—It is for the purpose of eulogising, if that which is already known is mentioned. The implication of the text 'the sacrificer is the grass-bundle' is that 'the grass-bundle is to be kept *upon Barhiṣ* grass, because it is the *Sacrificer* (who is the most important person)';—similarly the meaning of the text 'the sacrificer is the cake baked on one pan and should be offered as a single oblation' is that 'Heaven is the Sacrificial Fire, and the Sacrificer is installed in Heaven in the same manner as the Cake is placed on the fire.'

"But how can a word expressive of one thing, be applied to a thing expressed by another word?"

It is by way of indirect or figurative description; i.e. such a description is based upon certain qualities.

"But how can a word *not expressive* of a quality (such as 'sacrificer', 'grass-bundle', 'fire') denote a quality?"

It would do so by denoting its own meaning. All the words that are used in their secondary or figurative sense do not denote that sense after having entirely abandoned their own meaning; as in that case there would be an abandoning of what is well-known and an assuming of what is not known at all. Further, all such words are not expressive of a number of qualities; because we meet with figurative description even with regard to things wanting in some of the qualities. For instance, the lioness' cub, struck by disease, and hence not courageous in his behaviour, (and thus devoid of many leonine qualities), is still called a 'lion'. The word that denotes a group of things is not used to denote a part of that group; if it did so, then this would be against the law that 'the word Lion is expressive of that well-recognised factor which is common to all individual lions.' Nor could the term 'lion' be applied, by an assumption, to what is not a lion; because any such assumption would be impossible.

Question:—"If figurative description were based upon the actual meaning of the words, how could there be any restriction as to the extent of such description?"

Answer:—The restriction would be due to the actual presence of (at least part of) that meaning. For instance, when the term 'lion' is applied to something else (a man for instance), what is understood is that he is a man of courageous action, and this is due to the recognition of the fact that courageous action is the quality of the *lion* (which is denoted by the word 'lion'). Hence it is that when a man thinks of speaking of a man of *courageous action*, his intention is fulfilled if he uses the term 'lion'

for that purpose; and what happens is that the animal *lion*, which is denoted by the word 'lion', on being cognised, brings about the notion of 'courageous action' which is associated with that animal; and in this manner, by denoting its own meaning, the word ('lion') brings about the notion of the presence of the qualities associated with that meaning.

"Now, in the case of the Sacrificer being spoken as the 'grass-bundle',—or of the Sacrificer being spoken of as 'the cake baked on one pan',—what sort of quality is recognised as present?"

The quality recognised is that of '*accomplishment of purpose*' (*Sūtra*). Every one accomplishes his own work,—if some one else does that man's work, he is remembered whenever the other is spoken of; for instance, in the case of the King and the Keeper of the Muster-Roll, the latter does the King's work, and hence whenever the King is spoken of, the said Keeper comes to the mind as associated with him. In the same manner, in the case in question, the Grass-bundle and the Cake baked on one Pan accomplish the Sacrificer's purposes, and hence when the Sacrificer is spoken of, they also come to the mind; and thus it is that they also come to be denoted by the term 'sacrificer'—But why?—Because by being so denoted they become eulogised,—and that in reference to the *placing on top* (in the case of the Grass-bundle) and *being offered as an entire oblation* (in the case of the Cake).

From all this we conclude that words and texts like those under consideration are *Arthavādas*, not *Injunctions*.

Adhikaraṇa (13): *Words like 'āgnēya' serve to eulogise the Brāhmaṇa and others.*

SŪTRA (24).

(b) Birth (or Origin).

Bhāṣya.

We meet with such texts as 'The Brāhmaṇa is *āgnēya*' (*Taittirīya Brā.* 2. 7. 3. 1)—'The Kṣattriya is *aindra*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 4. 13)—'the Vaishya is *vaishvadēva* (Taī. Brā. 2. 7. 2. 2).—In regard to these, the question is—Are these statements injunctive of accessories or *arthavādas*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "they are injunctive of accessories; as it is only thus that they would enjoin something not already known; otherwise, being mere *Arthavāda*, they would be useless."

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—They are not injunctions, because the requisite injunctions are found elsewhere. Therefore they must be *arthavāda*; and the statement is for the purpose of eulogising what has been enjoined by another text.

Question:—"But in what manner would the words '*āgnēya*' and the rest be applied to (the Brāhmaṇa and the rest) who are not really *āgnēya*, etc.?"

Answer:—They would be applicable by way of figurative description.—"What is the basis of this *figurative description*?"—The relationship to Fire.—"How so?" The relationship between the *Āgnēya* and the *Brāhmaṇa* is that both have the same origin.—"In what way have they the same origin?"—This is made clear in the following passage—"Prajāpati desired to create progeny,—from out of his mouth, he created the *Trṛt*; after that, the deity Agni, the *Gāyatri* metre, the *Rathantara Sāman*, the Brāhmaṇa among men, the Goat among animals; thus it is that these are called *mukhya* (Principal, *literally*, 'of the mouth'), as they were created out of the mouth;—out of His chest and arms He created the *Pañchadasha*; after that the deity Indra, the *Triṣṭup* metre, the *Bṛhat Sāman*, the *Kṣattriya* among men, the Sheep among animals; thus it is that these are powerful, because they came about of Power;—out of His thighs and the waist He created the *Saptadasha*, and after that the deity Vishvēdēva, the *Jagatī* metre, the *Vairūpa Sāman*, the Vaishya among men, the Cows among animals". (*Taittirīya Saṁhita* 7. 1. 1. 4-5).—In view of this statement, (of the origin of things), if any one out of any of the three groups of things happen to be spoken of, another one of the same group also comes to the mind.

For these reasons, the texts in question must be taken as *Arthavāda*.

Adhikaraṇa (14): *Words like 'yūpa' serve the purpose of eulogising the Sacrificer.*

SŪTRA (25).

(c) Through Similarity of shape.

Bhāṣya.

We meet with such texts as 'The sacrificer is the sacrificial post', 'Aditya is the sacrificial post' (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 2. 1. 5. 2). The question is—Is this injunctive of accessories or an *Arthavāda* ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "it is injunctive of accessories, as it is only thus that it serves a useful purpose."

The *Siddhanta* is as follows—It cannot be an injunction, (*a*) because the Sacrificer cannot do the work of the Post, nor can the Post do the work of the Sacrificer; and (*b*) because we have other Injunctions.—Hence the text must be taken as an *arthavāda* serving the purpose of eulogising what has been enjoined. The co-ordination (between the Sacrificer and the Post) is got at through figurative description—"What is the quality on the basis of which you have this figurative description ?"—It is the *similarity of shape* (*Sūtra*)—"what is the *similarity of shape* ?"—*Tallness* and *Brightness*.

From all this it follows that texts like those under consideration are *Arthavādas*.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *Words like* 'A p a s h u' (*Not-animal*) *serve the purpose of eulogising the Cow and other animals.*

SŪTRA (26).

(*d*) PRAISE.

Bhāṣya.

We meet with such texts as (*a*) 'Animals other than cows and horses are not-animals' (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 2. 9. 4),—(*b*) 'A sacrifice without *Sāman* is not-sacrifice' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 5. 7. 1),—(*c*) 'That which is without the *Chhandoma* is not-Sattra'—(*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 7. 3. 8. 1).—In connection with these, the question arising as to whether these texts are injunctive of accessories or *Arthavādas*,—the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "they are injunctions, as it is only thus that they can serve a useful purpose".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—If these were injunctions, then (*a*) only cows and horses would be animals, (*b*) that alone would be a sacrifice in which *sāmans* are used, (*c*) and that alone would be *Sattra* which contained the *Chhandoma*;—and the mention (or injunction or creation) of other (*a*) animals, (*b*) sacrifices and (*c*) *Sattras* would be entirely useless;—nor would there be any possibility of there being another Injunction (as there is).—For this reason, the text must be taken as an *Arthavāda* serving the purpose of eulogising; that is, (*a*) it cries down all other animals (by calling them 'not-animals') for eulogising the cow and the horse; (*b*) the *Sāma-less* Sacrifices are cried down, for the purpose of eulogising those with *Sāman*; (*c*) the *Sattras* without the *Chhandoma* are cried down, for the purpose of eulogising those with the *Chhandoma*,—just as we have in the case of such assertions as 'eating without clarified butter is not-eating', 'dirty clothes are no-clothes'.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *Figurative Description based upon large numbers.*

SŪTRA (27).

(e) LARGE NUMBERS.

Bhāṣya.

We find the text '*Sṛṣṭīrupadadhāti*' ('Places the *Sṛṣṭi* bricks) [*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 5. 3. 4]. In regard to this there being a doubt as to its being injunctive of accessories or an *Arthavāda*,—the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "it is injunctive of accessories, as it is only thus that it will enjoin something not already known".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—If the text were an Injunction, then the meaning would be that 'one should place the bricks *having the Sṛṣṭi-mantras*'; but there is no peculiarity mentioned with regard to the *Bricks*, as to which are, and which are not, *with the Sṛṣṭi-mantras*; so that the *Sṛṣṭi-mantras* (i.e. Mantras containing the term '*sṛṣṭi*') would have to be recited in connection with all the bricks; and under the circumstances, the reciting of those *mantras* which have no connection with the rite of *Brick-placing* would be entirely useless.—For these reasons we conclude that the text is to be taken as Descriptive of, or Reference to, only those of the Mantra-texts which have been enjoined as to be recited in connection with the *Placing of Bricks*; and the mention of the term '*sṛṣṭi*' serves the purpose of eulogising the act of *erection* (*sarjana*).

Further, if the text were an Injunction, recourse to *indirect indication* would be inevitable; and this indirect indication would be of those *mantras* devoid of the term '*sṛṣṭi*' which are found in the hymn '*Ekayā stuvatē*, etc.' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 4. 3. 10).—[What is meant is that, though the *mantras* in question are spoken of as one collective whole, as in the sentence '*ekayā stuvatē*',—yet the distinguishing term '*sṛṣṭi*' is found only among a few of them, such as the *Anuvākyā*, etc., and hence if the name '*Sṛṣṭi*' were applied to all the *mantras*, it would be abandoning its direct signification and accepting an indirect one, which is not permissible in an Injunction; and while indirectly indicating the *mantras* not containing the term '*sṛṣṭi*', it would also denote those that do contain it; and this would be a very complicated process. If, on the other hand, it is taken as a mere descriptive eulogy of the Brick-placing, a recourse to indirect indication or figurative expression would not be considered improper.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 455–456].

Objection:—"There may be the same incongruity when the text is taken as a descriptive reference and recourse is had to indirect indication".

Answer:—Recourse to indirect indication would not be improper in the case of the text being taken as a descriptive reference.

Question :—" But how can the name '*Sṛṣṭi*' be applied to *mantras* not containing the term '*sṛṣṭi*' ? "

Answer :—It would be applied by reason of the fact of '*a large number* of the *mantras* concerned containing that term ;—as a matter of fact, among the *mantras*, there are many that contain that distinguishing term, and only a very few that do not contain it.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *Words like* 'Prāṇabhṛt' *serve the purpose of eulogising.*

SŪTRA (28).

(*f*) BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF INDICATIVE SIGNS.

Bhāṣya.

There are such texts as '*Prāṇabhṛta upadadhāti*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 2. 10 or 5. 3. 12), '*Ājyānīrupadadhāti*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 5. 7. 2. 5) [where also the terms '*prāṇabhṛtaḥ*' stands for the *bricks* placed with a set of Mantras beginning with the word '*praṇabhṛtaḥ*', and the case stands on the same footing as the text '*sṛṣṭīrupadadhāti*' dealt with in the foregoing *adhikaraṇa*; the only difference being that the *mantras* actually beginning with the word '*prāṇabhṛtaḥ*' are fewer than those beginning with '*sṛṣṭi*'; and yet the word '*prāṇabhṛtaḥ*' gives its name to a larger number of *mantras* than those to which the name '*Sṛṣṭi*' is applied].

Here also, if the text were an *injunction*, then, when the bricks with the '*Prānabhṛt*'-*mantras* would be placed, those *mantras* which do not contain the term '*prāṇabhṛt*' would be rendered useless. Hence the text must be taken as a mere declaration or reference; what happens is that '*because of the presence of indicative signs*', the word expressing one thing is applied to another thing; as when we find in the case of the assertion '*chhatriṇo gachchhnti*' ('Persons with umbrellas are going along'), where even though a single man of the lot may be carrying an umbrella, the whole lot become indicated by that indicative sign.—Neither the term '*prāṇabhṛt*', nor the term '*sṛṣṭi*' could be taken as having its indication restricted to those *mantras* that *do not* contain the indicative words; in fact those *mantras* also are included which contain the terms '*prāṇabhṛt*' and '*sṛṣṭi*'; just as in the case of the term '*chhatrinaḥ*', the term includes the *one man with the umbrella* as also others not carrying the umbrella.

Adhikaraṇa (18): *Doubts regarding the meaning of words and sentences set aside by subsequent (supplementary) passages.*

SŪTRA (29).

In doubtful cases, [a definite conclusion is arrived at] with the help of subsequent passages.

Bhāṣya.

[In interpreting Injunctions and Declamatory Declarations, sometimes doubts will arise as to which Declaration, *Arthavāda*, is to be taken with which Injunction and so on. Hence the Author is going to propound a general principle according to which these doubtful points could be settled.]

We have the *Injunction*—'*Aktāḥ sharkarā upadadhāti*' ('One puts in wetted pebbles') [*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 3. 12. 5. 12],—which is followed by the *Arthavāda* '*Tejo vai ghṛtam*' ('Clarified Butter is glory itself').—Now there arises the question—Are the 'pebbles' to be wetted with *any one* of the fluid substances, clarified butter, oil and fat? Or are they to be wetted with Clarified Butter *only*?—"Why should such a doubt arise?"—Because the passage opens with the statement speaking of mere *wetting* in general, while it ends with the statement speaking of the particular fluid substance, *Clarified Butter*.—Now, it is agreed that the opening sentence and the concluding sentence should be taken together as forming one sentence, to get at the meaning of the entire passage; but there arises the question as to whether the *general* statement in the opening sentence is to be qualified and restricted in its scope by the concluding particular statement, or the particular statement in the concluding sentence is to be extended in its scope by the general statement in the opening sentence. So that the question remains—as between the opening and the concluding statements, which is to be accepted as the final conclusion?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—

"In doubtful cases like the one cited, the general statement in the opening sentence having given rise to the general conception untrammelled by anything to the contrary (long before the concluding particular statement comes in), —there is nothing to justify its restriction to any particular conception; on the other hand, as regards the concluding statement, before it has come to the field, the general conception (that the wetting may be done by *any* wetting fluid) has been already brought about by the opening general statement; so that the particular statement, regarding the particular wetting substance being Clarified Butter only, runs counter to the said general conception already in the field. The only reasonable course to adopt in this case therefore is to take the term 'clarified butter' in the concluding sentence in a qualified figurative sense, indicating 'Clarified Butter' as also all other *wetting fluids*; just as in a preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the term '*sṛṣṭi*'

has been taken to include the *Mantras* containing the term '*sṛṣṭi*' as well as those *not* containing that term,—so the term 'Clarified Butter' here stands for *Clarified Butter* as also for what is *not-Clarified-Butter*."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa* regarding doubtful cases, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

It is true that the entire passage opens with the general statement; but the general statement always stands in need of specification; [as no *wetting* is possible except with a particular substance], the general statement in the opening sentence has to be restricted in its scope at the very outset, and this restriction (to one definite substance) is done by the particular statement in the concluding sentence.—"Why so?"—Because, as a matter of fact, there can be no injunction of mere wetting *in general*; [when there is Injunction of *wetting*, it must be wetting by some *one* substance]; so that the particular statement in the concluding sentence is in no way incompatible with the opening statement.—"But how can it be said that the *wetting in general* is not enjoined?"—Because so long as the doubt is there, no word in the passage can be regarded as having the injunctive force; so that there is no injunctive word at all; specially as the words of the text are '*aktāḥ sharkarā upadadhāti*' ('one puts in wetted pebbles'), where the verb is in the Present Tense. Then again, there is no commendatory text directly eulogising *wetting substance in general*; while of the particular wetting substance, Clarified Butter, we have the eulogy contained in the direct assertion ('Clarified Butter is glory itself'); so that for the particular substance Clarified Butter, we have the direct commendation, whereas of the *substance in general*, the commendation is only indirect; and Direct Assertion is always more powerful than Indirect Indication; so that the injunction deduced from the passage as a whole is that of *Clarified Butter*.

Similarly in the passage—'One wears clothes; ......the cloth sacred to all the gods is silk' [where the entire passage is taken as enjoining the wearing of *silk clothes*]; —and also in the passage—'Touching this, one should sing; ......all beings live upon this *Audumbarī*' [where the whole passage is taken as enjoining the touching of the particular object, *Audumbarī*].

Adhikaraṇa (19): *The Indefinite becomes definite by the capacity of things.*

Sūtra (30).

Or, the deducing of the conclusion may be based upon the capacity of things,—because that (capacity of things) forms an integral part (of what is enjoined in the Veda).

Bhāṣya.

[Another kind of doubtful cases is dealt with here.]

We have such texts as—'*Sruvēṇa avadyati*' ('Slices with the small Ladle'),—'*Svadhitinā avadyati*' ('Slices with the Razor'),—'*Hastēna avadyati*' ('Slices with the hand').—In regard to these, there arises the question—Is every substance—liquid, solid and meat,—to be sliced with the *Ladle*, the *Razor* and the *Hand*? Or the particular instrument for slicing is to be selected in accordance with the capacity of each (to do the slicing of the particular substance concerned);—i.e. that of liquids, with the *Ladle*,—that of meat, with the *Razor*,—and that of solids, with the *Hand*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "as the texts lay down no restriction, there need be no restriction at all (as to which instrument is to be used for slicing in any particular case)."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The deducing of the conclusion may be based upon the capacity of things*;—that is, the assumption of a definite conclusion is to be based upon the capacity of the things concerned. So that, the slicing could be done with the *Ladle*, only to that substance of which it could be done with the Ladle:—similarly by any instrument, the slicing could be done of that substance only which would be capable of being sliced with that particular instrument. Because it is a general rule that when a verb denotes an action, the potency or capacity (of things) is always helpful (in determining the exact form of the action denoted). Thus then, in the case in question, there would be restriction in accordance with the capacity of the things concerned.

Similarly in the case of the text—'*Añjalinā saktūn pradāvyē juhoti*' (cf. *Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 3. 3. 8. 4),—the term '*añjali*' stands for 'joined palms' (in general, without restricting it to any particular way of joining the two palms); but it is taken to be restricted by the 'capacity of things' to that way of joining the palms which brings about the shape of a *flower-bud* (a hollowed cup); because it is only with the palms joined in this form that the *Homa* could be offered:—just as when one makes the statement '*Kaṭē bhuṅktē—Kāmsyapātryām bhuṅktē*', the exact meaning determined by the 'capacity of things' is that 'He sits on the māt—places the food in the bell-metal dish,— and eats it'.

End of Pāda IV of Adhyāya I.

End of Adhyāya I.

ADHYĀYA II.

Differentiation among Actions.

PĀDA I. (Introductory).

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Bhāvārthādhikaraṇa.*

[*The Act as leading to the Apūrva is expressed by one word; and this word is the Verb.*]

SŪTRA (1).

THOSE 'WORDS DENOTING ACTION' (i.e. VERBS) WHICH DENOTE BHĀVANĀ (ACTIVITY),—FROM THESE PROCEEDS THE COGNITION OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT [OF THE RESULTANT A p ū r v a]; AS IT IS THIS FACT THAT IS ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

[The first *Adhyāya* has described the *means of knowing Dharma.*—The second *Adhyāya* deals with the question as to what are the various acts that are called 'Dharma'; but before this is dealt with, it is necessary to ascertain the means of finding out whether and how one act is different from another. According to Kumārila the main subject-matter of the second Adhyāya is the *Differentiation among Actions*, and the other matters dealt with are subsidiary to this.—According to Prabhākara, the subject-matter of the *Adhyāya* is the difference *among the texts* injunctive of the Acts.—Among the factors that go to differentiate one act from another, the most important is the result following from the Acts,—in the case of acts included under the category of 'Dharma', this result being the *Apūrva*, or Transcendental Potency.—Consequently it becomes necessary first of all to determine (1) what is this *apūrva*—and (2) what is the word that denotes it.]

In the first Discourse a full account has been given of the *Means of knowing* (Dharma): in course of which the real character of Injunctions, Declamatory Passages, *Mantras* and *Smṛtis* has been determined;—the Injunction of Accessories and also Names have been examined;—it has also been explained how doubtful cases are determined with the help of supplementary passages.—All this has to be borne in mind.—After this we are now going to consider what acts are *Primary* and what *Secondary*,—what acts are *different* and what *not-different*;—this is the subject-matter, and none other, that is to be dealt with (in the Second Discourse);—and such is the connection of the discourse (with what has gone before).

In connection with this, six kinds of differentiation among Actions are going to be described, as based on—(1) *Different words* (under 2. 2. 1), (2) *Repetition* (under 2. 2. 2), (3) *Number* (under 2. 2. 21), (4) *Accessory details*

(under 2. 2. 23 *et seq.*), (5) *Context* (under 2. 3. 24), and (6) *Name* (under 2. 2. 22).—We are mentioning here what we are going to explain because an explanation becomes readily understood when the subject has been already indicated beforehand; also the mind of the learner becomes concentrated.

Thus then, it is the treatment of the means of distinguishing the various acts that constitutes this, the *second discourse*; whatever else happens to be dealt with here is only what is introductory to, or connected, either directly or indirectly, with the said main theme.

[The correlation and sequence of the twelve discourses may be thus summarised:—Until the means of knowledge have been duly defined (Discourse I), there can be no discussion of the meaning of Vedic texts; and hence also no discussion regarding any two acts being the same or different (Discourse II) cannot be introduced;—the discussion of difference or non-difference is essential, as until some actions have been found to be different from others, there can be no idea as to one being the Primary act and the other secondary or subsidiary to it (Discourse III),—nor of the usefulness or otherwise of the acts (Discourse IV),—nor of the order of their performance (Discourse V);—it is only when the nature of an action has been duly understood that there can be any consideration regarding the person entitled to its performance (Discourse VI), which last question therefore stands in need of all the foregoing five discourses.—Similarly, Discourses VII—XII, treating as they do of such subjects as the *Transference of Details* and the like, presuppose a full knowledge of all the Injunctions regarding all the details of actions;—thus the latter half of the *Sūtras* (Discourses VII—XII) are dependent upon what has gone before in the earlier half (Discourses I—VI).]

The first point to be considered is this:—Under Discourse I it has been declared (*a*) that 'Dharma is that which is enjoined by the Injunction as conducive to the highest good' (Sūtra 1. 1. 2),—(*b*) that 'Injunction' is the sentence that denotes an action,—(*c*) that the words constituting a sentence have distinct meanings.—Now the *first* question (*A*) that has to be considered is—Is a different *Dharma* laid down by each one of the words composing the Injunctive sentence? or is a single *Dharma* laid down by all the words collectively?

Now on this question (*A*), we have the Pūrvapakṣa (*A*) that "a different *Dharma* is laid down by each of the words."

The *Siddhānta* (*A*) in answer to this question is as follows:—If the Transcendental Potency (*Apūrva*) results from one act (laid down by one word in the sentence), then anything else that may be laid down by any other word in the sentence should be only auxiliary to the former act (and not an independent act leading up to a distinct result); as in this way there would be need for the assumption of fewer transcendental potencies. Hence the conclusion is that there is only one transcendental Potency (resulting from the one act that is denoted by one word in the Injunctive sentence).

Now—if there is only one *Transcendental Potency*,—then there arises the question (*B*)—Does this Potency result from (acts denoted by) *verbs* (words denoting activity), or from (those denoted by) *nouns* (words

denoting substances and qualities) ?—(But before we can discuss this question), we have to determine what is an *action* and what are *the words denoting activity* ?—These words are '*yajati*' ('sacrifices'), '*dadāti*' ('gives'), '*jūhoti*' ('pours libations into the fire') and so forth.—" But these words are expressive of *sacrifice, gift* and *libation-pouring*,—and they cannot be 'expressive of activity.' "—It is not so; these words are expressive of *sacrifice* and the rest, and they are also *expressive of activity*; what is understood as expressed by the words is the *sacrifice* (*gift* and *libation-pouring*), as also *activity* in general,—the sense of the injunction in this latter case being that 'one should so act that something may come about (be accomplished)'. Thus it is that these are 'words expressive of activity'; from *nouns*, on the other hand, we derive notions of *substances* and *qualities*, not of *activity*; hence nouns are *not* 'words expressive of *activity*.'

The *Pūrvapakṣa* (*B*) on this question (*B*) is that "the Transcendental Potency results equally (from both kinds of words, Verbs as well as Nouns)."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta* (*B*):—Those Verbs that are expressive *of activity bring about the cognition of the accomplishment of the result*,—i.e. such verbs as '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice').—Why so ?—Just because they are expressive of activity; those words that express the idea that 'one should make something come about' would be just those which, when combined with the term 'desirous of heaven', would express the idea that 'one should make heaven come about'; thus it is that from these words is derived the idea of the 'accomplishment'—i.e. the *bringing about*, the *fulfilment*,—'of the result'; and what these words, as combined with the (special) acts of *sacrifice, gift* and *libation-pouring*, speak of is the fulfilment of heaven.—" How so ?"—Because '*it is this fact that is enjoined*', —e.g. by the words expressive of the 'sacrifice' and other acts. The construction is like this—The question being 'By what should the man seeking Heaven bring about Heaven ?'—the answer is—'By such acts as *Sacrifice* and the rest';—and when what is denoted by a word brings about such a result (as Heaven for instance), it can do so only though bringing about an (intervening) transcendental potency,—not in any other way; it is thus that the *Apūrva*, the Transcendental Potency, comes to be comprehended; hence the said Transcendental Potency comes to be known through the word expressive of the act. It is in this sense that we declare that 'words expressive of activity' are expressive of the Transcendental Potency; *not* that there is any word which is directly expressive of that Potency.—The fact of the matter is that *something has to be brought into existence* by *the activity denoted by the verb*,—and the *desire for Heaven* has to be fulfilled by some *means*;—thus between these two (the *Activity* and the *Heaven*) there is a mutual relationship,—like that between a carter who has lost his horse and another carter who has burnt his cart (i.e. the one needing the help that the other can give). For instance (in the case of the sentence 'one desiring Heaven should sacrifice' and such others), the verbs like 'sacrifice' ('*yajēta*') stand in need of certain factors,—i.e. the meaning of the term '*yajēta*' being, as explained before, that 'one should bring about something', it becomes necessary to know—(*a*) What is to be brought

about ?—(*b*) By what it is to be brought about ? and (*c*) How it is to be brought about ?—The statement of the purpose by the term '*svargakāmaḥ*' ('desirous of Heaven') supplies the information as to (*a*) *what is to be brought about*.—Such cannot be the explanation of words expressive of substances and qualities (i.e. Nouns).—Thus we conclude that verbs, being expressive of activity, express the Transcendental Potency.

Objection :—"Why has the *Sūtra* used both the terms '*bhāvārthāḥ*' (words denoting activity) and '*karmashabdāḥ*' (verbs, which also denote acts) [since both appear to be synonymous)?"

The answer to this is as follows: As a matter of fact, there are certain 'words denoting action' ('*karmashabda*') which are not 'expressive of *Bhāvanā* or activity';—e.g. '*shyēna*', '*chitrā*' and such others (which are names of sacrifices, but do not by themselves convey any idea of the agent undertaking an *activity* with a view to bringing about a certain result). [The reading '*shyenaikatrikādayaḥ*' appears to be defective, though it appears in the *Tantravārtika* also, Text, p. 356; from what follows '*shyenachitrādayaḥ*' appears to be the correct reading];—on the other hand, there are certain 'words denoting activity' which are not 'expressive of action'; e.g. '*bhavana*', '*bhāva*' and '*bhūti*' (Being).—

[The following extracts from the *Tantravārtika* throw some light upon the exact signification of the terms '*karmashabda*' and '*bhāvashabda*':—Says the *Bhāṣya*—'There are certain *Karmashabdas*, etc.' Though the proper words to be cited as examples were '*yāga*', '*yajana*' and other nouns denoting the action of *sacrificing*, yet the *Bhāṣya* has cited the words '*shyēna*', etc., which become names of actions only when appearing in sentences as in apposition to words like '*yāga*'; in fact they are recognised as *Karmashabda* because of their denoting certain actions after and along with the injunction of *sacrifice* as instrumental in the bringing about of certain results.—The *Bhāṣya* continues—'There are certain *Bhāvārtha* words which are not *Karmashabda*';—and in this connection, the proper words to cite would be '*bhāvayēt* (bring into existence)', '*kuryāt*' (make or do) and the like; as those are expressive of the activity of the agent,—and not '*bhavana*,' '*bhūti*' (Being) which is the action of the result that is brought about, not of the *agent*; though one of the three words cited by the *Bhāṣya*—'*bhāva*'—may be taken as signifying an activity on the part of the Agent—by being derived as with the causal affix (in which case '*bhāva*' would be equivalent, not to *being*, but to *bringing into existence* .... *Question*—"why should not the *bhāvārtha* words be spoken of as '*karmashabda*' when, as a matter of fact, every verbal root is a *Karmashabda*, expressive of action?"—*Answer*—An undefined general action, that of *Being*, is incapable of being performed; hence words denoting such general action cannot be spoken of as '*Karmashabda*', expressive of action; and it is only words denoting particular acts capable of being performed that have been regarded as '*Karmashabda*'.—*Tantravārtika*, Translation, pp. 492–493, *Text*, p. 356.]

How is this to be illustrated ?—There are two texts—(*a*) '*Shyēnēnābhicharan yajēta*' ('Going to kill, one should sacrifice with the *Shyena*'; Ṣaḍ. Brā. 3. 8. 1),—(*b*) '*Chitrayā yajēta pashukāmaḥ*' ('Desirous of cattle, one should sacrifice with the *Chitrā*'; Tai. Sa. 2. 4. 6. 1). In regard to these, it is doubtful if the construction of (*a*) is '*shyēnēna abhicharan*' ('going to kill with the *Shyena*'), or '*yajēta abhicharan*' ('going to kill, one should sacrifice'),—and that of (*b*) is '*chitrayā pashukāmaḥ*' ('Desirous of

cattle, with the *Chitrā*'), or '*pashukāmo yajēta*' ('Desirous of cattle, one should sacrifice').—It is only when these points are doubtful that there is any chance of the enquiry as to whether the words ('*shyēna*' and '*chitrā*') are to be taken as injunctive of accessories or as names.—(c) Similarly, in connection with the text '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ svargakāmo yajēta*' ('Desirous of heaven, one should sacrifice with the *Darsha* and the *Purṇamāsa*'),—where the terms '*darsha*' and '*pūrṇamāsa*' denote particular times,—is the construction to be '*darshapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmaḥ*' ('Desirous of heaven, through *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*'), or '*svargakāmo yajēta*' ('Desirous of heaven, one should sacrifice').—In all these three texts, neither '*Darsha*', nor '*Pūrṇamāsa*', nor '*Chitrā*', nor '*Shyēna*' is 'expressive of activity'; nor have these words any connection with the agent desiring the particular result, because their case-endings are different from those found in the words denoting the agent.—From all this it follows that words expressive of substances and qualities are not expressive of the *Apūrva* (Transcendental Potency).

[The sense of these arguments is as follows:—If the words '*shyēna*', '*chitrā*', '*darsha*' and '*pūrṇamāsa*' were directly related to the particular results (and as such, were *Bhāvashabda*, 'words expressive of activity'), then the *yāga* (sacrifice) itself would not be instrumental in the accomplishment of the results; and then words like '*shyēna*' could not be taken as *names* of sacrifices; as it is only because of the co-ordination of the instrumental *sacrifice* with words like '*shyēnēna*' that these latter come to be regarded as *names*; not being taken as names, these words could not be taken as injunctive of accessories. When however the sacrifice is taken as the instrument of the *Bhāvanā* (*bringing into existence*), then, the word '*shyēna*' cannot but be taken as the name of that sacrifice—'*na chaiṣāmarthinā sambandhaḥ*'—says the *Bhāṣya*; this means that the mention of the result has no direct concern with the word '*chitrayā*' or '*shyēnēna*'.]

SŪTRA (2).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"AS A MATTER OF FACT, 'ACTIVITY' IS DENOTED BY ALL (WORDS)";—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

[Says the *Opponent*]—"If your view is that words expressive of substances and qualities are not indicative of the Transcendental Potency (*Apūrva*), because they are *not* 'expressive of activity (*Bhāva*)',—then, we urge that '*activity* is denoted by *all words*'.—For instance, in the sentence '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*' ('Desirous of heaven, one should sacrifice with the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*'), the connection between the terms 'desirous of heaven' and 'with the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*' would be asserted by the term 'should sacrifice';—similarly in the

text '*Shyēnēnābhicharan yajēta*' ('Going to kill, one should sacrifice with the *Shyēna*'), the connection between the terms 'going to kill' and 'with the *shyēna*' would be asserted by the term 'should sacrifice';—and in the text '*Chitrayā yajēta pashukāmaḥ*' ('Desirous of cattle, one should sacrifice with the *Chitrā*'), the connection between the terms 'desirous of cattle' and 'with the *chitrā*' would be asserted by the term 'should sacrifice';—and thus *all these words* (and not only the term 'should sacrifice') are such as want the help of some other word to complete their sense; so that all of them are equally expressive of 'activity';—and when all the words are equally expressive of 'activity', there is nothing to justify the restriction that the Transcendental Potency is indicated only by 'words expressive of particular acts', and not by those expressive of substances and qualities."

SŪTRA (3).

THOSE WORDS ARE NOUNS,—ON THE UTTERANCE WHEREOF IN ACTUAL USAGE, THE FORMS OF THE OBJECTS DENOTED BY THEM BECOME APPREHENDED; CONSEQUENTLY ANY NEED FOR OTHERS IS FAR AWAY FROM THEM; SPECIALLY AS THEY ARE ACCOMPLISHED ENTITIES AT THE TIME OF BEING USED (AND SPOKEN OF).

Bhāṣya.

There are certain words in whose case it so happens that whenever they are pronounced for the purpose of conveying the idea of what is denoted by them, what is so denoted becomes apprehended in its true form, —i.e. as being something which, having come into existence, continues to exist for some time,—and is not, like an act, destroyed as soon as it comes into existence;—these words are *Nouns*, and these are 'words expressive of substances and qualities', and such are the objects denoted by 'words expressive of substances and qualities'.

Instead of saying that these are 'words expressive of substances and qualities', the *Sūtra* has said that 'these are *Nouns*', which means that the term 'Nouns' is synonymous (with the term 'words expressive of substances and qualities').—"How do you know this?"—We deduce this from the fact that the affixes taken by the words (expressive of substances and qualities) are known as '*nāmikī*' (pertaining to Nouns)—"What are these affixes?"—They are those that are found in the terms '*vṛkṣaḥ*', '*vṛkṣau*', '*vṛkṣāḥ*' (denoting substances), and '*shuklaḥ*', '*shuklau*', '*shuklāḥ*' (denoting qualities).—Thus the words used in the *Sūtra* are quite right.

Inasmuch as the objects denoted by these nouns are not momentary (but lasting),—'*any need for others is far away from them*'; that is, they do not stand in need of anything else in the shape of a Primary (to which they would be subsidiary); these have not got to be produced, '*because they are accomplished entities at the time of being used and spoken of*',—i.e. they are already in existence at the time that they are used.

SŪTRA (4).

THOSE WORDS, ON THE OTHER HAND, ARE VERBS—ON THE UTTERANCE WHEREOF WHAT IS DENOTED BY THEM IS NOT IN EXISTENCE; HENCE IT IS THROUGH THESE THAT IT (THE TRANSCENDENTAL POTENCY) WOULD BE COGNISED; AS WHAT IS DENOTED BY THEM IS DEPENDENT (UPON OTHER FACTORS).

Bhāṣya.

'*Those words on the utterance whereof what is denoted by them is not in existence*',—i.e. what is denoted by them does not exist at the time that they are pronounced,—'*are Verbs*';—i.e. these are 'words denoting activity (*Bhāva*)'; the Sūtra has taught us this by using the other synonym ('*verbs*').—"In what way are the terms '*verbs*' and 'words denoting activity' synonymous?"—That they are so is indicated by the fact that the affixes taken by the 'words denoting activity' are called '*ākhyātikī*' (pertaining to *verbs*)—"What are these affixes?"—They are those that are found in the terms '*pachati*', '*pachataḥ*', '*pachanti*', and so forth.

For this reason the Transcendental Potency would be cognised through these words; because what is denoted by verbs is *something to be brought into existence*; hence when these verbs are pronounced along with words, the things denoted by which are accomplished entities,—these latter entities are taken as subserving the purposes of *what is to be brought into existence*; as it is only thus that they would be serving a visible purpose; because the *coming into existence* of *what is to be brought into existence for a special purpose* serves a distinctly useful purpose; and it is brought about by what is already an accomplished entity;—thus does a visible purpose become served.—There would be no such purpose found to be fulfilled if *what is to be brought into existence* were taken as subserving the purposes of what is already an *accomplished entity*; so that in this case an invisible (transcendental purpose) would have to be assumed. From this it follows that the *sacrifice* (which is yet to be accomplished) cannot be taken as subserving the purpose of a *substance* (which is already an accomplished entity).

Further, '*what is denoted by them is dependent upon other factors*';—that is, what is denoted by them is dependent upon the human agent; '*Bhāvanā*' (Activity) is so called only when it is related to a human agent; specially because the term '*bhāvayēt*' ('should bring into existence') denotes (through the conjugational affix) the human agent; it is for this reason that the sentence 'one desirous of Heaven should sacrifice' conveys the idea of (1) the human agent, as also (2) the sacrifice, and (3) the relationship (between them).—On the other hand, if we had a sentence in the form '*svargakāmo dravyeṇa*' ('one desirous of Heaven, by substance', there being no Verb), it would convey the idea of (1) the human agent, and (2) the substance, but not of any relationship (between them).

Says the Opponent :—"What we mean is that the verb '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') would signify the relationship between *the human agent seeking to accomplish a purpose* and the *substance*,—in the form 'one should bring into existence by means of the substance'; so that the 'bringing into existence' of the purpose is understood to be brought about by means of the substance; and thus there would be the required 'need for others' also."

True, it is so understood that 'one should bring into existence by means of the substance'; but this is understood through *Syntactical Connection*; while the idea that 'one should bring into existence by means of the sacrifice' is understood through *Direct Assertion*.—Further, when the relationship of the *sacrifice* is predicated in the form 'one should bring into existence by means of the sacrifice',—at that time, the relationship of the *substance* in the form 'one should bring into existence by means of the substance' could not be predicated. Then again, if the relationship of the *substance* would be predicated, any relationship with the verb '*yajēta*' ('*should sacrifice*') also could not be predicated [as one and the same sentence could not have two predicates];—it could be possible if the former (the relationship of the substance) were only *referred to*; but in that case, there would be *predication* and *reference* at one and the same time,—which is impossible. Thus, there would be a conflict between Direct Assertion (of the relationship of Sacrifice) and *Syntactical Connection* (indicating the relationship of the Substance); and in the case of such conflict, it is Direct Assertion which is the more powerful; consequently there can be no connection between *the human agent seeking to accomplish a purpose* and the *substance*;—so that, so long as there is no connection between the substance and 'the person desiring heaven', it is not possible for the substance to be conducive to the fulfilment of heaven.

This is the reason that justifies the restriction that the Transcendental Potency is indicated by 'words denoting activity', and *not* by 'words denoting Substances and Qualities'. When therefore the words used are '*yāgena kuryāt*' ('should bring about by sacrifice'), then the word must be taken as expressive of the *sacrifice*,—and the connection of the term '*darshapūrṇamāsābhyām*' ('by means of *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*') would be obtained only by *indirect indication*, based upon the fact that the *sacrifice* is enjoined as to be performed on the *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* days.

Adhikaraṇa (2): *There is such a thing as Apūrva, Transcendental Potency.*

SŪTRA (5).

There is Apūrva, because action (is enjoined).

Bhāṣya.

[The foregoing discussion, as to the word that indicates the Transcendental Potency, has presupposed the existence of this Potency itself: but inasmuch as the existence of such a potency is not generally admitted, the present *Adhikaraṇa* proceeds to establish its existence.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 497.]

[The *Pūrvapakṣa* of this *Adhikaraṇa* is set forth only in the form of the *question*]—" How is it known that there is such a thing as '*Apūrva*', Transcendental Potency ?"

The answer to this, which embodies the *Siddhānta*, is supplied by the *Sūtra*—*There is Apūrva, because action is enjoined.*—The word '*chodanā*' (in the Sūtra) we explain as *Apūrva*; hence the meaning of the *Sūtra* is that there is such a thing as *Apūrva*,—because action is enjoined—in such injunctions as 'Desirous of Heaven, one should sacrifice.' Otherwise,—if there were no such thing as *Apūrva*—such an injunction would be meaningless; as the act of the *sacrifice* itself is perishable; so that if the sacrifice were to perish without bringing into existence something else, then the cause having ceased to exist, the result (in the shape of Heaven) could never come about.—From this it follows that the sacrifice does bring into existence something (some Force or Potency which continues to exist and operate till such time as the Result is actually brought about).—If it be argued that "on the strength of the declaration of a certain result following from a certain sacrificer, it may be presumed that the act of sacrifice itself does not perish (but continues to exist till the appearance of the result)",—the answer is that such a presumption cannot be right; because of the Act (sacrifice) itself, we do not perceive any other form (save the one that is perishable, and hence not able to bring about the final result); as a matter of fact, that alone is called an 'act' which transposes its substratum from one place to another; and no such transposition is possible for the *Soul* (which alone could be the lasting substratum for the *act*, if it were to continue till the appearance of the result),—because the Soul is omnipresent (and as such there can be no change of position for it); that the Soul is present in all places is indicated by the fact that its functioning (in the shape of the experiencing of pleasure, pain, etc.,) is found everywhere.—[Says the opponent, who holds that the Soul is no larger than the body encasing it]— "That same fact (of the Soul functioning everywhere) may be a sign of its going from one place to another".—[We have adopted the reading '*nanu*' for '*na tu*'; the *Tantravārtika* favours '*nanu*', though it provides

an explanation of the other reading also—see *Translation*, p. 517].—[The answer to this is that] we perceive no incongruity in the view that the Soul does *not* move from place to place [while there are several incongruities in the view that it does so move,—for which see *Tantravārtika*—Translation, p. 518].—Thus then, the only possible alternative is that the *act* (of sacrifice) subsists in the material substance (offered), and this substance has perished (ceased to exist); and when the substratum (in the shape of the substance) has perished, it is understood that the act (sacrifice) itself has perished.—If it be urged that "the substratum (substance) has not perished",—that cannot be true, as all that is found to be left of the substance (offered at the sacrifice) is mere ash.—It might be argued that "even while the ash is there the substance is there (in the form of that ash)",—that cannot be right; because what exists must be perceived, and yet the substance is *not* perceived (in the ashes).—"The very fact of the bringing about of the result would be indicative of the presence of the substance (at the time of the appearance of the result)."—In that case, it is necessary for the other party to answer the objection that there is no perception of the substance.—It might be argued that "the non-perception might be due to one or the other of the various reasons of non-perception, such as the subtle character of the substance [or 'being too remote' or 'too near', or 'the inefficiency of the perceptive organ', or 'absent-mindedness'—enumerated in *Sāṅkhyakārikā*].—If such is the view, then it comes to this that something has to be assumed; and the question to be considered is—is it the *Apūrva* that should be assumed—or some reason for the non-perception of the existing substance? There is always some justification for making a general assumption, and none for a particular one [so that while there may be some justification for the assuming of a general potency in the shape of the *Apūrva*, there can be none for assuming a reason for the non-perception of every particular object, as there will have to be a separate reason for each particular case of non-perception].—"[In order to avoid these difficulties, we may hold that] the Act continues to exist without any substratum".—But this assumption also would be open to the same objections (as those sought to be avoided).

[The translation follows the explanation supplied by the *Tantravārtika*, which says '*Evamanāshritakarmakalpanāyāmapi*'—See Translation, p. 523.—It may also be rendered as follows:—"There will be this justification for assuming a special reason for the non-perception of the existing substance that, in the absence of such a substance, there would be no substratum for the Act."—The answer to this is that even this remains open to the same objections].—(In order to avoid all these difficulties) it might be held that "we shall assume some such character in the *Act* whereby it will not carry its substratum (i.e. the Soul) to another place".—This also will be open to the same objections [such as the incongruity of denying a perceptible fact and assuming of what is not perceptible—says *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 523].—From all this it follows that the *act of sacrifice* is perishable, and because it is perishable, therefore there is such a thing as *Apūrva* (brought into existence by the Act).

"What is the purpose served by this discussion?"

It is as follows:—If 'words denoting Substances and Qualities' also

were indicative of *Apūrva*, —as held by the *Pūrvapakṣa*—then, on substances and qualities being spoilt, no substitutes could be employed;—this would be the case if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view were accepted. If, on the other hand, the *Siddhānta* view were accepted (that *Apūrva* is indicated only by 'words denoting activity'), then, the performance of the Act could be proceeded with after adopting a substitute for the substance or quality that may have been spoilt.

[The Pūrvapakṣa argument against the assumption of Apūrva is thus stated by Prabhākara:—"The injunction imparted by the injunctive word only urges the agent to the performance of a certain *action*, and not towards anything desired by him; the *action* is something ephemeral, and is not present immediately before the attainment of heaven by the agent; hence in order to meet these difficulties we must accept the sacrifice itself to be either everlasting, or bringing about either a certain faculty in the agent, or the favours of the deity; and there is no reason for assuming any such thing as Apūrva."

In answer to the above, he continues—

'At the very outset you commit a mistake in assuming that the injunction prompts the agent to *action*; what the injunction really does is to prompt him to *exertion*; and the particular *action* denoted by the root is only the *object of that exertion*. Thus then, what is denoted by the injunctive sentence is the 'Niyoga', decree or mandate; this 'mandate' urges the man to *exertion*; and this '*exertion*' pertains to some sort of action denoted by the verb. The assumption that the action itself is everlasting is against all evidence; the Soul also is, by its very omnipresence, inactive; hence what brings about the final result cannot abide in the Soul.'

The above passage from the Bṛihatī is not quite clear; nor has it been possible for us to obtain a manuscript of this portion of the commentary, *Ṛijuvimalā*. But the whole subject is discussed, from the *Prābhākara* standpoint, in the *Prakaraṇa-pañchikā* (page 185 *et seq.*), from which the following may be gleaned:—

There can be no doubt as to the ephemeral character of the sacrifice itself; it is borne out by everyday experience. Nor can the sacrifice be held to be laid down for the purpose of obtaining the favour of the deity; as there is no evidence in support of this; as a matter of fact also, sacrifices are never performed for that purpose; the deity is only one to whom the offering is made; and we could please a deity by only such acts as could reach it; then again, it is not possible for any deity to get at all the offerings made by different men at all times; specially because no deity is eternal or omnipresent. Nor can we accept the view that the verb with the injunctive affix expresses an action tending to produce in the agent, a certain faculty, which is the immediate cause of the final result. This is the view, favoured by Kumārila. We cannot accept this view, as there is no proof for the postulating of the appearance of any such faculty in the agent. That the sacrifice produces such a faculty is not proved either by Perception or by Inference, or even by Verbal Assertion,—there being no Vedic texts pointing to any such faculty; specially as we find that the *action* is brought about by the exertion of the agent; and therefore the causal potency must reside in this *exertion*,—which exertion therefore should be denoted by the injunctive sentence. The assumption of the faculty in question might be said to be proved by presumption, based upon the consideration that the action cannot be the cause of the final result, without some such faculty lasting during the time intervening between the completion of the action and the appearance of the result. But what presumption can justify us in assuming is some faculty or potency *in that thing*

itself which is found to be incapable in the absence of that faculty; so in the case in question, the presumption can only point to some faculty in the *action*, and not in the *agent*; hence what is brought about by the faculty abiding in the agent cannot be regarded as produced by the action.

The whole matter of what the *Bhāṭṭa* calls '*Apūrva*' and the *Prābhākara* '*Niyoga*', is thus explained in the *Prakaraṇapañchikā* (p. 187):—

(1) The second aphorism of Adhyāya I has shown that what the injunctive sentence denotes is Kārya, *something to be brought about*. (2) In the beginning of Adhyaya VI, it has been shown that, of this *Kārya* denoted by the sentence, the *Niyojya*—i.e. the person prompted to its bringing about—is one who is desirous of acquiring for himself some desirable result in the shape of Heaven and the like,—this being related to the *Kārya*. (3) In the *Bādaryādhikaraṇa* (III. I. 3) it has been proved that it is the *kārya* that is the direct cause of the production of that desirable result which is desired by (and as such, qualifies) the prompted person. (4) In the *Devatādhikaraṇa* (IX. I. 9) the Bhāṣya has shown that this *kārya* cannot be the *act* (of *sacrificing*, for instance); as this *act* cannot possibly be the direct cause of the final result; nor could it be held to lead to the result through the favour of the deity to whom the sacrifice is offered; nor can it be regarded as leading to the result through a certain potency in the agent; and it is well-known that either the act itself, or any potency abiding in itself, does not last long enough to bring about the result. (5) In the *Apūrvādhikaraṇa* (II. 1. 5), we have the final conclusions led up to by all the above *adhikaraṇas*. That which is denoted by the injunctive affix and other factors of the injunction is the *kārya* inhering in the agent who is prompted by the sentence, and as connected with whom the *kārya* is indicated; as this *kārya* is not cognisable by any other means of knowledge, it has been called '*Apūrva*', *something new, not known before*. The connection of this *kārya* with the agent and the action may be thus traced:—the *kārya* by its very nature is something brought about by *kṛiti*, or *operation*; and this *operation* is none other than the exertion of the agent. In the *Bhāvārth-ādhikaraṇa* (II. I. 1) again, it is shown that no such exertion is possible, independently of some act denoted by the verbal root. Hence what the injunctive sentence denotes, in this connection, is the *Niyoga* or *prompting*, relating to that act. This act, thus being the object of that prompting, comes to be spoken of as the 'instrument' by which that prompting is accomplished, as shown under III. 1. 3. Even though the *kārya* is brought into existence at a time other than that of the appearance of the final result, yet, inasmuch as it is inseparably related to the prompted agent,—in whom the desire for that result is present,—there is nothing incongruous in regarding that *kārya* as the direct cause of the result. This *kārya* has been called '*Apūrva*' by the Bhāṣya by reason of its being *something new* to all other means of knowledge, save the injunctive sentence; but the name given to it by Prabhākara is '*Niyoga*' or *prompting*, by reason of the fact that it acts as an incentive to the prompted person (*Niyojya*) and makes him put forth an exertion towards the accomplishment of the action denoted by the verbal root. This *kārya* or *Niyoga* is expressed neither by the verbal root, nor by the injunctive affix, nor by any other word in the sentence, but it is denoted by the sentence as a whole; all other necessary factors being expressed by the several words of the sentence individually, what the sentence as a whole expresses is this *Niyoga* (Mandate) as related to the prompted person expressed by one of the words in the sentence (i.e. the word signifying the result, the person desiring which is the prompted person). That the *Niyoga* is thus expressed by a sentence is also proved by the fact that the general rule is that, that which is the principal thing made known by the sentence forms its 'meaning'; and there is no doubt that of all the things made known by the sentence, the *Niyoga* is the most important; for even though the

final result has all the appearance of the most important factor, yet it is the *Niyoga* that is really such, because it is the direct and immediate cause of the result, and it is also the immediate effect of the action performed; also, because the result also has to be regarded as subservient to the *Niyoga*, in view of the fact that the result enters as one of the factors necessary for the making up of the full character of the *Niyoga*. To explain—The *Niyoga* cannot be a true *Niyoga* until there is a *Niyojya*, the person to be prompted to exertion, as without exertion there can be no *Niyoga*; then again, without the agent there can be no exertion; and lastly, it is only the person desiring the result issuing from the undertaking that is entitled to its performance; thus indirectly, through the agent, the result becomes a necessary factor in the *Niyoga*; this relation between the *Niyoga* and the result being similar to that between the master and the servant: without the servant the master cannot be a true 'master', and yet it is the master that is the more important person of the two.

The *Prakaraṇapañchikā* raises an interesting question here:—

"Granted that the injunctive sentence—'One desiring heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma' expresses the *Niyoga* as proceeding from the action of *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, and as being the direct cause of attaining heaven. But just as the sacrifice, being an effect, has only an ephemeral existence, and cannot continue till the appearance of the result,—so in the same manner, the *Niyoga* also, as an effect, could not but be transient, and as such unable to continue till the appearance of the result. Thus the very purpose for which the hypothesis of the *Niyoga* has been put forward, fails to be accomplished by it. This cuts off the ground entirely from under the whole fabric of the *Niyoga* or *Apūrva*."

The author fails to answer this objection satisfactorily. All that he says is that the *Nijaga* does not bring about the result immediately after it itself comes into existence, but in its action towards the bringing about of the result, it stands in need of certain auxiliaries, which are not always available, and until whose appearance the result cannot appear. This explanation does not meet the difficulty that the *Niyoga* itself cannot, and does not, exist at the time that the result appears. He has explained in another place that it is through the prompted agent that the *Niyoga*, though itself appearing at the present time, brings about the result at a future time. This, however, is as much as to say that the *Niyoga* produces something in the agent, which latter something brings about the result; and thus this much-vaunted theory of the Prabhākara is found to be less acceptable than the *Bhāṭṭa* view, by which the action (of sacrificing) itself produces a certain faculty in the agent, which faculty brings about the result at the proper time; while Prabhākara appears to assume a *Niyoga* intervening between the action and the something lasting that is produced in the agent, he does not call it 'faculty', but which comes to be the same thing. In order to meet the difficulty, Shālikanātha has been forced to call in the aid of 'destiny'; he says that it is only when the *Niyoga* is aided by destiny that it brings about the result. This after all, is a very poor explanation to be offered by the '*Mīmāṁsāṁmṣṇāta*' as he has called the followers of Prabhākara.

Another question arising in this connexion is that, what has been said above may be all right, so far as those actions are concerned which are laid down to be performed with a view to a certain result; but how would it apply to those actions which are to be performed merely in fulfilment of a duty incumbent upon all persons, without reference to any result,—or to those passages that lay down the non-doing of certain acts? The answer to this is that, in the explanation of *Niyoga*, the Prābhākara has brought in the *result*, not as something desired by the agent, but only as something the presence of which makes a person entitled to the performance of a certain act; in the case of those actions, then, that are laid down as *necessary* duties to be performed *throughout life*, any person *who is endowed with life* being

entitled to the performance of those acts, the character of the agent becomes fully accomplished; and this is all that is needed for the explanation of the *Niyoga*.

By Kumârila's view the *Apūrva* is 'a potency in the principal action, or in the agent, which did not exist prior to the performance of the action, and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures.' Before the sacrifices laid down as leading to Heaven are performed, there is in the sacrifices themselves in the first place, an incapacity to lead any person to heaven, and in the second place, in the agent, to attain heaven. Both these incapacities are set aside by the performance of the sacrifice; and this performance also creates a positive potency or force, by virtue of which heaven is attained; and to this latter force or capacity we give the name '*Apūrva*'. The proof of the existence of such an *Apūrva* lies in Presumption,—based upon the fact that without some such force or potency many Vedic passages are wholly inexplicable. For instance, there are many passages dealing with the fact that certain sacrifices lead the sacrificer to heaven,—the idea being that he goes to heaven, not indeed immediately on the completion of the sacrifice, but after death. The question then arises, that as a general rule the effect comes into existence while its cause is still present, or immediately after the cause has ceased to exist; but in the case in question, the sacrifice ceases to exist at the present time, while the attainment of heaven comes ten or twelve or more years later. This can be explained only by the hypothesis that the sacrifice, on its completion, produces directly a certain potency or faculty in the agent, which resides in him, like many other faculties, throughout life, at the end of which it leads him to heaven. Without some such intervening potency—as the connecting link between the sacrifice and its result—the causal relation between these two cannot be explained. *Apūrva* thus is nothing more than a force set in motion by the performance of the action—this force being the direct instrument whereby, sooner or later, the action accomplishes its result. There is nothing incongruous in this hypothesis; as every action is actually found to set going certain forces, either in some substance, or in persons connected with some substances; and the force thus set going accomplishes its result, as soon as it reaches its full development with the aid of attendant auxiliaries. The whole process is thus briefly stated systematically in *Nŷayamâlâvistara*:—

(1) "The sentence—'one desiring heaven should perform sacrifices'—lays down the fact that the sacrifice is instrumental in the bringing about of the attainment of heaven.

(2) Then arises the question—how can the sacrifice which ceases to exist at the moment that it is complete, bring about the result at a much later time?

(3) The answer to this is that the sacrifice accomplishes the final result through the agency of the force called '*Apūrva*'.

(4) A further question arises—how is the *Apūrva* brought into existence?

(5) The answer is—by the performance of the sacrifice.

In all simple sacrifices, there is a single *Apūrva* leading to a single result. But there are certain elaborate sacrifices which are highly complex, being made up of a number of subsidiary sacrifices. Such for instance as the *Darshapaurṇamāsa* sacrifices. In all such sacrifices, there are as a rule four kinds of Apūrva:—

(1) The *Phalāpūrva*—that which brings about the result directly, and which is the immediate cause of the result;

(2) the *Samudāyāpūrva*;—in the *Darshapaurṇamāsa* sacrifices, the three main sacrifices performed on the Moonless day form one group and the three performed on the Full Moon day another group; each of these groups occurring at different points of time could not have a single *apūrva*; hence each group has a distinct *Apūrva* of its own, the two *Apūrvas*

combining to produce the final *Phalāpūrva*; and each of these distinct *Apūrvas* is call a *samudāyāpūrva*;

(3) the *Utpattyapūrva*;—i.e. the three *Apūrvas* following from each of the three sacrifices forming the Darsha group: these three *Apūrvas* lead to the *Samudāyāpūrva* of the '*Paurṇamāsa*' group, which leads to the final *Phalāpūrva*;

(4) the *Aṅgāpūrva*;—each of these sacrifices of the group is made up of a number of minor acts, each of which in its turn, must have a distinct *Apūrva* of its own; as otherwise the act could not help in the final *Phalāpūrva*.]

Adhikaraṇa (3): *Division of Acts into 'Primary' and 'Secondary'.*

SŪTRA (6).

They (Verbs and Acts denoted by them) are of two kinds—Secondary and Primary.

Bhāṣya.

[From the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* it would appear as if there were an *Apūrva* resulting from every act. In order to remove this misconception, the author now proceeds to point out the division of Acts into 'secondary' and 'primary',—the idea being that it is only the Primary Act that directly brings about an *Apūrva*, the Secondary Act only helps the Primary.]

It has been understood that *Bhāvashabdas* (Verbs) are expressive of Acts. As a matter of fact, however, there are several kinds of Verbs,—such as '*yajati*' ('sacrifices'), '*juhoti*' ('pours the libation'), '*dadāti*' ('gives'); also several of such other kinds as '*dogdhi*' ('milks'), '*pinaṣṭi*' ('pounds'), '*vilāpayati*' ('melts'), and so forth.

With regard to these Verbs, there arises the question—Are all these verbs expressive of a Primary Act? Or, are some expressive of only a preparatory (secondary) Act?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this point is that—"inasmuch as all are equally '*bhāvārtha*', verbs expressive of activity, they are all expressive of Primary Acts".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—Verbs are to be classed under two heads—some are expressive of Primary Acts, others are expressive of preparatory (secondary) Acts. Even so, all these acts would be useful; and a useful purpose being thus served by all of them, there would be no justification for the assuming of an *Apūrva* following from all. Thus then all verbs are not expressive of Primary Acts.

Adhikaraṇa (3A): *Definition of the Primary Act.*

SŪTRA (7).

Those acts are 'Primary' which are not meant to be productive (or preparatory) of material substances; because the material substance is a subordinate factor.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"It is true that according to the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, there would be need for assuming fewer transcendental potencies; and to that extent, this view is quite reasonable. But we find no grounds for discrimination as to which Acts lead to *Apūrva* and which do not".

The answer to this is that those verbs that denote such acts as are *not* meant to be preparatory or productive of a material substance are 'Primary'—i.e. expressive of Primary Acts,—*because the material substance is a subordinate factor*; i.e. the material substance is a secondary factor, being subservient to *the accomplishment of the Act*, which is what is most desired.

ADHIKARAṆA (3B): *Definition of the Secondary (Subsidiary) Act.*

SŪTRA (8).

THOSE, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT ARE MEANT TO BE PRODUCTIVE (OR PREPARATORY) OF A MATERIAL SUBSTANCE ARE TO BE REGARDED AS 'SUBSIDIARY'; BECAUSE IN REGARD TO THESE, THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCE IS THE DOMINANT FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

In those cases where the Acts are intended to be productive (or preparatory) of the material substance, the Act should be recognised as subsidiary;—why?—because in the case of such an Act, the material substance would be the dominant factor.—In the case of such acts as are expressed by verbs like '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice'), it is clear that they are not meant to be productive of any material substance; hence verbs like these are expressive of Primary Acts, because in the case of the acts, the material substance is the subordinate factor. But in the case of acts expressed by such verbs as '*pinaṣṭi*' ('pounds'), it is clear that they are meant to be preparatory of a material substance; hence these verbs are expressive of subsidiary Acts.—This is the ground for differentiation among acts (as to which are, and which are not, productive of the *Apūrva*).

The purpose served by this differentiation is that *Vrīhi* being the material at the archetypal sacrifice,—and *threshing* having been laid down as to be done to the *Vrīhi*,—as, at the ectypal sacrifice, the material to be used for the cooked offering is the *Priyaṅgu* corn,—if according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view, all acts were equally 'primary', then the '*threshing of the Vrīhi*' would be a primary act, no portion of which could be left out; so that even at the sacrifice where *Priyaṅgu* is the prescribed material, it would become necessary to do the 'threshing of the Vrīhi', and hence for that purpose, to bring in the *Vrīhi* also; while according to the *Siddhānta*, the 'threshing of the Vrīhi' would be a subsidiary act, meant only to be sanctificatory or preparatory of the particular material *Vrīhi*; so that there would be no need for doing the 'threshing of the Vrīhi', or bringing in the *Vrīhi*, at a sacrifice where the prescribed material is *Priyaṅgu*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *Acts like* 'Sammārjana' (*Washing*) *are not 'Primary'*.

SŪTRA (9).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO FAR AS THE ELEMENT OF 'DHARMA' IS CONCERNED, EVERY ACT SHOULD BE 'PRIMARY'; BECAUSE OF NON-ACCOMPLISHMENT (OF ANY MATERIAL SUBSTANCE); AS IN THE CASE OF PRAYĀJA".

Bhāṣya.

[The general principles of differentiation of acts into 'Primary' and 'Subsidiary' having been laid down, the author now proceeds to deal with the case of a few particular acts.]

We meet with such texts as '*Srucham sammārṣṭi—Agnim sammārṣṭi,—Paridhim sammārṣṭi,—Puroḍāsham paryagnikaroti*'. (Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa 3. 3. 1).—In regard to these there arises the question—Are the two acts that are spoken of here—viz. *Washing* and *Taking round the Fire*—'primary' or 'subsidiary'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—"The mere act—i.e. to the extent that it does not suffice to fulfill the visible purpose (of bringing about a material substance)—is what we call '*the element of Dharma*'; and this should be a 'primary' act;—why?—*because of non-accomplishment* of any help; i.e. an Act of this kind does not render any help to the material substance; it is only when an act of this kind accomplishes a material substance that it is regarded as 'subsidiary'; and as it is only an act of this latter kind that is 'subsidiary', the act under consideration must be regarded as 'primary'."

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT THE ACT IN QUESTION SHOULD BE OF THE SAME CHARACTER AS OTHERS; BECAUSE OF SIMILARITY IN THE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*' ('but') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa*.

Acts of the kind that are under consideration *should be of the same character* as other *subsidiary* acts,—such as the *Threshing of Vrīhi*;—why?—*because of the similarity in the texts*;—i.e. in all these texts (speaking of the acts) we find the same Accusative ending in connection with the terms denoting material substances; for instance, just as we have the Accusative ending in the word '*vrīhīn*', in the text '*Vrīhīn avahanti*' (T. B. 3. 2. 5. 6) which enjoins the act of *threshing*,—so have we also in the word '*agnim*' in the injunction '*Agnim sammārṣṭi*', and in the word '*puroḍāsham*' in the

injunction '*Puroḍāsham paryagnikaroti*'.—"Is there any such rule as that the Accusative ending is to be found only in connection with material substances mentioned in texts injunctive of subsidiary acts,—on the basis of which rule, you conclude the acts in question to be *subsidiary*, from the fact that these also contain the Accusative ending?"—Certainly not, we reply. What we mean is that the Accusative ending has been declared to convey the idea of 'what is most desired by the Agent',—that the same Accusative ending is found in the words in question,—hence it follows that what is signified by the term with that ending is 'what is most desired',—if that is the 'most desired' (and as such, the dominant factor), then the Act mentioned in the text must be a 'subsidiary' one.—Though it is true that the 'subsidiary character' of Acts is not cognisable by such Means of Cognition as Sense-perception and the like,—yet it is cognised by means of 'Word'.—From all this it follows that the Acts under question are 'subsidiary'.

SŪTRA (11).

[OBJECTION]—"BUT (IN MANY CASES) THERE IS INJUNCTION OF THE MATERIAL SUBSTANCE (AS THE SUBORDINATE FACTOR)".—IF THIS BE URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"Evidently your view is that—inasmuch as the word has the Accusative ending, the substance (signified by it) must be the predominant factor.—But this is not right, because we find the Accusative ending also in words which denote the substance as the subordinate factor;—e.g. in such texts as '*Saktūn juhoti*' (T. S. 3. 3. 8. 4), '*Mārutam juhoti*', '*Ekakapālan juhoti*' [where the material substances *Saktu* and the rest are distinctly subordinate to the action of *Homa*]".

SŪTRA (12).

[ANSWER]—NOT SO; BECAUSE, IN REALITY [THE ACCUSATIVE ENDING ALWAYS INDICATES THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR],—AS IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE IN COMMON PARLANCE; AND IT IS ONLY IN SPECIAL CASES THAT THAT FACTOR MAY BE TAKEN AS SUBSERVIENT, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS SUBSERVING THE PURPOSES OF THE ACT.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the Accusative ending never indicates the subordinate factor; learned people have taught us that (*a*) 'The Accusative case-ending signifies the objective' (Pāṇini 2. 3. 2), and (*b*) 'The objective is that which is most desired by the Agent' (Pāṇini 1. 4. 49).—In common parlance also we do not find the Accusative ending indicating a subordinate factor. Even in such instances as—(*a*) '*Taṇḍulān odanam pacha*' ('Prepare cooked rice of these rice'), what is meant is 'Prepare this rice for the

purpose of obtaining *cooked rice*'; so that it is the *rice* (to be prepared) which is still 'what is most desired'; similarly in the sentence '*Balvajān shikhaṇḍakān kuru*' ('Make bundles of straws'), it is the *straws* themselves tied up in the form of *bundles* that are 'what is most desired'. The significance of words is determined by common, not *Vedic*, usage.—In common parlance also when the verb '*juhoti*' ('offers into the Fire') is used along with a word with the Accusative ending, it is possible to say that the Accusative ending indicates 'what is most desired'; for instance, in the sentence '*Taṇḍulān juhudhi*' ('Offer the rice into the Fire'), the idea intended to be conveyed may be 'Relate the rice to the act of offering into fire' and many such others. —It has already been declared that it is not right to attribute several meanings to a single word.

Thus then, it having been established that the Accusative ending indicates the predominant factor, it would be only in very special cases (where the said indication of the predominant factor would be impossible) that it could be assumed to indicate the subservient factor.

Question.—"But in the Veda, how could the subservient factor be indicated by the Accusative ending?"

Answer.—In fact, wherever the Accusative ending is used, the idea conveyed to us is always that of the predominant factor;—and when this *predominance* has been comprehended, it might be denied only if there were some stronger authority for such denial.—"How?"—Well, in the case of the text '*saktūn juhoti*', the Accusative ending in '*saktūn*' points to the *saktu*, *Meal*, as the predominant factor,—by which the meaning of the text would be that '*the act of offering into fire* should be made to subserve some purpose for the *Meal*'; but in reality it is found that *the act of offering* cannot in any way serve any purpose for the *Meal*;—why?—for the simple reason that the *Meal* can have no purpose of its own; in fact, we do not see, or hear of, any purpose that the *Meal* may have. Under the circumstances, if the *Act of offering into Fire* were to be taken as subserving some purpose for the *Meal*, that Act itself would have to be regarded as purposeless (aimless, useless). [Thus in this case, if we insist upon the direct signification of the Accusative ending as indicating the predominant factor, we find that a Vedic injunction becomes useless.]—And yet as a matter of fact, *the act of offering into Fire* is one that actually serves as an indirect (remote) aid to the Primary Act of the Jyotiṣṭoma, and as such must be *useful*; and this *usefulness* of the act in question follows from the fact of the text occurring in the context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; hence it cannot be said that the Act is useless; specially it is something needed by the text laying down the entire method of procedure of the Primary Act (*Jyotiṣṭoma*).—"[What you say regarding the act of *offering into Fire* may be said regarding the *Meal* also];—the *Meal* also, being mentioned in the same context, may have its use (and as such may be treated as the predominant factor)."—Who says that the *Meal* has no use; it is certainly of use; but it is of use only as tending to the fulfilment of the act of *offering into Fire* (for which a material is necessary),—and not in any other manner. —"But the *Meal* also is needed by the text laying down the entire method of procedure of the Primary Act (*Jyotiṣṭoma*)."—Our answer to this is that

a material substance is not what is needed by the method of procedure; what the Method of Procedure needs is only a detail of the method; and it is the *act of offering into Fire*, and not the material substance *Meal*, which is a detail of the Method.—" But when the *offering into Fire* is done with the *Meal*, a transcendental potency would result from the *Meal*."—There is no authority for this.—" The Accusative ending would be the requisite authority."—The Accusative ending does *not* indicate the fact of the act of *offering into Fire* subserving the purposes of the *Meal*.—" As the *Meal* itself serves no useful purpose, the *act of offering into Fire* would naturally subserve the purpose of the *Meal*, as thus would the *Meal* become related to the act of *offering into Fire*; as it is only when the *offering into Fire* has been made that the *Meal* (offered) becomes related to the act of *offering into Fire*."—If the *Meal* is something useless, then it is not possible for the act of *offering into Fire* to subserve the purpose of the *Meal*. The mere declaration of the *act* subserving the purposes of the *Meal* would be of no use either to the Agent or to the Sacrifice; so that it would still remain useless; because merely on the strength of the said declaration, it would not be possible to assume its use to either (the Agent or the Sacrifice).—Under the circumstances, we conclude that what the word with the Accusative ending ('*saktūn*') does is only to indicate the connection of the *Meal* (*saktu*) with the act of *offering into Fire*; and whenever a material substance becomes related to an act, it can be so related only in a subordinate capacity, because it is an *accomplished* entity (and as such must be subservient to the act *to be accomplished*);—and being so subordinate, it should be spoken of by a word with the Instrumental ending ('*saktubhiḥ juhoti*');—that is why it is asserted that in the text '*saktūn juhoti*', the Accusative ending has been used in place of the Instrumental.

This is what is meant by the word '*tadarthatvāt*' (in the *Sūtra*), which means that, inasmuch as the *Meal* subserves the purposes of the *Act of offering into Fire*, it cannot be regarded as the predominant factor, even though it is spoken of by a word with the Accusative ending. It is only thus that the declaration ('*saktūn juhoti*') could serve a useful purpose; and when it is found to serve a useful purpose, it cannot be said to be useless or aimless.

It is in this same manner that material substances, like the Cake, become subservient to the sacrifice and thereby serve a useful purpose.

Such being the case, the 'preparation' (sanctification) of the material substances also comes to serve a useful purpose.—If it be urged that "it serves no visible purpose",—then the answer is that, in that case it could be taken as serving an invisible (transcendental) purpose; because we find even in ordinary life that there is invisible 'preparation' (sanctification) also; for instance, when men come from other villages, the Fire is carried round, which is said to be productive of an invisible (transcendental) beneficial effect; and there can be no incongruity in what is actually found in ordinary experience.

The use of this *Adhikaraṇa* is as follows:—(*a*) In connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa* sacrifices (which have the *Dashapūrṇamāsa* as their archetype) it is laid down that 'The *sruks* should be made of the *Shamī*-wood, or

of gold'; in the Archetypal Sacrifice, the *Apūrva* is brought about by the 'scouring' of the *Sruks made of several kinds of wood*; hence at the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, *Sruks made of several kinds of wood* should have to be brought up for the purpose of 'scouring' (which is the predominant factor to which the *Sruk* is subservient, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*); while according to the *Siddhānta* (by which the *scouring* is subservient to the *Sruk*), only the *Sruks* made of *Shamī-wood* or of *gold* have to be *scoured*. (*b*) Similarly, the *Paridhi* having been enjoined as to be made 'with spokes', Paridhis made of Palāsha-wood would have to be made for the purpose of being 'scoured', according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*; while according to the *Siddhānta* only *Paridhis with spokes* should have to be 'scoured'.—(*c*) Again, in connection with the *Avabhṛtha*, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the fire would have to be produced for the purpose of being 'stirred' while according to the *Siddhānta*, the *Water* only should have to be 'stirred'.—(*d*) Lastly, we read that at the *Saṭṭriṁshatsamvatsara* sacrifice, the *Savanīya cakes* are to be 'made of meat'; and according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, cakes *of flour* would have to be got ready for the purpose of being 'circumambulated by the Fire', while according to the *Siddhānta*, the circumambulating by the Fire' should be done to the *meat-cakes* themselves.

[This explanation of the use of the *Adhikaraṇa* has not been accepted by Kumārila, who has supplied a different explanation. See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 538–541.]

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The 'primary' character of the* Stuti *and* Shastra *Hymns.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'STOTRA' AND 'SHASTRA' HYMNS ARE SANCTIFICATORY IN THEIR CHARACTER,—LIKE THE 'YĀJYĀ' HYMNS,—AS THEY ARE INDICATIVE OF DEITIES".

Bhāṣya.

[It has been declared under Sūtras 7 and 8 that those acts are to be regarded as 'subsidiary' which are preparatory or productive of material substances, and that those that are not so preparatory or productive are 'primary' acts. It is by way of an exception to this general principle that we have the present *Adhikaraṇa*.—'*Stotra*' is the name given to the hymns consisting of *Mantras* that are set to music and sung; and '*Shastra*' is the name given to those consisting of *Mantras* that are not set to music or sung.]

We have the texts—(*a*) '*Pra-ugam shaṁsati*', (*b*) '*Niṣkēvalyam shaṁsati*' [each of these enjoining the reciting of a *Shastra-hymn*];—and (*c*) '*Ājyaiḥ stuvatē*', (*d*) '*Pṛṣṭhaiḥ stuvatē*' [each of which enjoins the reciting of a *Stotra*-hymn].—These hymns are descriptive of qualities, and are sung (as *Stotra*) or recited (as *Shastra*); an example of such hymns we have the *Mantra* '*Indrasya tu vīryāṇi pravocham*, etc.' (Ṛgveda 1. 36. 1) [which speaks of the good qualities of Indra].

Now, with regard to this *Mantra* descriptive of the good qualities (of Indra), there arises the question—Is this subsidiary (and subordinate) to the deity, or is it 'primary' in character?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The *Stotra* and *Shastra* hymns are sanctificatory acts;—why?—because *they are indicative of deities*; i.e. when the *mantras* descriptive of certain qualities are recited, they point to the deity possessing those qualities; if it were not so, it would not be *descriptive of qualities*; in fact, there is a clear indication of the deity in this case; and through this indication of the Deity, there is a clear aid imparted to the act of sacrifice (to that deity), which act thus becomes accomplished.—For these reasons, the acts under question should be regarded as sanctificatory in their character, '*like the Yājyā mantras*'; that is, just as the *mantras* spoken of in the text '*Yājyāmanvāha-Puronuvākyāmanvāha*' are descriptive of qualities and serve the useful purpose of indicating deities, so also the hymn under discussion".

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT IN THAT CASE THE MANTRA WOULD BE TAKEN AWAY FROM ITS SPHERE BY THE PURPOSE (SERVED BY IT): BECAUSE IT WOULD BE SUBSERVIENT TO THE NAME OF THE DEITY MENTIONED IN IT.

Bhāṣya.

If the reciting of the *Stotra* and *Shastra* hymns were a sanctificatory act, then it '*would be taken away from its sphere by the purpose served by it*';—

because it would be subservient to the name of the deity which is mentioned in the *mantra*; i.e. the *mantra* would be subservient to the purposes of the Deity; and as, in that case the Deity would be the predominant factor, the *mantra* would have to be taken away to that sacrifice where that Deity would be the recipient of the offering; and this would go against the indications of 'Order' and 'Position' (whereby the *mantra* has to be used at a different sacrifice).—For these reasons the view set forth in the *Pūrvapakṣa* is open to objection, and as such, should be rejected.—"Which is the particular *mantra* (in connection with which the contingency pointed out would arise)?"—It is the *mantra* '*Abhi tvā shūra*, etc.' (Mā. Sa. 27. 35) which is called the '*Aindra Pragātha*' (Hymn sacred to *Indra*);—this *mantra*, though occurring in proximity to (in the context of) the *sacrificing of the Māhendra Cup* (cup dedicated to *Mahēndra*), would have to be taken away to that sacrifice where *Indra* (not *Mahēndra*) would be the deity.

SŪTRA (15).

[OBJECTION]—"BUT (IN THE INSTANCE CITED) THE WORD WOULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF POINTING TO A QUALIFICATION; JUST LIKE THE WORD 'VASHĀ' ('BARREN')".

Bhāṣya.

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"We shall not reject the *Pūrvapakṣa* view; in fact, we reiterate the view that the reciting of the *Stotra* and *Shastra* hymns is a sanctificatory act, simply because the *mantras* are indicative of deities.—As regards the argument that 'under this view the *Aindra Pragātha* (*mantra* '*Abhi tvā shūra*, etc.') would have to be taken away from its sphere',—our answer is that there would be no such contingency; because even the word '*indra*' would denote the deity *Mahendra*; as it is the same deity *Indra* who, when qualified by the quality of *greatness* (*mahān*), is called '*Mahendra*' [and *Mahendra* would not be a different deity from *Indra*]; in fact, the term '*indra*' (as occurring in the compound word '*Mahendra*') clearly denotes the particular deity (*Indra*), and the term '*mahat*' (as occurring in the same compound) as clearly denotes the quality of *Greatness* [so that the name '*mahendra*' only means *the Great Indra*]; just as in the case of the terms '*Rājā*' (King), '*Mahārāja*' (Great King)—and '*Brāhmaṇa*', '*Mahābrāhmaṇa*' (Great Brāhmaṇa).—This case would be analogous to that of the term '*vashā*', 'barren'; in the text '*Sā vā ēṣā sarvadevatyā yat ajāvashā—vāyavyāmālabheta*' ('This barren-goat is sacred to all deities—one should kill it as an offering to *Vāyu*'; T. S. 3. 4. 3. 2),—the term '*ajā vashā*' ('barren-goat') points to the same 'goat' which has been mentioned in connection with the enjoined sacrifice; similarly where the qualified deity (*Mahendra*, Great Indra) is enjoined, it would be understood as the deity denoted by *the term without the qualifying term* (i.e. '*indra*'). Thus then, there would be no 'taking away' of the *mantra* from its sphere (as urged by the *Siddhāntin*, under Sū. 14)."

SŪTRA (16).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS IT FORMS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE VEDIC TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin* is not possible;—in the case of the term '*māhendra-graha*' ('the cup dedicated to Mahendra'), that the 'cup' meant is 'that of which *Indra* is the Deity' could be signified only by the presence of the nominal affix (in the term '*māhendra*'); but as a matter of fact, this nominal affix would not be possible if what is denoted by the term '*indra*' (as occurring in the compound '*mahendra*') stood in need of being construed along with the *greatness* (denoted by the term '*mahat*' as occurring in the compound '*mahendra*'); [what is meant is that the word '*mahendra*' cannot be taken in its literal sense of 'great-Indra', as if so taken, it would be incapable of taking the nominal affix in its compounded form; as in the operation of compounds, as also in that of nominal affixes, the *capability* of the terms concerned is essential; if then the term '*māhendra*' were explained as '*mahān indro devatā yasya*', "that of which the *Great-Indra* is the deity", then this essential 'capability' would be wanting; because if the chief stress is laid upon the factor of '*greatness*' as needed by '*Indra*', then the word '*indra*' would become 'incapable' of taking the nominal affix, which would have to go with '*mahat*', an impossibility.—If, on the other hand, stress were laid upon the nominal affix, then there would be no connection with '*greatness*'.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 544-545]. Nor on the other hand, would it be possible to have the compound by connecting the term '*indra*' with '*mahat*', if the former stood in need of, and were taken along with, the nominal affix. [That is to say, if the word '*indra*' is first taken along with the nominal affix, it takes the broadened form '*aindra*'; then as regards the quality of '*greatness*' denoted by the term '*mahat*', it could have no connection with the term '*indra*' which occupies only a secondary position in the term '*aindra*'; so that the term '*mahat*' would have to go with '*aindra*', not with '*indra*', and the resultant form would be '*mahaindra*' not '*mahendra*', and the qualification of 'greatness' would have no connection with *Indra*.—*Tantravārtikā*—Trans., p. 546].—Thus then, if the term '*indra*' is taken up with the nominal affix, it can have no connection with '*greatness*', while if it is taken up with '*greatness*' and compounded with it, it can have no connection with the nominal affix. [That is, if the functioning of the compound and that of the Nominal Affix were explained separately, one after the other, then, inasmuch as the terms would have to be repeated oftentimes, it would involve a syntactical split.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 546].—Nor is it possible to have a single construction including the functioning of the compound as well as that of the Nominal Affix (as *mahān indro dēvatā yasya*'); as that would involve the incongruity that the same *Indra* would, in one instance, be something not already predicated and thus connect itself for the sake of its own predication, with the nominal affix,—and in the other, it would be something

already predicated and hence only referred to for the purpose of being connected with *greatness.*

Then again, as a matter of fact, the object *Mahēndra*—the *Great-Indra* (as the deity to whom the *cup* is dedicated)—is something quite distinct from *Indra*, who is the deity to whom the offering is made; so that both of them could not be spoken of by means of the word '*mahēndra*' uttered only once.

From all this it follows that the deity *Mahēndra* is not the same as *Indra qualified by greatness*; and in the term '*mahēndra*', the nominal affix is added to the term '*mahēndra*'; from this also it follows that the basic noun ('*mahēndra*') has a distinct connotation of its own as one composite whole, and its connotation does not consist of the connotation of its component parts ('*mahān*' and '*Indra*').—Thus the conclusion being that *Mahēndra* is a deity distinct from *Indra*, the *Anindra-Pragātha* would have to be taken away from its sphere (as urged in Sūtra 14, above). Consequently the *Pūrvapakṣa* view has got to be rejected.

It has been argued that the name '*Mahēndra*' as applied to *Indra* signifies the *greatness* that accrued to him after his killing Vṛttra;—as clearly declared in the text 'He who killed Vṛttra became great' (Ai. Brā. 3. 21).—But if this were so, then it would involve the incongruity of the Veda being regarded as having a beginning in time [i.e. the argument would imply that the Vedic text quoted came to be written *after* Indra had killed Vṛttra].

From all this we conclude that *Indra* is distinct from *Mahēndra*.

SŪTRA (17).

ALSO BECAUSE THE TWO NAMES ARE MENTIONED SEPARATELY.

Bhāṣya.

We find a separate mention of the two names, in the two *mantras*—(*a*) '*Bahudugdhīndrāya dēvēbhyo haviḥ*' (T. B. 3. 2. 38), and (*b*) '*Bahudugdhi mahēndrāya dēvēbhyo haviḥ*' (Mā. Sh. S. 1. 1. 3. 29). From this also it follows that the two are distinct deities; if they were one and the same, then these two *mantras* would have been optional alternatives (which they are not).

SŪTRA (18).

THE MENTION OF THE QUALIFICATION ALSO WOULD BE USELESS.

Bhāṣya.

When the Injunctive word itself provides the notion that Indra is the deity of the particular sacrifice, what would be the use of mentioning the qualification—that 'greatness' is the quality of Indra [according to the view that *Mahēndra* is the same as *Indra qualified by greatness*]?—In fact, whenever a deity is indicated, it is only for the purpose of showing how the offering is to be made to that deity; and the offering is made to the Deity even when its qualification is mentioned, and it is made to the same deity, even when the qualification is *not* mentioned; so that the mention of the qualification can serve no useful purpose.—If it be argued that the idea

conveyed by the mention of the qualification is that "that Indra who is related to this cup is great",—then, that also cannot be right; because (apart from the text in question itself) any connection between the *cup* and *Indra* is entirely unknown; and hence no qualification could be mentioned in reference to that which is not known. Further, any connection between the qualification (and Indra) also being unknown, any characterisation (of Indra) by means of that qualification is not possible.—For this reason also *Mahēndra* should be a totally different deity from *Indra*.

SŪTRA (19).

SO ALSO THE MENTION OF THE TWO 'YĀJYĀ' AND THE 'PURORUCH' MANTRAS.

Bhāṣya.

It is only in accordance with the *Siddhānta* view that the distinctive mention of the two '*Yājyā-Puronuvākyā*' *mantras* becomes justifiable; for instance, the *mantras*, '*Ēndra sānasiṁ rayim, etc.*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 3. 4. 11. 3) constitute the two '*Yājyā-Puronuvākyā*' mantras sacred to *Indra*; and the *mantras* '*Mahān indro ya ojasā, etc.*' (*Ṛgveda* 5. 8. 9) constitute the '*Yājyā-Puronuvākyā*' sacred to *Mahēndra*. If *Indra* and *Mahēndra* were one and the same, these two sets of *mantras* would have to be regarded as optional alternatives; so that under one alternative course, one set would be rejected.

[Āshvalāyana, Shrauta-sutra 1. 5. 10. 5. 4, states that there are seven *ṛk*—verses included under the name '*Puroruch*'; no such *ṛks* are found in the Ṛgveda Samhitā. There is a separate Adhyāya called '*Nivid-Kuntāpa*' which contains the *Puroruch* verses; but these are not in any way connected with the *Yājyā*; while the *Puroruch* verses are to be recited on the occasion of the repetition of what is known as the '*Pra-uga Shastra*'. Hence the commentators have interpreted the name '*puroruch*' as standing for '*puronuvākyā*'.—Kunte: *Ṣaḍdarshanachintanikā*.]

SŪTRA (20).

AS REGARDS THE TERM 'VASHĀ' (BARREN), WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY IT ACTUALLY FORMS PART OF THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, under Sū. 15) that though the animal laid down in connection with the enjoined act is the '*barren-goat*', yet in actual practice it is the mere (unqualified) *goat* that is used [so that there is no distinction made between the 'goat' and the 'barren goat'; similarly there is no distinction between '*Indra*' and '*Mahēndra*'].—That is only right because in the case of the term '*vashā*', we perceive that what is denoted actually does form an integral part of the sacrificial act; as is clear from the text '*Chhāgasya vapāyā mēdasonubrūhi*' (cf. Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 3. 6. 8); from which it is clear that the '*vashā*' (barren-goat) is the same as the '*chhāga*' (goat).—Thus then, it is clear that if the *Stotra* and *Shastra* are merely sanctificatory, then, the *Aindra-Pragātha* has to be

taken away from its sphere; for this reason they should be regarded as 'primary'.

SŪTRA (21).

[OBJECTION]—"[THERE MAY BE A TAKING AWAY OF THE HYMN] TO WHERE (MERE INDRA MAY BE THE DEITY); BUT THAT SHOULD BE SO, IF IT SERVES A USEFUL PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*' ('but') sets aside the view expressed above.—"In reality the *Stotra* and *Shastra* are sanctificatory acts. As for the taking away of the *Aindra-Pragātha*,—let it be carried over to the sacrifice where *Indra* is the deity; [it is only right that it should be so], as it is only right that what is indicated by the *Indicative Power* of the words of the text should set aside what is indicated by *Order* and *Position*."

SŪTRA (22).

[ANSWER]—THIS SHOULD NOT BE SO IN THE CASE OF SUCH MANTRAS AS ARE DIRECTLY LAID DOWN IN THE VEDA.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, in the case of many *Mantras*, we find that, if they are taken away from their sphere, they serve no useful purpose in the sphere to which they are carried over,—and that if so carried over, they become entirely useless. Such is the case with the *Mantras* mentioned in the following texts:—(*a*) '*Yāmyāḥ shaṁsanti*', (*b*) '*Shipiviṣṭavatīm shaṁsanti*', (*c*) '*Pitṛdevatyāḥ shaṁsati*', (*d*) '*Agnimārutē*', (*e*) '*Kusumbhaka-sūktam*', (*f*) '*Akṣasūktam*', (*g*) '*Mūṣikāsūktam*' and such others.

[The *mantras* referred to here are to be recited on the occasion of the third *Soma-Extraction* of the *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice. They constitute the *Agnimanotā-shastra* described in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (3. 35). In the case of the Mantras spoken of as '*yāmyāḥ*' in the text '*Yāmyāḥ shaṁsanti*', it is found that, inasmuch as Yama is not the deity of the other Cups,—if the *mantras* laid down in that context were to be taken away from there, they could not point to that deity; and as in that case the very injunction of these would become useless, it would be necessary to admit the fact of their leading to transcendental results.]

SŪTRA (23).

[OBJECTION]—"BUT IT IS ACTUALLY SEEN".

Bhāṣya.

[Says the Opponent]—"What we assert is that all the *mantras* referred to have their use (even on being taken away from their own context):—for instance, (*a*) the *Maṇḍūka-hymn* is of use in connection with the *Fire* (which has to be drawn in with the said hymn),—(*b*) the *Akṣa-hymn* is of use at the *Rājasūya* (where the gambling is done with the *Akṣa*, Dice),—(*c*) the *Mūṣikā-hymn* is of use at the *Ekādashinī* [where the *Mantra* '*Ākhustē*, etc.' eulogises a certain spot];—(*d*) all the *mantras* have their use at the

Vāchastoma, as declared in the text '*Sarvā ṛchaḥ sarvāṇi yajūmṣi sarvāṇi sāmāni vāchastomē*';—(*e*) similarly the *Pāriplava-Ākhyāna* is of use at the *Ashvamēdha*;—(*f*) in connection with the *Āshvina* sacrifice it is said—'*Yasyāshvinē shasyamānē sūryo nodiyādapi sarvā dāshatayīranubrūyāt* [i.e. 'in case the sun does not rise when the *Āshvina Shastra* is being recited all the *Ṛk*. verses should be recited by way of expiation'—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 559].—From all this it is clear that Mantras carried away from their context do serve distinctly useful purposes.—Consequently the reciting of the *Stotra* and *Shastra* hymns should be regarded as sanctificatory in character".

SŪTRA (24).

[ANSWER]—IN REALITY HOWEVER, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ACTUAL PRESENCE (OF THE GENITIVE, LOCATIVE AND OTHER ENDINGS) IN THE VEDA, THE 'STOTRA' AND THE 'SHASTRA' APPEARING IN THEIR OWN CONTEXT SHOULD LAY DOWN THE COMING ABOUT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL POTENCY [AND HENCE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 'PRIMARY' IN THEIR CHARACTER].

Bhāṣya.

In reality the reciting of the '*stotra*' and '*shastra*' must be regarded as 'primary' acts;—why?—because of '*the presence in the Veda*, etc.'—In the Vedic texts we find the presence of the Locative ending;—for instance, '*Kavatīṣu stuvatē*', '*Shipiviṣṭavatīṣu stuvatē*' (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 7. 5. 5. 2);—here the presence of the Locative ending (in '*kavatīṣu*' or '*shipiṣṭavatīṣu*') would be justifiable only if the *mantra* were taken as purely *eulogistic*, and as such subsisting in the *letters* composing the Mantra; on the other hand, if it were indicative of the Deity, then the *Kavatīs* (Sāma. S. 1. 169) should have been spoken of as the *instrument* (by means of the Instrumental ending), and not with the Locative ending.

There is another '*presence in the Veda*', of such texts as '*Pra-ugam shaṁsati*', '*Niṣkevalyam shaṁsati*'; which shows that the *mantras* spoken of are to be used for the purpose of praising; and words descriptive of qualities used for the purpose of praising would bring about a transcendental result; and as such the reciting of these should be regarded as 'primary'.

There is yet another '*presence in the Veda*',—of the Genitive case-ending; e.g. in the text '*Indrasya tu vīryāṇi pravocham, etc.*' (Taitti. Brā. 2. 5. 4. 1). Here the name of the deity (Indra) has been mentioned for the purpose of connecting him with the eulogy contained in the *mantra*; if it were meant to serve the purpose of indicating the Deity (of a sacrifice), then the word would have taken the Nominative ending; as in that case, the sense intended to be conveyed would be that of the basic noun by itself (independently of all relationship to other things).—" But even a word with the Nominative ending could denote something *for the sake of the deity* (and not

the deity itself); as we find in the case of the text '*Indro yāto-vasitasya rājā, etc.*' (*Ṛgveda* 1. 32. 15)."—Not so, we reply; because such words also would serve the purpose of praising, by virtue of their syntactical position in the sentence.—"But the indicative power of the words would be more powerful than their syntactical connection."—True; but what we assert would also be pointed to by the indicative power of the words,—this 'power' consisting in the capacity of the word to supply the requirements of the eulogistic sentence which is wanting in certain respects.—"Even so, when both the conclusions are pointed to by the indicative power of words, how could the truth be determined?"—From the supplementary passages, it is clear that the word is not expressive of the Deity.—If the word were intended to be expressive of the Deity, then the sentence conveying the sense of praise would remain defective and purposeless.—From all this it follows that the sentence conveying the sense of praise serves the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result, and consequently the reciting of the *Stotra* and *Shastra* hymns is a 'primary' act.

Further, the words '*stauti*' and '*shaṁsati*' are directly expressive of good qualities, and it is only through indirect indication that they could point to deities. Therefore [as this latter view involves recourse to indirect indication], the hymns should be taken as 'laying down the coming about of the transcendental potency—*Apūrva*'—[and as such should be regarded as 'primary' in their character].

SŪTRA (25).

ALSO BECAUSE THE DISTINCTNESS IS IMPLIED BY THE WORDS (OF THE VEDA).

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, distinctness is implied by the words of the Veda; for instance, we have the Vedic text speaking of 'the *Agniṣṭoma* sacrifice as accompanied by *twelve Stotra* and *Shastra* hymns'; if those hymns were not distinct, their number could never be *Twelve*; as the act of reciting or singing of the *stotras* and *shastras* would be *one* only. If, on the other hand, distinctness is admitted, then the number 'twelve' becomes secured.

[If each of the hymns were not meant to be distinct, and if all of them were taken as equally serving the one purpose of indicating the deity for the sacrifice, then, there would be no point in mentioning the number 'twelve'. If, in order to justify the mention of this number 'twelve', each word of the hymns were taken as indicating a distinct deity, then the number of such deities would be innumerable, not only 'twelve'.—On the other hand, if the reciting of the Hymns is a 'primary' act, then the reciting of each hymn would bring about a distinct *Apūrva*; and if the number of these *Apūrvas* is 'twelve', the number of the Hymns also should be 'twelve', as each action leading to a definite result is counted as 'one.' And as regards the question as to what act can lead to an *Apūrva*, the Veda is our sole authority; and according to the Veda, from the point that the reciting commences to the point where it halts, it is to be regarded as *one act*; and from the point of the re-starting of the reciting to the point of

the next halt, it would be the second act; and so on, in the case in question, the number of these *recitings* is twelve, as leading to *twelve Apūrvas*. In this case there is no justification for taking each single verse as a distinct act, by which the number of acts would become more than 'twelve'.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 562].

SŪTRA (26).

THEN AGAIN, THE MENTION OF IT (AGAIN) WOULD BE USELESS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Agniṣṭut*, we have the text '*Āgnēyā vai grahā bhavanti*'; and then again, we have the further text '*Āgnēyīṣu shaṁsanti, āgnēyīṣu stuvanti*'. Now this latter text lays down the reciting of the *Stotra* and *Shastra* in connection with certain *things connected with Agni* (*Āgnēyī*); the reciting herein laid down would be useless (superfluous), if the reciting were a sanctificatory act (and indicated only deities). For this reason also the recitings should be regarded as 'primary' acts.

SŪTRA (27.)

THE THING ITSELF IS RECOGNISED TO BE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

In the Veda we find the text '*Sambaddhē vai stotrashastrē vā*'; now this '*sambandha*,' *connection, relationship*, between the '*stotra*' and '*shastra*' is possible only if the '*stotra*' is something different from the '*shastra*';—and the '*stotra*' can be something different from the '*shastra*' only if each of them is indicative of an *Apūrva*; otherwise (if both signified the single deity, *Indra*), the '*stotra*' would be the same thing as the '*shastra*'.

SŪTRA (28).

THERE IS SIGNIFICATION ALSO, AS IN THE CASE OF OTHER (PRIMARY) ACTS.

Bhāṣya.

In the texts in question, '*Pra-ugam shaṁsati*', '*Niṣkevalyam shaṁsati*', there is signification (of a primary act), by the Accusative ending (in '*pra-ugam*' and '*niṣkevalyam*').

SŪTRA (29).

THERE IS FULFILMENT OF RESULTS ALSO (MENTIONED).

Bhāṣya.

We find in the Veda also the mention of the fulfilment of results, (proceeding from the act of reciting the '*stotra*' and '*shastra*' hymns);—e.g. in such *mantras* as '*Stutasya stutamasi*' (T. S. 3. 2. 7. 1). '*Indravanto manēmahi, bhakṣīmahi prajāmiṣam sā mē satyāshīryajñasya bhūyāt*' (*Taittirīya*

Saṁhitā 1. 6. 4. 2), we find a reference to the results that follow from the reciting of the *Stotra* hymns,—not to those following from the Deity.—For this reason also the recitings of the *Stotra* and the *Shastra* are 'primary' acts.

Elsewhere in the *Sūtra*—under Discourse X (Pāda iv, Sūtra 49)—we have dealt with the purpose served by this *Adhikaraṇa*,—where it has been shown that the deities of the Cups being distinct, the Agent is entitled to the performance (of the act of *reciting*) only when the reciting of the *Stotra* and the *Shastra* is a 'primary' act.

[Kumārila (*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 547–556) has taken exception to the above exposition of the *Adhikaraṇa*. His contention is that '*Indra*' and '*Mahēndra*' are names of the same deity (p. 552), as in the compound '*Mahēndra*', the two terms '*mahat*' and '*indra*' do not, as the Bhāṣya says, function simultaneously; and by the gradual functioning of these two terms what the term '*mahēndra*' denotes is *Indra qualified by greatness*. Thus the main position of the *Pūrvapakṣa* being sound, it is necessary to have recourse to another line of argumentation for the effective refutation of that *Pūrvapakṣa*. This line of argumentation, representing Kumārila's *Siddhānta*, may be thus summed up:—As a matter of fact, the Deity enters into the sacrifice, not in his material form, but only in its verbal form,—the form in which he is mentioned in the Vedic Injunction; hence, inasmuch as, in the particular act in question, the deity has been mentioned in the injunction in the form of '*Mahēndra*', the deity for this act must be *Mahēndra*, not simply *Indra*,—even if the two are names of the same Deity. In this sense, and to this extent, *Mahēndra* and *Indra* are to be regarded as distinct deities.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *Mantras are not injunctive.*

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE INJUNCTION AND THE MANTRA MUST HAVE THE SAME PURPORT, AS IT IS THE SAME WORD THAT OCCURS IN BOTH."

Bhāṣya.

[It has been held above, in *Adhikaraṇa* (1) that Verbs serve to enjoin *action* and *Apūrva*; and we have dealt with the division of acts into 'Primary' and 'Subsidiary'. We now revert to the original subject, and proceed to consider if all verbs occurring in the Veda—in the injunctive passages, etc., and in *Mantra* texts—are *injunctive*; as the purpose of the Discourse is only to differentiate among such actions as are enjoined by Vedic texts.]

There is the text—'*Na tā nashanti na dabhāti taskaro nāsām ā mitro vyathirā dadharṣati.—Devāṁshcha yābhiryajatē dadāti cha jyog ittābhiḥ sa cha tē gopatiḥ saha*' (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 2. 4. 6. 11):—The terms to be considered in the present *Adhikaraṇa* are '*yajatē*' and '*dadāti*' contained in this *mantra*;—and the question that arises is—are the verbs (like '*yajatē*' and '*dadāti*') occurring in the *mantra* injunctive in the same way as those occurring in Brāhmaṇa-texts?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—"The verb, occurring in the *Brāhmaṇa-injunction* and in the *mantra*, should have one and the same meaning,—'*as it is the same word that occurs in both*'; and under the circumstances, it is not possible that the same word occurring in the *Brāhmaṇa* should be injunctive, while occurring in the *Mantra* it should be unable to enjoin things.—Hence the Mantra also should be regarded as injunctive."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, INASMUCH AS THE MANTRA FUNCTIONS ONLY DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACT, IT SHOULD BE EXPRESSIVE OF MERE ASSERTION.

Bhāṣya.

The phrase '*api vā*' ('in reality') serves to set aside the *Pūrvapakṣa* view.—Words like those quoted '*should be expressive of mere assertion*',—because '*the Mantra functions only during the performance of an act*'; that is, it is only while the sacrifice is being performed that the *mantra* (quoted above) is able to function;—and this function is to 'assert'—speak of, not to *enjoin*—the acts of *Godāna* (*giving of the cow*) and *Goyāga* (*cow-sacrifice*);—why so?—because both these acts are already enjoined elsewhere,—(*a*) *the giving of the cow* in course of the injunction of the *Sacrificial Fee* (which includes the *Cow*) and the *cow-sacrifice* at the *Anubandhyā Iṣṭi*.—"But the

act as enjoined in the Mantra would be different from those enjoined elsewhere".—That is not possible; because even though the word (the name of the act) be repeated several times, the idea conveyed by it is always one and the same.—If the *mantra* were taken as expressing *commendation* (like *Arthavāda*), then it would be superfluous, as the Sacrifice has already been enjoined by an injunction aided by another commendatory text (*Arthavāda*).—For these reasons the verb occurring in *Mantras* quoted above cannot be injunctive.

[Kumārila has taken exception to the above exposition of the *Adhikaraṇa*, on grounds for which see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 566-567. According to him, there is no necessity for introducing any *mantra* in this discussion; and the *Adhikaraṇa* is to be expounded as follows:—Verbs have been declared to be injunctive of acts, and acts have been divided into 'primary' and 'subsidiary'; the question that arises now is—Are these,—(1) the enjoining of the *primary* act, and (2) the enjoining of the *subsidiary* act—the only functions of the verb? Or is there any other also?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that there is no third function.—The *Siddhānta* view is that in addition to the aforesaid function, there is yet another function of the verb,—that of simple *assertion*, which function takes place where the injunctive function is precluded by the presence of another injunctive word.]

[Prabhākara's exposition of this *Adhikaraṇa* is thus summed up in the *Bṛhatī*—From the very nature of *Mantras* it is clear that they cannot be taken as Injunctions,—being, as they are, entirely devoid of any kind of injunctive word; also because all *Mantras* are found to be construable,—either by direct syntactical connection or by indirect implication,—with other passages, which are injunctive. So if the *Mantras* themselves were to enjoin another action, there would be two actions enjoined by what is practically only 'one sentence'.—Nor are the *Mantras* found to contain any *commendation* or *condemnation*; so they cannot be taken as *Arthavāda*;—with all this however, *Mantras* cannot be regarded as absolutely meaningless or useless; forming an integral part of the Veda, they must serve some useful purpose, they must have some meaning, expressing something that is needful in the acts prescribed by the injunctive passages.]

Adhikaraṇa (7): *Definition of 'Mantra.'*

SŪTRA (32).

The name 'Mantra' is applied to those texts that are expressive of the said (assertion, of things connected with prescribed acts).

Bhāṣya.

It has been established that the verbs occurring in *mantras* are no injunctive. Now it is explained what a '*mantra*' is.

Without knowing what a '*mantra*' is, how could the verb contained therein be discussed?—So, in reality, the present *Adhikaraṇa* should have gone before the foregoing one.

The question to be considered in the present *Adhikaraṇa* is—What is a '*mantra*'?

The answer to this is given in the Sūtra—*The name 'mantra' is applied to those texts that are expressive of the said 'assertion'*. That is to say, it is in regard to those texts which express the 'assertion' (spoken of in Sū. 31), that learned men use the term '*mantras*',—in such statements as 'we are reading the *mantras*', 'we are teaching the *mantras*', 'these are *mantras*' and so forth.

This definition is only illustrative; as there are certain texts which are not expressive of any assertion and are yet called '*mantra*',—e.g. the text '*Vasantāya kapiñjalān ālabhatē*' ('Kills *Kapiñjala* birds for *Vasanta*' V. S. 24. 20).

It is not possible to indicate each *mantra* individually scattered here and there; hence some sort of a general definition has been provided. As there is the saying—'Even sages can never come to the end of the enumeration of things individually; but wise men come to the end of things by means of definitions'. [The term '*pṛṣṭhākoṭam*' is thus explained in the *Tantravartika*, p. 570: Without a definition, the teacher would have to indicate the *mantras* one by one, and this would be as painful a process as the curvings of the back undergone when several objects around one have to be looked at in different directions.]

The following are examples of *Mantras* of various kinds:—(*a*) *Those ending in 'asi'*, e.g. '*Mēdhosi, etc.*';—(*b*) *those ending in 'tvā'*, e.g. '*Iṣē tvorjē, etc.*' (*Vājasa. Saṁhitā* 1. 1);—(*c*) *benedictory*, e.g. '*Āyurdā asi, etc.*' (T. S. 1. 6. 6);—(*d*) *Eulogistic*, e.g. '*Agnirmūrdhā, etc.*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 4. 4. 4. 1);—(*e*) *expressive of number*, e.g. '*Eko mama, etc.*' (Sh. Br. 1. 5. 5. 12;—(*f*) *incoherent talk*, e.g. '*Akṣī tē indra piṅgalē dulēriva*';—(*g*) *bewailing*, e.g. '*Ambē ambikē, etc.*' (*Vājasa. Saṁhitā* 23. 18);—(*h*) *directory*, e.g. '*Agnidagnīn vihara, etc.*' (Taittirīya Saṁhitā 6. 3. 2);—(*i*) *searching*, e.g. '*Kosi katamosi*' (V. S. 7. 29);—(*j*) *questioning*, e.g. '*Pṛchchhāmi tvā, etc.*' (V. S. 23. 61);—(*k*) *descriptive*, e.g. '*Iyam vediḥ, etc.*' (V. S. 23. 62);—(*l*) *elliptical extension*, e.g. '*Achchhidrēṇa pavitreṇa, etc.*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā*

1. 1. 5. 1);—(*m*) *performance*, e.g. '*Traisvaryam chātusvaryam, etc.*';—(*n*) *capability*, i.e. power of expression.—All this (division of *mantras*) has been indicated by the *Vṛttikāra* by means of examples.

All this also is merely illustrative (not exhaustive); there are several *mantras* which have the word '*asi*' in the middle (not at the end);—e.g. '*Īdyashchāsi vandyashcha vājin*' (V. S. 29. 3); also some having '*tvā*' in the middle,—e.g. '*Tattvāyāmi, etc.*'—Further in the *Brāhmaṇas* also we find the (*a*) *Benedictory texts*;—e.g. '*So'kāmayata prajāḥ srjeya, etc.*';—(*b*) *Eulogistic* texts also are found in the *Brāhmaṇas*,—e.g. '*Vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭhādevatā*' [*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 2. 1. 1. 1);—(*c*) *incoherent talk*,—e.g. '*Na chaitadvidmo brāhmaṇā vā smo* '*brāhmāṇāh smo vā*' (Mait. S. 1. 4. 11);—(*d*) *bewailing*,—e.g. '*Yē māmadhukṣanta te mām pratyamuñchanta*';—(*e*) *directory*,—e.g. '*Amutaḥ somamāhara*';—(*f*) *searching*,—e.g. '*Iha vā sa iha vā, etc.*';—(*g*) *questioning*,—e.g. '*Veda karṇavatīm sūrmim, etc.*';—(*h*) *answer*,—e.g. '*Vidmo vā, etc.*';—(*i*) *Elliptical extension*,—e.g. '*Hṛdasyāgrvadyate atha jihvāyā atha vakṣasi, etc.*';—(*j*) *performance*,—e.g. '*Traisvaryañchātusvaryañcha*';—(*k*) *capability*,—e.g. '*Sruvēṇāvadyati dravēṣu, etc.*' [So that the description supplied by the *Vṛttikāra* is neither inclusive of *all Mantras*, nor exclusive of all *non-mantras*].

There is no necessity for stating the purpose served by propounding a definition, as it is well-known; in fact the knowledge of things obtained by means of a definition is much easier. On this point there is the following saying—'There is no necessity to point out any purpose in the case of (*a*) objections, (*b*) exceptions, (*c*) a *prima facie* statement, (*d*) providing a definition, and (*e*) after-thought';—and the reason for this lies in the fact that (*a*) in the case of objections, it is necessary to answer them, for the sake of the conclusion arrived at in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*; (*b*) in the case of exceptions, an explanation serves the purposes of the general rule to which the exceptions have been pointed out; (*c*) in the case of a *prima facie* statement, there is always the desire to state the final conclusion; and (*e*) in the case of an *after-thought*, an explanation serves the purposes of the *Adhikaraṇa* that has gone before.

In the Veda itself we find the word '*Mantra*' whose significance we have been discussing,—e.g. in the text—'*Ahē budhniya mantram mē gopāya yamṛṣayastrayīvidā viduḥ ṛchaḥ sāmāni yajūṁṣi.*' (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 1. 2. 1. 26.)

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *What is a Brāhmaṇa?*

SŪTRA (33).

TO THE REST (OF THE VEDA) THE NAME 'BRAHMAṆA' (IS APPLIED).

Bhāṣya.

[The Veda has been defined as consisting of '*Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*'; the *Mantra* has been defined; the *Brāhmaṇa* is defined in the present *Adhikaraṇa.*]

"What is the definition of the *Brāhmaṇa*?"

'Mantra' and 'Brāhmaṇa' constitute the *Veda*; of these the *Mantra* having been defined, it follows naturally that all the rest of the Veda is *Brāhmaṇa*; so that it is not necessary to provide a definition of the *Brāhmaṇa*; from the definition of *Mantra* itself it follows that those parts of the Veda which do not possess the character indicated as differentiating *Mantras* are '*Brāhmaṇa*'; thus it is by the simple process of elimination that we come to know what *Brāhmaṇa* is.

For the benefit of students however, the *Vṛttikāra* has supplied the following details regarding the characteristic features of the *Brāhmaṇa*:—(1) One abounding in the particle '*iti*'; (2) one containing the phrase 'so they say'; (3) anecdotal; (4) stating a reason—'*Shūrpēṇa juhoti tena hyannam kriyate*' (*Shata. Brāhmana* 2. 5. 2. 23); (5) Explanatory,—'*Tad dadhno dadhitvam*' (*Taittirīya Saṁ.* 2. 5. 3. 4); (6) Deprecatory,—'*Upavītā vā ētasyāgnayaḥ*'; (7) Eulogistic,—'*Vāyurvai kṣēpiṣṭhā dēvatā*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 2. 1. 1); (8) Doubtful,—'*Hotavyam gārhapatyē na hotavyam*'; (9) Injunctive,—'*Yajamānasammitā audumbarī bhavati*' (cf. T. S. 6. 2. 10. 3); (10) Something done by another,—'*Māṣāneva mahyam pachati*'; (11) Ancient history,—'*Ulmukairhasma pūrvē samājagmuḥ*'; (12) Assumption of transposition,—'*Yāvatoshvān pratigṛhṇīyāt*, etc.'—On this there is the following saying—'There are ten forms of Brāhmaṇa—(1) Statement of reason, (2) Explanatory, (3) Deprecatory, (4) Eulogistic, (5) Doubtful, (6) Injunctive, (7) Act of others, (8) Ancient history, (9) Assumption of transposition, and (10) Analogical; in all Vedas this is the definite characteristic feature of the *Vidhi*'.

This also is only illustrative (not exhaustive);—because among *Mantras* also, there are (*a*) some abounding in the particle '*iti*',—e.g. '*Iti vā iti mē manaḥ, etc.*' (*Ṛgveda* 10. 119. 1);—(*b*) some containing the phrase 'so they say',—e.g. '*Bhagam bhakṣītyāha*' (R. V. 7. 41. 2),—(*c*) anecdotal,—e.g. '*Ugro ha bhujyam, etc.*' (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 1. 10. 2):—(*d*) stating a reason,—e.g '*Indavo māmushanti hi, etc.*' (R. V. 1. 2. 4);—(*e*) explanatory,—e.g. '*Tasmādāponusthanā, etc.*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 5. 6. 1. 3);—deprecatory,—e.g. '*Moghamannam bīndate aprachetāḥ, etc.*' (Ṛgveda 8. 6. 23);—eulogistic,—e.g. '*Agnirmūdhā, etc.*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 4. 4. 4); doubtful,—e.g. '*Adhaḥ*

svidāsīdupari svidāsīt, etc.' (Ṛgveda 10. 129. 5); injunctive,—e.g. '*Pṛṇīyādinnādhamānāya, etc.*' (Ṛgveda 10. 117. 15);—done by another,—e.g. '*Sahasramayutādadat, etc.*' (R. V. 8. 21. 18);—ancient history,—e.g. '*Yajñena yajñamayajanta devāḥ, etc.*' (Ṛgveda 10. 90. 16).

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *Modifications in Mantras are not 'Mantra'.*

SŪTRA (34).

THE CHARACTER OF 'MANTRA' DOES NOT BELONG TO THOSE WORDS THAT DO NOT FORM PART OF THE TEXT OF THE VEDA; AS THE AFORESAID DISTINCTION IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE TEXTS THAT ACTUALLY FORM PART OF THE TEXT OF THE VEDA.

Bhāṣya.

[(*a*) The *Mantra* '*Agnayē tvā juṣṭam nirvapāmi*', which is laid down as one to be employed in connection with an offering to *Agni*, is *modified* into '*Suryāya tvā, etc.*', when the offering is made to *Sūrya*; this is an instance of '*Ūha*', *Modification proper*.—(*b*) When the names of the presiding *Ṛṣis* of the family of a particular sacrificer are recounted, along with a certain *Mantra*, it is an instance of '*Pravara*'.—(*c*) When, along with a *Mantra*, the names of the particular sacrificer, and his son and other descendants are recounted, it is an instance of '*Nāmadhēya*'—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 573].—In regard to these—'*Ūha*', '*Pravara*' and '*Nāmadhēya*', there arises the question—Are these to be regarded as '*Mantra*'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, "inasmuch as they are *assertive* in their character (mentioning things in connection with the sacrifice), they are to be regarded as '*Mantra*'".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* view is that those words that do not form part of the Vedic text are not to be regarded as '*Mantra*',—even though they be 'assertive' in their character; because the fact of certain words being 'assertive' is not a ground for regarding them as '*Mantra*'; the only ground for it is the usage of learned men; so that those words which the learned do not call '*Mantra*' cannot be regarded as '*Mantra*'. As regards the three kinds of words in question—*Ūha* and the rest—they are not found to form part of the text of the Veda; hence they cannot be regarded as '*Mantra*'.

The purpose served by this discussion is that, if there is some mistake in the utterance of these words, it is not necessary to perform that expiatory rite which has been laid down in connection with mistakes in the pronouncing of *Mantras*.

[Kumārila has a supplementary *Adhikaraṇa*, the conclusion of which is that the character of '*Mantra*' is denied to just those words that have been discussed,—i.e. the modifications and the names recounted along with the *Mantra*; so far as the unmodified parts of the *Mantra*, or the Mantras along with which the names are recounted, are concerned,—the '*Mantric*' character of those is not affected.]

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *What is 'Ṛk'?*

SŪTRA (35).

OF THESE (MANTRAS), THOSE ARE CALLED 'ṚK' WHEREIN THERE IS DIVISION INTO 'FEET' (QUARTERS), ON THE BASIS OF THE MEANING.

Bhāṣya.

[Though the definition of the several kinds of *Mantra* does not form the subject-matter of the present Discourse, yet the *Sūtra* treats of it, because a consideration of it is connected with the subject of *Mantras*, whose character has been discussed in connection with the division of acts into 'primary' and 'subsidiary'.—*Tantravārtika* —Trans., p. 578.]

We find the term '*ṛk*' used in the Veda;—e.g. in the text, '*Ahē budhniya mantram me gopāya yamṛṣayastrayīvidā viduḥ ṛcho yajūmṣi sāmāni*'. (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 1. 2. 1. 26.)

The question is—"What is the definition of '*Ṛk*'?"

The answer is—*Of the mantras, those are called 'Ṛk' where there is division into 'feet', on the basis of the meaning.* That is, that *mantra* is called '*ṛk*' where there is division into 'feet'; e.g. '*Agnimīlē, etc.*' (*Ṛgveda* 1. 1. 1). It is only in regard to *mantras* like these that learned men use the term '*ṛk*', in such statements as 'we are reading *Ṛks*', 'we are teaching *Ṛks*', 'these are *Ṛks*'.

If the fact of the division into 'feet' being *on the basis of the meaning* were emphasised, then the definition would cease to apply to those *Ṛks* where the said division is *on the basis of the metre*; as in the Ṛk '*Agniḥ purvebhirṛṣibhiḥ, etc.*' (R. V. 1. 1. 2). The phrase '*on the basis of meaning*' is to be taken, not as meant to exclude the cases of division *on the basis of metre* and other things, but only as an illustrative reference. This should be clearly understood; as otherwise, if the phrase in question were taken as meant to exclude the cases of division *on the basis of metre* and other things, then there would be syntactical split.—Hence the definition of '*Ṛk*' is to be taken simply as 'that wherein there is division into *feet*'.

Adhikaraṇa (11): *What is 'Sāman'?*

SŪTRA (36).

The name 'Sāman' is applied to the Music.

Bhāṣya.

"What is the definition of the *Sāman*?"

The particular music (to which a Mantra is set) is called '*Sāman*'; it is only when a *mantra*-text is set to music and so sung, that the learned use with regard to it the term '*Sāman*', in such statements as 'we are studying the *Sāman*', 'we are teaching the *Sāman*', 'these are *Sāman*'. And in this matter, the teaching of the learned is our sole authority. [See Mīmāmsā-Sūtra VII—ii—1 to 21; also IX—ii—3 to 13 and 29, 30, 31, 46.]

Just as, in the case of the expression 'curd is sour', the term 'sour' stands only for the peculiar taste of the curd,—and in the expression 'molasses are sweet', the term 'sweet' stands only for the peculiar taste of the molasses,—similarly, when the term '*Sāman*' is applied to *mantras set to music*, it should be understood that the name stands for the *music* to which the *mantra* has been set, and it is applied to the *Mantra* itself only because of its connection with that music.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *What is 'Yajuṣ'?*

SŪTRA (37).

THE NAME 'YAJUṢ' IS APPLIED TO THE REST (OF THE MANTRAS).

Bhāṣya.

"What is the definition of the *Yajuṣ*?"

It is not necessary to propound a definition of *Yajuṣ*; as by the process of elimination the nature of the '*Yajuṣ*' would be understood from the definitions of '*Ṛk*' and '*Sāman*';—i.e. that which is not set to music, and where there is no division into 'feet', is '*Yajuṣ*', which is a mixed sort of text.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *Nigadas are included under 'Yajuṣ'.*

SŪTRA (38).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE NIGADA SHOULD BE TAKEN AS THE FOURTH KIND (OF MANTRA), BECAUSE OF ITS PECULIAR CHARACTER."

Bhāṣya.

[*Nigadas* are texts containing addresses by one Priest to another.]

The question that arises now is—Is the *Nigada* the same as '*Yajuṣ*'? or is it something different from *Yajuṣ*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"*Nigadas* are not '*Yajuṣ*';—why?—*because of their peculiar character*; the peculiar character is described in the text—'the *Ṛk* is recited loudly, the *Sāman* is sung loudly, the *Yajuṣ* is recited softly, the *Nigada* is recited loudly.' If the *Nigada* were '*Yajuṣ*', then 'loudness' would not have been its peculiar character;—as a matter of fact however, we do find this to be its peculiar character (in contradistinction to the 'softness' of the *Yajuṣ*). Hence the *Nigada* must be a fourth kind of *mantra*.

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE (DISTINCT) NAME."

Bhāṣya.

"We also find the names used as distinct: 'These are *Yajuṣ*, not *Nigadas*', 'These are *Nigadas*, not *Yajuṣ*'.—From this also it follows that *Nigadas* form a distinct class of '*Mantra*'."

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS "YAJUṢ" BECAUSE THEY HAVE THE SAME FORM AS THAT.

Bhāṣya.

The *Nigadas* are *Yajuṣ*;—why?—*because they have the same form as that*; the form of the *Nigada* is that same *mixed-text* which we found in *Yajuṣ*, and the character of being different from *Ṛk* and *Sāman* is also common to the *Yajuṣ* and the *Nigada*.

SŪTRA (41).

THE PECULIAR CHARACTER IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT IT HAS TO BE ADDRESSED (TO OTHERS).

Bhāṣya.

On account of being addressed to others,—i.e. on account of being capable of being addressed to, and understood by, others. In fact some *Yajuṣ* texts

are found to have the power of being addressed to, and understood by, others; [and it is on the basis of this capacity that those particular texts are given distinct name of '*Nigada*'].

SŪTRA (42).

Also because of a distinct purpose (served by it).

Bhāṣya.

There is a distinctly useful purpose served by the *Nigadas* being addressed to, and understood by, other persons;—if they were pronounced softly (they could not be heard by others, and) they could not convey any idea to the other persons; it is for this reason that 'the peculiar character' (of being recited *loudly*) comes to serve a useful purpose. Thus then, those *Yajuṣ-mantras* are *Nigadas* which are recited *loudly*.—How so?—Because the prefix '*ni*' (in the term '*nigada*'), signifies *excellence*;—just as, when the red colour of a thing is specially excellent, it is said to be '*nitarām rakta*' (very red),—and the root '*gad*' (in the term '*nigada*'), denoting *utterance*, signifies the act of *reciting*; and the *excellence* of this act of *reciting* consists in its being done *loudly*.

Objection.—"But it has been specially declared in the Vedic text that *being recited softly* is the quality of the *Yajuṣ-mantra* [so that what is recited *loudly* cannot be *Yajuṣ*]."

Answer.—We say, no. That is said to be the 'quality' of a thing which helps that thing in its functioning. In the case in question, when the *Yajuṣ-mantras* are recited for the purpose of conveying an idea to other persons, *being recited softly* could not help them in that function; in fact, it would hinder that function (by making the words inaudible); hence in the case of these *Mantras*, the quality is 'loudness', which helps the purpose of being addressed to, and understood by, other persons.—The 'soft' reciting would be for other texts; i.e. there are other *Yajuṣ-mantras* which are not meant to be addressed to others, and the character of 'softness' would pertain to the reciting of these *mantras*.

SŪTRA (43).

The (different) name is for the purpose of indicating the particular qualification.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the different name (which has been urged as an argument in favour of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, under Sū. 39),—that can be explained also when the *Nigada* and the *Yajuṣ* are one and the same, on the basis of the '*particular qualification*'; just as we have in such expressions as 'Feed the *Brāhmaṇas* here and the *Wandering Mendicants* there' (where, though the Mendicants also are Brāhmaṇas, yet they are named differently on account of special qualifications). In the same manner, when the name '*Nigada*' is used, it is in reference to the *Yajuṣ-mantras* themselves, as qualified by 'loudness'.

SŪTRA (44).

[OBJECTION]—"THE NAME 'NIGADA' WOULD BE APPLICABLE TO ALL (*Mantras*)"—IF THIS IS URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

"If the name '*nigada*' is applicable to all that is recited *loudly*,—then the *Ṛk-mantra* also becomes liable to be called '*nigada*'."

SŪTRA (45).

NOT SO; AS THEY ARE DISTINCTLY NAMED 'ṚK'.

Bhāṣya.

Ṛk-mantras are not called '*Nigada*'; because in the text—'*Ayājyā vai nigadāḥ ṛchaiva yajanti*', we find the two (*Ṛk* and *Nigada*) mentioned separately, on the basis of a distinct difference between them.—"But the separate naming is only an indication, you have to give a reason."—The reason lies in the fact that the root '*gad*' (in the term '*nigada*') denotes such *speech as is not divided into* (*metric*) *feet*; it is for this reason that only such speech as is not divided into (metric) feet is called '*gadya*', 'Prose' [so that *Nigada* is *Prose*, while *Ṛk* is *Verse*, and the name '*nigada*' therefore cannot apply to *Ṛk*].

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *Principle of Syntactical Unit—'One Sentence'.*

SŪTRA (46).

SO LONG AS A SINGLE 'PURPOSE IS SERVED' BY A NUMBER OF WORDS, WHICH ON BEING SEPARATED, ARE FOUND TO BE WANTING ('INCAPABLE OF EFFECTING THE PURPOSE'), THEY FORM 'ONE SENTENCE' (ONE YAJUṢ-MANTRA).

Bhāṣya.

[In connection with Mantras, there arises the question as to what is there to determine that a certain *mantra* begins with such and such a word and ends with such and such. In the case of *Ṛk* and *Sāman*, the verse itself may form the determining factor, and it may not be difficult to determine the exact extent of the *mantra*; but it is not so easy in the case of *Yajuṣ-mantras*, where the determining factor of the *metre* is not available.]

In regard to the *Yajuṣ*-mantras, which are of mixed character, there arises the question.—How is it to be known that so far it is one *Yajuṣ*?

The answer is that that group of words should be regarded as 'one *Yajuṣ*' which is employed in the act of sacrifice.

"But how far does that *group of words* extend which is used at a sacrifice?"

[The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that in view of the fact that even single words express an *idea*, even incomplete and defective sentences should be treated as 'one sentence'.]

[The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—

It extends to that extent up to which the words serve the purpose of indicating things helpful to the act of sacrifice;—to that extent it is 'one *sentence*'—called '*vākya*' or 'declaration', 'judgment,' 'proposition', because it is what is *declared*.—It is in this sense that we have the assertion of the *Sūtra* to the effect that—'*So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, they form one sentence*'. Because this is the condition that makes a number of words 'one sentence',—therefore it comes to this that a group of words serving a single purpose forms one sentence,—but only if any one of these words, on being disjoined from the rest, become 'wanting' (defective).

"What is the example of (such 'one sentence')?"

We have an example in the shape of the *Yajuṣ-mantra* '*Devasya tvā savituḥ prasavē, etc.*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 1. 1. 4. 2) [where the words express a single idea and are so syntactically connected that if any word is taken out, it becomes meaningless].

Objection.—"But in the text quoted, each individual word denotes a *single idea*" [and as such each word should be treated as a 'sentence'].

True (each word denotes an idea); but it does not fulfil the second condition that 'on being disjoined, it becomes wanting or defective' [as no such *disjoining* is possible in the case of any single word].

"But in any case the mantra-text quoted cannot be said to *express a single idea*, as there are several ideas expressed by the several words (of the text); and apart from what is expressed by the component words, there is no single idea expressed by the sentence as a composite whole—as has been explained above.—It might be argued that *difference* (among the things denoted by the several words), or *correlation* (of the things denoted by the several words), constitutes the idea expressed by the sentence as a composite whole.—But even so, this idea so expressed could not be *one* only; as the number of 'differences' and 'correlationships' would be more than one (as there are more words than one)."

The assertion in the *Sūtra* is to be explained and justified as referring to the *fulfilling of a single purpose*. For instance, the *mantra* '*Devasya tvā, etc.*' serves the purpose of indicating the act of '*nirvāpa*' (offering); and the group of words in the *mantra* may be regarded as expressing this particular fact,—and hence as forming 'one sentence.'

"In the text quoted there are several sentences—the first is '*Dēvasya tvā savituḥ prasavē nirvapāmi*', and the second is '*Ashvinorbāhubhyām nirvapāmi*', and so on, there are several other sentences."

If the word '*nirvapāmi*' is to be supplied as an elliptical extension (in the manner shown by the opponent),—then certainly there are several sentences; but in reality there is no such elliptical extension [i.e. the verb is not to be supplied to each group of words]; for if the act denoted by the verb '*nirvapāmi*' were a subordinate factor, then it would have to be taken as distinct with each of the primary acts. Then again, the action of *Nirvāpa* (offering) is not denoted by what is expressed by the words '*Devasya tvā, etc.*'; so that if the implemental accessories were the predominant factors, then the mantra-text would have to be taken as serving only a transcendental purpose. On the other hand, if the *Nirvāpa* itself is taken as the predominant factor, then the mantra-text serves the perceptible purpose of indicating that act of *Nirvāpa*; and this act would then be indicated as qualified by all the adjectives contained in the entire *Mantra-text* under consideration; in this way there would be no incongruity at all. How one word is qualified by another word has been already explained under *Sūtra* '*Tadbhūtānām, etc.*' (1. 1. 25).—Thus then, the whole of the *Mantra-text* forms a single sentence [speaking of the *Nirvāpa* as qualified by a number of qualifications].

Question:—"Why has the *Sūtra* laid down both the conditions—(*a*) that it should serve a single purpose, and (*b*) that on being disjoined, it be wanting?"

Answer:—There may be a sentence which may serve a single purpose, but which is not 'wanting' on being disjoined; e.g. the text—'*Bhago vām vibhajatu aryamā vām vibhajatu*' serves the single purpose of expressing '*vibhāga*'.—"But the *vibhāga qualified by Bhaga* is distinct from the *vibhāga*

qualified by Aryamā [so that the whole text does not express a single idea]."—Not so, we reply; because what is intended to be spoken of here is *Vibhāga in general*, not particular *vibhāgas*; as it is only by expressing *vibhāga in general* that it serves a perceptible purpose, which it could not do if it expressed particular *vibhāgas*.—And though the text serves the said single purpose, yet it is not found to be 'wanting' on being disjoined [each of the two parts—(1) '*Bhago vām vibhajatu*' and (2) '*Aryamā vām vibhajatu*' being syntactically complete in itself]; so that on being disjoined, there are two distinct sentences,—and each of them is treated as an optional alternative [and the whole is not taken as a single sentence] [and this result is due to both the conditions laid down in the *Sūtra* not being fulfilled].—Similarly in the case of the *Mantra-text* '*Syonan tē sadanam kṛṇomi ghṛtasya dhārayā susēvam kalpayāmi tasmin sīdāmṛtē pratitiṣṭha vrīhīṇām medhaḥ sumanasyamānaḥ*' (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 3. 7. 5. 2-3),—the parts on being disjoined become syntactically 'wanting' (and hence the second condition of 'one sentence' is fulfilled), but there are *two* purposes served and expressed by the text—*the preparing of the seat* (expressed by the first part of the text '*syonam....kalpayāmi*') and the *depositing of the cake* (expressed by the second part '*Tasmin sīda, etc.*') [so that the first condition of 'one sentence' is not fulfilled]; consequently the *Mantra text* is taken and used as two distinct sentences,—the first part being used in the *preparation of the seat* and the second in the *depositing of the cake*.

Thus then we find that the words of the *Sūtra* are well chosen and no objection can be taken to it.

[There is a difference among the *Bhāṭṭas* themselves regarding the exact meaning of the term '*artha*' in the compound '*arthaikatvāt*' in the *Sūtra*. Pārthasārathi Mishra takes it in the sense of *purpose*; according to which all the words, phrases and clauses that serve a single purpose—of indicating details connected with an act, for instance,—are to be treated as 'one sentence'.—Somēshvara Bhaṭṭa in the *Nyāyasuddhā*, on the other hand, takes the word '*artha*' in the sense of *idea*; so that any group of words that expresses one complete idea or judgment is to be treated as 'one sentence'.—The difference in reality comes to this that while, by the former view, the definition of 'one sentence' is applicable to Vedic sentences only,—by the latter, it becomes applicable to all kinds of sentences, Vedic as well as secular.—According to *Prabhākara*, '*artha*' here means the 'reminding or indicating of what is to be done'; and this is more in keeping with Pārthasārathi than with Somēshvara. As an *Anvitābhidhānavādin*, Prabhakara could not very well accept the words to have any meaning apart from the other words; it is for this reason that he says that the word '*artha*' must mean *prayojana, purpose*; as the *purpose* is the most important factor and all the words in the sentence must be related to that important factor.—*Bṛihati* MSS., p. 51].

Adhikaraṇa (15): *Principle of Syntactical split—* *'Distinct Sentences'.*

SŪTRA (47).

When the sentences are equally independent (of one another) they should be treated as syntactically distinct (distinct sentences).

Bhāṣya.

[This is the antithesis to the principle formulated in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*].

In regard to such *mantra-texts* as (*a*) '*Īṣē tvā ūrjē tvā*,' (*Vājasaneya Saṁhitā* 1. 1), and (*b*) '*Āyuṛyajñena kalpatām prāṇo yajñena kalpatām*" (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 7. 9. 1)—there arises the question—Are such sentences to be treated as 'one sentence' or 'several distinct sentences'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"Every such text is to be treated as 'one sentence'; for the utterance of the words '*Īṣē tvā*' is not found to fulfil any perceptible purpose; nor is that of the words '*ūrjē tvā*': [hence as not serving distinct purposes, each of these two groups of words cannot but be treated as 'one sentence']; on the other hand, on the strength of the text itself the implication is that they serve only transcendental purposes; and so far as transcendental purposes are concerned, it is more reasonable to assume a single transcendental purpose to be served by both sets of words, than to assume a distinct purpose for each set; such an assumption would be much simpler. Hence the whole should be regarded as 'one sentence'."

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta*—'*When the sentences are equally independent, they should be treated as syntactically distinct*' (Sūtra). That is in cases where each set of words is independent of—does not stand in need of,—the other, they should be regarded as distinct sentences. For instance, in the case of the text '*Īṣē tvā—ūrjē tvā*', we find that the words '*Īṣē tvā*' serve one purpose (being used in *the chopping of the tree-branch*) and the words '*ūrjē tvā*', a totally different purpose (being used in *the planing of the lopped branch*). [Hence the two sets of words must be treated as two distinct sentences].

Objection:—"It has just been said by us that neither set of words serves any perceptible purpose."

Though no such purpose is cognisable by sense-perception and other such means of cognition, yet it is learnt from the Veda, where we find such injunctions as 'With the words *Īṣē tvā* one cuts off the branch; with the words *ūrjē tvā* one planes it'. (Vide *Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1. 1. 6. 6; 1. 7. 1. 2; 4. 3. 1. 7.)

Similarly in the case of the *mantra* '*Āyuryajñēna kalpatām, prāṇo yajñena kalpatām*', we find that the *kalpana*, bringing about, of '*Āyu*', Long Life (which is the purpose served by the first set of words '*āyuryajñena kalpatām*') is distinct from the *kalpana*, bringing about, of *Prāṇa*, vitality

(which is the purpose served by the second set of words '*Prāṇo yajñena kalpatām*').

Objection.—"All that is desired to be fulfilled here is the *kalpana*, bringing about, in *general*, and not particular *kalpanas*, and hence no differentiation is proper; just as it has been pointed out (by the *Siddhāntin* himself) in connection with the words '*Agnayē juṣṭam nirvapāmi*', that only *nirvāpa* in general is meant, and not its specifications as mentioned in the words '*Savituḥ prasavē ashvinorbāhubhyām pūṣṇo hastābhyām*', and no differentiation of the *Nirvāpa* is meant [see *Bhāṣya* on Sūtra 46, Text, p. 132]. Exactly in the same manner, in the case in question what is meant is the single *kalpana* in general, which should not be differentiated on the basis of such specifications as those of '*āyu*' and '*prāṇa*'."

Answer—In connection with this *mantra*, we find the injunction '*Klṛptīḥ vāchayati*' ('Pronounces the *Klṛpti-mantras*'), where the *Klṛpti-mantras* (which is the name given to the *Mantra*-text in question) are spoken of in the plural; so that when the text is recited, there should be a reciting of *many mantras*,—one of them being in the form '*Āyur yajñena kalpatām*', where we have the '*klṛpti*' of *Āyu*, which would be one *Mantra*,—the next *mantra* being '*Prāṇo yājñena kalpatām*' where we have the '*klṛpti*' of *Prāṇa*; and so on, with the other parts of the text which speak of the '*klṛpti*' of several other things. Thus the making up of so many distinct *mantras* to be recited would be the distinctly perceptible purpose served by each set of words; and as each set of words would be serving a distinct purpose, and various distinct purposes would be served,—each set should be regarded as a distinct sentence.

Objection.—"As in the case of '*Bhago vām vibhajatu, etc.*', the *Siddhāntin* has taken all the various sets of words as speaking of the single act of *vibhāga* in general (see *Bhāṣya* under Sūtra 46, bottom of p. 132 *Text*), in the same manner we may take the various sets of words as speaking of the single act of '*klṛpti*' in general."

Reply: That is not possible. In the case of the *Vibhāga*, the *vibhāga* in general was something perceptible, while in the present case the *Klṛpti* is not perceptible.

Further, we have the distinct injunction 'Recites the *Klṛpti-mantras* (plural)'; and in the first set of words '*Āyur-yajñena kalpatām*' we have a clear enunciation of the '*Klṛpti*' of *Āyu*, and similarly in the second set of words, '*Prāṇo yajñena kalpatām*' we have an equally clear enunciation of the *Klṛpti* of *Prāṇa*.—From all this it follows that these are distinct sentences.

[To the principle enunciated in this Adhikaraṇa we have a corollary to the effect that, when different parts of a *mantra* are found by their implication to be meant for serving distinct purposes, each such part should be regarded as a distinct sentence. For instance, in the mantra—'*Syonante sadanaṅkṛṇomi......tasmin sīda* (Taitti. Brāhmaṇa, 3. 7. 5. 2; Mānava Shrauta Sūtra 1. 2. 6. 19)—we find that the first part, by its meaning, is intended to be employed in the act of preparing the 'seat' for the cake, while the last part, in the same manner, for that of actually keeping the cake upon that 'seat'; hence the passage is regarded as containing two distinct *mantras*. This has been called 'Syṇtactical split due to difference in use' (see Bṛihati MSS., p. 79*b*).]

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *Principle of Elliptical Extension—Anuṣaṅga.*

SŪTRA (48).

ELLIPTICAL EXTENSION SHOULD COMPLETE THE SENTENCES; AS IT IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL.

Bhāṣya.

[The consideration of the extent of *Mantra-texts* continues.]

We have the text—'*Yā tē agnē ayāshayā-tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā gahvarēṣṭhā ugram vacho apābadhīt tvēṣam vacho apābadhīt svāhā ;—yā tē agnē rajāshayā—yā tē agnē harāshayā*' (*Taittirīya Saṁhitā* 1. 2. 112).—In connection with this, there arises the question—Is the connection of the portion of the text beginning with '*Tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā*' to be extended to each of the two clauses at the end ('*yā tē agnē rajāshayā*' and '*yā tē agnē harāshayā*)'? Or are these two incomplete sentences to be completed by the adding of ordinary secular words?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that "the sentence '*yā tē agnē rajāshaya*' is not to be completed by adding to it the words beginning with '*tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā*'; as these words are not found in the text appearing after the said incomplete sentence."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*;—The sentence is to be completed by means of the elliptical extension of the words '*tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā, etc.*'; as these words are as construable with the clause '*yā tē agnē rajāshayā*' and '*yā tē agnē harāshayā*' as with '*yā tē agnē ayāshayā*'.

"But with the clause '*yā tē agnē harāshayā*' the connection of the words '*tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā, etc.*' is interrupted (by the intervention of the clause '*yā tē agnē rajāshayā*')."

Not so; because there is nothing intervening between the words '*tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā, etc.*' and the two clauses ('*yā tē agnē rajāshayā*' and '*yā tē agnē harāshayā*') taken as one composite whole; i.e. the composite whole consisting of the clause '*yā tē agnē rajāshayā*' (and the clause '*yā tē agne harāshayā*'). But, inasmuch as no useful purpose would be served by connecting the supplementary clause ('*tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā, etc.*') with the composite whole (consisting of both the clauses '*yā tē agnē rajāshayā*' and '*yā tē agnē harāshayā*'), the said supplementary clause is construed with each of the component clauses; and as there is nothing to choose as to which one of the component clauses the supplementary clause is to be construed with, the elliptical extension (of the supplementary clause) is to apply to all the incomplete clauses.

[The sense of this somewhat obscure passage has been thus elucidated in the *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 602-603.—The author of the Bhāṣya holds that, inasmuch as the factor in question, '*Tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā, etc.*' is read between the first and second *mantras*, it is not expressed to which of these

two it is more intimately connected; hence it must be taken as equally related to both of them. Then he raises the question of its connection with the third *mantra*, from which the supplementary clause is one step further removed; and in order to meet the difficulty of the intervention, what the Bhāṣya does is to take the second and third *mantras* together as forming a single composite whole; and this removes the difficulty due to the intervention of the second *mantra* between the supplementary clause and the third *mantra*. Then, there arises the difficulty that in that case the supplementary clause would complete the composite whole formed by the two *mantras*, and not each of them separately. This difficulty is met by the declaration that, inasmuch as the composite whole is incapable of being used at a sacrifice, the supplementary clause must be construed with each part of it; and hence it is concluded that both the clauses being equally incapable of being completed in any other way, the whole of the supplementary clause is to be construed with each one of the incomplete clauses.]

Says the Opponent—"[In the case cited above the last two clauses were incomplete and hence there was need and justification for connecting the supplementary words '*Tanūrvarṣiṣṭhā, etc.*' with them]—How will it be in the case of the following text where the sets of words are complete in themselves and yet there is a supplementary set of words capable of being construed with the former sets:—'*Chitpatistvā punātu—vākpatistvā punātu—devasya tvā savitā punātu—achchhidrēṇa pavitrēṇa vasoḥ sūryasya rashmibhiḥ*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 2. 1. 2). Here each of the three clauses, each of which ends with the term '*punātu*', is complete in itself and does not stand in need of any additional words (for the completion of its syntactical connection).—'But the words beginning with *achchhidrēṇa* would require some words to complete the sentence'.—True, those words do require some words; but this requirement would be met by connecting these words with only one of the three sets of sentences ending with '*punātu*', and there would be no need for them to be connected with the other two sets. Because one set of words requires another only when the former, without the latter, remains meaningless; and the meaning of the set of words beginning with '*achchhidrēṇa*' becomes completed by its being connected with one sentence out of the three ending with '*punātu*', and as thus it no longer remains meaningless, it would not require to be connected with the other two sentences. As for these two sentences, each of them is complete in itself, and hence does not require to be connected with the set of words beginning with '*achchhidrēṇa*'.—It might be argued that it is true that the requirements of the set of words beginning with '*achchhidrēṇa*' would be met by being connected with only one of the three sentences, but there is nothing to indicate the one particular sentence out of the three with which it might be connected, in preference to the other two, with which latter it may not be connected;—and under the circumstances, it would be best to connect it with all the three sentences.—But this is not possible; there *is* a peculiar circumstance (which connects the words with only one of the three sentences), in the shape of the fact that the words follow immediately after one of the three sentences (i.e. the sentence '*Dēvasya tvā savitā punātu*', with which the words may be connected (in preference to the other two

sentences). So that the set of words beginning with '*achchhidrēṇa*' should be construed with the sentence immediately preceding it,—and the elliptical extension should not extend to all the three sentences."

The *answer* to the above is as follows:—It cannot be as urged above. In fact, the word that is found to immediately precede the set of words beginning with '*achchhidrēṇa*' is the word '*punātu*';—this word '*punātu*' itself is preceded by every one of the three clauses '*chitpatistvā*', '*vākpatistvā*' and '*devasya tvā savitā*';—the term '*punātu*' also is one and the same only repeated again and again;—hence we conclude that wherever the word '*punātu*' is found used, there the set of words beginning with '*achchhidrēṇa*' should also be used, as it is syntactically connected with the word '*punātu*'; —now the word '*punātu*' having become connected with '*achchhidrēṇa*, etc.'—the clauses '*chitpatistvā*', '*vākpatistvā*' and '*dēvasya tvā savitā*' remain 'wanting' (incomplete) without the word '*punātu*'; and they require this word '*punātu*' for their completion;—this word has become connected with the words '*achchhidreṇa, etc.*';—from all this it follows that each of these clauses has to be completed (and has its requirements met) by the connection of the word '*punātu*' *along with the elliptical extension* (in the shape of the words '*achchhidrēṇa, etc.*').—Thus it follows that the words '*achchhidrēṇa, etc.*' are '*equally applicable to all*' the three sentences, and hence all these sentences have to be completed by the extension of those words.

Adhikaraṇa (17): *Cases where Elliptical Extension is not permissible.*

SŪTRA (49).

There should be no elliptical extension where there is intervention (of unconnected words).

Bhāṣya.

[This *Adhikaraṇa* is brought in by way of a counter-instance to the functioning of mere Proximity in the matter of *Anuṣaṅga*, Elliptical Extension—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 607.]

There is the text—'(*a*) *Santē vāryurvātena gachchhatām*, (*b*) *Saṁ yajatrairaṅgāni*, (*c*) *Saṁ yajñapatirashiṣā*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 3. 8. 1). Here the (singular) '*gachchhatām*'—as occurring in (*a*) '*Santē vāyurgachchhatām*' cannot be construed with (*c*) '*Saṁ yajñapatirāshiṣā*', because the connection between these two is interrupted by the sentence (*b*) '*Saṁ yajatrairaṅgāni*' (which cannot be construed with '*gachchhatām*' of the preceding sentence, as the plural noun '*aṅgāni*' would need the plural verb '*gachchhantām*'); that is, the supplementary word '*gachchhatām*' to be connected with the last sentence, which stands in need of that word, is interrupted by the words '*Saṁ yajatrairaṅgāni*'; and unless the said word '*gachchhatām*' has become connected with these intervening words, it could not, by reason of this interruption, become connected with the last sentence (ending with '*āshiṣā*'). For this want of connection thus there is a special reason, in the shape of the said intervention; and so long as this special reason is there, it is not possible for the supplementary word ('*gachchhatām*) to betake itself to the third sentence.—For these reasons, the intervening sentence which needs a plural verb,—as also the sentence whose connection with the verb in the first sentence is interrupted by the intervening sentence,—have to be completed only by the adding of secular words.

End of Pāda i (Introductory) of Discourse II.

DISCOURSE II.

PĀDA II.

Grounds of Differentiation Among Acts.

Adhikaraṇa (1):—*Difference in the Apūrva of Subsidiary Acts: Difference among Acts based upon the difference of words signifying the Acts.*

SŪTRA (1).

Where there is a different word, there is a different Act; because of its special equipment.

Bhāṣya.

[In the foregoing *Pāda* which is Introductory to the Second Discourse, we have dealt with all matters connected, directly or indirectly, with the subject-matter of the Discourse—Differentiation of Acts. And now, first of all we take up the differentiation of acts through difference in the words expressive of the acts.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 610.]

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, in connection with which we have the texts—(*a*) '*Somena yajēta*', (*b*) '*Dākṣiṇāni juhoti*',* and (*c*) '*Hiraṇyamātrēyāya dadāti*' (Shata. Brā. 4. 3. 4-21)—which speak of the three acts of (*a*) 'sacrifice', (*b*) 'offering of libations into fire', and (*c*) 'giving'.—Now, in regard to these acts, there arises the question—Do these accomplish their result collectively or severally?—There is this doubt because instruments in general are found to accomplish their results collectively as well as severally; for instance, when we find the mortar standing upon three stone-pieces, we have a case of the act of supporting being done collectively by the three stone-pieces; in the case of pegs in the wall, on the other hand, we find each of them severally serving the purpose of supporting the hanging noose (on which articles of food, etc., are hung).—Thus it is that there arises the doubt as to whether the acts of *sacrificing, offering libations into fire* and *giving* accomplish the result collectively or severally.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—"These acts operate collectively;—why?—because of things with transcendental potency we should assume as few as possible.—Why so?—Because, when a thing is neither seen nor heard, it is understood that it does not exist; but only if its non-existence does not involve the inconsistency of a fact that has been perceived or heard of. In case, there is such inconsistency, it would be right to assume the existence of the thing which had been understood to be *non-existent*; as on being thus assumed, it serves the useful purpose (of rendering consistent and explaining the perceived fact). In case however, this

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* No one knows of any such material substance as '*dakṣiṇāni*': hence this word has to be taken, not as denoting something to be offered into the Fire, but as the *name* of the *Homa*.—(*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 620.)

special circumstance (of the inconsistency of a perceived fact) is not duly recognised, then there can be no assumption of anything at all.—In the case in question however, we do recognise a special circumstance,—viz. that the several acts bring about a single *Apūrva*; hence it is that what is desired to be performed is the whole set of the three acts; and when we come to assume a transcendental potency arising from the performance, it is far more reasonable to assume a single potency arising out of the entire set than one potency from each one of the acts.—It will not be right to argue that (the acts being enjoined severally) there is no *set of acts* as a whole enjoined by the Veda.—Because the *set as a whole* is enjoined by the injunction of the several components themselves.—Thus it follows that what is meant to be performed is the entire set of the three acts.—

"Or, in the word '*yajeta*' ('should sacrifice'), there are two factors; of which the first factor denotes the *sacrifice* and the second factor denotes the '*bhāvanā*', 'bringing about';—similarly in the word '*dadāti*', the first factor denotes the *giving* and the second factor reiterates the same 'bringing about';—so also in the word '*jūhoti*', the first factor denotes the *offering into fire* and the second factor reiterates the same 'bringing about'. Thus then, the three acts of *sacrificing, offering of libation into fire* and *giving* are enjoined by the Veda as the means to the single 'bringing about' (of the desired result); so that what is recognised is the peculiar (qualified) *Bringing About* of the Transcendental Potency by means of the three acts of *sacrificing, offering into Fire* and *giving*. It is for this reason that it is asserted that the acts accomplish a single Transcendental Potency (*Apūrva*) *collectively*.—

"Or, it may be that the term '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') itself denotes the act of *giving*, which same *giving* is mentioned again in the terms '*juhoti*' ('offers into Fire') and '*dadāti*' ('gives') for the purpose of connecting the act (*of giving*) with the various accessory details.

"From all this it follows that there is a single Transcendental Potency (*Apūrva*, brought about by the three Acts collectively)."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—There is a distinct Transcendental Potency with each individual word (denoting an action). This is what is meant by the *Sūtra*—'*Where there is a different word, there is a different act, because of its special equipment*'. As a matter of fact, the word '*yajēta*' ('should sacrifice') lays down the propriety of performing *the act of* '*sacrificing*', not the act of 'offering into Fire' which is spoken of by means of the second word '*juhoti*', or the act of 'giving' which is spoken of by means of the third word '*dadāti*',—simply because all these are 'different words'. The fact that the three acts form one composite whole is indicated only by the circumstance that they are spoken of by means of sentences which are construed together on the basis of a supposed *directive sentence* (which recapitulates all the subsidiaries as pertaining to a single Primary); while the fact that each of the components is a distinct entity is indicated directly by the Vedic text itself. That is to say, that the act of 'sacrifice' mentioned by the word '*yajēta*' is to be taken along with the 'giving' and the 'offering into Fire' is indicated only by the *syntactical connection* based upon the proximity of the words speaking of these latter to

the word speaking of the *sacrifice*; while the act of 'sacrifice' mentioned by the word '*yajēta*' expresses by *direct denotation*, the single act of 'sacrifice', not the acts of 'offering into Fire' and 'giving';—and *Direct Denotation* (*Shruti*) is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection* (*Vākya*). Thus the composite whole (composed of the three acts) is not what is denoted directly by the words of the text; so that if any such whole had to be assumed, it could be assumed only on the basis of the syntactical connection due to all the (three) sentences in the context being construed together.—The word '*dadāti*' ('gives') is entirely distinct from the word '*yajati*' ('sacrifices'), so that, even though the second part of these words ('*yajati*', '*juhoti*' and '*dadāti*'), which connotes the 'bringing about', is common to all, yet the first part of each of them is distinct from the rest; hence one composite (formed of the two parts) must be a word different from the other composite (formed of the two parts); and what is denoted by one composite must clearly be different from that denoted by the other composite.—For example, what the word '*daḍyāt*' ('should give') signifies is that 'one should bring about by the act of *giving*', where what is understood as the means of the 'bringing about' is the single act of *giving*, which does not stand in need of the help of the two acts of *sacrificing* and *offering into Fire*. Similarly, the word '*juhoti*' ('offers into fire') signifies the 'bringing about' as accomplished by the act of *offering into Fire*, which does not stand in need of the help of the other two acts of *giving* and *sacrifice*.—Thus all that we learn from the word ('*dadāti*') is that 'the *Bringing About* is accomplished by the act of *giving* only';—also what we learn from the word '*juhoti*' is that 'the *Bringing About* is accomplished by the act of *offering into Fire* only'; and there is nothing by which the notion that 'the bringing about is accomplished by the act of *giving* only' could be set aside.

Thus then, we find that the act of *giving*, having become 'equipped' with all its special auxiliaries, does not stand in need of being equipped or connected with the other acts of *sacrifice* and *offering into Fire*;—and the conclusion therefore is that the three sentences are distinct, and there is a distinct Transcendental potency related to each of the three verbs.

It is not possible for the 'sacrifice' or the 'offering into Fire' to be taken as a reference to the act of *giving*; as that would lead to the incongruity that the acts of *sacrifice* and *offering into Fire* are not meant to be performed.—Nor can the 'giving' be regarded as a reference to the other two acts; because the purpose served by the 'giving' is the bringing about of the proprietory right of another person (the recipient of the gift,—in the article given away), while the purpose served by the other two acts is mere *surrendering* (of what belongs to the Agent).

The purpose served by the present discussion is that according to the *Pūrvapakṣa* there would be a single Transcendental Potency resulting from all the three acts taken as one composite whole, [so that there would be no relation of 'primary' and 'subsidiary' among the three acts]; while according to the *Siddhānta* the Transcendental Potency results from the act of *sacrifice* alone and the other two acts are subsidiary to that act.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *Difference among Acts spoken of by the same word often repeated :—Different Apūrvas from the Samit, Tanūnapāt, etc. all of which are ' sacrifices '.*

SŪTRA (2).

THE REPETITION OF ONE AND THE SAME WORD ALSO SHOULD [INDICATE DIFFERENCE AMONG ACTS]; BECAUSE, IF THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCE, THE REPETITION WOULD BE USELESS.

Bhāṣya.

[The foregoing Adhikaraṇa has treated of a case where the difference among acts was based upon the difference among the words expressive of those acts. This would give rise to the notion that the acts would be the *same* where they are expressed by the *same* words; i.e. when the same word is repeated several times, it stands for the *same act*. It is this notion on which the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the present *Adhikaraṇa* is based; which is finally rejected in favour of the *Siddhānta*, that when the same word is repeated several times, it stands for so many several acts.]

We have such texts as—'*Samidho yajati—Tanūnapātam yajati, etc.—[Iḍo yajati—Varhir yajati—Svāhākāram yajati* ']—(Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 1. 1-2),—where the same verb '*yajati*' is repeated five times. The question is—Does this word so repeated indicate a single Transcendental Potency (resulting from the acts collectively)? Or is there a distinct Transcendental Potency from each repetition of the Act?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"It has been declared (in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*) that the acts are different when the words expressing them are *different*; in the present case it is the *same* word repeated again and again; hence in the present case there must be a *single* Transcendental Potency—'If different potencies were not indicated, then the repetition would be useless'.—True; the repetition would serve no useful purpose; but even though repeated several times, a word cannot have different meanings; in fact, what is understood from it at the first time of its utterance is exactly the same that is understood from it at the hundredth time.—Hence it follows that even though the word '*yajati*' has been repeated five times, it stands for a (single Act and a) single Transcendental Potency (resulting from that act).—Nor does this make the repetition entirely useless; as it serves the purpose of enjoining the several deities *Tanūnapāt* and the rest.—Hence it is only a single Transcendental Potency that follows in the case in question."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*The repetition of one and the same word also would indicate difference among the acts;* because if the mere single act were enjoined,—and '*if there were no difference, —then the repetition would be useless*'.—"It has already been explained that the same word cannot enjoin different things".—Our answer to this is that even the very first sentence '*Samidho yajati*' is only reiterative (not

injunctive); the fact of the matter is that the act of *sacrifice* has already been enjoined by the (Primary) Injunction '*One should offer the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa sacrifices*';—now, it is not possible for deities for this sacrifice to be enjoined (by the sentences in question, '*Samidho yajati, etc.*'); because the deity for that sacrifice has already been got at from the direct injunction (contained in the text '*Āgneyo'ṣṭākapālaḥ*', where *Agni* is enjoined as the Deity); while, if the deity were to be indicated by the sentences in question, it could be done either through Syntactical Connection or through Context; and under the circumstances, it would not be right to regard the two deities (one, the directly enjoined one, and the other got at through Syntactical Connection or Context) as optional alternatives. And yet the connection between the act of *sacrifice* and the *deities* (Samit and the rest), which is clearly enjoined (by the sentences '*Samidho yajati*', *etc.*) could not be effected unless the act of sacrifice were performed; so that if the sacrifice were not performed, the injunction (of the deity) would be useless; on the other hand, if the sacrifice is performed, then the said connection (with the deities) can be effected. It is necessary therefore to repeat the act of sacrifice (for the purpose of connecting it with the several deities mentioned, *Samit, Tanūnapāt* and the rest); and with each such repetition there is a distinct Transcendental Result. Then again, the result that is brought about by the connection of the sacrifice with *Samit* cannot be the same that has brought about its connection with *Tanūnapāt*; because they are quite distinct; hence also they cannot be regarded as optional alternatives.

The purpose served by this discussion is that according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, there is a single performance, while according to the *Siddhānta*, the performance has to be repeated over and over again.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *The Āghāra, etc. are subservient to the Āgnēya, etc.—Exceptions to the last two Adhikaraṇas.*

SŪTRA (3).

The context certainly points to the Paurṇamāsi, as the details (of any other) are not mentioned.

Bhāṣya.

[The form of this Sūtra has led some people to think that we have here a discussion of the primary and subsidiary character of certain acts,—and hence to raise the objection that it is irrelevant in the present Adhyāya. But in reality, as the *Tantravārtika* (Trans., p. 634) rightly points out, the present discussion had to be introduced as dealing with the exceptions to the principles of differentiation deduced from the last two discussions,—and not dealing with the question of the primary or subsidiary character of certain acts; this latter question comes in only incidentally.]

We have the text—(A) '*Yadāgnēyo'ṣṭākapālo' māvāsyāyām paurṇamāsyāñchāchyuto bhavati*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 3. 3)—'*Tāvabrūtāmagnīṣomāvājyasyaiva tau—Upāmshu paurṇamāsyām yajanniti*'—'*Tābhyāmetamagnīṣomīyamēkādashakapālam paurṇamāsē prāyachchat*' (cf. Shata. Brā. 1. 6. 2. 14)—'*Aindrandadhyamāvāsyāyām aindram payo' māvāsyāyām*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 4. 1);—and then (B) '*Āghāramāghārayati*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 11. 6);—'*Ājyabhāgau yajati—Sviṣṭakṛtē samavadyati—Patnīsamyājām yajati—Samiṣṭayajūrjuhoti*' (Shata. Brā. 1. 9. 2. 25);—further (C) '*Ya evamvidvān paurṇamāsīm yajatē ya evamvidvānamāvāsyām yajatē*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 6. 9. 1-2). —In regard to these, there arises the question—(1) Are all the acts here spoken of equally 'primary'? Or those beginning with *Āgnēya* and ending with *Payas* (i.e. all those spoken of in the set of sentences *A*) are 'primary' and those beginning with *Āghāra* (spoken of in *B*) direct auxiliaries, and hence 'subsidiary' to the aforesaid?—There also arises the further question (2)—Are the two sentences '*Ya evamvidvān, etc.*' (C) conjointly only references to the original acts (spoken of in the preceding sentences)? Or are the two sentences '*Ya evamvidvān paurṇamāsīm yajatē*' and '*Ya ēvamvidvānāmāsyām yajatē*' injunctive of two entirely different acts, and the preceding sentences are injunctive of details regarding those two acts?

[The issues involved in these questions have been thus clearly stated in the *Tantravārtika* (Trans., pp. 634-635)—If the two sentences '*Ya evamvidvān paurṇamāsīm yajatē*' and '*Ya evamvidvānamāvāsyām yajatē*' lay down two distinct independent acts, then all the various sacrifices mentioned in the other sentences—viz: *Āgnēya*, etc. and *Āghara*, etc.—would be all distinct acts, all of equal importance; while, if the two sentences contained only a reference to the six acts that have been mentioned in the first set of sentences (A),—then these alone would be 'primary' acts as being connected with the prescribed times of *Amāvāsyā* and *Paurṇamāsī*; and the two names '*Darsha*' and '*Puraṇamāsa*' would, in this case, be taken as the names of these six acts, which alone would therefore be directly connected with

the resultant *Apūrva*; and in that case the other set of acts, *Āghāra* and the rest, mentioned in the second set of sentences (B), become 'subsidiary' to the aforesaid acts.]

On the said question, we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* that "because of 'the words being different' and because of there being 'a repetition of the same words', all the acts spoken of in the texts are distinct acts, all equally 'primary'."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The context certainly points to the 'Paurṇamāsī'*; that is, the two sentences (C) mentioning the words '*amāvāsyā*' and '*paurṇamāsī*' are only references to the original acts, *Āgnēya* and the rest;—why?—because *the details of any other are not mentioned*;—the sentence '*Ya evamvidvān paurṇamāsīm, etc.*' ('One who knowing this offers the sacrifice named *Paurṇamāsī*, etc.') speaks of *all* the said sacrifices;—nor do we know what is the form (details) of the particular (distinct) sacrifice named '*Paurṇamāsī*'; so that if this were a distinct sacrifice by itself we would know nothing about it. It is for this reason that we assert that if the two sentences (C) were injunctive of distinct sacrifices, then they would be entirely useless;—on the other hand, if these two sentences were only references to the actions prescribed in the first set of sentences, then the meaning of the two sentences comes to be that the sacrifices that have been mentioned in the preceding sentences in close proximity to these two sentences are related to (are to be performed at) the two points of time *Amāvāsyā* and *Paurṇamāsī*; and thus the form (details) of the sacrifices thus referred to being well known, the two sentences come to serve the distinctly useful purpose (of pointing out the *time* of their performance).—"How can a word with the singular ending ('*paurṇamāsīm*') speak of (refer to) several sacrifices (the six sacrifices mentioned in the first set of sentences)?"—To such an objection, if raised, our answer would be that the word with the singular ending would be taken as a collective noun; i.e. the sacrifices originally mentioned have their details laid down, and there is a collective group composed of these sacrifices, which *collective group* is what is referred to by the word with the singular ending ('*paurṇamāsīm*'); so that there is nothing incongruous in the singular ending (in the word referring to the group of sacrifices); because there are many such words with the singular ending as refer to several things taken collectively, —such words, for instance, as 'company', 'forest', 'tribe', 'assembly'.— When the two sentences in question are taken as referring to the *group* composed of *Āgnēya* and the other acts, then these same acts come to be spoken of by means of the word '*Darsha-Paurṇamāsa*,' and thus it is that they become connected with the result (spoken of in the sentence '*Darshapaurṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*').

Such being the case, the *Āghāra* and other acts spoken of (in the second set of sentences *B*) in close proximity to the other acts (*Āgnēya*, etc. which are connected with the result, Heaven) come to be regarded as direct auxiliaries (to those acts).

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND A PECULIAR FEATURE IN ALL; IF THEY WERE ALL EQUALLY 'PRIMARY', THAT FEATURE COULD NOT APPEAR IN THEM.

Bhāṣya.

If all the acts were equally 'primary', then the *Prayājas* could not be found in the ectypal sacrifices (of which the *Darsha-paurṇamāsa* are the Archetype);—but they *are* actually found in them; as is clear from the text that '*Kṛṣṇala* is to be used at each *Prayāja*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 2. 3) (when this *Prayāja* is performed in connection with the ectypal sacrifices).—This (presence of the *Prayājas* in the ectypal sacrifices) could not be possible if the *Prayāja*, were not subsidiary to the *Āgnēya* and the rest.—For this reason also all the acts cannot be regarded as equally 'primary.'

[If the sacrifices mentioned in the two sentences '*Ya evamvidvān, etc.*' were distinct from all the others spoken of in the connected texts, then *Āghāra* and the other acts would be equally 'primary'; and hence, in accordance with the principle enunciated under *sūtra* 8. 1. 20, the *Prayājas* also, like the *Āgnēya* and the rest, would form part of the instrumental factor; and as such they would no longer be able to form part of the Procedure of the ectypal sacrifices, the instrumental factor of whose 'Bringing About' is already prescribed elsewhere; under the circumstances, the ectypal sacrifices could no longer take the *Prayājas* into themselves;—but as a matter of fact, the *Prayājas* are actually taken up by the ectypal sacrifices; as is clearly indicated by the fact that we have a text laying down *Kṛṣṇala* as the material to be used at the *Prayāja when performed in connection with the ectypal sacrifices.* Consequently, in order to establish the fact of the *Prayāja* being subsidiary to the *Āgnēya*, etc. we must take the two sentences ('*Ya evamvidvān, etc.*') as only *referring* to the sacrifices already spoken of in the preceding sentences.—*Tantravārtika*, Trans., pp. 657-658].

SŪTRA (5).

[OBJECTION]—"BUT THE REQUISITE ACCESSORY DETAILS (OF THE TWO SACRIFICES ENJOINED BY THE TWO SENTENCES 'YA EVAMVIDVĀN, ETC.') ARE ACTUALLY LAID DOWN DIRECTLY IN THE VEDIC TEXTS."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not true that the texts containing the mention of *Paurṇamāsī* and *Amāvāsyā* are expressive of the two groups of sacrifices; in fact, they are clearly injunctive of two distinct sacrifices. Being thus taken, the words would not have to be taken in an indirect figurative sense (as standing for the two groups of acts mentioned in other sentences).—'But the form (details) of the two sacrifices is not mentioned'.—This form we would find out from another text—such as '*Paurṇamāsyāmāgneyo'ṣṭākapālo bhavati*'—from which it is clear that 'the sacrifice named *Paurṇamāsī* (which is enjoined by the sentence '*Ya evamvidvān, etc.*') has this form that *Agni* is the deity and *Cake* is the material offered'. Thus it is that the

sentences speaking of the *Āgnēya* and the rest are to be taken as laying down the accessory details (of the two distinct acts, *Paurṇamāsī* and *Amāvāsyā*, which are enjoined by the two sentences '*Ya evamvidvān, etc.*')".

SŪTRA (6).

[ANSWER]—IN REALITY, THE TEXTS ('YADĀGNĒYAḤ, ETC.') SHOULD BE REGARDED AS INJUNCTIONS; AS (OTHERWISE) SEVERAL ACCESSORY DETAILS WOULD BE PRESCRIBED SIMULTANEOUSLY; [WHICH WOULD NOT BE RIGHT]; FOR, IF SEVERAL ACCESSORIES WERE PRESCRIBED IN CONNECTION WITH A SACRIFICE ALREADY ENJOINED,—THEN, INASMUCH AS THE ACCESSORY DETAILS ARE FOR THE SAKE OF SACRIFICES ONLY, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HAVE THE INJUNCTION (OF A SACRIFICE) IN CONNECTION WITH EACH ONE OF THE ACCESSORIES CONCERNED.

Bhāṣya.

In reality the sentences speaking of the *Āgnēya* and other acts *should be regarded as injunctions of actions*;—why?—*as otherwise several accessory details would be prescribed simultaneously*; that is to say, what you mean is that all the texts ('*Yadāgnēyaḥ, etc.*') are syntactically connected and they prescribe several accessories (*Agni, etc.* as deities and the *Cake, etc.* as materials) (in connection with the sacrifices enjoined in the sentence '*Ya ēvamvidvān, etc.*').—But it is not possible for several accessories to be prescribed by one sentence in connection with a sacrifice that has been enjoined by another sentence, specially when there is no connection between the two sentences.—"Why?"—Well, if, in the case in question, the connection intended is that 'the *Aṣṭākapāla* (the Cake baked upon eight pans) is the material used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice',—then whence shall we get the idea that 'there *is* such a thing in existence as the *Aṣṭākapāla* (Cake)';—and under the circumstances (if there is no such thing in existence), what '*aṣṭākapāla*' would be connected with the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice? In the text speaking of the *Aṣṭākapāla* ('*Yadāgneyo'ṣṭākapālo bhavati*') we find the verb '*bhavati*', which means that 'when the *Aṣṭakapāla Cake* is there, it is '*āgnēya*'; if then the '*aṣṭākapāla*' is taken out of its connection with '*bhavati*' [and connected with the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice enjoined in another sentence), then it could not be open to any such connection as that 'the *Aṣṭākapāla* is *Āgnēya*'.—If, on the other hand, the intended connection be that 'the *Āgnēya* is present at the '*Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice',—then, in that case, there would be no connection between the *Āgnēya* and the *Aṣṭākapāla* Cake.—If, (in order to avoid these difficulties) it be held that what is enjoined is that 'the *Aṣṭākapāla* Cake used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice should

be *Āgnēya*',—then, it becomes necessary to point out the sentence that has enjoined the use of the *Aṣṭākapāla* Cake at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice.—If (to avoid this difficulty) it be held that that what is enjoined is that 'the *Āgnēya* used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice should be *Aṣṭākapāla*',—then, also, there is the same difficulty [i.e. what is the sentence that has enjoined the use of the *Āgnēya* at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice ?]—If it be held that "the *Paurṇamāsī* is connected with both (*Āgnēya* and *Aṣṭākapāla*)," then there would be no connection between the material (*Aṣṭākapāla* Cake) and the *Deity* (*Agni*, mentioned by the term '*āgnēya*').—If it be explained that "what are connected with the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice are the material and the Deity *as related to each other*",—then the meaning would be that 'That *Aṣṭākapāla Cake which is Āgnēya* is to be used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice',—and in that case, inasmuch as there is no such thing known as '*the Aṣṭākapāla Cake which is Āgnēya*' [as no Cake can be '*āgnēya*' unless and until it has been offered to *Agni*, so that until the sacrifice itself has been performed, there can be no such thing as '*the Aṣṭākapāla Cake which is Āgnēya*'], this explanation also would be improper.—If it be held that "what is enjoined in connection with the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice is *the Cake that has been dedicated by some one to Agni* (and not actually offered)"—in that case, as the Deity of the *Paurṇamāsī* itself would remain unmentioned [the term '*āgnēya*' denoting only the deity to whom the cake has only been *dedicated* by some one, and not the one to whom it is to be *offered* at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice], the form of the *Paurṇamāsī* would remain incomplete.

[The *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 663—does not favour this explanation of the phrase '*Kēnachit saṅkalpitaḥ*'—It says—some people take this phrase as meaning 'dedicated to Agni by another sacrificer'; but this is not correct; because the using of what has been dedicated by another sacrificer would be tantamount to stealing the material got ready by another person. The phrase has therefore to be taken as 'what has been prescribed by some other *text*'—the deity *Agni* being one that is prescribed, for instance, by the text that speaks of 'one desiring a bright complexion'.]

—If some one were to say that "*Agni* would be the deity at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice",—then, he should be told that '*there can be no mutual relationship*' (Sū. 1. 4. 15); i.e. the term '*āgnēya*' cannot contain a *reference* (to the deity to whom the cake has been dedicated by some one) and also an *injunction* (of the deity for the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice).—"We shall then *assume* a deity (for the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice)".—That cannot be; as unless there is an actual Injunction of the Deity, there can be no Deity; the term '*deity*' is a relative one; and while *Agni* is the 'deity' of the *Aṣṭākapāla Cake*, it is not a deity of the *Ājya* (Butter). It is necessary therefore that the connection between '*Āgnēya*' and the *Aṣṭākapāla Cake* should be actually enjoined; and that in regard to which such a connection would be enjoined would be an act of sacrifice (as the *cake* cannot be *āgnēya*, until it is actually offered in sacrifice to *Agni*); and the result of this would be that, if the sentence laying down the said connection between the *Cake* and *Āgnēya* were taken as laying down an accessory for the *Paurṇamāsī*, what would be laid down as such an accessory for the *Paurṇamāsī* would be this

other *sacrifice*, and not a *material* or a *deity*;—and one *sacrifice* cannot constitute the *form* of another;—so that in this case, as the form of the *Paurṇamāsī* remains unmentioned, the two sentences containing the terms '*Paurṇamāsī*' and '*Amāvāsyā*' could not be taken as enjoining two distinct Acts.

It has been argued (Text—Bottom of p. 141) (against the *Siddhānta*) that "the terms '*Paurṇamāsī*' and '*Amāvāsyā*' can refer to the sacrifices spoken of in the first set of sentences, only through indirect indication, not directly".—But this does not affect our position; under the circumstances, what is assumed even *indirectly* would be quite right; for instance, we have such expressions as '*agnau tiṣṭhati*'—'*avaṭē tiṣṭhati*', where (the *direct* meaning of the words being found to be impossible, as no one can stand *in the fire* or *in the well*), it is taken to mean *indirectly* that 'one stands *near the fire*', 'one stands *near* the well'; so that indirect indication is what is accepted in ordinary usage also (and there is nothing incongruous in it).

SŪTRA (7).

THE MENTION ALSO OF THESE IS LIKE THAT.

Bhāṣya.

We have the text '*Ugrāṇi ha vā ētāni havīṁṣi amāvāsyāyām sambhriyantē—āgnēyam prathamam aindrē uttarē*', which speaks of the two sets of offerings collectively: (1) the *Āgnēya* (*Cake*), and (2) the *Aindra* (*Milk and Curd*).—Now if (as held by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) the *Āgnēya* and the rest were to be regarded as accessories at this same single sacrifice, the *Amāvāsyā*,—then the two sets of materials spoken of (*Āgnēya—Cake*, and *Aindra—Milk and Curd*) would be optional alternatives, and in that case there would be no point in mentioning an order of sequence in the getting together of these materials, which is mentioned in the sentence '*āgneyam prathamam—aindrē uttarē*'; as there can be no order of sequence between two optional alternatives.—[And further, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, over and above the three—*one*, *Āgnēya* and two *Aindra*,—there would be a fourth also, in connection with the distinct sacrifice enjoined by the sentence '*Ya ēvaṁvidvān, etc.*' so that we should have the plural form '*uttarāṇi*' and not the dual form '*uttarē*' found in the text quoted.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 665.]

SŪTRA (8).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

We find a text also indicative of the same—viz.: '*Chaturdasha paurṇamāsyām āhutayo hūyantē, trayodasha amāvāsyāyām*' ('There are fourteen libations offered at the *Paurṇamāsī* and thirteen at the *Amāvāsyā*').—[If the sentences '*Ya ēvaṁvidvān, etc.*' enjoined two distinct sacrifices, then the number of libations would be more than *Fourteen* and *Thirteen*;—if the

sentences '*Yadāgnēyo*, etc.' were injunctive of accessories then the libations would be less than *Fourteen* and *Thirteen*; and both of these views would be incompatible with the numbers *Fourteen* and *Thirteen* mentioned in the text just quoted. In fact the said numbers are possible only when there are *three* principal libations at the *Paurṇamāsī* and *two* principal libations at the *Amāvāsyā*.—*Tantravārtika*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The Upāṁshuyāja is a distinct sacrifice: Counter-instance to the foregoing Adhikaraṇa.*

SŪTRA (9).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA].—"THE UPĀṀSHUYĀJA SHOULD BE LIKE THE PAURṆAMĀSĪ."

Bhāṣya.

[The next three *Adhikaraṇas* treat of cases where a *reference* to a composite whole is not possible, as it is in the case of the *Darsha-Paurṇamāsa*.]

We have the text '*Jāmi vā ētad yajñasya kriyatē yadanvañchau puroḍāshau—Upāṁshuyājamantarā yajati*', ['It is a *Jāmi*, flaw in the sacrifice, that the two cakes are in close proximity; in between the two, therefore, one should perform the *Upāṁshuyāja*'—cf. T.S. 2. 6. 6. 4]; this is followed by another text—'*Viṣṇurupāṁshu yaṣṭavyo' jāmitvāya,—Prajāpatirupāṁshu yaṣṭavyo' jāmitvāya,—Agniṣomāvupāṁshu yaṣṭavyāvajāmitvāya*' ['Viṣṇu should be sacrificed to for the removal of the flaw of *Jāmi*;—Prajāpati should be sacrificed to for the removal of the flaw of *Jāmi*;—Agni-Soma should be sacrificed to for the removal of the flaw of *Jāmi*'].—Now in regard to these two sets of texts, there arises the question—Does the sentence 'One should perform the *Upāṁshuyāja*' contain a *reference* to the batch of the three sacrifices mentioned in the second set of sentences as having Viṣṇu, Prajāpati and Agni-Soma as accessories? or the injunction of a distinct sacrifice?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—

"The *Upāṁshuyāja* also is capable of being treated like the *Paurṇamāsi* [i.e. as a mere reference to the batch of three sacrifices];—why?—because it is spoken of by its name only. It is only a sacrifice equipped with all its accessory details that is spoken of by the particular name '*Upāṁshuyāja*'; but in the sentence where it is so spoken of, we do not find any mention of any accessories in the shape of material and Deity;—in the second set of sentences however we find a number of sacrifices mentioned of which '*Upāṁshu*' is mentioned as a qualification [which makes the name '*Upāṁshuyāja*' applicable to them];—from all of which it follows that the name '*Upāṁshuyāja*' applies to the batch of these latter sacrifices.—'But what is enjoined in the sentence *Upaṁshuyajamantarā yajati* is an entirely different sacrifice with *upāṁshu* as its qualification, and with a definite form of its own'.—In fact, words like those we find in this sentence are not capable of signifying a sacrifice with *upāṁshu* as its qualification; the only term that could signify such a sacrifice is the term '*Upāṁshuyāga*'; as the change of '*ja*' into '*ga*' would be necessary according to Pāṇini 7. 3-52;—the term '*Upāṁshuyāja*' (with *ja*) is, in fact, grammatically incorrect. Hence there is no distinct sacrifice with a definite form (spoken of in the

sentence '*Upāṁshuyājamantarā yajati*').—It may be that this sentence speaks of *sacrifice in general* with a particular name ('*Upāṁshuyāja*'); but even so, we could not have any idea of a distinct sacrifice, inasmuch as its material or deity is not mentioned.—'In that case, the name *Upāṁshuyaja* would not be able to signify the batch of the sacrifices spoken of in the second set of sentences'.—The term '*Upāṁshuyāja*' may be so incapable, but the word '*yajati*' in the sentence would be expressive of those sacrifices; and under the circumstances, there would be nothing objectionable in regarding the word '*Upāṁshuyāja*' also as a reference to those sacrifices."

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE SENTENCE MUST BE AN INJUNCTION, AS THERE ARE NO OTHER SACRIFICES MENTIONED IN THE CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

The sentence '*Upāṁshuyājam yajati*' should be taken as speaking of a distinct sacrifice;—why?—because *there are no other sacrifices mentioned in the context*; and when there are no other sacrifices mentioned in the context, the batch of which would the sentence in question refer to?—"We have just pointed out that there are the sacrifices with Viṣṇu, Prajāpati and Agni-Soma as deities which are spoken of in the context."—Certainly there are no such sacrifices; the sentences you speak of—'*Viṣṇurupāṁshu yaṣṭavyaḥ*' and the rest,—are not injunctions, they are only *Arthavādas* (commendatory declarations).—"How so?"—Because in the same context we have another injunction, in the form of the sentence '*Upāṁshuyājamantarā yajati*', which enjoins a sacrifice; in the circumstances, if the other sentences were also treated as Injunctions, there would be a syntactical split (there being several injunctions in a set of texts which practically form 'one sentence').—Then again, what those sentences express is the connection of the sacrifice with Viṣṇu and other deities, not an Injunction.—"In the case of the sentence '*Upāṁshuyajamantarā yajati*' also, what is expressed is the connection of the '*interval*' ('*antarāla*', as the time)".—True; but in this sentence the *sacrifice* itself is enjoined as connected with the qualifications '*upāṁshu*' (the 'interval' and the rest).—And as the whole set of the sentences forms a single 'sentence', more than one thing could not be enjoined by it.—"How so?"—The whole set of sentences, beginning with '*Jāmi vā ētat yajñasya kriyatē*' and ending with the term '*ajāmitvāya*', form 'one sentence';—in the middle of this one (compound) sentence, we have the sentences speaking of *Viṣṇu, Prajāpati* and *Agni-Soma*;—so that what is connected with these cannot be treated as a separate sentence;—hence it follows that these sentences—'*Viṣṇurupāṁshu yaṣṭavyaḥ*' and the rest, are not injunctions;—they are only commendatory declarations.—"What is the meaning of this commendatory declaration?"—It is in this way—it has been declared that if the two cake-offerings—to *Agni* and to *Agni-Soma*—are made without any interval between them, it involves the flaw of '*Jāmi*',—with a view to remedy this flaw, it has been

enjoined that 'the *Upāṁshuyāja* should be performed in the interval';—but in what manner would the flaw be remedied by this?—When the *Upāṁshuyāja* is performed, we know that in that performance, offerings are made to *Viṣṇu*, to *Prajāpati* or *Agni-Soma*; and as all this offering would come in between the two cake-offerings, it implies the cessation of the flaw of '*Jāmi*'; and it is this *cessation of the flaw of* '*Jāmi*' that is meant to be declared in the commendatory declaration; and to this end, the connection with Viṣṇu and other deities (which has been already enjoined by the injunction of the *Upāṁshu-Yāja*) is reiterated in the declaration.—There is no use for the mention of the term '*antarā*' ('in between'—in the sentence '*Upāṁshuyājamantarā yajati*') except that the sacrifice is enjoined (as to be performed in between the two cake-offerings).

"How is it to be known that offerings have to be made to Viṣṇu and the other deities,—when, as you say, the sentences '*Viṣṇurupāṁshu yaṣṭavyaḥ, etc.*' speak of Viṣṇu and the other deities—who may or may not be those to whom offerings have to be made,—simply for the purpose of eulogising the *Upāṁshuyāja*?"

To this some people make the reply that the offerings (to Viṣṇu and others) are already recognised as enjoined;—how?—by injunctive texts in other rescensional texts.—

But even though the offerings be not already recognised as enjoined,—yet on the basis of the common character of '*Upāṁshu*' (*silence*), the mention of Prajāpati as well as of Viṣṇu would be a *reference* to what has already been enjoined (in the sentence '*Upāṁshuyājamantarā yajati*');—that is to say, Viṣṇu and Prajāpati are possessed of the common character of 'silence' ('*upāṁshu*'); it is for this reason that at a sacrificial performance whatever is done in honour of Prajāpati is done *in silence*: so that by describing those facts and by the injunction of indicative *Mantras*, Viṣṇu also (who has the character of *silence*), even though not already recognised as enjoined, would be *referred* to as if already so recognised.—As regards the third deity, *Agni-Soma*, the text enjoining that deity is as follows:—'*Ētāvabrūyātām agnī-somāvājyasyaiva tāvupāṁshu paurṇamāsyām yajan*'.—

From all this it follows that the sacrifice (spoken of in the sentence '*Upāṁshuyājamantarā yajati*') is an entirely distinct one.

SŪTRA (11).

FROM THE MENTION OF THE QUALIFICATION (WE RECOGNISE THE PARTICULAR SACRIFICE).

Bhāṣya.

It has been urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that it is not known which sacrifice it is that is called '*Upāṁshuyāja*'.—Our answer to this is that the sacrifice so called is that one of which the qualification (*silence, Upāṁshu*) has been mentioned in the sentence '*Upāṁshu paurṇamāsyām yajan*' (which, mentioning the *Paurṇamāsī* as the day of the *sacrifice qualified* by the qualification of *upāṁshu*, indicates that sacrifice to be one that is

performed on the *Paurṇamāṣī*).—Hence the objection has no force against the *Siddhānta*.

SŪTRA (12).

ALSO BECAUSE [THE UPĀṀSHUYĀJA SACRIFICE HAS BEEN] SPOKEN OF 'AS IF IT WERE' [THE PRINCIPAL LIMB OF THE SACRIFICE].

Bhāṣya.

When a sacrifice is spoken of 'as if it were' a principal act, it strengthens the notion that it is a principal act; just as when a person's name is written 'as if he were' the most important person, it gives rise to the notion that he is actually the most important person. [The *Upāṁshuyāja* has been spoken of as '*Hṛdayaṁupāṁshuyājaḥ*', where it is spoken of as the *Heart*, i.e. *as if it were* the most important part of the sacrifice, which also indicates that it is a distinct sacrifice] and hence it cannot be a collective name [of the batch of three sacrifices mentioned in the second set of sentences].

ADHIKARAṆA (5): [' *Āghāra* ' *and* ' *Agnihotra* ' *are distinct independent acts: Second exception to Adhikaraṇa* (3)].

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" THE ' ĀGHĀRA ' AND ' AGNIHOTRA ' (ARE NOT INDEPENDENT ACTS), AS THEY HAVE NO FORM (ACCESSORY DETAILS) OF THEIR OWN."

Bhāṣya.

(A) There is the text ' *Āghāramāghārayati* ' (T.S. 2. 5. 11. 6),—and then the texts ' *Ūrdhvamāghārayati, Santatam āghārayati* ', (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 11. 7), *Ṛjumāghārayati* ' (Ibid.), and so on.—(B) Similarly, there is the text ' *Agnihotram juhoti* ',—and then the texts ' *Dadhnā juhoti* ', ' *Payasā juhoti* ' and so on.—Now there arises the question : (A) Are the *Āghāras* enjoined by the sentences ' *Ūrdhvamāghārayati* ', etc., and these same are collectively *referred* to in the sentence ' *Āghāramāghārayati* ' ? Or is this latter sentence injunctive of a distinct and independent *Āghāra* ?—(B) Similarly, are the *Homas* enjoined by the sentences ' *Dadhnā juhoti* ', etc., and these same are collectively *referred* to in the sentence ' *Agnihotram juhoti* ' ? Or is this latter sentence injunctive of a distinct and independent *Homa* ?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—" The two sentences (' *Āgharamāghārayati* ' and ' *Agnihotram juhoti* ') are not injunctive of independent acts ;—why ?—because ' *they have no form of their own* ' ; i.e. the acts spoken of in these two sentences have no forms other than those of the ' *Āghāra* ' and ' *Homa* ' spoken of in the other two sets of sentences,—on the basis of which different forms the acts could be regarded as different from those. Hence it follows that they contain mere references to the acts already enjoined by the other sentences in the context."

SŪTRA (14).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (*continued*)]—" ALSO BECAUSE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE NAMES."

Bhāṣya.

" The names also are applied, in such expressions as ' *Agnihotram nāma homam juhoti* ', ' *Āgharasanjñakam karma karoti* ', where the two acts of *Homa* and *Āghāra* are predicated as qualified by the names ' *Agnihotra* ' and ' *Āghāra* ' ;—and it is not known which particular act is called ' *Āghāra* ', and which is called ' *Agnihotra* '.—' But it is well known that *Āghara* is the act of *Pouring*, and *Homa* is the act of *offering into fire* '.—If what are enjoined in the sentences is the act of *Pouring in general* and the act of *offering into fire in general*, then these two acts being already known, their mention in the sentences in question could only be by way of *reference*.—If

on the other hand, the two names (' *Āghara*' and ' *Agnihotra*') are not meant to be applied in their literal (etymological) sense,—even then the two acts of *Āghāra* and *Homa* could not be regarded as mentioned only in their *general forms*, because a name is always applicable to a particular individual (not a general) entity; and yet we perceive no particular features. For these reasons, the two sentences in question (' *Āghārmāghārayati*' and '*Agnihotram juhoti*') could not be regarded as injunctions of a distinct *Āghāra* and a distinct *Homa*.—Further, how could an *action* (*Homa*) be spoken of by means of a word expressive of the *means of accomplishment* (' Agnihotram') ?—In fact that *means of accomplishment* which is 'the most desired' is spoken of by means of a word with the Accusative ending, and the *action* is spoken of by means of a word with a conjugational ending. In case the two sentences are taken as mere *references* (collectively to the acts enjoined in the other sentences), the actions taken collectively as one composite whole would be something different from each of the component actions; and this composite whole could be treated as 'the most desired' *means of accomplishment* (and hence capable of being spoken of by a word with the Accusative ending).

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (*concluded*)]—" ALSO BECAUSE IT IS NOT RELATED TO THE CONTEXT."

Bhāṣya.

"There is no *material* or *Deity* in the context which could be connected with the *Āghāra* (as a distinct sacrifice), and which could impart a form to that sacrifice.—For this reason also the terms '*āghāra*' and '*agnihotra*' must be treated as standing for the sacrifices taken collectively."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY ARE INJUNCTIONS; BECAUSE THE WORDS SIGNIFY ACTUAL PERFORMANCE; AND THE REPETITION OF THE WORDS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING THE ACCESSORY DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the two terms '*Āghāra*' and '*Agnihotra*' should be treated as words standing for the sacrifices already enjoined taken collectively; they should be treated as *Injunctions*.—Why ?—*Because the words signify actual performance*; i.e. the words '*āghārayati*' (in the sentence '*āghāramāghārayati*') and '*juhoti*' (in the sentence '*agnihotram juhoti*') mean that the acts of *Āghāra* (Pouring) and *Homa* (Offering into Fire) are to be performed;—hence we conclude that two distinct acts are *enjoined* (by the sentences in question).—The terms '*āghāra*' and '*agnihotra*' are well-known to be expressive, respectively, of the two actions in general, of *Pouring* and *Offering into Fire*; and they are not words whose meanings are not known;

the two sacrifices (of *Āghāra* and *Agnihotra*) will thus have their forms duly determined, and enjoined in those forms.

It has been argued above that—"the sacrifices are really enjoined in the sentences, '*Ūrdhvamāghārayati*', '*Dadhnā juhoti*' and the rest, which sacrifices are only *referred* to in the two sentences '*Āghāramāghārayati*' and '*Agnihotram juhoti*'".—But in reality, it is not so; the sentences '*Ūrdhvamāghārayati*' and '*Dadhnā juhoti*' and the rest are not capable of enjoining the acts of *Āghāra* and *Agnihotra*; because the sentences do not convey the notions that 'the *āghāra* should be performed' and that 'the *Agnihotra* should be performed'; what the sentence '*Ūrdhvamāghārayati*' signifies is that 'the connection between *ūrdhvatā* (uprightness), and *āghāra* should be brought about',—and what the sentence '*Dadhnā juhoti*' signifies is that 'the connection between the *Dadhi* and the *Homa* should be brought about';—thus then, the sacrifices of *Āghāra* and *Agnihotra* not being such as are already enjoined by the other sentences, the two sentences in question cannot be regarded as mere *references* to something already enjoined.—"When, as you say, the sentence '*Ūrdhvamāghārayati*' enjoins the connection of the *Āghāra* with *Ūrdhvatā*,—and the sentence '*Dadhnā juhoti*' enjoins the connection between the *Homa* and the *Dadhi*—the *Āghāra* and the *Homa* would naturally come in."—Not so; because the connection (of the *Āghāra* with the *Ūrdhvatā*, or of the *Homa* with the *Dadhi*) could be possible only when the injunction of the acts (*Āghāra* and *Homa*) is already there; hence the acts of *Āghāra* and *Homa* cannot be regarded as coming in by mere implication. It follows from this that these are distinct acts by themselves.

Says the Opponent—"As a matter of fact, what the terms '*āghārayati*' and '*juhoti*' directly signify is the *operation on* (performance of) the *Āghāra* and the *Homa*,—not the *connection* of the *Ūrdhvatā* and the *Dadhi*."

True; the said *connection* is not directly signified; but the signification of the *operation* would be assumed '*in proximity*' (to the Injunction), '*for the purpose of indicating the accessory details* (*qualifications*).'

"But the *Shruti* (a Direct Assertion) could not signify the operation of a thing other than what is mentioned by itself."

This is quite true; but it could very well signify the operation of something spoken of by itself; and this something would be qualified by the qualifying word; and there would thus be a recognition of the qualified thing.

"That may be; the qualifying word might qualify the thing spoken of by the sentence; but the operation in question is not recognised as subsisting in the qualification.—[That is, so long as the qualification is not directly laid down, the Agent could not engage himself in it; so that, even if he would perform the particular sacrifice without taking notice of the qualification, he would feel that he had done his duty.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 690.]"

What would happen, even if it were so? Even though the qualification would be inoperative, the meaning of the word would be definitely known.

"In this case, what would be the purpose served by the proximity of the qualifying word?"

It may not serve any purpose at all.

"How can (a word of) the Veda be useless?"

In cases where it serves a purpose, it cannot be useless; but when it does *not* serve a useful purpose, what else could be said (except that it is useless)?—[It is the opponent's reasoning that makes the word useless, by making the qualifying word inoperative; according to our reasoning it does serve a distinctly useful purpose; so that it cannot be useless.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 691.]

"In that case, the necessary qualification could be obtained through Syntactical Connection; it is only when there is Direct Assertion (by the words) that no assumption can be made on the basis of Syntactical Connection.—[That is, even though the injunction of the qualified operation is a direct one, yet, in the way you put it, it would come to rest upon Syntactical Connection.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 691.]"

That is true; but the said assumption could be made when the meaning of the Direct Assertion would not be intended to be conveyed.

"Why should there be no intention to convey the idea in the present case?"

Because the word speaking of the qualification is not a wrong reading, —and because the act spoken of by the text itself is one that has been already enjoined by another text.

Thus it becomes established that the repetition (of the mention of *Homa*) in such texts as '*Dadhnā juhoti*' serves the purpose of indicating the qualifying (accessory) details; that is, the use of the term '*juhoti*' is a *reference* (to the *Homa* enjoined elsewhere) for the purpose of connecting that Homa with qualifying accessory details (like *Dadhi*).

"If the term '*jūhoti*' (contained in the sentence '*Dadhnā juhoti*') is a *reference*, then by what is the accessory detail enjoined?"

Please do not say that we hold it to be enjoined by the term '*dadhi*'.—[What is meant is that in the term '*juhoti*' as appearing in the sentence '*Dadhnā juhoti*', the conjugational affix serves the purpose of *enjoining* the material, *Dadhi*, mentioned by the word '*dadhnā*', and it is only the verbal root that contains the *reference* to the *Homa* enjoined elsewhere;—so that there is no difficulty about the injunction of the accessory detail, *Dadhi*.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 691-692].

"But we have just explained that the operation of the accessory (qualifying) detail is understood to be got at through Syntactical Connection."

True, that is so; but unless the thing has been actually enjoined, how can it be understood (through anything)? In fact, if an *unenjoined* thing were to be cognised, there could be no means of right cognition by which that cognition could be brought about; and in the absence of such a means of right cognition, the cognition could only be regarded as an illusion.

Under the circumstances, the term '*juhoti*' (in the sentence '*Dadhnā juhoti*'), as also the term '*āghārayati*' (in the sentence '*Ūrdhvamāghārayati*') must be *injunctive* (of the accessory detail).

"What is it then that signifies the *reference* (to the sacrifice enjoined elsewhere)?"

This *reference* is signified by the verbal root (in '*juhoti*' and '*āghārayati*').

"If these terms ('*juhoti*' and '*āghārayati*') are *injunctive*, then,—inasmuch as what they express (i.e. the acts of *Homa* and *Āghāra*) has been already enjoined (by the sentences '*Agnihotram juhoti*' and '*Āghāram-āghārayati*'—according to the *Siddhānta*),—why should they be repeated ?"

The words are repeated for the purpose of enjoining what is expressed by the whole sentence ; so that there is nothing incongruous.

From all this it follows that the two sentences ('*Agnihotram juhoti*' and '*Āghāramāghārayati*') are injunctions of distinct and independent acts.

It has been argued (by the opponent) that there are no materials or Deity mentioned in connection with any such distinct act as '*Āghāra*'.—But what is the need for any such material and Deity being mentioned, when the form of the act (sacrifice) is already fully recognised on the basis of the name signifying what is well-known ?—Further,—[it is not true that no material and Deity are mentioned in connection with the *Āghāra* sacrifice]—we actually find the *Butter* (*Ājya*) mentioned as the material for this sacrifice, in the text '*Chaturgṛhītam vā ētadabhūt tasyāghāramāghāryā*', and its Deity *Indra* is indicated by the *mantra* laid down in the following text—'*Indra ūrdhvodhvaro divi spṛshatu mahato yajño yajñapatē indravān svāhā—ityāghāramāghārayati*' (Cf. Taitti. Sam. 1. 1. 12. 1); the sacrifice can be '*indravān*' (as mentioned in this *mantra*) only if it has *Indra* for its deity ; so that if this mentions the deity for the *Āghāra* sacrifice, then this sacrifice becomes duly complete in all its details.

For these reasons it becomes established that the two sentences in question are injunctive of two distinct and independent acts, and do not speak of the two groups of sacrifices (enjoined in the other sentences).

[The subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa* (5) cannot be regarded as already included in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, (4); because acts of *Āghara* and *Homa* as spoken of in the sentences, '*Ūrdhvamāghārayati*' and *Dadhnā-juhoti*', are precisely in the same form in which they are presented by the two sentences '*Āghāramāghārayati*' and '*Agnihotram juhoti*'; while in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the word speaking of the sacrifice in one sentence was '*upaṁshuyāja*' and in the other '*yaṣṭavyaḥ*'; further, in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*, the injunction of the deity Viṣṇu in the sentence '*Viṣṇurupāṁshu yaṣṭavyaḥ*' completely over-shadows the notice of the 'Bringing about' of the Sacrifice; while there is no over-shadowing in the present *Adhikaraṇa*;—in the present Adhikaraṇa the several sentences are not capable of being construed as 'one sentence', as in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*;—lastly, the sentences in the present *Adhikaraṇa* are not regarded by either party to be purely commendatory declarations, as those of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* have been regarded by the *Siddhāntin*.]

[ADHIKARAṆA (6):—*The 'Pashu' and the 'Soma' are distinct and independent Acts.*]

(SŪTRA 17).

AS THERE IS MENTION OF THE MATERIAL, (THE SENTENCES MUST BE) INJUNCTIONS OF THE 'PASHU' AND 'SOMA' SACRIFICES;—BECAUSE THE MENTION OF THE MERE MATERIAL IN THE CONTEXT WOULD BE USELESS, SPECIALLY AS THE WORDS COULD NOT SERVE THE PURPOSE OF LAYING DOWN NECESSARY DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we find the text—(A) '*Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhatē*'—('The initiated sacrificer kills the animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*',) (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6)—and then it goes on, '*Hṛdayasyāgre'vadyati, atha jihvāyā, atha vakṣasaḥ*' ('He cuts out the heart first, then the neck, then the chest') (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 3. 10. 4);—similarly there is the text (B)—'*Somēna yajēta*' ('Sacrifices with Soma'); then it goes on, '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti, maitrāvaruṇam gṛhṇāti, āshvinam gṛhṇāti*' and so on ('He takes up the cup dedicated to *Indra-vāyu*, then the one dedicated to Mitra-Varuṇa, then the one dedicated to the Ashvins').

In regard to these two sets of texts, there arises the question—(A) Is the word '*ālabhatē*' ('kills') only a reference to the group of acts expressed by the word '*avadyati*'? Or is it injunctive of a distinct and independent act? (B) Similarly, is the word '*yajēta*' only a reference to the group of acts expressed by the word '*gṛhṇāti*'? Or is it injunctive of a distinct and independent act?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—

"Both these words are references to the two group of acts;—why?—Because the two acts that may be thought of as being enjoined by these two words are already made known (enjoined) by the two words '*avadyati*' and '*gṛhṇāti*';—and what has been already made known cannot be enjoined again.—The term '*pashu*' ('animal') [in the text (A)] is a *reference* to the 'heart' and other limbs (mentioned in the sentences '*Hṛdayasygrēvadyati*', etc.);—and the term '*Soma*' [in the text (B)] is a reference to the *Soma-juice* (in the 'cups', mentioned in the sentence '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*, etc.')—Consequently, the root '*yaj*', 'to sacrifice', in the sentence '*Somēna yajēta*' (B) is a *reference*, made for the purpose of connecting the 'sacrifice' with the result (Heaven) by such sentences as '*Yajēta svargakāmaḥ*' ('one desiring heaven should sacrifice'); and similarly the root '*ālabha*', 'to kill', is a *reference*, made for the purpose of connecting the 'killing' with the deity *Agni-Soma*.

Further, that the several 'holdings' (of the cups, spoken of in the sentences '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*', etc.) form one *group* of acts is clearly shown by the text '*Dashaitānadhvaryuḥ prātaḥsavanē grahān gṛhṇāti*' ('At the morning extraction, the Adhvaryu *holds these ten cups*'); the order of sequence also among these 'holdings' is shown by the texts—'*Āshvino dashamo gṛhyatē*', and '*Tṛtīyo hūyatē*'.

"Then again, if the two distinct and independent acts were enjoined (by the two verbs '*ālabhatē*' and '*yajēta*'), then, in that case, the terms '*aindravāyavam*', '*maitrāvaruṇam*' and '*āshvinam*' could only be taken as injunctive of deities; and the several deities, being thus enjoined in relation to a single sacrifice, would have to be regarded as so many optional alternatives; just as in the case of the text '*Khādirē badhnāti, pālāshē badhnāti, rohitakē badhnāti*',[the three woods, *Khadira, Palāsha*, and *Rohita*, having been enjoined in relation to the single act of *Tying*, have been regarded as three optional alternatives).—If those deities were so many optional alternatives, then the mention of the *order of sequence* among them, (as shown in the texts '*Āshvino dashamo gṛhyatē*, etc.'), as also the mention of them as forming one *group* (as in the text '*Dashaitānadhvaryuḥ prātaḥsavanē grahān gṛhṇāti*'), would have no sense. On the other hand, if the root '*yaji*' (to sacrifice, in the text '*Somēna yajēta*', were treated as speaking of the *group* of acts (of *holding* the cup dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu, and* that dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa, and* that dedicated to the *Ashvins*),—then all this would be quite applicable.—From all this it follows that the terms '*ālabhatē*' and '*yajatē*' must be taken as speaking of the two groups of acts."

On this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The two texts are injunctions of the two distinct sacrifices, 'Pashu' and 'Soma';—why?—The term '*soma*' is known to be expressive of the *milky-creeper*, not of the *juice* (as held by the *Pūrvapakṣin*); and the word '*Soma*' denotes the *Class*, not the *Individual*.—Similarly the term '*pashu*' is used by people as expressing a particular object with horns, tail, hair, four feet,—and this also denotes the *Class*.—Now, there are no sacrifices enjoined in the context at which any such *class* of Material (not any *individual*) is to be used;—and it is only if there were such sacrifices that they could be referred to as groups by the words '*Pashu*' and '*Soma*'.

"The *Heart* and other limbs are parts of the *Pashu* (*Animal*); and it is these limbs that would be referred to by the term '*pashu*', for the purpose of connecting them with the deity *Agni-Soma*."

That cannot be; all that the sentence means is that the '*Pashu* becomes dedicated to *Agni-Soma*', not that '*the Heart and other* limbs are *Pashu*'. If the term '*pashu*' be taken in its ordinary sense of the *animal*, then the word retains its primary significance; if, on the other hand, it is taken in the sense of *the Heart and other limbs*, then the word becomes secondary (indirect) in its significance of the parts of the animal's body.—Similarly, the term '*soma*' could be a *reference* only if it were taken in the secondary (indirect) sense of the *juice of Soma*.—From all this, it follows that the texts in question are injunctions of distinct acts, and not mere references.

It might be argued that—"the text '*Somēna yajēta*' may be taken as

enjoining the *Soma-creeper* in relation to the sacrifices to *Indra-Vāyu* and other deities (which sacrifices are enjoined in the other sentences '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*', etc.)".

Our answer to this is that this cannot be; because the *creeper* could be recognised as related to the deities *Indra-Vāyu* only through *Syntactical Connection*; while it is by *Direct Assertion* that the *juice* is recognised as related to *Indra-Vāyu*. Under the circumstances, if the term '*Soma*' (in the text '*Somēna yajēta*') were expressive of a material, then,—even though the other sacrifices, *Aindravāyava* and the rest, would be there as mentioned in the Context,—it (the word '*soma*') would be incapable of either enjoining, or referring to, a material for those sacrifices [as the material for these is already *directly asserted* to be the *Soma-juice*]; so that the word would be entirely *useless*.

From all this it follows that the texts in question enjoin distinct acts, and they do not refer to the sacrifices mentioned in the Context.

SŪTRA (18).

SIGNIFYING PREPARATORY ACTS, THE SENTENCES CANNOT BE INJUNCTIVE.

Bhāṣya.

The Siddhānta view as propounded just now has been that, even though there are other sacrifices enjoined in the contexts (by the sentences '*Hṛdayasyāgrēvadyati, etc.*', and by the sentences '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti, etc.*'), yet these are not the sacrifices that are referred to collectively by the words '*Pashu*' and '*Soma*'.—The position taken up in the present *Sūtra* is that there *are* no other sacrifices enjoined in the contexts.—Why?—Because '*signifying preparatory acts, the sentences cannot be injunctive*'; that is, the sentences '*Aindravāyavam, etc.*' and the rest do not enjoin sacrifices at all; the act of '*grahaṇa*', 'taking up' (spoken of by the word '*gṛhṇāti*', in the sentence '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*'), stands for mere *preparation*, which serves a visible purpose (of getting the 'cup' ready); after this 'preparation', the mention of the deity (*Indra-Vāyu*) would be for a transcendental purpose; so that what the sentence '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*' means is that 'the cup is prepared and dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*';—and as this 'dedication' would not be possible without the act of *sacrifice*, this act of sacrifice would be assumed (on the basis of the 'apparent inconsistency' of the 'dedication'); [such is the roundabout manner in which the sentence '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*' could be taken as indicating the act of *sacrifice*];—this act of *sacrifice*, however, at which the said 'dedication' could be made, is already directly enjoined in the other sentence ('*Somēna yajēta*');—hence there could be no justification for taking the sentences '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*' and the rest as injunctive of a sacrifice. Thus then, there being no other sacrifices enjoined in the context, the root '*yaji*' (in the word '*yajēta*' in the sentence '*Somēna yajēta*') cannot be taken as referring to any *group* of sacrifices.

Similarly with the root '*ālabh*' (in the verb '*ālabhēta*' in the sentence '*Agnīṣomīyam pashumālabhēta*').

SŪTRA (19).

BECAUSE OF THE DIVERSITY OF DEITIES, THERE SHOULD BE REPETITION OF THE ACT (OF SACRIFICE); AS THE MENTION OF THE DIVERSE MATERIALS WOULD BE OTHERWISE MEANINGLESS, THERE SHOULD BE MULTIPLICITY (OF THE ACT OF 'GRAHAṆA', 'HOLDING'), SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE ACT (OF GRAHAṆA) IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE MATERIAL.

Bhāṣya.

The discussion that we had so far in regard to the '*Pashu*' sacrifice shall be resumed under Discourse X. It is in connection with the '*Soma*' sacrifice alone that we continue the discussion now.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that in regard to the acts of *grahaṇa* (Holding), there are texts mentioning an 'order of sequence' among them (e.g. '*Āshvino dashamo gṛhyatē*'), as also those speaking of them as a 'group' (e.g. '*Dashaitānadhvaryuḥ prātaḥsavanē grahān gṛhṇāti*');—how are these two facts to be accounted for?

As regards this argument, the fact of the matter is that when *Indra-Vāyu* and the other deities are spoken of (in the sentences '*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*' etc.), it is not meant that 'a sacrifice is to be offered to *Indra-Vāyu*' or 'a sacrifice is to be offered to *Mitra-Varuṇa*'. If such were the direct meaning of the sentences, then alone could these deities be assumed to be the deities of *sacrifices*; and in that case the sense of the injunction contained in the sentence would be that the sacrifice is to be accomplished with the Deity alone (without any material, etc.) [which is absurd]. On the other hand, if the deities are taken as enjoined in connection with the preparatory act of '*grahaṇa*' (Holding), with a view to some transcendental result, then the 'dedication' to *Indra-Vāyu* would be something distinct from the 'dedication' to *Mitra-Varuṇa*; and this 'dedication' in each case would bring about a transcendental result distinct from the transcendental result brought about by the said *Holding* itself. So on with the other *Holdings* also. And thus it is that the several Holdings are spoken of collectively as a *group* (on the ground that the several transcendental results brought about by them go together to help the final transcendental result of the *Soma sacrifice*).

[Next as regards the 'order of sequence'] the quantity of Soma-creeper to be used at this sacrifice is 'ten handfuls', all of which is kept in several definite-sized vessels opening upwards and six inches (one *Prādesha*) in height, and pounded and mixed with water in several definite-sized jars; all this *Soma* prepared in this fashion could not be 'held' in the hand (in *Cups*, except by a small quantity being taken up and kept in each Cup). [Hence these 'holdings' must be many and distinct.] Even if it were possible to 'hold' all this (by a single act of *Holding*), the right course would be to 'hold' it by parts, as otherwise, the performance would run counter to the directive text of the performance whereby the several enjoined deities have to be treated as optional alternatives; for, if the whole of the *Soma* were

'held' once only, then what is dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu* would be the same that is dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa*; and this would be absurd.—Hence, in view of the 'dedication' (to each deity) being distinct, the Soma meant for each separate deity must be kept separately; and this could not be done by a single act of *Holding*. Further, unless there is a sacrifice to be offered to a Deity, there can be no 'dedication' of a material to deities; hence it follows that sacrifices should be offered to all those deities to whom the material has been 'dedicated';—and when these sacrifices are offered to these deities, thereby becomes accomplished the sacrifice that has been directly enjoined in the text '*Jyotiṣṭomēna yajēta*', which thus needs no other deities. This *Soma-sacrifice* (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) has been enjoined as to be performed with the entire 'handful' (of Soma-creepers);—and this is possible only if the act of 'Holding' is repeated;—it is only then that it becomes complete in all its details. It is for this reason that the sacrifice has to be repeated; as unless it is repeated, it cannot become fully equipped with *all the deities* (mentioned) and *the whole* (*handful*) *of the Soma*.—And when the action is repeated, it is only natural that there should be an order of sequence among the several acts and they should be spoken of collectively as forming a *group* (called the '*Soma*' or '*Jyotiṣṭoma*'); so that the mention of these in the texts is only natural.

SŪTRA (20).

THE PREPARATORY ACT CANNOT BE DIVERSE; BECAUSE THE MATERIAL, WHICH SUBSERVES THE PURPOSES OF SOMETHING ELSE, OCCUPIES ONLY A SECONDARY POSITION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"in the case of the texts '*Khādirē badhnāti*', '*Pālāshē badhnāti*', and '*Rohitakē badhnāti*', the three woods, *Khadira*, *Palāsha* and *Rohita*, are treated as optional alternatives in the preparatory act of the 'Tying'; and similarly in the case in question the several deities (*Indra-Vāyu*, *Mitra-Varuṇa*, *Ashvins*) could be treated as optional alternatives."—But this cannot be right, because in the case cited, the *Khadira* and other woods are found to be directly enjoined for the purpose of accomplishing the 'preparation'; hence in the case in question also, if the several deities of the 'Holding'—*Indra-Vāyu* and the rest,—had been directly enjoined for the purpose of accomplishing the sacrifice,—then alone could *option* be admitted. As a matter of fact, however, they are not found to be directly enjoined for the purpose of accomplishing the *sacrifice*; hence they have to be taken together (as forming one group).

[There is some difference in the interpretation of the Sūtras in this *Adhikaraṇa*, as to which embodies the *Pūrvapakṣa* and which the *Siddhānta*;—for which see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 709.]

[The purpose served by the Adhikaraṇa is that, at the Ectypal Sacrifices of which the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the Archetype, the details have to be performed in relation to a single cup,—and that too only once,—according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*; while according to the *Siddhānta*, all the details have to be performed exactly as at the Archetypal Sacrifice.]

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Actions differentiated by Number.*

SŪTRA (21).

INASMUCH AS IT IS BASED UPON SEPARATENESS, NUMBER SHOULD BE A DIFFERENTIATOR AMONG ACTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

[Differentiation among acts on the basis of *different words* and on the basis of the *Repetition of the same word* having been disposed of,—along with exceptions—we now proceed to discuss the differentiation of actions by *Number*.]

The *Vājapēya* sacrifice has been enjoined in the sentence '*Vājapēyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta*'; at this sacrifice there are *seventeen* animals consecrated to Prajāpati, as mentioned in the text—'*Saptadasha prājāpatyān pashūnalabhatē, saptadasho vai prajāpatiḥ prajāpaterāptyai shyāmāstūparā ēkarūpa bhavanti, ēvamēva hi prajāpatiḥ samṛddhyai*'. (Taitti. Brā. 1. 3. 4. 3.)

Now, in regard to this, there arises the question—Does this passage speak of *seventeen* distinct acts? Or of only one act at which the seventeen animals come in as an accessory detail?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"There is only one action;—why?—because, when the question arises as to whether the seventeen animals are dedicated to Prajāpati, is it for the accomplishing of a single sacrifice or several sacrifices?—the most reasonable view to take is that they are dedicated for the purpose of accomplishing a single act. When a man dedicates *seventeen* animals, he dedicates *one* animal also;—when one animal has been dedicated (and the act of *sacrifice* accomplished through that dedication), the dedication of all the seventeen animals becomes accomplished (as part of that same first sacrifice);—wherefore then should there be any assumption of the *second* and subsequent sacrifices? In this way there would be need of assuming a fewer transcendental results (as following from the single sacrifice, than the large number that it would be necessary to assume if there were *seventeen* sacrifices).—From all this it follows that a single act of *sacrifice* is accomplished by means of the *seventeen* animals."

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta*—There should be difference among actions due to number, because the number *seventeen* is based upon the separateness of the actions; that is, there is 'separateness' among the animals only when there are several actions,—not if there is a single action.—Why?—The Injunction lays it down that the sacrifice in question is to be accomplished by means of eleven offerings (made out of the eleven pieces cut out of the body of the dedicated animal);—all these offerings are got out of the body of a single animal;—under the circumstances, the killing of the other sixteen animals (beginning with the *second*) could not be for the purpose of obtaining the pieces to be offered;—so that the animals that would be killed after the killing of the first animal would be killed only for the purpose of bringing about a transcendental result;—and in that case, as the bodies of these other animals would not be actually offered to Prajāpati, they would not be '*prājāpatya*' ('dedicated to

Prajāpati');—and this would be incompatible with the fact that the Vedic text speaks of them as '*prājāpatya*'.—Thus then, it would be impossible for the number *seventeen*—which is based upon the *separateness* of so many distinct things,—to rest in a single animal (offered at a single sacrifice);—on the other hand, if there are several sacrifices, there would be need for several sets of cuttings for offering; so that for the *seventeen* sacrifices, it would be necessary to get together *seventeen* animals; and it is only thus that the mention of the number 'seventeen' would be reconciled.—For all these reasons, the number of sacrifices (mentioned in the text in question) must be *seventeen*.

Objection—"Even when there is a single *sacrifice*, the sacrificing could be done by means of the seventeen sets of cuttings (out of the bodies of the seventeen animals),—on the basis of the direct declaration (contained in the text)".

Reply—That cannot be; what is directly asserted is the *number* of the *animals killed*,—not the number of *sets of cuttings*; and what are the means of accomplishing the sacrifice are the *cuttings* as the sacrificial material,—not the class 'animal'; as what this class 'animal' has done at the archetypal sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) is that it helped the primary act by qualifying the individual animal out of which the *cuttings* were obtained; so that at the ectypal sacrifice also what it will do is to help the primary act by qualifying the individual animal out of which the *cuttings* would be obtained.—Now, what the number 'seventeen' applies to is the *Animal*, not the *sets* of *cuttings*; so that for the purpose of obtaining one set of *cuttings*, it becomes necessary to kill one animal; and in this way the number 'seventeen' could not be applicable to the *cuttings*.—This would be the only explanation possible.—If then the animals had been spoken of as 'seventeen' in reference to their horns, or their complexions, or their shapes,—such as *white, black, red*,—then any *one* of these alone would be taken up (for killing, for the purpose of obtaining the *cuttings*);—or, if it were in reference to such division as that into 'the hornless', 'the two-horned' and 'the one-horned', then also any *one* of these alone would be taken up. In the text under consideration, however, we find that all the animals are spoken of as 'black, hornless and of one shape' ('*shyāmāstūparā ēkarūpāḥ*');—and the killing of all the seventeen animals of this same kind (for the purpose of obtaining the cuttings out of the bodies of all the seventeen) would be possible (and necessary) only when there are several (i.e. seventeen) sacrifices,—and not when there is a single sacrifice (at which a single set of cuttings would be used, for which the body of only one animal would be required).

From all this it follows that there are seventeen sacrifices.

The purpose served by this *Adhikaraṇa* is that,—according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, if a single animal were lost or found defective, the act (of *killing*) performed over the entire batch of animals would have to be repeated, each one of whom would be killed after the other,—the whole act in this case being conducive to a transcendental result;—while according to the *Siddhānta*, it is only one animal over which the act would have to be repeated; because when the seventeen sacrifices are distinct, one would not need the animal used at the other sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *Actions differentiated by Name.*

SŪTRA (22).

THE NAME ALSO (DIFFERENTIATES ACTIONS), AS IT OCCURS IN THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the text '*Athaiṣa jyotirathaiṣa vishvajyotirathaiṣa sarvajyotiḥ*,' there arises the question—Is it the single sacrifice *Jyotiṣṭoma* that is referred to here by the (three) names (1. *Jyotiḥ*, 2. *Vishvajyotiḥ*, and 3. *Sarvajyotiḥ*) for the purpose of enjoining, in connection with it, such accessories as 'the gift of a thousand' and so forth? Or do these names lay down three distinct actions, the details regarding which are going to be mentioned later on?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The text in question should be taken as laying down the accessories of the principal sacrifice spoken of in the context (i.e. the *Jyotiṣṭoma*); as it is only thus that the connection of the context is maintained.—'But all these accessories would be taken, on the strength of *Syntactical Connection*, as enjoined in connection with the sacrifices named *Jyotiḥ*, *Vishvajyotiḥ*, and *Sarvajyotiḥ*'.—That does not affect our position; because all these names denote the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice itself. That is, (*a*) the term '*jyotiḥ*' mentions the initial term in the compound '*jyotiṣṭoma*'; as regards the terms (*b*) '*Vishvajyotiḥ*' and (*c*) '*Sarvajyotiḥ*', what is meant is that *all* ('sarva' and 'vishva') '*jyotis*', *Trivṛt* and the rest, which are spoken of in the supplementary texts, belong to this *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, and on that account, the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is called '*Vishvajyotiḥ*' and '*Sarvajyotiḥ*' (i.e. 'having all the *Jyotis*'). [Thus then, all the three names stand for the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice itself]."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The three *names*, *Jyotiḥ*, *Vishvajyotiḥ* and *Sarvajyotiḥ* are differentiators of actions,—because these are found mentioned in the originative injunction; and they do not merely repeat the names of sacrifices mentioned before; hence the sentence '*Athaiṣa jyotiḥ*' should be taken as injunctive of a new distinct act (not already enjoined). If it were a mere *reference* (to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), it would not be conducive to any distinct activity, and as such would be useless (superfluous). Further, if the reference were regarded as being for the purpose of laying down the further accessory detail (of the *gift of a thousand*), in regard to the sacrifice of the Context (i.e. *Jyotiṣṭoma*), —then there would be an *option* (between the accessory details previously laid down and those laid down through the said reference); which would mean that one of the two accessories would be rejected at the performance where the other would be employed [and the rejection of what has been enjoined is most improper].—Further, the terms '*Jyotiḥ*', '*Vishvajyotiḥ*' and '*Sarvajyotiḥ*' do not denote the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; in fact they stand for a totally distinct set of sacrifices. Merely because one part of the name

is common to the two acts, it does not follow that one subserves the purposes of the other; for instance, the term '*shālā*' denoting *House*,—the term '*mālā*' also could not be regarded as denoting the *House*, simply on the ground of the similarity of the syllable '*lā*' which is present in both the terms, '*shālā*' and '*mālā*'.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that "the term '*Jyotiḥ*' (which is one of the terms in question) mentions the initial term in the compound '*Jyotiṣṭoma*'."—But (if, '*jyotiḥ*' stood for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), the sentence '*Athaiṣa jyotiḥ*' could be construed with the term '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' (contained in a totally different sentence) only indirectly on the strength of the Context;—this would set aside the natural and direct syntactical connection of the sentence with the term '*Jyotiḥ*'; and this would be most unreasonable, as *Syntactical Connection* is more powerful than *Context*.

It might be urged that "the term '*Jyotiḥ*' might apply to a distinct sacrifice, through its etymological sense of *illuminating* or *effulgence*,—but the other two terms '*Vishvajyotiḥ*' and '*Sarvajyotiḥ*', which are connotative of *all* (or *entirety*), must stand for the *Trivṛt* and other *Jyotis* (which are present in their entirety in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice)."

That cannot be, we reply; because the term '*Jyotiḥ*' is not known to be connotative of the *Trivṛt* and the rest; so that by arguing as he has done the Opponent goes against well-recognised usage.—It has been urged that "the fact of the term '*Jyotiḥ*' signifying the *Trivṛt* is indicated by the supplementary texts."—But that in a sentence a certain term is used in the sense of something spoken of in the same sentence is understood on the basis of a means of cognition other than *Verbal*; so that where there is no such other means of cognition, indicative of the fact, the term cannot be taken as used in that sense. For instance, in the case of the sentence '*simho dēvadattaḥ*' ('Dēvadatta is a lion'), that the term '*simha*' ('lion') stands *for* Devadatta is indicated by a *means of cognition* other than this sentence itself; but this other *means of cognition* is not available in the case of the sentence '*simhamālabhēta*' ('one should kill the lion) [hence in this case the term '*simha*' is *not* taken as standing for *Dēvadatta*].—From all this it follows that the terms '*Vishvājyotiḥ*' and '*Sarvajyotiḥ*' do not denote the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and if the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is not spoken of by means of these words, all the three terms must be taken as standing for entirely different sacrifices.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *Actions differentiated by difference of deities.*

SŪTRA (23).

WHEN A WORD DENOTING A MATERIAL IS RELATED (TO A WORD DENOTING A DEITY) OTHER THAN THE ONE THAT HAS GONE BEFORE [IT BECOMES A DIFFERENTIATOR OF ACTIONS], BECAUSE THE TWO SENTENCES ARE EQUAL.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Vaishvadēva* section of the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice, we have the text—(*a*) '*Taptē payasi dadhyānayati sā vaishvadēvī āmikṣā*; (*b*) *Bājibhyo bājinam*' [' When curd is put into hot milk, the milk turns into (1) curdled solids called '*āmiksā*, which is offered to the Vishvēdēvas, and (2) the liquid, skimmed milk, which is offered to the *Bājins*'] [cf. Maitrā. Sam. 1. 10. 1].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does the second sentence (*b*) lay down a fresh material, *Bājina*, curd-water, for the act which has been enjoined in the first sentence (*a*) as having the *āmikṣā*, curdled pieces, for its material? Or the act with the curd-water for its material is distinct from that with the curdled pieces?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The second sentence (*b*) lays down a fresh material for the sacrifice enjoined in the first sentence (*a*).—Why?—Because '*bāja*', like '*āmikṣā*', standing for *food*, the term '*bājin*' (the basis of '*bājibhyaḥ*') stands for the *Vishvēdēvas*; so that the second sentence refers—by the word '*bājibhyaḥ*'—to the Vishvēdēvas, and enjoins, with reference to those deities, a fresh material in the shape of the *Bājina*, curd-water; so that both the materials,—*āmikṣā*, curdled pieces, and *Bājina*, curd-water—are to be offered to the same deity, *Vishvēdēvas*. Thus the Bājina, curd-water, is enjoined in connection with the same act that has been laid down in the preceding sentence. Just as, the act of the *Agnihotra* having been enjoined in the first sentence, the subsequent sentences, '*Dadhnā juhoti*' and '*Payasā juhoti*' (cf. Tai. Brā. 2. 1. 5. 4), lay down fresh materials for that same act."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*When a word denoting a material is related to a word denoting a deity other than the one that has gone before, it should enjoin a distinct act*; *because*, in that case, *the two sentences are equal*; i.e. both are equally injunctive of distinct and independent acts.

"But in the texts quoted, where is there *a word denoting a deity other than the one that has gone before*,—when, as just pointed out by us, the term '*Bājina*' refers to (and stands for) the *Vishvēdēvas* themselves?"

Our answer to this is as follows—According to the explanation suggested, it would come to this that the *deific character* of the Vishvēdēvas is indi-

cated in one case (the first sentence), by Direct Assertion, and in the other (the second sentence) by Syntactical Connection; i.e. it is by 'direct assertion' when it is expressed by the *nominal affix* (as in the term '*vaishvadēvī*'), and it is by 'syntactical connection' when it is expressed by the Dative ending (as in the term '*bājibhyaḥ*');—when the deific character is indicated by Direct Assertion, the *Vishvēdēvas* are syntactically construed with *Āmikṣā* (curdled pieces),—and when the deific character is indicated by the Dative ending, it is syntactically construed with *Bājina* (curd-water);—further, in the former case the deific character is indicated by Direct Assertion, and the connection of the particular material (curdled pieces) is indicated by Syntactical Connection, while in the latter case, both are indicated by Syntactical Connection. Thus then, in regard to the deific character, there is conflict between Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection;—and in cases of such conflict, Direct Assertion is more powerful than Syntactical Connection. All this leads to the conclusion that the first sentence, which speaks of the *Āmikṣā*, clearly establishes the fact of the Vishvēdēvas being the *Deity*, and that this is not done by the second sentence, which speaks of the *Bājina*; from which it follows that this latter material *Bājina* is related to some word expressive of the Deity, other than the one mentioned in the preceding sentence; which proves that the act mentioned in the second sentence is distinct from that mentioned in the first sentence.

SŪTRA (24).

WHEN, HOWEVER, THE WORD MENTIONING THE ACT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A WORD DENOTING A MATERIAL, THE ACCESSORY MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THAT SAME ACT.

Bhāṣya.

[It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that—"Just as the act having been enjoined in the sentence '*Agnihotram juhoti*', the subsequent sentences, '*Dadhnā juhoti*' and '*Payasā juhoti*', are injunctive of materials for that same act,—so also in the present case the act being mentioned in the first sentence, the second sentence will be injunctive of a material for that same act]".—Our answer to this is that it is only right that in the case cited (of *Agnihotra*), the subsequent sentences should be taken as injunctive of materials for the same act; as in that case the act mentioned in the first sentence is not connected with any material not mentioned in the Context,—while the material mentioned in the second sentence *is* connected with the *Sacrifice* mentioned in the context (by the first sentence).—Hence the two cases are not analogous.

Or, this Sūtra (24) may be taken as a separate *Adhikaraṇa* by itself, as follows.—

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *Exception to Adhikaraṇa* (9).

SŪTRA (24).

WHEN HOWEVER THE WORD MENTIONING THE ACT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A WORD DENOTING A MATERIAL, THE ACCESSORY MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THAT SAME ACT.

Bhāṣya.

Pūrvapakṣa—"Such sentences as '*Dadhnā juhoti*', '*Payasā juhoti*' and the like are to be taken as enjoining distinct acts; as otherwise they would have to be taken as laying down so many optional materials (for the same act)."

Siddhānta—It is clear from the words of the texts that there is a single act of the *Agnihotra*,—and not different acts; and it is in regard to the same act that the sentences in question lay down diverse materials; among which an option has to be admitted, as clearly justified by the texts themselves.

[The *Tantravārtika* does not take this as a separate *Adhikaraṇa*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The mention of certain materials serves the useful purpose—even in connection with the same Act—of indicating different results.*

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF A (DISTINCT) RESULT, THERE WOULD BE A (DISTINCT) ACT (LAID DOWN BY THE SENTENCE); SPECIALLY AS A RESULT IS ALWAYS CONNECTED WITH A DEFINITE ACTION".

Bhāṣya.

[Two conclusions have been previously arrived at:—(1) If the originative Injunction of a sacrifice mention no accessory detail, the accessory mentioned in a supplementary sentence becomes connected with that sacrifice;—and (2) if the originative Injunction of a sacrifice mention an accessory, any other accessory mentioned in the same context must be connected with some other sacrifice.—There are cases however where the originative Injunction mentions no accessory detail, while the supplementary sentence mentions, not one, but several kinds of accessory details; and it is one of these cases that is going to be considered now.—*Tantra-vārtika*—Trans., p. 752.]

With reference to the *Agnihotra* (which is enjoined by the simple Injunction '*Agnihotram juhoti*'), we have the texts '*Dadhnēndriyakāmasya juhuyāt*' ['If one is desirous of acquiring sense-efficiency, one should pour into fire libations of *Dadhi*'], and so forth. (Tai. Brā. 2. 1. 5. 6.)

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the offering of the libations of *Dadhi* an offering different from the offering made at the *Agnihotra*? Or is the result (sense-efficiency) meant to follow from the material *Dadhi* (offered at the *Agnihotra* itself)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is as follows:—

"The offering (*Homa*) in question is distinct (from the offering made at the *Agnihotra*);—why?—*because a distinct result is mentioned*; that is to say, we find a distinct result mentioned, and a result can follow only from an act.—'When you lay down the general proposition that 'a result can follow only from an act', do you refer to such visible (ordinary) results following from acts as grains from Agricultural Operations [and from that infer the same in the case of the act of offerings]?'—Our answer to this is—No; what we have asserted does not follow from the analogy of visible results (such as grains, etc.). Because if what is seen were to be the sole basis of our knowledge of results from acts,—then, such results are *seen* only in the case of acts like Agricultural Operations, not in the case of acts like *offering into fire* [so that there could be no cognition of any results following from these latter].—If it be meant that 'the result having been seen to follow in the case of the Agricultural Operations, it would be concluded that similar

Adhikaraṇa (10): *Exception to Adhikaraṇa* (9).

SŪTRA (24).

WHEN HOWEVER THE WORD MENTIONING THE ACT IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A WORD DENOTING A MATERIAL, THE ACCESSORY MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THAT SAME ACT.

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results follow from other things also',—in that case, a result would be likely to follow from a material substance also.—If it be meant that—'what is asserted is that a result follows from every act that is similar to Agricultural Operations—and what is similar to Agricultural Operations is the *offering into fire*, because it is an *act* (like the said operations), and not the material substance, which is *not similar* to Agricultural Operations',—then our answer is that the *offering into fire* also is *not similar* to Agricultural Operations, because the *offering into fire* is accomplished by means of such things as the *Mantra*, the *Deity* and other accessories, while *Agricultural Operations* are carried on by means of such things as the plough and other implements; and further, the *offering into fire* is of the nature of *giving*, while Agricultural Operations are of the nature of *tilling* (the ground).—'But we base our assertion on some sort of similarity (not absolute analogy)'.—Well, *some sort of* similarity (to Agricultural Operations) there is in a *material substance* also, which latter, like the operations, is an entity and is ephemeral and so on.—'But seeing that there is another thing (the *offering into fire* for instance) which bears a greater degree of similarity (to Agricultural Operations) than that borne by the material substance, we assert that the material substance is *not similar* (to the operations)'.—In that case, there are other acts with visible results which bear a greater degree of similarity to Agricultural Operations than that borne by the *offering into fire* [because this offering leads to invisible results, while the other acts, like Agricultural Operations, lead to visible results], and hence the *offering into fire* also should be regarded as *not similar* to Agricultural Operations. Nor is there any such well-established law as that whatever is seen in one thing should be regarded as present, even though not actually seen to be so, in every thing that is similar to the former thing. As a matter of fact, when a certain thing has been found to be a cause, in connection with a well-known object, (i.e. with that which is cited as the *Instance* in connection with the Inference),—if that same thing happen to be cognised as the cause in connection with what is going to be proved, then, in that case, that thing proves this conclusion; and if it is not cognised as the cause in connection with this latter, then, it cannot prove that conclusion, even though it be *similar* to the said *Instance*. Consequently even when a thing is similar to the Instance, it has to be examined whether or not it proves the desired conclusion.—

"—'[The reasoning may be put thus]—Whatever is an act is always found to lead to a result,—the *offering into fire* also is an *act*,—hence this *offering* also must lead to a result'.—[If this reasoning be right] then, on the cessation of the Act, the material substances and their various combinations are found to bring about a result in the shape of another substance,—and from this the material substances also might be regarded as leading to a result.

"Further, no invisible (transcendental) result is found to follow from the Agricultural Operations,—and as the act of *offering into fire* is similar to the Agricultural Operations, that *offering* also could not bring about an invisible (transcendental) result.—Or, on the ground of its similarity to the Agricultural Operations, the act of *offering* also might bring about results in

the shape of *grains* (which are the result brought about by Agricultural Operations),—and not any such result as *sense-efficiency.*—

"Thus then the conclusion is that in matters like those we are considering, it is not true that what is *not seen* is proved by what is *seen.*

"—'How then is it that *a result can follow only from an act* (as asserted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, Text, p. 158, line 16)?'

"Our answer is that the fact that a result follows is known only from words (of the Veda); hence a result can be held to follow only from that from which it is declared, by the word, to follow;—that the result follows from the act of *offering into fire* we learn from *Direct Assertion* (of the Vedic text),—while the fact that it follows from the material *Dadhi* is learnt from the *Syntactical Connection* (of the term '*Dadhnā*' in the sentence '*Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*');—and Direct Assertion is always stronger than Syntactical Connection.—Hence we conclude that the result (sense-efficiency) follows from the act of *offering into fire,*—which alone is the reasonable view, —and the other view, that it follows from the material, *Dadhi*, is unreasonable.

"Then again, the *Dadhi* is incapable of doing both,—bringing about the result (sense-efficiency) and accomplishing the act of *Offering into Fire.* —'It might be like the washing of the blanket (with the Feet)—this *washing* does both, it cleanses the blanket and also removes dust from the feet.'—We do not say that one thing has not the capacity to serve two purposes; what we do say is that a single sentence cannot express the two ideas—(1) that the *Dadhi* is accessory to the accomplishment of the Result and (2) that the *Dadhi* is accessory to the accomplishment of the act of *Offering into Fire*; that is, if the sentence declares that 'the result is to be brought about by means of the *Dadhi*', then it cannot declare that 'the act of *Offering into Fire* is to be accomplished by means of *Dadhi*'; or if it declares that 'the act of *Offering into Fire* is to be brought about by means of *Dadhi*', then it cannot declare that 'the result is to be brought about by means of *Dadhi*'; if it were to declare both, then there would be two sentences—a syntactical split; while as a matter of fact, we find a single sentence.—From all this the conclusion is that the result does not follow from the accessory, *Dadhi*, and that the *Offering into the Fire* of *Dadhi* is an act distinct from the *Offering into Fire* that is done in the *Agnihotra.*"

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT INASMUCH AS THE TWO SENTENCES ARE NOT EXACTLY ALIKE, IT (THE SECOND SENTENCE) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN AN ACCESSORY FOR THE SACRIFICE (MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE).

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*', 'but', sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa.*—What the second sentence ('*Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*') does is, not to lay down a distinct act, but only to declare that a certain result follows from the use of a certain material.—Why?—Because the two sentences are '*not alike*';

that is, in the sentence '*Agnihotram juhujāt svargakāmaḥ*', we have a result, Heaven, mentioned along with an *act* (*Offering into Fire*),—the meaning of the sentence being 'one desiring Heaven should bring it about by means of the act of *Offering into Fire*'; while in the sentence '*Dadhnā indriya-kāmasya juhuyāt*', we have a result mentioned along with a *material*; this latter sentence does not convey the idea that 'the act of *Offering into Fire* is to be done for the purpose of bringing about efficient sense-organs'; the idea that it does convey is that 'the act of *Offering into Fire* should be done with *Dadhi*, when it is done for one desiring sense-efficiency'; so that what it lays down is the connection of the act of *Offering into Fire* with the *Dadhi*, for the purpose of bringing about sense-efficiency;—it does not lay down the performance of the act of *Offering into Fire* itself; the sense being that 'if a man is desirous of efficient sense-organs, he should perform the act of *Offering into Fire* with *Dadhi*'.

Question.—"Which is the term in the text that signifies the effort (activity) of the Agent?"

Answer.—The word '*juhuyāt*' is that term.

"It is by *Direct Assertion* that this word '*juhuyāt*' signifies the Agent's activity as connected with the act of *Offering into Fire*, while it is by *Syntactical Connection* that it signifies its connection with *Dadhi*;—and *Syntactical Connection* cannot set aside *Direct Assertion*. Nor will it be right to say that there would be no incongruity in the sentence signifying both the connections simultaneously;—as that would involve a syntactical split."

Our answer to this is as follows:—Those who accept your view would set aside the entire Direct Assertion; while in our view, what would be set aside would be only what is denoted by the verbal root in the word '*juhuyāt*': in your own view on the other hand, the entire word '*dadhnā*' would be set aside, and yet this word has been used by persons who never commit a mistake; nor is it a mad man's song:—as has been explained under *Sūtra* 1. 2. 8—'The convention of long-established tradition is equally present'.—For this reason it is not right to take the result as mentioned in connection with a distinct *act*. The other interpretation, on the other hand, whereby the result is taken as mentioned in connection with the material, *dadhi*, does not render the text incongruous in any way. Because the verb '*juhuyāt*' is actually used for the laying down of the connection between the '*dadhi*' and the 'desire for sense-efficiency'.

Objection.—"Even though all this may be signified, yet it is not mere *activity* (*doing* in general) that is understood; in fact, no purpose would be served by the signification of mere *activity*; what is understood must be something connected with the act of *Offering into Fire*; so that the incongruity pointed out still remains."

Not so, we reply; for what is understood as connected with the act of *offering into Fire* is also *activity* (*doing*), with only this difference that it is *activity connected with the act of offering into Fire*; this however is not incompatible with the fact that the word denotes *activity*; the sense of the whole sentence being that 'if a man is desirous of sense-efficiency, his *activity in connection with the act of Offering into the Fire* should be connected with *Dadhi*'.

"Even so, the same incongruity remains,—that the result is spoken of as along with the act of *Offering into Fire.*"

Our answer is that the force of the word "*juhuyāt*' is such that it signifies the *activity qualified by (connected with) the act of Offering into Fire*; but in this the act of *Offering into Fire* is not enjoined as the means of accomplishing (any result); in fact, *the Activity as something to be accomplished* is connoted by the sentence as the substratum for (the operation of) the *Dadhi*. It is for this reason that the *Vṛttikāra* has declared as follows—'The material as resting in the act of *Offering into Fire* would accomplish the result; just as the king's officer performs the king's work as subsisting on the king.'

Thus it is that the result follows from the *Dadhi*; and the sense of the sentence is that 'the man desirous of sense-efficiency should bring about that efficiency by means of *Dadhi*'.

"But in what way is this to be done?"

In the manner of the entire procedure of the *Agnihotra*.

"How do you get at this?"

(*a*) *Dadhi* as a means of accomplishing the result stands in need of the indication of the manner and method in which this is to be done,—(*b*) the method that is in close proximity to the mention of the *Dadhi* is that detailed in the procedure of the *Agnihotra*,—(c) the sentence contains the term denoting the act of *Offering into Fire* (i.e. the root '*hū*' with the sign of the Injunctive);—yet this same word is *not injunctive*, being, as it is, only a reference to the same act of *Offering into Fire* (as enjoined in another text).—It cannot be said that there is no other word injunctive of the act of *Offering into Fire*.—From all this it follows that what is mentioned in the sentence '*Dadhnā indriyakāmasya juhuyāt*' is not a distinct act; hence the Result follows from the (use of the) *Dadhi* (at the act of *Offering into Fire* which is enjoined by the sentence '*Agnihotram juhoti*').

Or (the other explanation is that) as special significance is meant to be attached to the term '*Dadhi*', the connection between *Dadhi* and the act of *Offering into Fire* is enjoined by the sentence ('*Dadhnā*, etc.');—hence the Result would follow from the *Dadhi as connected with the act of Offering into Fire*.

Adhikaraṇa (12): *The Vāravantīya, etc. are distinct acts: Exception to the foregoing Adhikaraṇa.*

SŪTRA (27).

Where the sentences are alike, (the mention of the Result) must be connected with a distinct action.

Bhāṣya.

We have the text—(*a*) '*Trivṛdagniṣṭut agnistomaḥ, tasya vāyavyāsu ēkavimshamagniṣṭoma sāma kṛtvā brahmavarchasakāmo yajēta*', [and in continuation of this *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice, we have the sentence '*Vāravantiya magniṣṭoma sāma kāryam*", which prescribes an accessory in the shape of the *Vāravantīya*];—then comes the text (*b*) '*Ētasyaiva revatīṣu vāravantīyamagniṣṭoma sāma kṛtvā pashukāmo hyētēna yajēta*'. [The difference between (*a*) and (*b*) is that while the result mentioned in the former is *Brahmavarchasa*, Brahmic glory, that spoken of in the latter is *pashu*, Cattle].

[*Agniṣṭoma* or *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the Archetype of all Soma-sacrifices; one of the minor Soma-sacrifices is the one-day sacrifice called '*Agniṣṭut*', which is also called '*trivṛt*', 'trifold', because the *Trivṛt-stoma* hymn is sung at it; being of the nature of the *Agniṣṭoma*, which is one of the seven stages of the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice, it is also called by the name '*agniṣṭoma*'. During the performance of the Archetype itself,—at the third extraction, they sing the *Yajñāyajñiya Sāman*, which Sāman, by reason of the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice being completed thereby, is also called the '*Agniṣṭoma Sāman*';—this *Sāman* being sung in connection with the *Āgnēyī* Ṛk-verses beginning with the words '*Yajñāyajñā vā agnayaḥ*'.—But at the Ectype, i.e. the *Agniṣṭut*, if the Agent is desirous of Brahmic glory, the *Agniṣṭoma-sāman* is sung in connection with the *Vāyavī* Ṛk-verses,—this *Sāman* having twenty-one *stomas*, as at the Archetypal sacrifice. This is what is laid down in the first sentence (*a*).—If, however, the Agent desires to obtain *Cattle*, instead of *Brahmic glory*, the *Sāman* to be sung is the *Vāravantīya*, and that is sung in connection with the *Rēvatī-verses*, beginning with '*Rēvatīrṇaḥ*'. This is what is laid down in the second sentence (*b*).]

In regard to these sentences (*a*) and (*b*), there arises the question—Does the second sentence speak of the *cattle* as the result following from the special accessory, *Vāravantīya*, appearing in connection with the same act of the *Agniṣṭut-Agniṣṭoma* that has been enjoined in the first sentence,—and hence the words '*ētēna yajēta*' of the second sentence is only a *reference* (to the same act of sacrifice which has been spoken of by the same words in the first sentence)? Or do the words '*ētēna yajēta*' in the second sentence lay down a distinct and independent sacrifice?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The second sentence does not lay down a distinct sacrifice; it only mentions a particular result following from a particular accessory (used at the same sacrifice that has been laid down in the first sentence).—Why?—The phrase '*ētēna yajēta*' (as occurring in the second sentence) only mentions what is already

known, and not anything not already known; and for that reason, it cannot be a new Injunction. What the second sentence declares is that 'if the Agent desires Cattle, he should perform the *sacrifice*, adopting the *Vāravantīya Sāman*',—and it does not mean that 'one should perform the *sacrifice*—by doing what?—by adopting the *Vāravantīya-sāman*'.—Then again, the phrase '*ētasyaiva*' (in the second sentence, which phrase means 'of this same') clearly shows that what follows is not a different sacrifice.—From all this we conclude that all that the second sentence declares is that a particular result (Cattle) follows from the use of a particular accessory (*Vāravantīya*)."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

In a case where distinct *sentences* like those under consideration *are alike, the mention of the result must be connected with a distinct action*. What the second sentence says is '*Etasyaiva revatīṣu vāravantīyam kṛtvā*' ('At this, having adopted the Vāravantīya on the Rēvatī verses');—as a matter of fact however, 'at this'—at the sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence,—there are no *Rēvatī* verses on which the *Vāravantīya* could be adopted. So that if the second sentence were to be taken as referring to the same act as that mentioned in the first sentence, it would have to mean that 'the *Rēvatī* verses are to be used,—and in connection with these, the *Vāravantīya Sāman* has to be sung'; and this would involve a syntactical split [and make the term '*ētasya*' wholly redundant—says the *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 784].

The *Pūrvapakṣin* may suggest the following interpretation—"What the second sentence means is this—'Having brought into the sacrifice, the *Rēvatī* verses and having sung the *Vāravantīya* on them,—one should perform that sacrifice'; so that that part of the sentence which speaks of the performance of the *sacrifice* is only a reference to the *sacrifice* laid down in the first sentence [and the part speaking of the introduction of the *Rēvatī* verses and the singing of the *Vāravantīya* on them is an injunction of these (new) accessories]."

But in that case, [the *Vāravantīya-sāman* being connected with both sets of verses], it could not be regarded as the *Agniṣṭoma-sāman*.

"But even so, the *Vāravantīya* would come in for accomplishing that purpose which (in the former sacrifice) is served by the *Agniṣṭoma-Sāman* [so that the name '*Agniṣṭoma-sāman*' would still continue to be applicable]."

In that case, the term '*ētasya*' would lose its significance (be wholly redundant); and if significance were to be attached to both (i.e. the *Vāravantīya* and the pronoun '*ētasya*'), then there would be syntactical split.

From all this it follows that what is spoken of in the second sentence is an act distinct from the sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence.

Question.—"Even when the second sentence is taken as speaking of a distinct act, how is the syntactical connection avoided?"

Answer.—The meaning of the sentence is that—'One desirous of cattle should perform the sacrifice after singing the *Vāravantīya-Sāman* over the *Rēvatī*-verses'; and what is here enjoined is a new sacrifice along with all

these qualifications; so that the sentence 'expresses a single idea' (and serves a single purpose), and it is also such that, 'on being separated, the words are found to be wanting';—and thus (all the conditions of 'one sentence' laid down in 2. 1. 46 being fulfilled), syntactical unity is maintained.

"As a matter of fact, even under this construction, the sentence conveys two distinct ideas—(1) 'The new sacrifice should be performed' and (2) 'the new *Sāman*, *Vāravantīya*, should be sung over the *Rēvatī*-verses'."

It is not so, we reply. What is enjoined is the sacrifice which has for its accessory the *Rēvatī-verses* over which the *Vāravantīya Sāman* has been sung,—not *the singing of the Vāravantīya*; the singing of the *Vāravantīya* over the Rēvatī-verses would be done as a matter of course (when the said qualified sacrifice is performed), and certainly it is something that is capable of being done.

Objection.—"In this way, the connection of the *Rēvatī verses* with the *Vāravantīya* would not be something enjoined; so that it would be possible to have other *Sāmans* sung over those verses, and it would be possible also to sing the *Vāravantīya* over other verses."

This does not affect our case. The term '*kṛtvā*' ('having done') in the sentence denotes the said connection as duly accomplished for the purpose of the sacrifice; so that the said connection becomes understood; the term '*kṛtvā*', '*having done*', is capable of signifying both, the *accomplishment* as well as the connection of the *past* time; just as in the sentence '*shoṇamānaya*', *where both the horse and the red colour* are enjoined (by the single word '*shoṇa*') for one who is to 'bring in' the horse, and yet this causes no syntactical split,—similarly would it be in the case in question also.

"Even so, however, there are several things that come to be spoken of in the sentence—viz: (1) the *Rēvatī-verses*, (2) the *Vāravantīya-Sāman*, (3) the connection between (1) and (2), (4) the *sacrifice*, and (5) the desire for cattle."

This does not affect our position. Several things are *spoken* of, but what is *enjoined* is only one, the *qualified sacrifice*.

"As a matter of fact, the *Rēvatī-verses* also are enjoined, as also the *Vāravantīya Sāman*. If these were not enjoined, then the sacrifice could not be enjoined as qualified by these two; because it is not possible to enjoin the *qualified* without enjoining the *qualification*. Thus then, there being several objects of injunction, there is no 'singleness of idea' (conveyed by the sentence in question) [and hence the sentence cannot be regarded as a *syntactical unit*.]"

The answer to this is as follows:—The term '*artha*' (in the definition of 'one sentence' under Sūtra 2. 1. 46) stands for *purpose*, and the definition of 'one sentence' thus comes to be that 'when a number of words accomplish a single purpose, they constitute *one sentence* (a syntactical unit)'. Now, in the sentence in question the purpose accomplished is not more than one; i.e. there are not several words injunctive of several desired things; the term '*rēvatīṣu*', for instance, is not injunctive of the *Rēvatī-verses* only;—if we take the two terms '*rēvatīṣu vāravantīyam*', together,—then also, the term '*vāravantīya*', taking the Accusative ending, does not signify the desired connection (between the *Rēvatī* verses and the *Vāravantīya*

Sāman);—as the meaning of the noun remains the same, the term '*kṛtvā*' also, signifying only *doing* or *bringing about*, does not tend to indicate *connection* only; of the two words '*rēvatiṣu*'-'*vāravantīyam*', so far as the term '*vāravantīya*', which appears with the Accusative ending, is concerned, it does not signify the intended connection; as it signifies nothing more than what is denoted by the basic noun itself;—then, as regards the word '*kṛtvā*', the root '*kṛ*' does not tend to signify mere connection; what it signifies is the connection that subserves the purposes of something else (the sacrifice);—the *sacrifice* (denoted by the root in '*yajēta*') as qualified by this connection, however, does not subserve the purposes of any other thing. Thus then, all these things, expressed by the words of the sentence in question, serve only one single purpose; and hence the whole forms 'one sentence' (a syntactical unit).—On the other hand, if the result spoken of in the sentence (cattle) were taken as following from the use of the particular accessory, the ideas expressed by the sentence would be—(*a*) that 'the *Vāravantīya-Sāman* is to be for the purpose that is served by the Agniṣṭoma-Sāman', and (*b*) that 'the name of this is *Agniṣṭoma-Sāman*',—and this would involve a clear syntactical split.

Says the Opponent—"What is enjoined by the sentence is the sacrifice qualified by the several qualifications, *Rēvatī* and the rest, as subsidiary to the *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice (mentioned in the first sentence).—[The meaning is that 'Having sung the *Vāravantīya* over the *Rēvatī* verses, one should perform this sacrifice as subsidiary to the previously-mentioned *Agniṣṭut*'; the advantages attendant upon this interpretation would be (1) that there would be no rejection of what is indicated by the context, and (2) that the use of the word '*ētasya*' would serve the useful purpose of pointing to that *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice which is mentioned in the Context.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 788.]"

Even so, the connection of the term '*pashukāmaḥ*' ('desirous of cattle') would bring about syntactical split.—[The explanation suggested makes this term '*pashukāmaḥ*' entirely irrelevant; if, to avoid this, it is taken in and included in the construction, then there comes about a syntactical split; because a single sentence cannot, at one and the same time, enjoin a *sacrifice* and also a *result*.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 788.]

"The construction may be presented as follows—'one desiring cattle should perform the sacrifice by means of the *Vāravantīya* sung over the *Rēvatī* verses'. [Thus the syntactical split would be avoided.]"

This is not possible; for (if the sacrifice laid down in this second sentence thus explained were the same as the *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice laid down in the first sentence, then)—inasmuch as the first sentence has laid down the *Agniṣṭoma-Sāman*, in connection with that sacrifice, as sung over the *Vāyavī* verses,—if, in accordance with the second sentence, the same *Agniṣṭoma-Sāman* were sung over the *Rēvatī* verses, that would cause a flaw in the sacrifice, due to its being deprived of the previously-mentioned *basis for the Sāman* (in the shape of the *Vāyavī* verses).

"But it has just been said by you that it is possible for the *Vāravantīya* to be sung over the *Rēvatī* verses [and this is all that our explanation involves]."

It is certainly possible, if there is an injunction to that effect; unless there is a declaration to that effect, the *Rēvatī* verses do not become taken in merely by the taking up of the *Vāravantīya*.

"There would be an injunction to that effect in the form—'One desiring cattle should accomplish the *Vāravantīya* on the *Rēvatī* verses, and then he should offer the sacrifice,'—this '*sacrifice*' being a reference to the sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence."

In case there is an injunction of connecting the *Vāravantīya* with the *Rēvatī* verses, this itself becomes a distinct *act*; and the injunction cannot in that case be taken as that of an accessory of the *Agniṣṭut* mentioned in the first sentence.

"The clause 'then he should offer the sacrifice' being a reference to the *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice, it would be manifest that between the two (i.e. the *Agniṣṭut* sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence, and the *connection* mentioned in the second sentence) there is a relationship which makes the latter a subsidiary to the former."

That is not possible; if the said connection (between the *Vāravantīya* and the *Rēvatī*) were merely subsidiary to the sacrifice (*Agniṣṭut*), then it could have no connection with the 'desire for cattle'; for if both the connections were meant to be predicated, then there would be syntactical split.

"But the connection with the sacrifice would be only by way of *reference*, and the fact of this connection being subsidiary to the sacrifice would be indicated by the Context."

This also is not possible; as *Syntactical Connection* is more powerful than *Context*.

For these reasons what is mentioned in the second sentence must be a distinct *act*,—this being either the *singing of the Vāravantīya over the Rēvatī verses* as qualified by (i.e. in connection with) a sacrifice, or a *sacrifice* qualified by the said singing of the *Vāravantīya* over the *Rēvatī* verses.—As regards the connection between this 'sacrifice' and the 'desire for cattle', we find its injunction in the form of the affix appearing at the end of the root '*yaji*' (in '*yajēta*'), while we find nothing in the sentence that could be directly injunctive of the connection between the *Rēvatī* and the *Vāravantīya*. Hence it becomes established that the second sentence enjoins, for the person desiring cattle, the sacrifice as qualified by all the qualifications mentioned in the sentence.

"If this qualified sacrifice is what is enjoined, then, how does this *Vāravantīya sung over the Rēvatī verses* become *Agniṣṭoma-Sāman* (as mentioned in the second sentence itself)?"

On the strength of the declaration itself, it would be so, because of its serving the same purpose as the *Agniṣṭoma-Sāman*. What is there that cannot be done by a direct declaration (of the Veda)? In fact no burden is too heavy for a direct declaration.

As regards the argument that the pronoun '*ētasya*' (in the second sentence) [is a clear reference to the sacrifice mentioned in the first sentence, to which therefore the second sentence should be taken as a reference],—our answer is that a sentence is always dependent upon what is immediately before or after it; so that there would be no incongruity in the word

'*ētasya*' ('this') being taken in the indirect (figurative sense) of '*ētad-dharmakasya*' ('that which has this character') [and the *Vāravantīya Sāman sung over the Rēvatī verses* is certainly something that has the same *character* as the *Agniṣṭoma-Sāman*].

From this it follows that the second sentence should be taken, not as mentioning a result following from the use of a certain accessory, but as laying down a distinct sacrifice with such characteristics as those mentioned in the sentence. Thus it becomes established that *where the sentences are alike, the result is connected with a distinct action.*

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The 'Saubhara' and the 'Nidhana' both lead to the same Result: Exception to the foregoing Adhikaraṇa.*

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA].—"BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF THE HUMAN AGENT, THERE MUST BE A RESULT IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'SAUBHARA' AND ALSO ONE IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'NIDHANA.'"

Bhāṣya.

We have the text (*a*) '*Yo vṛṣṭikāmo yo'nnādyakāmo yaḥ svargakāmaḥ sa saubhareṇa stuvīta, sarvē vai kāmāḥ saubharē*' [Tāṇḍya. M.B. 8. 8. 18, 20] ('One who desires rain, one who desires food, one who desires Heaven should sing the *Saubhara Sāman*, as all desires are centred in the *Saubhara*'); following on this we have the sentence, (*b*) '*Hiṣiti vṛṣṭikāmāya nidhanam kuryāt, ūrgityannādyakāmāya, ū—iti svargakāmāya*' [Tāṇ. M.B. 8. 8. 19] ('For one desiring rain, the syllable *hiṣ* should be used as the *Nidhana*, for one desiring food, the syllable *ūrk* and for one desiring Heaven, the syllable *ū*').—['*Saubhara*' is the name of a particular *Sāma-chant*, and '*Nidhana*' is the last of the five or seven parts of a *Sāma-chant*; the syllables '*hiṣ*', '*ūrk*' and '*ū*' are some of those that are used as *Nidhanas* in various *Sāma-chants*.]—

In connection with these texts the question to be considered is—Is *Saubhara* the means of obtaining rain, and the *Nidhana* '*hiṣ*' another means of obtaining rain? Or the *Saubhara* alone is the means of obtaining rain, and the syllable '*hiṣ*' is to be used as the *Nidhana* of the *Saubhara* when this latter is employed as the means of obtaining rain? Similarly when the *Saubhara* is employed as the means of obtaining food, the syllable '*ūrk*' is to be used as its *Nidhana*,—and when the *Saubhara* is employed as the means of obtaining Heaven, the syllable 'ū' is used as its Nidhana? The same consideration applies to all these three cases.—[In connection with these two sets of texts, we proceed to consider the following question—Does the *Saubhara* mentioned in the first sentence bring about its result by itself, independently of the *Nidhanas* '*hiṣ*' and the rest mentioned in the second sentence, which latter bring about distinct results of their own, apart from that brought about by the *Saubhara*? Or the *Nidhanas*, '*Hiṣ*' and the rest, have been laid down as the instruments which, when used in connection with the same aforesaid *Saubhara*, help this latter in bringing about its results?—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 793.]—

"How can the sentence convey the idea that there is a distinct result following from the *Nidhana*? And in what manner does the text serve the purpose of restricting the particular *Nidhana* to be used (with the *Saubhara*, for the purpose of bringing about a particular result)?"

If the second sentence is construed as meaning that 'the Nidhana *Hiṣ* is to be used for the man desiring rain' (*Hiṣiti vṛṣṭikāmāya kuryāt*'),—then it means that a distinct result follows from the particular *Nidhana*. On the other hand, if the construction is—'*Hiṣiti nidhanam kūryāt*', 'the syllable *Hiṣ* is to be used as the *Nidhana*', then the text serves the purpose of restricting the particular *Nidhana* to be used (in connection with the *Saubhara*);—and in this latter case, the term '*vṛṣṭikāmāya*' (in the second sentence) is treated as a qualification of the *Saubhara*, and it has no connection with the Nidhana '*Hiṣ*'.

[Though the question here propounded has no bearing on the subject-matter of the *Adhyāya*, which is Difference among Actions,—yet it has been introduced here as connected with that subject; or it may be that, like Difference among *actions*, Difference among the *Results of actions* also forms the subject-matter of the *Adhyāya*.—Further, the question here propounded affects the actual performance of the action concerned: At the time that the *Saubhara* has been commenced for one who desires *Rain*,—(*a*) would the last two *nidhanas* 'ūrk' and 'ū' be used at the time along with the *Hiṣ*, for the purpose of obtaining the other two results (food and Heaven),—and (*b*) a difference is to be made between the two desires of rain, one to be fulfilled by the *Saubhara* and the other to be fulfilled by the *Nidhana* '*Hiṣ*', as would have to be made if a distinct result follows from the *Nidhana* separate from similar results spoken of in the first sentence as following from the *Saubhara* itself? (*c*) Or does the second sentence only serve the purpose of restricting the particular *Nidhana* for the same *Saubhara* as leading to the result mentioned,—so that when one commences the *Saubhara* for the purpose of obtaining *rain* he should use the *nidhana* '*Hiṣ*' only, the *rain* mentioned in the second sentence, in this case being the same as that mentioned in the first sentence?—From the way that the *Bhāṣya* has explained it, the question becomes a verbal one—Are the terms '*hiṣ*', '*ūrk*' and '*ū*' connected directly with the terms 'desiring rain', 'desiring food' and 'desiring Heaven',—or with the term '*nidhana*' only?—*Tantravārtika*—Translation, pp. 793-794.]

On the question as propounded above, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*In connection with the* '*Saubhara*' *and the* '*Nidhana*', *there is a distinct result*;—why?—*because of the mention of the human agent*; i.e. we find the *human effort* mentioned in the second sentence by means of the term '*kuryāt*' ('should use'). If the connection intended were that between 'desire for rain' and the *nidhana* '*hiṣ*', then alone would such mention of human effort have any sense; not if the connection intended were that between the *Saubhara* and that *Nidhana*; as in the latter case, the idea that 'the *Saubhara* should be sung along with all its accompaniments (in the shape of *Nidhana, etc.*)' would be already obtained from the injunctive text itself, which lays down the singing of the *Saubhara-Sāman*.—Thus, from the mention of human effort by the term '*kuryāt*', we conclude that that view of the question is the correct one under which the 'human effort' mentioned is fruitful; and as a matter of fact, it is fruitful only if a distinct result follows the *Nidhana*. Hence the conclusion is that there is one result following from the *Saubhara* itself, and a second result follows separately from the *Nidhana*.

"Or, the '*mention of the human agent*' spoken of in the *Sūtra* may be that which appears in the term '*vṛṣṭikāmāya*', ('for one desiring Heaven'); it is

the *man desiring rain* who is spoken of by the term '*vṛṣṭikāma*',—and this mention of the human agent in the *Shruti* text is capable of serving the purpose of urging the man to the particular activity, only under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (that a distinct result follows from the *Nidhana*);—under the other view, on the other hand, the term '*vṛṣṭikāma*', which denotes the human agent, will have to be taken in the figurative sense, as indicating the *Saubhara*; and this would involve a recourse to indirect (figurative) Indication. And as between Direct Assertion and Indirect Indication, it is Direct Assertion, not Indirect Indication, that is logical. Hence we conclude that a second result follows from the *Nidhana*; and in this way there would be a larger volume of the result, in the shape of rain [one supply of rain coming from the *Saubhara* and a second supply from the *Nidhana*]; so that a distinct result must be regarded as following from the *Nidhana*."

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT INASMUCH AS ALL THE RESULTS MENTIONED IN THE SECOND SENTENCE ARE THE SAME AS THOSE MENTIONED IN THE FIRST SENTENCE,—THE MENTION OF THE RESULT SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE SAUBHARA; AND THE REPETITION OF THE WORDS SERVES THE PURPOSE OF RESTRICTING THE NIDHANAS.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*', 'but', sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa*.—The view that has been set forth above, that a separate result follows from the *Nidhana*, is not right. The second sentence is not to be construed as '*vṛṣṭikāmāya hīṣiti kuryāt*' ('one should use the Nidhana *Hīṣ* for one desiring rain'),—but as '*hīṣiti nidhanam saubharasya*' ('*Hīṣ* is the *nidhana* for the *Saubhara*').—If the '*hīṣ*' were connected with the term 'desiring rain', we could not get the idea that 'the *Nidhana* should be used' ('*nidhanam kuryāt*'); so that the Nidhana '*Hīṣ*' would not be used at all. If the '*Hīṣ*' were connected with both ('desiring heaven' and 'should be used'), then there would be a syntactical split; which would imply that the term '*nidhana*' has been wrongly put in the text; but it has been already pointed that texts like those we are dealing with cannot be held to be 'wrong'. Hence the '*Hīṣ*' cannot be connected with the term 'desiring rain'; so that the result spoken of cannot be regarded as a separate one following from the *Nidhana* by itself.

"How do you avoid the syntactical split by connecting *Hīṣ* with the *Nidhana*?"

Our answer is as follows:—For the purpose of obtaining rain we have the *Saubhara* already (enjoined in the first sentence);—that there should be a *Nidhana* to the *Saubhara* is also well known;—so that all that is enjoined, in this case, by the second sentence, is that '*Hīṣ* is the particular *Nidhana* to be used in connection with the *Saubhara* (when it is sung for the purpose of obtaining rain)'; and in this there is no syntactical split. From this it follows that the second sentence serves to restrict the particular *Nidhana* to be used (in a particular case).

Similarly in the case of the other two *Nidhanas*—*ūrk* and *ū*—(spoken of in the second sentence). Inasmuch as the *Saubhara as a whole* is capable of bringing about all the results in the shape of Food, Rain and Heaven, it is possible to differentiate the *Saubhara* in particular cases by means of words expressive of these results [and this is what is done in the second sentence].

"But why should this differentiation be done?"

The repetition (involved in this differentiation) serves the purpose of *restricting*,—i.e. of specifying the particular *Nidhana* to be used in a particular case, for the purpose of obtaining a particular result.

[Kumārila has criticised the above presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa* and has proposed a different presentation, though the *Siddhānta* remains practically the same—viz., that 'the previous sentence having spoken of certain results as following from the *Saubhara as a whole*, what the second sentence does is to restrict the particular *Nidhanas* of the *Saubhara* with reference to each one of the results mentioned before, so that the mention of the results in the second sentence is only a reference to that in the first sentence'.—See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 796-802.

Kumārila also adds a supplementary *Adhikaraṇa* leading to the conclusion that 'the *Saubhara Sāman* to be employed for the purpose of obtaining rain and the other results must belong to that particular Vedic Recension in which the *Sāman* appears with those *Nidhanas*.—See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 803.]

End of Pāda ii of Discourse II.

DISCOURSE II.

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The Grahāgratā is subsidiary to the Jyotiṣṭoma, and not a distinct Act.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN REALITY AN ACCESSORY, MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH A SACRIFICE, SHOULD MAKE IT A DISTINCT ACT; BECAUSE THE CONNECTION IS WITH THE ENTIRE SACRIFICE."

Bhāṣya.

The *Jyotiṣṭoma* is a sacrifice, enjoined in the text (*a*) '*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' ('One desiring Heaven should offer the *Jyotiṣṭoma* Sacrifice'). In reference to that same sacrifice, we find the text—(*b*) '*Yadi rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt aindravāyavāgrān grahān gṛhṇīyāt ; yadi bṛhatsāmā, shukrāgrān ; Yadi jagatsāmā, āgrayaṇāgrān*' ('If the Soma is one at which the *Rathantara-Sāman* is sung, then the cups to be offered first should be those dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*; if it is one at which the *Bṛhat-Sāman* is sung, then the cups dedicated to *Shukra*; if it is one at which the *Jagat-Sāman* is sung, then the cups dedicated to *Agrayaṇa*').

In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the *first offering of the particular cups* (*grahāgratā*) enjoined as part of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*? Or as part of the two distinct acts named '*Rathantarasāmā*' and '*Bṛhatsāmā*'?—If the names '*Rathantarasāmā*' and '*Bṛhatsāmā*' stand for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, then the accessory detail in the shape of the *First-offering of the Cups* should appertain to that same sacrifice; if the two names do not stand for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, then it should appertain to other acts.

The idea that presents itself first of all is that the particular accessory detail appertains to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, because the *Context* is of this sacrifice.

As against this, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"*Guṇastu kratusaṁyogāt, etc. In reality, an accessory mentioned, etc.* (Sūtra).—The particle '*tu*', 'in reality', sets aside the first idea.—It is not true that the accessory detail appertains to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—why?—*because mentioned in connection with a sacrifice*.—'To what then does it appertain?'—It appertains *to a distinct act*.—'But words like *Rathantarasāmā* and *Bṛhatsāmā* are always expressive of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*'.—Certainly not, we say; the names could be taken as standing for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, if the connection (of the particular *Sāman*, *Rathantara*) were not with the entire sacrifice; the connection, however, *is* with the entire sacrifice [hence the name cannot stand for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*].—'How do you know that the connection is with the entire sacrifice?'—Well, how do you know that it is *not* with the entire sacrifice?—'If the presence of the *Rathantara* or the *Bṛhat* were the sole reason for the adopting of a particular *First-offering*, then the connection

could *not* be with the entire sacrifice; that is to say, if the First-offering is that of the cup dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*, by reason of the *Sāman* sung being *Rathantara*,—or if the First-offering is that of the cup dedicated to *Shukra* by reason of the *Sāman* sung being *Bṛhat*, then [as the connection of the particular *Sāman* would not be with the entire sacrifice], the two sentences in question (*Yadi rathantarasāmā, etc.*) should be taken as laying down accessories for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*'.—But, if the presence of the *Rathantara Sāman*, or the presence of the *Bṛhat Sāman*, were not the sole reason (for the adopting of any particular *First-offering*), then the connection would be with the entire sacrifice [and in that case, the accessory in question cannot be taken as appertaining to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*].

"Now, what is the meaning of the term '*rathantarasāmā*' (as occurring in the sentence '*Yadi rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt, etc.*')?—Its meaning is '*if the Rathantara Sāman forms the distinguishing feature of the Act*'.—'How do you get at this meaning?'—We get at it from the implications of the compound. As a matter of fact, there is compounding of only such terms as have the requisite capacity,—and this capacity is there when there is the relationship of *qualification and qualified* (between the terms),—and one thing is called the 'qualification' of another when it is peculiar to this latter (when alone it can serve to qualify or differentiate it). So that, in the case in question, the meaning of the sentence comes to be this—'If *Rathantara is the only Sāman sung and no other*,—or *if the Bṛhat is the only Sāman sung, and no other* (then, the First-offering is to be of the *Indra-Vāyu Cup*, or the *Shukra Cup*)';—at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, however, there are many *Sāmans* sung, such as the *Gāyatra* and the rest (and not the *Rathantara only*, or the *Bṛhat only*);—for this reason the two words '*Rathantarasāmā* and '*Bṛhatsāmā*' cannot stand for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. So that, even though through Context, the second set of sentences would appear to be laying down accessories for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, yet, this implication of the Context is set aside by the more authoritative indication of Syntactical Connection, which connects the accessories with the *Rathantarasāma* and the *Bṛhatsāma* (which are acts entirely distinct from *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

"—'But', says the Opponent, 'just as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* cannot be called *Rathantarasāmā*, so also there is no such act as could be called *Rathāntarasāmā* (by reason of the *Rathantara* being the only *Sāman* sung at it)'.—On the strength of the sentence in question—*Yadi rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt*—itself, we shall assume a distinct act at which *Rathantara* would be the only *Sāman* sung.—'This sentence does not contain an Injunctive word (which could be taken as enjoining the said distinct act).'—Our answer is that there is such a word, in '*syāt*'.—'This word *syāt* cannot enjoin anything, for the simple reason that it is accompanied by the conditional *yadi* (*if*, which is incompatible with an Injunction); and words so accompanied by *if* are found to be expressive of conditions for the existing state of things, and never to be injunctive'.—Our answer to this is as follows:—The whole sentence containing the conditional '*yadi*' ('if')—'*Yadi rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt*'—contains the subordinate sentence '*rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt*';—and the meaning of this subordinate sentence must be different from that of the whole sentence with the conditional '*yadi*'; so

that, while the sentence with the conditional '*yadi*' may not be able to enjoin an act, the subordinate sentence could certainly enjoin it. Further, the mere mention of the presence of the *Rathantara-Sāman* or the *Bṛhat-Sāman* as conditions for certain things,—even though actually found in the text,—could not serve any useful purpose; from which it follows that the connection of the conditional '*yadi*' ('if') is not meant to be significant;—and when no significance attaches to this conditional '*yadi*', then the sentence practically contains only two terms, '*rathantarasāma-somaḥ syāt*' ('*there should be—Soma with the Rathantarasāma*'), and as such it would be perfectly able to enjoin *the sacrifice at which Rathantara is the sāman sung*, the term '*yadi*' ('if') being superfluous (no significance attaching to it).

"Or, (even retaining the word 'if'), the word '*rochēta*' ('one so wishes') may be supplied after '*yadi*' ('if'). For instance, we have such expressions as 'one should eat *Ṣāṣṭika* grain with milk;—if he eats *Shāli*, he should mix curd with it', where the latter sentence, though containing 'if', is taken as enjoining the eating of *Shāli*; in the same manner in the case in question, the act would be taken as enjoined by the sentence '*yadi rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt aindravāyavāgrān grahān gṛhṇīyāt*' (even though it contains the conditional '*yadi*').—'In what way does the expression quoted enjoin the eating of *Shāli*'?—We get at the injunction by transposing the phrases and construing the sentence as 'if one desires to mix curd with his food, *he should eat Shāli*'.—'[You construe the sentence as *Yadi dadhyupasiñchanamichchhēt*]. But in the sentence you have quoted ('*Yadi shālīn bhuñjīta tat dadhyupasinchēt*), the conditional *Liṅ*-ending appears with the root *siñcha* (to mix), not with the root *ichchha* (as you put it in your explanation)'.—The fact of the matter is that, appearing along with the root *siñcha*, the *Liṅ*-ending indicates the sense of *desire*; so that we take that ending in the sense of *having a desire*.—Thus then, in the case in question also, the sentence '*Yadi rathantarasāmā somaḥ syāt aindravāyavāgrān grahān gṛhṇīyāt*' is to be construed as 'if one *desires* to make the First-offering of the *Indra-Vāyu* Cups, he should perform the sacrifice where *Rathantara* is the only *Sāman* sung'.—'If the sentence is construed thus, then what is got at is mere *desire*, not the injunction of a particular *First-offering*'.—Just as in the ordinary expression quoted above, when we construe it to mean 'if one desires to mix curd with his food, he should eat *Shāli*', the mention of the *mixing of curd* as construed with the 'eating of *Shāli*' provides the injunction that 'one should eat *Shāli* mixed with curd', —so in the case in question also, the mention of the particular First-offering (*Aindravāyava* for instance) when construed along with the performance of the act where *Rathantara* is sung, provides the injunction of *the sacrifice where Rathantara is sung* as qualified by that particular *First-offering*.

"Or again, the injunctive affix *Liṅ* may be taken as laying down a cause and effect; the meaning being that 'the *Rathantara-sāmā Soma* (the sacrifice at which *Rathantara* is sung) should be made the *cause* of the First-offering being made of the *Indra-Vāyu* Cup'.

"Thus the conclusion is that, as *the connection mentioned is with the entire sacrifice, the accessory should make it a distinct act*; it is only thus that the said connection with the entire sacrifice would serve a useful purpose.

"Further, in every case, what goes before is the cause, and what comes later is the effect;—why so?—because the effect can come into existence only when the cause is already there, not when the cause is not there;—and what is *yet to come* is not *in existence*;—in the case in question, the *Rathantarasāmā* (the act at which *Rathāntara* is the only *sāman* sung) is *yet to come*; how then could it be the cause (or condition) of the particular First-offering [as would be the meaning of the sentence if taken in any way other than the one just suggested by us]?

"Lastly, there is no doubt regarding the *Jagatsāmā* [which is mentioned in the last of the three sentences quoted as (*b*)] being a distinct act by itself (apart from the *Jyotiṣṭoma*); and from the analogy of this, the other two acts mentioned in the other two sentences (*Rathāntarasāmā* and *Bṛhatsāmā*) should also be taken as distinct acts.

"From all this it follows that the sentences in question should not be taken as laying down accessories for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BUT THE SAME SACRIFICE HAVING DIVERSE CHARACTERISTICS, EACH OF THESE COULD BE SPOKEN OF FOR A DEFINITE PURPOSE,—THE SACRIFICE ITSELF BEING ONE ONLY, THE SECOND SENTENCE BEING SUBORDINATE (TO THE FIRST).

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*', 'but', serves to reject the view just set forth. What has been said—that a distinct sacrifice is mentioned in the sentence in question—is not right.—"What then is the right view?"—The right view is that the particular First-offering appertains to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself;—why?—Because of the force of the *Context*.—But we have already pointed out that "on the strength of *Syntactical Connection*, the First-offering should be taken as appertaining to the distinct sacrifices, called *Rathantara-sāmā* and *Bṛhatsāmā* [and Syntactical Connection is stronger than *Context*]."—This argument has been already refuted—by the assertion that it is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself which is called '*Rathantarasāmā*' and '*Bṛhatsāmā*'.—"But this view has been refuted, in its turn, by the fact that several *Sāmans* are sung at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which therefore could not be characterised as *having the Rathantarasāma* or as *having the Bṛhatsāma*."—Our answer to this is that the said characterisation should be possible, on the ground that the *Rathantara* and the *Bṛhat* are two *Sāmans* between whom there is option at the Jyotiṣṭoma itself; so that of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* there can be one performance where the *Rathantara* is *not* sung at all, and there may be also a performance where the *Rathantara is* sung; and in this latter case, the *Rathantara*, being peculiar to the performance, could serve to characterise the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. Thus then it is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself which is called '*Rathantarasāmā*' and '*Bṛhatsāmā*'.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* has argued that "the cause should come first, then the effect."—But there is no such hard and fast rule; as a matter of fact,

something *yet to come* also serves as a cause; for instance, *the rain that is expected to come* becomes the cause (instigation) of such acts as tilling the fields and building of houses. Further, what has been said may be true of visible causes and effects; what however we are considering is a cause mentioned in a verbal text; and what is so mentioned has to be taken just as it is mentioned.—Then again the *Liṅ*-affix in the word '*syāt*' also can refer to all the three points of time, past, present and future. So that what is *yet to come* may also serve as a cause.

Another argument put forward by the *Pūrvapakṣin* is that "the *Jagatsāmā* being accepted by all parties to be a distinct act, the *Rathantarasāmā* also, being similar to it, should be regarded as a distinct act."—But the *Jagatsāmā* is accepted to be a distinct act, because it cannot be regarded as anything else; while in the case of the *Rathantarasāmā* and the *Bṛhatsāmā*, they are found capable of being taken as names of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself; and hence these cannot be regarded as distinct acts (other than the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The Avēṣṭi is a distinct sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (3).

IN REGARD TO THE AVĒṢṬI, WHAT IS ASSERTED IS THE INJUNCTION OF THE SACRIFICE ITSELF; BECAUSE OF THE CONNECTION OF THE (PREVIOUSLY ENJOINED RĀJASŪYA) SACRIFICE (WITH THE KṢATTRIYA ONLY).

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Rājasūya* sacrifice enjoined in the text—'*Rājā rājasūyēna svārājyakāmo yajēta*' ['The Rājā desiring self-sovereignty should perform the *Rājasūya* sacrifice']; in the same context is mentioned the sacrifice named '*Avēṣṭi*' in the text, '*Āgnēyo'ṣṭākapālo hiraṇyam dakṣiṇā*' ['The cake dedicated to Agni is to be baked on eight pans; Gold is the sacrificial fee'] and so forth;—in reference to this latter, we meet with the further injunction—'*Yadi brāhmaṇo yajēta bārhaspatyam madhyē nidhāya āhutīmāhutim hutvā'bhighā-rayēt; yadi rājanya aindram; yadi vaishyo vaishvadēvam*' ['If the Brāhmaṇa is sacrificing, the Cooked Rice for Bṛhaspati is to be placed in the middle, clarified butter poured over it after every oblation; if the Kṣattriya, the cake for Indra; if the Vaishya, the Cooked Rice for the Vishvēdēvas'].

In regard to these latter texts there arises the question—Do they speak of the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* with a view to laying down the conditions under which the details mentioned in the sentence (*Bārhaspatya*, *Aindra* and *Vaishvadēva*) are to be adopted at the *Rājasūya*, to the performance of which the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya* are all entitled? Or is the *Avēṣṭi* a distinct sacrifice prescribed for the *Brāhmaṇa*, the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*?

On what grounds could the text be taken as laying down the said conditions? And on what grounds could it be taken as laying down a distinct sacrifice?

If the term '*rājā*' (as occurring in the first injunction of the *Rājasūya*) could be made, somehow or other, applicable to the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Vaishya*, then the sentences in question would be taken as laying down the conditions;—if, on the other hand, the term '*rājā*' applies to the *Kṣattriya* only, then the sentences in question would be taken as injunctive of distinct sacrifices (for the Brāhmaṇa and the rest).

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"The sentences lay down conditions under which the details mentioned are to be adopted; and for this purpose we put forward the following explanation:—The term '*rājā*' is to be taken in its etymological sense; i.e. 'one whose function is *rājya, kingship* or *ruling*' is the *Rājā* (Ruler).—'What is the function of the *Ruler*?'—The people of *Āryāvarta* (North India) use the word '*rājā*' in the sense of *one who protects the country and*

the city (and relieves them of all criminals—adds the *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 818);—the learned also explain the term '*rājya*', 'kingship' as the *functions of the king*;—hence we think that *one who performs the functions of the king* is the *Rājā, King*.—For instance, if people did not know any man of the name of '*Udamegha*', and yet knew his son by the name '*Audamēghi*' (which etymologically is equivalent to '*the son of Udamegha*'),—then they would be in a position to assume that 'the father of *Audamēghi* is *Udamegha*';—in the same manner, if people do not know the meaning of the term '*rājan*',—and yet they know that *rājya* is the name of *the functions of the Rājā*,—they assume that 'the person connected with (performing) *Rājya* (kingly functions) is *Rājā*'.

"*Objection*.—'But the people of the *Andhra* country apply the term '*rājā*' to every *Kṣattriya*, even if he does not perform the *functions of protecting the country and the city*.'

"*Answer*.—We do not say that people do not use the term in that sense; what we mean is that the connotation of the term '*rājan*' being based upon certain definite functions (viz. the functions of *rājya*, kingship), the term may also be used on the basis of those functions; and in fact, people actually apply the term '*rājan*' even to a *non-Kṣattriya* who performs the said functions (of the king).—Thus then, such use of the term (in the sense of *any one, Kṣattriya* or *non-Kṣattriya*, who performs the functions of the king) being possible [and hence the Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣattriya and the Vaishya being all equally entitled to the performance of the Rājasūya sacrifice]—the sentence in question should be taken as laying down certain details in connection with the same *Rājasūya* sacrifice itself,—as is indicated by the *Context* and also by the presence of the term '*yadi*' ('if', with which the sentence starts, which indicates the fact that what follows is an adjunct to the sentence that has gone before);—and it should not be taken as laying down a totally different act for the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Vaishya*.

"Or (we may put the case as follows):—That usage which is limited to a few people, and is not current among all persons, should be rejected as unreliable (wrong) if it is in conflict with such usage as is current among all men; in fact people accept only such usage as is current among all men.—Then again, such ordinary usages as are not rejected by anyone are always more reliable than those that are rejected; for instance, the usage current among the people of *Āryāvarta* who are learned in the matter of words and their meanings, who make use of words and also perform actions,—is always better than that of the *Mlechchhas* and that of persons residing in the lands of the low people (*antya-janapada*).—[And the use of the term '*rājan*' in the sense of *King* in general, anyone who performs the king's functions, is current among all men; while it is the *Āndhras* alone who restrict it to persons belonging to the *Kṣattriya* caste, irrespective of the fact of the man performing or not performing the functions of the king.]

"From all this we conclude (*a*) that the term '*rājan*' is to be taken in its etymological sense (of anyone who performs the functions of the king),—(*b*) that the mention in the second sentence of the Brāhmaṇa and the others is for the purpose of laying down the conditions (under which certain

details have to be employed),—(c) that the second sentence lays down these details in connection with the same *Rājasūya* sacrifice (which has been enjoined in the sentence '*Rājā rājasūyēna svārājyakāmo, etc.*')—and (d) that the sentence does not lay down a distinct sacrifice."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*In regard to the Avēṣṭi what is asserted*,—in reference to the *Brāhmaṇa* and the rest—*is the injunction of the sacrifice*,—i.e. it serves to enjoin the *Avēṣṭi-sacrifice* for the Brāhmaṇa, etc. ;—why ?—because the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Vaishya* have not been mentioned in the Context at all.—"How do you say that these have not been mentioned ?"—Because the *Rājasūya* sacrifice (which is the sacrifice enjoined in the Context) has been enjoined for the *Kṣattriya only*, by the sentence '*Rāja rājasūyēna yajēta*'.

"But it has been pointed out that the term '*rājā*' (used in this injunction) is to be taken in its etymological sense (so as to include men of all the three castes *who perform the functions of the king*)."

This is not right; as the word '*rājā*' really denotes the particular *caste* (*Kṣattriya*).

"It has been explained above that it is not right to take the sentence (beginning with '*yadi*') as laying down a distinct sacrifice,—because (a) the term '*rājan*' denotes both (the *Kṣattriya* as well as the *non-Kṣattriya*, performing the functions of the king),—(b) because the sentence opens with the term '*yadi*' ('if'),—and (c) because of the indications of the *Context*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—We do not accept the statement that the term '*rājan*' denotes both;—why ?—If the term '*rājan*' signifies the *caste* (*Kṣattriya*), then the term '*rājya*' would stand for the function of *protecting the country*, this being the function of the *Kṣattriya caste*; so that there would be no incompatibility with the usage of the people of the *Āryāvarta* (under which usage the *Rājā* is one who performs the function of protecting the people). If, on the other hand,—the term '*rājya*' were eternally connected with (i.e. if its connotation always consisted in) the *function of protecting*, then *one who performs that function* would be spoken of by the term '*rājan*', and this term, in this sense, would apply to the *Kṣattriya-caste*;—and this would be quite compatible with the usage of the *Āndhras*. Thus on the strength of usage, it has to be admitted that both the terms—'*rājan*' and '*rājya*'—need not be eternally connected with the connotations respectively of 'the Kṣattriya *caste*' and 'the kingly function' [i.e. only one of the two terms need be taken as so *eternally connected* with its connotation, and the other term will have its connotation determined by that connotation].

[The two words '*rājā* and '*rājya*' could not have their connotations wholly independent of one another; the fact is that when one of them has its connotation fixed by convention, that of the other follows from it. That is to say, when the word '*rājā*' has been known, by convention, as signifying the *Kṣattriya* caste, then the connotation of the term '*rājya*',—explained as 'the function of the *Rājā*'—comes to be based upon that of the term '*rājā*'; and so long as this is possible, it is not right to assume an independent connotative potency for this latter word; as even without such an independent connotative potency, there would be nothing incompatible with the usage of the people of *Āryāvarta*, who apply the term '*rājya*' to the 'kingly function of protecting the people'. If,

conversely, it be held that the term '*rājya*' itself has its connotation of the 'function of protecting the people' fixed by convention, before that of the term '*rājā*' is known,—then too, the term '*rājā*' would, as based on the term '*rājya*', come to be applied to the *performer* of that function, and it would not be necessary to assume an independent connotative potency in the word '*rājā*'; and as such there would be nothing incongruous in the usage of the *Draviḍas* (wrongly attributed by the *Bhāṣya*, to the *Āndhras*) who apply the word '*rājā*' to any and every *Kṣattriya* who is capable of performing the function of protecting the people.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 824–835.]

"How then is it to be decided (which is the word that has an independent eternal connotative potency)?"

The decisive fact is that the term '*rājya*' denotes the function of *protecting*, which function belongs to *the person belonging to the caste* '*Rājan*' (Kṣattriya).—Writers on grammar have laid down the affix '*ṣyañ*' (which we find in the term '*rājya*') as denoting 'the function of the person spoken of, i.e. the '*Rājā*' [see Pāṇini, 5. 1. 124];—and they do not countenance the expounding of the term '*rājā*' as 'the *performer* of the functions of *rājya*' ['*rājyasya kārtā rājā*'], which would involve either the deletion of the syllable '*ya*' (present in the term '*rājya*'), or the transformation of the basic noun ('*rājya*') itself (into the form '*rājā*').

"As a matter of fact, *any one who performs the function* of *protecting the country* is spoken of by the people by the name *Rājā* [and not only one belonging to the *Kṣattriya caste*.]"

Our answer to this is as follows:—It is on the basis of the etymology of the word that people apply the name so;—the term '*rājya*' is well known as signifying the *function of protecting*; and as we have explained above, this signification of *the function of protecting* by the term '*rājya*' is based upon its being derived from the term '*rājan*' (the term being etymologically explained as '*rājnaḥ karma rājyam*'); so that it is the term '*rājan*' (and its connotation) which is the basis of the above-mentioned recognised signification (of the term '*rājya*'); so that the use of the term '*rājya*' is dependent upon its derivation from the term '*rājan*' (and its connotation of the function of protecting the country); and as for the application of the name '*rājā*' to the Brāhmaṇa and other *non-Kṣattriyas*, this is a figurative use of the term based upon the presence, in these *non-Kṣattriyas*, of '*rājya*' (i.e. the *function of protecting the people*), which rests *primarily* with the *Kṣattriya* caste alone. That this usage should be regarded as only secondary or figurative is shown by the fact that grammarians do not countenance the explanation of the term '*rājā*' as *one who performs the functions of kingship*.—[The word '*rājya*' is explained by its connection with the *Rājā*, and then the presence of this *rājya* (kingly functions) in the Brāhmaṇa, etc. makes the term '*rājā*' indirectly applicable to these latter castes also; but it is so applicable only *indirectly*, figuratively; and a figurative use of the word cannot affect the *Siddhānta* that the term '*rājā*' stands for the *Kṣattriya caste*. It must be admitted therefore that the term '*rājā*' is applied to the *Brāhmaṇa* and other *non-Kṣattriyas* only in consideration of the fact of these latter being the proxy of the *Kṣattriya* in the performance of the latter's legitimate function of protecting the people.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 826.]

It has been argued above that "through inference we get at the notion that the *Rājā* is so called because he is the performer of the kingly functions (*rājya*), just as we get at the notion that *Udamēgha* is the father of *Audamēghi*."

Our answer to this is as follows:—Actual usage is more authoritative than inference; that 'the *Rājā* is the performer of *Rājya*' we get at through inference, but in actual usage we find people using the word '*rājā*' in the sense of the *Kṣattriya* caste.—Then again, the etymology also of the term '*rājā*' as '*rājyasya kartā*' (performer of kingly functions) can be got at through inference, while the etymology of the term '*rājya*' as '*rājñaḥ karma*' (king's function) is actually laid down in the grammatical scriptures. People who would base the etymology upon inference would, on the strength of that inference, have to infer the grammatical scripture (countenancing that etymology), while those who depend directly upon the scripture actually see the grammatical rule itself. Thus under the circumstances, the direct scripture would be distinctly more authoritative.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, people apply the name '*rājan*' to any one who performs *rājya* (functions of the king); they do not apply the term '*rājya*' to the function performed by the *rājā* (king);—from which it follows that the use of the term '*rājan*' is dependent upon the connection of *rājya* (kingly functions), and that the use of the term '*rājya*' is *not* dependent upon the connection of *Rājā*."

We do not say that we regard the connection of the *Rājā* as the basis of the use of the term '*rājya*'; what we hold is that the use of the term '*rājya*' is based upon the grammatical scriptures; and scripture is always more authoritative than usage, as usage could only be made a ground for the inference of a scripture [and a directly perceived scripture is more authoritative than an inferred one].

Then again, the premise that 'the use of the term *rājā* is dependent upon the connection of *Rājya* (kingly functions)' is not true; as it has been asserted above that the *Āndhras* apply the name '*rājā*' even to a person who is not performing the function of protecting the country.

The premise that "the use of the term is dependent upon the connection of the *Rājā*" is also not true; as every function of the king—such as locomotion or winking, for instance—is not called *Rājya*."

We would be open to this taunt if we said that the use of the term is dependent upon usage;—but what we say is that the basis for the use of the term lies in the grammatical scripture; so that we regard all those functions to be '*rājya*' which belong to a person of the *Kṣattriya* (*rājan*) caste,—i.e. every act that is marked out as pertaining specifically to the *Kṣattriya* caste.

As for the argument that—"the *Āndhras* also do regard a person as '*rājā*' on the basis of his connection with *rājya* [i.e. they also do not deny some sort of connection between the name '*rājā*' and the performing of the *rājya*]",—this has already been refuted by the argument that usage is weaker than (grammatical) scripture.

Lastly, as regards the argument that in the matter of usage, the usage of the inhabitants of *Āryāvarta* is more reliable than that of others,—our

answer is that in the matter of the usage of words, all usage is equally authoritative,—as has been already explained (under the *Smṛtipāda*, 1. 3. 9 and 1. 3. 10).

From all this it follows that the use of the term '*rājān*' is based upon the *caste* (*Kṣattriya*);—and hence, *on account of the connection of the previously enjoined sacrifice of the Rājasūya with the Kṣattriya only*, the sentence that speaks of the *Avēṣṭi* must be an injunction of an independent sacrifice (for *non-Kṣattriyas*).

Adhikaraṇa (3): *The 'Ādhāna', Fire-laying, is enjoined as an independent act.*

SŪTRA (4).

The Fire-laying (should be taken to be enjoined as an independent act); because it does not form an integral part of all (sacrifices).

Bhāṣya.

We have the text—'*Vasantē brāhmaṇo'gnīnādadhīta, grīṣmē rājanyaḥ, sharadi vaishyaḥ*' ['The *Brāhmaṇa* should lay the Fires during spring, the *Kṣattriya* during summer, the *Vaishya* during autumn']. (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 2. 6-7.)

In regard to this there arises the question—Does the mention of the *Brāhmaṇa* and other castes serve the purpose of laying down the conditions (for the selection of a particular season, as the time for the act of *Fire-laying* which itself has already been enjoined elsewhere)—the meaning being that '*if the Brāhmaṇa does the Fire-laying*, he should do it during the spring, —*if the Kṣattriya does it*, he should do it in the summer,—*if the Vaishya does it*, he should do it in the autumn'?—Or does the sentence actually enjoin the act of *Fire-laying* itself for the Brāhmaṇa and others?

Question:—On what grounds could the sentence be taken as laying down conditions? and on what grounds could it be taken as an injunction of Fire-laying?

Answer:—If the two words '*brāhmaṇaḥ*' and '*vasantē*' are construed as syntactically connected, then the mention of the *Brāhmaṇa* must be taken as laying down a condition. If, on the other hand, the word '*brāhmaṇaḥ*' is construed as correlated with '*ādadhīta*', then the sentence must be an injunction of *Fire-laying* for the Brāhmaṇa. So also in regard to the *Kṣattriya* and the *Vaishya*.

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"The sentence in question serves the purpose of laying down conditions (for the choice of the seasons);—why?—because the words of the text are similar to conditional phrases.—'In what way are the words *similar* to conditional phrases [when we have no such conditional terms as *if* and the like]?'—The various castes, *Brāhmaṇa* and the rest, have been mentioned along with the various seasons, *spring* and the rest; and it is this fact (of the caste and the season being related as the condition and the conditioned), which, not otherwise known, is made known by the sentence in question. [That is to say, the injunctive potency of the sentence having been used up in laying down the relationship between the *caste* and the *season*, it could not serve to enjoin the act of *Fire-laying* itself; so that they could be taken only as laying down the conditions that would be indicated by the aforesaid relationship between the *caste* and the *season*.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans.,

p. 834].—'But the Brāhmaṇa and the rest are mentioned along with the verb *to lay* also (*ādadhīta*) [so that the sentence could be taken as enjoining the act of *Fire-laying qualified by the spring*, for the *Brāhmaṇa*, and so forth. —*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 824].'—True; they are so mentioned together; but the relationship of the Brāhmaṇa and other castes with the act of *Fire-laying* is not *unknown*; [i.e. the fact that *Fire-laying* should be done by the Brāhmaṇa and others being already known from other sources, it could not form the object of an injunction contained in the sentence under consideration].—'From what source is it already known as enjoined?' —It is known from the Vedic texts speaking of certain desirable results.— 'What are those *Vedic texts speaking of certain desirable results*?'—They are, '*Agnihotram juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*', '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*' and so forth.—'In what way is the act of *Fire-laying* got at as enjoined by these texts?'—By implication; that is to say, what the texts mean is that 'one should act in such a manner as to accomplish the *Agnihotra*', 'one should act in such a manner as to accomplish the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*';—now as a matter of fact, none of these acts can be accomplished without the *fires*—*Gārhapatya, Āhavanīya, Anvāhārya-pachana* and the rest; there are declarations also to this effect; such as—'When one offers a libation into the *Āhavanīya Fire*, his desired object becomes accomplished' (Tai. Brā. 1. 1. 10. 5-6);—thus by implication it becomes known that the *Āhavanīya* and other Fires should be brought about,— and these Fires cannot be brought about except by the act of *Fire-laying*;— hence it follows that this act of *Fire-laying* also should be performed.—'By whom is this act to be done?'—By the person who entertains the desires spoken of in the texts; and these texts are applicable in common to all the castes, *Brāhmaṇa* and the rest. It is thus that the connection of all these castes with the act of *Fire-laying* is already known (as enjoined).—Further, if the Brāhmaṇa and other castes were construed as related to *both* (the act of *Fire-laying* and the *spring* and other seasons),—then there would be syntactical split; as in that case the object enjoined (and predicated) would not be one only.—From all this we conclude that the texts in question lay down the conditions (for the choice of the seasons)."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The Fire-laying should be taken to be enjoined as an independent action, because it does not form an integral part of all sacrifices* (Sū.); i.e. the sentences in question should be regarded as injunctive of *Fire-laying*;—why?—because from among the several means of knowledge available—in the shape of *Direct Assertion, Indication, Syntactical Connection, Context, Position* and *Name*,—there is not one which indicates that the act of *Fire-laying* is an integral part of all sacrifices; what forms part of all sacrifices is the *Fire*, and the *Fire-laying* comes in only with the Fire.—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then it is the *Fires*—not the *Fire-laying*—that come in as enjoined by the Vedic texts speaking of desirable results.—"But the *Fire-laying* is the means of getting the Fires."—Our answer to this is that *Fire-laying* is not the only means of getting the Fires; just as for the obtaining of other substances there are many such means as Purchase and the like, so there are for the obtaining of the Fires also; and it is not necessary to obtain it by

producing (it in the manner laid down in connection with the *Fire-laying* rite). So that while in one case the *Fire-laying* would come in for the obtaining of Fire, in another case it would not come in (when Fire would be obtained by other means). In that case where the *Fire-laying* does *not* come in (for the obtaining of Fire), the performance of the *Fire-laying* by the *Brāhmaṇa* and others would come in (by virtue of the sentences in question); so that when the meaning of the sentence '*Brāhmaṇo'gnīnādadhīta*' is that 'the *Brāhmaṇa* should lay the Fires for his own purposes', then alone,—not otherwise—do the *Āhavanīya* and other Fires come to be *laid* for the purposes of the Agent himself; and under the circumstances, it would follow that the *Agnihotra* and other rites should not be performed with the help of any such Fire as is produced artificially or obtained by *begging*; and it is concluded that it is only the *non-artificial* (natural) Fire that helps in the performance of the said rites.—"But how is it known that the act of *Fire-laying* is for the purposes of the Agent himself?"—It is so understood from the fact that the *Ātmanēpada* ending in the verb '*ādadhīta*' clearly indicates the fact of the result of the action (of *Ādhāna*, Fire-laying) accruing to the Agent. If the sentence containing this word '*ādadhīta*' were not there, and we depended entirely upon the Vedic texts speaking of desirable results, the result of the act of *Fire-laying* would not necessarily accrue to the Agent who had performed this act; [in that case the injunction of the Fire-laying would have to be inferred from the said Vedic texts, and as such an injunction would not necessarily contain the *Ātmanēpada* ending which could indicate the fact of the result accruing to the Agent only].

Further, as a matter of fact, so long as we have Vedic texts in the shape of the sentences in question directly laying down the *Fire-laying*, those Vedic texts which only speak of certain desirable results cannot justify the assumption of any other text laying down the same act; in fact any such assumed texts would only be repetitions of the texts that directly lay down the *Fire-laying*.

If there had been no such Vedic texts injunctive of *Fire-laying*, then, in that case,—if the Vedic texts speaking of certain desirable results did not imply the injunction of the *Fire-laying*, they would declare the *Agnihotra* and other rites to be incapable of being performed (as these cannot be performed without the properly *laid* fires, and *ex hypothesi*, there would be no such fires as there would be no *Fire-laying*); for this reason therefore it would be necessary for the Vedic texts speaking of desirable results to imply the injunction of the *Fire-laying*. When, however, we have Vedic texts (like those in question) directly laying down the Fire-laying, those Vedic texts that speak of desirable results, coming after the said texts (directly laying down *Fire-laying*), would naturally be taken as applying to those persons for whom the *Fire-laying* has been already laid down [specially when the texts speaking of desirable results following from sacrifices—such as '*Agnihotram jūhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*', lay down such acts as can be performed by those only who have done the *Fire-laying* in the proper manner].

[With a view to setting aside all the arguments that the *Siddhāntin* has put forward in support of the contention that the sentences in question have

to be taken as injunctive of the act of Fire-laying, as apart from those sentences in question, there would be no *Fire-laying*, and without properly *laid* Fires, there would be no sacrificial acts performed,—the *Pūrvapakṣin* puts forward the following arguments]—"As a matter of fact we have a direct Injunction of the act of Fire-laying (apart from the sentences in question),—in the shape of the text—'*Ēvam sapatnam bhrātṛvyam avarti sahatē ya ēvamvidvān agnimādhattē*'; and when the act of Fire-laying has been enjoined by this text, the sentences in question ('*Vasantē, etc.*') speaking of the *Brāhmaṇa* and others should be taken as laying down the conditions (for the choosing of particular seasons for that act).—It might be argued that 'the text just quoted contains only a reiteration (not the injunction) of the act of *Fire-laying*, for the purpose of laying down the details of the performance'.—But that cannot be so, we reply; as this sentence is entirely distinct from the sentence that lays down the details of performance; the meaning of the sentence '*agnīmādhattē*' ('lays the Fires') is quite different from the meaning of the sentence '*Apa upasṛjati*', *etc.* ('Heats water', etc.) (which lays down the details of the performance of that Fire-laying). It is only when two sentences express a single idea (or serve a single purpose) that they are regarded as 'one sentence'; in the case in question as the *ideas they express* (or the purposes they serve) are totally distinct, the sentences also must be taken as distinct."

Our reply to this argument is as follows:—When the text in question—'*Vasantē brāhmaṇo'gnīnādadhīta*'—is there (as injunctive of *Fire-laying*), any other text reiterating the same cannot be taken as *injunctive* (of that act). As for the *heating of water*, this is actually enjoined (in the sentence '*Apa upasṛjati*'); so that this being the only thing enjoined, there are not *two* purposes [served by the two sentences (*a*) '*evam sapatnam .... ādhattē*' and (*b*) '*apa upasṛjati*'].

"It is this sentence—'*Ya ēvam, etc.*'—which is really injunctive of the act of *Fire-laying*, and it is the sentence '*Vasantē brāhmaṇo, etc.*' which contains its reiteration for the purpose of laying down the details (in the shape of the *Season*, etc.)."

That cannot be, we reply. In fact the text containing the mention of the *Brāhmaṇa, etc.*—i.e. the text '*Vasantē brāhmaṇo, etc.*'—comes first, and the other, coming later, must be only a reiteration;—why so?—because the former does the enjoining directly by the word '*ādadhīta*,' where we find the injunctive '*Liṅ*' affix actually present; while all that the other sentence says is that 'the act of Fire-laying is praiseworthy (as destructive of the enemy)';—and this 'praiseworthiness' of the act of Fire-laying we readily admit. Thus what we assert is that the text injunctive of *Fire-laying* is the sentence '*Vasantē brāhmaṇo'gnīnādadhīta*'; and this view of ours is not shaken by the *declaration of praiseworthiness* in the other sentence; as it is quite reasonable to assert that one sentence praises what has been enjoined by another.—Our view would be shaken only if it were held that the other sentence—'*Ya evam, etc.*' is injunctive of the act of *Fire-laying*.—Why?—Because in that case this sentence would contain an injunction of something not already known; and as a mere eulogistic declaration could not speak of anything not already known, the implication of this would be that the

injunctive affix '*liṅ*' (in the word '*ādadhītā*' as contained in the sentence '*Vasantē brāhmaṇo, etc.*') does not enjoin anything not already known; and this would be incompatible with the very nature of the word whose sole function is the enjoining of something not already known! On the other hand, if the act is enjoined by the injunctive affix '*liṅ*', there would be nothing incompatible in the other sentence praising that act; because it is always possible for one sentence to praise what has been enjoined by another.—Lastly, when the injunctive does the *enjoining*, it is by *Direct Assertion*, while the praise is got at only through the *sentence* (Syntactical Connection) ('*Ya ēvam, etc.*') [on the strength of which, this injunction of *Fire-laying* could only be *inferred*]; and *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*.

Says the Opponent—"The other text '*Brāhmaṇo'gnīnādadhīta*' also is a *sentence* (just like the text '*Ya ēvam, etc.*') [so that in your case also, it is only through *Syntactical Connection* that the injunction contained in the word '*ādadhīta*' is connected with the rest of the sentence]."

Our answer to this is as follows—In the case of the sentence '*Vasantē brāhmaṇo*, etc.', when it enjoins the *Fire-laying*, it enjoins something directly expressed by the same word [i.e. the *ādhāna*, Fire-laying, is expressed by the word '*ādadhīta*' which also does the *enjoining*], in relation to the *Brāhmaṇa* and others; while the other sentence—'*Ya evamvidvān .... sahatē*'—the Praise is not expressed by the same word as the act that it praises [the act praised is expressed by the word '*ādhattē*', while the Praise is expressed by the other words in the sentence].

Objection—"According to your view, the single sentence would contain the injunction of several accessory details (the Fire-laying, the Brāhmaṇa performer, and *spring* as the time)."

That does not touch our position; it has already been explained that in the case of a sentence which is not primarily injunctive of accessory details, it is possible to have several details laid down,—under the *Sūtra*. 'The action as well as its accessories should be taken as enjoined, as they are not divorced in the injunctive word,—specially when they have not been enjoined by another text.' (1. 4. 9.)

From all this it becomes established that the sentence mentioning the *Brāhmaṇa*, etc. is injunctive of the act of *Fire-laying*, and the other sentence only reiterates the act of Fire-laying for the purpose of introducing the details of the performance of that act.

It has been argued above that the injunction of several accessories by a single sentence would involve a syntactical split. But there would be a syntactical split only if the sentence were taken as enjoining (1) the Fire-laying as qualified by one accessory (the Brāhmaṇa performer) and (2) the Fire-laying as qualified by the other accessory (the spring-time); as a matter of fact, the sentence (according to us) would enjoin *the single act of Fire-laying as qualified by the two qualifications* (Performing Agent and Time of Performance); so that there would be no syntactical split.

It becomes established by all this that the sentences in question are injunctive of the act of *Fire-laying* to be done by the Brāhmaṇa and other castes.

Adhikaraṇa (4): *The 'Dākṣāyaṇa' and the rest are Accessories, not distinct Acts.*

SŪTRA (5).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The texts relating to the 'Ayanas' should be regarded as injunctions of distinct acts;—(a) because particular names are attached to them."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, we find the text—'*Dākṣāyaṇayajñēna yajēta prajākāmaḥ, sākamprasthāpyēna yajēta pashukāmaḥ, saṅkramayajñēna yajētānnādyakāmaḥ*' ['One desirous of offspring should perform the *Dākṣāyaṇa*-sacrifice; one desirous of cattle should perform the *Sākamprasthāpya*-sacrifice; one desirous of food should perform the *Saṅkrama*-sacrifice'] (See Taitti-Saṁ. 2. 5. 4. 3).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do these sentences speak of particular results following from the adoption of particular accessories at the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice? Or are the acts mentioned distinct and independent sacrifices?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"They are distinct sacrifices;—why?—*because particular names are attached to them.* Though the Context and the use of the same root '*yaji*' (*to sacrifice*) indicate that it is the same sacrifice that has been previously enjoined,—yet, inasmuch as that sacrifice does not bear the names mentioned in the sentences in question, it follows that these sentences lay down distinct sacrifices."

SŪTRA (6).

[Pūrvapakṣa *continued*]—"(b) Also because no accessory is mentioned, the sentence must be taken as the injunction of an act."

Bhāṣya.

"We do not find in the sentence the mention of any accessory which could be regarded as enjoined by it; under the circumstances, if the sentence does not enjoin a distinct act, it is useless.—Further, if an accessory had been mentioned in the sentence, then we could understand that there is some connection between the sacrifice and that Accessory; and in that case the employment of this Accessory could be taken as enjoined by the sentence;—as a matter of fact, however, no Accessory is mentioned in the sentence, which mentions the *sacrifice* only; so that it is this *sacrifice* alone which could be taken as enjoined by the sentence."

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"(c) ALSO BECAUSE THE SENTENCE IS COMPLETE WITH THE MENTION OF THE RESULT."

Bhāṣya.

"For the following reason also the sentence should be taken as enjoining a distinct act—How?—*Because the sentence is complete with the mention of the result*—'*Prajākāmo yajēta*' ('Desiring offspring one should perform the sacrifice'); where the *sacrifice* is laid down as the means of obtaining offspring; and if it is so laid down, it must be a distinct act."

SŪTRA (8).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE ACT SPOKEN OF IN THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE A MODIFICATION (OF THE PREVIOUSLY-MENTIONED SACRIFICE); BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

The actions like the *Dākṣāyaṇa* and others mentioned in the sentence should be regarded as falling within the purview of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* itself; as it is only this view that would be in keeping with the *Context.*

SŪTRA (9).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE (OF THE SAME).

Bhāṣya.

The above view is supported also by indicative texts,—such as—'*Trimshatam varṣāṇi darsha-pūrṇamāsābhyām yajēta; yadi dākṣāyaṇayājī syāt atho api pañchadashaiva varṣāṇi yajēta, atra hi eva sā sampadyatē; dvē hi paurṇamāsyau yajēta dvē amāvāsyē, atra hi eva khalu sā sampad bhavati.*' ['One should perform the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* for thirty years; if he is a performer of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* he should perform it for fifteen years only; even thus does it become accomplished; as the *Dākṣāyaṇa* contains two *Paurṇamāsa* and two *Darsha* sacrifices; thus is accomplishment attained in fifteen years']. —There would be some purpose in accomplishing the 'thirty' in the manner indicated, only if the *Dākṣāyaṇa* were the same as the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*; then alone would there be some possibility of the said accomplishment. For this reason also the act spoken of in the sentence in question cannot be regarded as distinct.—[This completion of the *thirty years' course of the Darshapūrṇamāsa* by the performance of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* for fifteen years distinctly indicates the non-difference of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* from the *Darshapūrṇamāsa.* Such completion could not be possible if the two were entirely different. The text cannot be taken to mean that the course of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* itself is reduced to one of *fifteen* years in the case of the performer being one who has performed the *Dākṣāyaṇa* sacrifice. Because the course of one sacrifice could not be reduced by the performance of a totally different sacrifice. Nor would there be any justification, in this case, for the explanation that the fact of *two Darshas and two Paurṇamāsas* are performed in course

of the *Dākṣāyaṇa* serves to reduce the course from *thirty* to *fifteen* years—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 842.]

SŪTRA (10).

THE NAME ATTACHED TO THE ACT ('DĀKṢĀYAṆA') IS DUE TO THE PECULIARITY OF THE ACCESSORY DETAIL.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under *Sūtra* 5) that "the acts should be distinct, *because particular names are attached to them*";—but the act spoken of by the name '*dākṣāyaṇa*' would be treated as a distinct act only if the name could not, in any way, be made to be applicable to the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*;—as a matter of fact, however, the name is capable of being applied to this latter, on the basis of the presence, in that sacrifice, of '*āvṛtti*', *Repetition* as an accessory detail; the term '*ayana*' (in the name '*dākṣāyaṇa*') connotes *repetition*,—and '*dākṣa*' is *that which pertains to Dakṣa*;—hence the term '*dākṣāyaṇa*' denotes *the repetition of that which pertains to Dakṣa*.—"But who is '*Dakṣa*'?"—The man (sacrificer or priest) who is quick and expert [so expert that he completes the thirty-years' course of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* in *fifteen years* only;—and as this is done by repeating the *Darsha* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*; the term '*dākṣāyaṇa*' stands for *the repeated performance of the Darshapūrṇamāsa by the expert sacrificer and priests*; and as such the name is applicable to the *Darshapūrṇamāsa sacrifice* itself.]

Similarly with the name '*sākamprasthāpya*'; it is based upon the *presence of an accessory detail* [in the shape of the '*sākam-prasthāna*', i.e. the material whose '*prasthāna*', *proceeding* (to the place of *Homa*), is done '*sākam*', *along with*, the smaller vessels, without slicing off the *sānnāyya*] at the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* itself.

Similarly in the case of the other names also.

Thus then, in so far as the names ('*dākṣāyaṇa*' and the rest) are capable of connoting the presence of certain accessory details at the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* itself, why should the sacrifice, which is cognised as that same, be regarded as a different one? Why too should it be repugnant to the *Context* if the terms are taken as standing for the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* itself?

SŪTRA (11).

THERE IS NOTHING PECULIAR IN THE COMPLETION (OF THE SENTENCE WITH THE MENTION OF THE RESULT).

Bhāṣya.

As regards the argument urged (in Sū. 7) that "the sentence is quite complete with the mention of the result, hence it enjoins a distinct sacrifice for one who is desirous of *offspring* and other results",—our answer is that it is not so; as *there is nothing peculiar in the completion of the sentence* with the mention of the result; that is to say, on this point (of being complete with the mention of the result), the sentence under discussion does not differ from several other sentences which have been accepted, beyond doubt,

to be injunctive of results following from certain accessory details,—such sentences, for instance, as 'If one is desirous of acquiring sense-efficiency, one should make the offering of curd' (cf. Tai. Brā. 2. 1. 5. 6)—which have, on that account, been definitely recognised as mentioning results following from the accessories concerned;—because in the sentence in question, also, what is spoken of is the result (*offspring*) following from the adoption of the accessory detail (in the shape of the *Repetition* denoted by the name '*Dākṣāyaṇa*').

Objection—"Why cannot the sentence be construed to mean that 'one should perform the sacrifice for one desirous of offspring' [this sacrifice being quite distinct from the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*]?"

Answer—In that case, how could the *Repeated Sacrifice* (which is what is connoted by the name '*dākṣāyaṇa*') be performed *for the man desiring offspring*? What the name 'repeated sacrifice' indicates as to be performed is *the repetition of the same sacrifice*, not a distinct *sacrifice*.

From all this we conclude that what the sentence in question mentions is the result following from the adoption of a certain accessory, and it does not enjoin a distinct sacrifice.

Similarly with the *Sākamprasthāpya* sacrifice and the *Saṅkrama* sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *Sacrifices spoken of along with distinct Materials and Deities are distinct.*

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA A]—"IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A PREPARATORY RITE, NOT OCCURRING IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY SACRIFICE; SPECIALLY AS THERE IS NO CONNOTING OF AN ACT."

Bhāṣya.

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the texts—(*a*) '*Vāyavyam shvētamālabhēta bhūtikāmaḥ*' ['One desiring prosperity should touch the white (goat) dedicated to *Vāyu*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 1. 1. 1), (*b*) '*Sauryam charum nīrvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ* ['One desiring Brahmic glory should offer the cooked rice dedicated to Sūrya'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 2. 3);—and in connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, we find the texts—(*a*) '*Īṣāmālabhēta*' ['One should touch the cart-pole'], and (*b*) '*Chaturo muṣṭīr-nirvapati*' ['He offers four handfuls']. [Wherein also we find the two acts of Touching and Offering, but enjoined in connection with the *Cart-pole* and the *Four Handfuls* respectively.]

In regard to (*a*) and (*b*) above, there arises the question (*A*)—Does the mention of the *ālambha* (Touching) enjoin an accessory detail (viz. the *shvēta* dedicated to *Vāyu*) in connection with the *Touching* that is done at the primary sacrifice, *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* itself (in connection with the *cart-pole*),—and the mention of the *nirvāpa* (*Offering*) enjoins an accessory detail (viz. *dedication to Sūrya*) in connection with the *Offering* done at the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* itself (in connection with the Four Handfuls)? Or is each of these two acts meant to be distinct and independent?—(*B*)—In case, these declarations are independent of the Primary Sacrifice (and they lay down distinct acts)—are the two acts precisely and merely those that are mentioned in the texts (i.e. mere *Touching* and mere *Offering*)? Or are they meant to be accompanied by the act of *sacrificing* in both cases?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* (*A*)—"The two texts are injunctive of accessory details in reference to the *Touching* and *Offering* done at the Primary Sacrifice of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*;—why?—because they contain *no word denoting the act of sacrifice*;—i.e. in the texts there is *no word injunctive of any act*.—'But there are the words *ālabhēta* (which denotes the act of *touching*) and *nirvapēt* (which denotes the act of *offering*).'—These words are not *injunctive*; that word alone is *injunctive* which speaks of what is not already known; while what is expressed by these two words,—viz. that 'the *Touching* should be done' and 'the *Offering* should be done'—is not anything that is not already known. For this reason, these words should be regarded as only reiterative (of something already enjoined elsewhere).—'But why should they reiterate it?'—The reiteration is done for the purpose (*a*) of enjoining the '*shvēta*' in

reference to the *Touching* and (*b*) of enjoining the '*Cooked Rice*' in reference to the *Offering*.—From this it follows that the *Touching* and the *Offering* mentioned in the texts are not distinct from those forming part of the primary (*Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*); and that the texts only enjoin accessory details in connection with those acts as occurring in the Primary Sacrifice itself."

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA B]—"THE ACTS SHOULD BE REGARDED (AS DISTINCT AND) AS CONSISTING IN JUST WHAT IS EXPRESSLY MENTIONED IN THE TEXT; AS EVERY ACT IS BASED UPON THE DIRECT VEDIC TEXT."

Bhāṣya.

[In reply to the above *Pūrvapakṣa* (*A*) we have the arguments set forth here, which go to support the view that *the acts are distinct and independent*;—so far what is set forth in the present Sūtra 13 would be in keeping with the *Siddhānta*; but it goes on to add that these acts are just those mentioned in the texts—i.e. mere *Touching* and mere *Offering*—without any connection with the act of *sacrificing*. As this is not in keeping with the *Siddhānta* view, this *Sūtra* is taken as embodying the *second Pūrvapakṣa* (*B*).]

"It is not correct to say that the texts in question only lay down accessory details in connection with the *Touching* and *Offering* done at the Primary Sacrifice;—in fact, they enjoin a distinct Touching and a distinct *Offering*.—If the Touching and the *Offering* were enjoined (by the sentence in question), then these acts could not be those that have been enjoined in connection with the Primary Sacrifice.—If they were not *enjoined* (by the second sentence), then, these acts would be the same as those enjoined in connection with the Primary Sacrifice, and they would have to be taken as only *indicated* in the sentence in question, as the acts of *Touching* and *Offering* that have to be done;—and having indicated those acts, the *Shvēta* and the *Cooked Rice* would have to be taken as enjoined in reference to those acts so indicated;—and they would be thus enjoined for the person 'desiring prosperity' and the person 'desiring Brahmic glory'; so that two factors—the accessory *Shvēta* and the *Prosperity as the result*, or the accessory *Cooked Rice* and *Brahmic glory as the Result*—would have to be taken as enjoined by the sentences in question; and this would involve a syntactical split.—Or, (there would be another difficulty)—the only word in these sentences, which could be injunctive would be taken up by the *indicating*; so that, there being no injunctive word left, even a single factor could not be enjoined.—'The same word may do the *indicating* (the act of *Touching* already enjoined) and also *enjoining* (of the *Shvēta*).'—No such joint *enjoining* and *indicating* is possible.—'In the same term (*ālabhēta*) what is denoted by the *verbal root* would be a reiteration, or reference to, the *Touching* already known and what is denoted by the *affix* would be the injunction (of the accessory),—the meaning of the sentence being that *the act of Touching already known should have the Shvēta for its accessory* (*i.e. it should be done to the Shvēta*).'—Even so, the indication (or reference) would not (necessarily)

be that of the Touching enjoined in connection with the Primary Sacrifice; as the act of *Touching* is known also as done in ordinary life (and not necessarily as that which is done at the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*). If it were the connotation of the '*Liṅ*' *affix* that were reiterated (or referred to), then this reiteration could be that of the accessory connected with the Primary Sacrifice; as this accessory is one that has to be brought up at the performance, and not one that exists in the ordinary world.—Thus it is not possible for the sentences to be taken as mere reiteration of the *Touching* or *Offering* enjoined in connection with the Primary Sacrifice.—For these reasons we conclude that *the acts should be performed* as distinct, and just in that form in which they are *expressly mentioned in the text—i.e. mere 'Touching', or mere 'Offering'—as every act is based upon the direct Vedic text*; every religious act is only such as is mentioned in the Vedic text; as has been made clear under Sūtra 1. 1. 2.—Thus it follows that the sentences in question lay down distinct acts of *Touching* and *Offering* (without any connection with any *sacrifice*)."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, IT IS THE ACT OF 'SACRIFICE' THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ENJOINED; AS THE CONNECTION OF THE MATERIAL, THE RESULT AND THE PARTAKER (IS EXPRESSED IN THE SENTENCE), AND THESE ARE RELATED TO AN ACT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been asserted by the *Purvapakṣin* (*B*) that the two sentences in question are not injunctive of accessories for the acts (of Touching and Offering) enjoined in connection with the Primary "Sacrifice."—This we accept. But the other assertion—that "they enjoin mere *touching*, or mere *Offering* (independently of any act of *sacrifice*)",—we repudiate; because what are enjoined are these acts *accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice'*.—Why?—*Because of the connection of the Material, the Result and the Partaker*;—i.e. on account of the sentences expressing the connection between the *Material* and the *Deity* (Partaker of the Material offered); what is actually enjoined in the sentences is the connection between the Material and the Deity, for the person desiring prosperity and for the person desiring Brahmic glory.—How so?—The sentence does not say simply that 'one shall touch the *shvēta*'; if this were all that was meant, then the connection expressed would be that between the *Shvēta* and the *Touching*;—but what is actually said is that 'one should touch the *Vāyavya shvēta*'; so that what is enjoined is the connection between the *Shvēta* and *Vāyavya*; just as in the sentence 'Weave the cloth' what is enjoined is the connection between the *cloth* and the *weaving*, and in the sentence 'Weave a long piece of cloth', what is enjoined is the *length* of the *woven cloth*—as is made clear by the presence of the word 'long';—in the same manner, in the case in question, because the sentences contain the words '*Vāyavya*' and '*Saurya*' (which mean 'dedicated to Vāyu' and 'dedicated to Sūrya'), it follows that what

is enjoined by the sentences is the connection between the Material (*Shvēta* or *Cooked Rice*) and the Deity (*Vāyu* or *Sūrya*). If this were not so, then the implication would be that the presence of the names of the deities is a wrong reading of the texts.

Objection—"But even so, there would be syntactical split; as the meaning of the sentence would be—'one should make the *Shvēta vāyavya* (dedicated to *Vāyu*)—and he should touch it'."

Not so, we reply; it would not be too great a burden for the injunctive word '*ālabhēta*' ('should touch') to signify the agent's activity in regard to the connecting of the Material and the Deity, as qualified by the further idea that *it should be touched*; it is by Direct Assertion itself that *the Agent's activity as thus qualified* is declared,—it is only the connection between the Material and the Deity that is expressed by *Syntactical Connection*;—so that (in this interpretation) there is no need for two *sentences* (and Syntactical Connections) [so that there is no possibility of any syntactical split].—[To take an instance from ordinary usage]—In the case of the sentence 'Yoke the red horse',—when it is taken as enjoining an accessory, and two accessories are taken as enjoined, then there is need for two sentences;—when however all that is said is 'Bring the Red', there is injunction of two accessories even by the sentence itself taken as enjoining an accessory, as the qualified sentence (animal) is spoken of by Direct Assertion itself; on this account this burden is not too great for the single sentence.—It is exactly the same in the case in question also.—The sentence in question, under this interpretation, would be 'expressing a single idea' (or 'serving a single purpose'), as what would be expressed by it is the connection or relationship as qualified by several words;—furthermore, if the words of the sentence are separated from one another, they become 'wanting' (incomplete);—so that both the conditions of 'one sentence' are fulfilled.

Without a *sacrifice*, however, it is not possible for a material to be 'dedicated' to a Deity; so that this connection (of the *sacrifice*) also has to come in.—From all this it follows that what are enjoined are the two acts of *Touching* and *Offering accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice'*.

SŪTRA (15).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

The view above set forth is supported by indicative texts: In reference to the injunction '*Somāraudram charunnirvapēt*' ('one should offer cooked rice dedicated to *Soma-Rudra*',) (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 10. 1), we have the sentence '*Parishṛtē yājayēt*' ('The sacrifice should be performed after the rice has been properly cooked') (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 10. 2), where we have the injunction of *proper cooking*; and here we find the act of '*Offering*' mentioned in the first sentence '*Somāraudram*, etc.' referred to in the second sentence by means of the root '*yāji*' ('to sacrifice') as contained in the word '*yājayēt*'; and this would be justifiable only if, in the sentences in question the two acts were taken to be enjoined as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice' [and on that analogy the 'offering' spoken of in

'*Somarudram*', etc., also were taken as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice']. —If, on the other hand, the sentences were taken as laying down an accessory in connection with the Primary Sacrifice (as in *Pūrvapakṣa* A)—or as laying down just what is expressed by the words (as in *Pūrvapakṣa* B)—then it could not be possible to speak of (refer to) the act of 'Offering' by means of the word '*yājayēt*'. From this we conclude that the acts enjoined by the sentences in question are *as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice'*.

[In the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* we considered the question as to the sentence being an Injunction or a mere Reiteration of, or Reference to, a previously-enjoined act :—while in the present *Adhikaraṇa* we have dealt with a case where the Injunctive character being admitted, the question discussed is as to the nature of the act enjoined.—*Tantravārtika*.—Trans., p. 851.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'Touching' of the Calf is a Preparatory Act.*

SŪTRA (16).

IN A DOUBTFUL CASE [THE CORRECT CONCLUSION IS DERIVED] FROM THE PERCEPTION OF SIMILARITY.

Bhāṣya.

[A preliminary objection is raised]—"What is the illustrative text here? We do not find it mentioned here in the *Sūtra*, as we did in the case of the Sūtra '*Aveṣṭau yajñasamyogāt*, etc.' (2. 3. 3) [where the text mentioning the *Avēṣṭi* is clearly indicated]; nor does the *Sūtra* declare what is meant to be proved, as is done in Sū. 2. 3. 5 [where what is meant to be proved is clearly stated as that 'the *Dākṣāyaṇa* is a distinct act'];—all that the present *Sūtra* does is to mention '*the perception of similarity* in a doubtful case' as a reason; and we do not know for what (conclusion) this is a *reason*. The subject-matter of the context (of the *Sūtras*) is 'action accompanied by a sacrifice' (spoken of in the *Siddhānta-Sūtra*, 2. 3. 14, of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*); but we do not find anything that could connect the present *Sūtra* with that *act*;—so that this *Sūtra* appears to convey no meaning, and as such is useless."

Answer—It is necessary to explain what is the proposition meant to be established here—and what is the 'doubt' referred to in the *Sūtra*. In fact, we know the Proposition and the Doubt from the words of the *Vṛttikāra*: This revered Teacher has cited the text—'*Vatsamālabhēta, vatsanikāntā hi pashavaḥ*' ['One should touch the calf; animals are very fond of their calves']; (see Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 1. 4. 8) and has propounded, in connection with this text, the *Doubt*—Does the root '*ālabh*' (*to touch*, occurring in the word '*ālabhēta*') signify the act of *Touching* as accompanied by the act of sacrifice'? Or does it signify *mere* 'Touching'?—The text cited here is most suitable, and so also is the *question* propounded.

In connection with this question, the same Teacher has set forth the *Pūrvapakṣa* that "the root does signify *the Touching as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice.'*"

The present *Sūtra* provides a counter-instance (exception) to what has gone before in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*. Though, in reality, there is not much useful purpose served by the propounding of the present *Pūrvapakṣa* (and its refutation), yet as there are varying degrees of intelligence among men, there may be some people of dull intellect who might be led to draw

conclusions from premises based on mere analogy;—such for instance, on the basis of the fact that a man stung by a mildly poisonous scorpion does not die, one might conclude that 'in no case of scorpion-bite should any careful medication be resorted to' [similarly, as in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, so in the present instance also, the word in question must be taken as signifying the Touching accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice'],—and such conclusions have to be set aside (shown to be wrong). It is for the purpose of setting aside such a conclusion that the Teacher has propounded as the present *Pūrvapakṣa* the view that some people might hold, that—"in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* it was found that the *Touching* spoken of in connection with an animate object was accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice,'—and in the present case also we find that the *Touching* is spoken of in connection with an animate object,—hence this also should be taken as accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice.'—Or (the *Pūrvapakṣa* may be stated in the form that) "in the foregoing *adhikaraṇa* we found the root 'to touch' signifying *Touching accompanied by the act of 'sacrifice,'*—and it is that same which is referred to or reiterated in the text cited here, for the purpose of laying down the 'calf' (as the animal to be *touched*, in place of the *shvēta* in connection with which we had the *touching* in the foregoing *adhikaraṇa*). The advantage in stating the *Pūrvapakṣa* in this latter form is that no fresh result has to be assumed [in connection with the present *adhikaraṇa*, as the connection with the result mentioned in the foregoing *adhikaraṇa*—viz: *Prosperity*—continues to be maintained in the present *adhikaraṇa* also.]"

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In a doubtful case,—like the one just propounded,—what is enjoined is *mere Touching* as a preparatory act;—why so?—because of *the perception of similarity*. That is, there are other sanctificatory or preparatory acts described, along with which is mentioned the act in question also;—and definite conclusions are actually derived from *similarity* also; for instance, what is written down *as if it were* the 'foremost thing' is actually recognised as the 'foremost thing'.—"The *perception of similarity* is a mere *indicative*; how can it establish any conclusion?"—Our answer is that this is just what has got to be explained in the present *Adhikaraṇa*,—how a conclusion can be established on the basis of the *perception of similarity*.—"But how can the *perception of similarity* act as a valid reason (leading to a conclusion)?"—It can do so, when the conclusion concerned is a reasonable one.—"What is the *reasonableness* of the conclusion in the present instance?"—The fact that makes the conclusion *reasonable* is that, in the text we are dealing with, there is *not* (as there *was* in the text dealt with under the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*) any expression speaking of the connection of a deity; which shows that the act spoken of cannot be of the nature of a *sacrifice* (in which the connection of a deity is essential); —and the fact that shows the reasonableness of the conclusion is that the act in question serves a visible purpose,—the touching of the calf will make the cow yield more milk.—Thus the conclusion being one that is found to be reasonable, the 'perception of similarity' becomes indicative (confirmatory) of it.—Hence the conclusion is that the text speaks of mere *Touching* and that as a preparatory act.

SŪTRA (17).

Also because of the possibility of connection with the commendatory declaration.

Bhāṣya.

In continuation of the sentence speaking of the act of 'touching' the calf, we find the commendatory declaration that 'animals are very fond of their calves';—the sense of the two sentences being that 'Because animals are very fond of their calves, therefore the calf should be touched.'—Now all this declaration would have some sense only if the *Touching* were done for the purpose of making the cow yield more milk; if the Touching were meant to be done for the purpose of *killing* (for being offered in *sacrifice*), then there could be no connection with the commendatory declaration. [The fact of animals being fond of their calves could never be a reason for *killing* the calf].—For this reason also it becomes established that what is spoken of is mere *Touching*, and that as a preparatory act.

Adhikaraṇa (7): *The Boiled Nīvāra Rice is for the purpose of being deposited.*

SŪTRA (18).

As connected with the word denoting an Action, the thing should be taken as being for the purpose of that action; specially as such is the sense of the Direct Assertion.

Bhāṣya.

[The *Adhikaraṇa* before the last has dealt with the two acts of *Touching* and *Offering*;—the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* has dealt with a counter-instance to that *Adhikaraṇa*, in relation to the act of *Touching*; in the present *Adhikaraṇa* we have the counter-instance to it, in relation to the act of *Preparing*. The present case cannot be covered by one just dealt with, as here we find some sort of a connection with a *deity* in the shape of *Bṛhaspati*, while there was no Deity concerned in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.]

In connection with *Agni*-sacrifice, there is the text '*Naivārashcharurbhavati*' ['the cooked rice is of *Nīvāra* corn']; and following upon this is the text—'*Yadēnañcharumupadadhāti*' ['He deposits this cooked rice'].

In regard to this, there arises the question.—Is the *cooked rice* for the purpose of being used at the sacrifice, and is it only what is left over after the sacrifice that is to be deposited? Or is the cooked rice got ready only for being *deposited*?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"The *Cooked Rice* is for being offered at the *sacrifice*; the well-known use for cooked rice is that of being offered at sacrifices, not of being *deposited*.—It might be argued that 'though the well-known use of cooked rice is that of being offered at sacrifices, yet,—as the sentence contains no word signifying a deity, nor any word expressive of the *act of sacrifice*, it follows that the cooked rice spoken of in the text in question cannot be for the purpose of being offered at a sacrifice'.—Our answer to this is that towards the end of the text quoted we find the sentence '*Bṛhaspatērvā ētadannam yannīvārāḥ*' ['The *Nīvāra*-corn is the food of Bṛhaspati']; this mention of the deity could be construed along with the sentence in question; so that the two sentences together would convey the idea that 'the Nīvāra of which Bṛhaspati is the Deity should be deposited'; and this would mean that the cooked Nīvāra-rice is meant for the purpose of being offered at the sacrifice (to *Bṛhaspati*)."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

As connected with the word denoting an action,—i.e. the word '*upadadhāti*', 'deposits'—*the thing should be taken as being for the purpose of that action*,—i.e. for the purpose of being *deposited*. The connection of the 'cooked rice' with the action of being 'deposited' is direct, perceptible;

while its connection with the sentence speaking of the Deity (*Bṛhaspati*) is indirect, only inferable;—since the assertion in the form 'he deposits the cooked rice' is direct and actually present in the Veda,—while the assertion in the form 'he deposits that of which *Bṛhaspati* is the Deity' is only inferable (from the connection between the text 'he deposits the cooked rice' and the subsequent sentence '*Nīvāra* is the food of *Bṛhaspati*'). From this it follows that the whole of the cooked rice is to be 'deposited'; and out of it so 'deposited', a small quantity could be used at a sacrifice; but that would be using the thing on an occasion (and for a purpose) other than the one that is directly laid down in the Vedic text.

As for the sentence 'the *Nīvāra* corn belongs to *Bṛhaspati*', it is purely commendatory.

It has been argued above that the fact of Cooked Rice being meant for sacrifices is well-known.—But such generally recognised notions are always set aside by direct assertions of the Veda.

Thus it becomes established that the Cooked Rice is for the purpose of being 'deposited'.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The 'Tvāṣṭra-Pātnīvata' has the 'Paryagnikaraṇa' for its Accessory.*

SŪTRA (19).

INASMUCH AS THE ACTION IS THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS ONE, THE QUALIFICATION IS OF THE PĀTNĪVATA.

Bhāṣya.

Following upon the injunction of the *Pātnīvata* appertaining to *Tvaṣṭṛ* (Kāṭha. Saṁ. 30. 1) is the text—'*Paryagnikṛtam pātnīvatam utsṛjanti*' ['They let off the Pātnīvata animal over which the *Encircling of Fire* has been performed'].—In regard to this there arises the question—Does the sentence lay down the *letting off* of the same *Pātnīvata* which has been enjoined before as appertaining to *Tvaṣṭṛ*, but along with *Paryagnikaraṇa* as the accessory? Or does it lay down the *letting off* of a *Pātnīvata* which is totally different from what has been previously enjoined as appertaining to *Tvaṣṭṛ*?

If the sentence is construed by connecting the word '*paryagnikṛtam*' with the word '*utsṛjanti*' [i.e. if *the letting off of that over which Paryagnikaraṇa has been performed* be predicated of the *Pātnīvata*] then, the meaning would be that the *letting off* is to be of the same *Pātnīvata* which has been previously enjoined as appertaining to *Tvaṣṭṛ* (but as qualified in the stated manner); while if the word '*pātnīvatam*' is connected with the word '*utsṛjanti*', then the *letting off* of the *Pātnīvata* laid down would be distinct from the previous *Pātnīvata* enjoined as *related to Tvaṣṭṛ*.

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"An entirely distinct act is laid down in the sentence;—why?—how could the term '*pātnīvata*' (in the second sentence) be taken as referring to the *Pātnīvata* as qualified by two qualifications—(1) of being the previously-enjoined one, appertaining to *Tvaṣṭṛ* and (2) of being accompanied by *Paryagnikaraṇa*? [As such a construction would involve a syntactical split].—Further, if what is enjoined were the *offering* of what appertains to *Tvaṣṭṛ*,—then the qualification '*paryagnikṛtam*' could not form part of the Injunction. It is for this reason that we assert that what is enjoined by the sentence in question is that *what has been made Paryagnikṛta* has to be made *Pātnīvata* (i.e. offered to *Patnīvat*), and this constitutes an act of *sacrifice*."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—What is enjoined is not a distinct act, it is the '*avachchheda*', *qualification*, of the previously-enjoined action, which is referred to in the sentence by means of the word '*utsṛjanti*' ('let off').—"What would be the advantage in this interpretation?"—*Firstly*, it will not be necessary to assume the mention of the act of 'sacrifice' (which is not actually spoken of in the sentence in question);—*secondly*, the term '*utsṛjanti*' directly laying down the act of

letting off would not be set aside by the indications of Syntactical Connection;—on the other hand, if the act enjoined were a distinct one,—and what was enjoined by the injunctive term '*utsṛjanti*' in the sentence were the fact of being made *Pātnīvata*,—then the verbal root in '*utsṛjanti*' would have to be taken only as reiterating and referring to the act of *letting off* which would be already got at by implication.—Further, the fact that the previously-enjoined act along with the *Paryagnikaraṇa* is to be made *Pātnīvata*, being already known, could not be the object of an Injunction. For all these reasons the sentence in question should be taken as laying down the qualification of the previously-enjoined Act.

It has been argued that—"if the offering of the *Tvāṣṭra* (what appertains to *Tvaṣṭṛ*) were taken as enjoined, then the qualification '*Paryagnikṛtam*' could not form part of the Injunction."—This however does not affect our position; because no significance attaching to the word '*pātnīvatam*', this *Pātnīvata* would not be qualified by any qualification; hence what the term '*pātnīvata*' standing by itself does is to indirectly reiterate and refer to *that Pātnīvata* which *appertains to Tvaṣṭṛ*, which is characterised by the two qualifications; so that there would be no incongruity at all.

Thus it is established that what is laid down is the qualification of the act already previously enjoined.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *'Adābhya' and 'Amshu' are names of the act of 'Holding'.*

SŪTRA (20).

When the name appears alone by itself, without any material, it should be subsidiary to the primary sacrifice.

Bhāṣya.

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the texts—'*Ēṣa vai haviṣā haviryajatē yo'dābhyam gṛhītvā somāya yajatē*' ['He offers the real material at sacrifice who, holding the *Adābhya*, sacrifices to Soma'], —and '*Parā vā ētasyāyuḥ prāṇa ēti yo'mshum gṛhṇāti*' ['If one holds the *Amshu*, his life reaches its highest span'.] (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 3. 4. 1.)

In regard to these there arises the question—Do these sentences speak of distinct sacrifices at which the said *Cup-Holdings* (*grahaṇa*) come in? Or do they lay down the *Cup-Holdings* in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice itself?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The sentence should be taken as speaking of an entirely different sacrifice;—why?—because of the presence of a new name ('*Ādābhya*' or *Amshu*'). In course of the primary sacrifice (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) there is no such sacrifice bearing the name ('*Ādābhya*', or '*Amshu*'); nor is there any *Holding* whose repetition could be made the object of injunction by the sentence in question. Consequently the sacrifice mentioned in the sentence must be a totally different one.—'But we do not find any material or Deity mentioned (of this new sacrifice)?—It does not matter if no material or Deity is mentioned: so long as there is the word '*sacrifice*' '*yajatē*' itself. Hence what the sentences mean is (*a*) that 'one should perform *the sacrifice named Adābhya*' and (*b*) that 'one should perform *the sacrifice named Amshu*'."

Against this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—When what we find is the mere name, without any mention of the material or the Deity, the sentence should be taken as laying down the repetition of particular *Cup-Holdings* at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice itself (at which there are numerous *Cup-Holdings*).—"Why so?"—Because in reality the name mentioned (*Adābhya* or *Amshu*) is that of a *Cup that is held*, not of a *sacrifice*; as is clear from the fact that it is connected with the *Holding* directly, while with the *sacrifice*, it is connected only indirectly.—As regards the term '*Amshu*', there is absolutely no doubt as to its being the name of a *Cup that is held*;—the mere difference of *Cup-Holding* does not make the *sacrifice* different.—Nor do we find any material or Deity mentioned, on the basis whereof the sentence could be taken as speaking of the *Holding* accompanied by the act of *Sacrifice*.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that "the term '*yajatē*' ('sacrifices') itself is found in the sentence, and this is injunctive of the *sacrifice*".

But even so, no distinct and independent sacrifice could be enjoined by the said word; as it really stands for a sacrifice that has already been enjoined (by another sentence), and the sentence in question does not speak of anything which could distinguish the *sacrifice* here spoken of from that already enjoined elsewhere.—From this it follows that it is the previously-enjoined *sacrifice* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself which is spoken of by means of the root '*yaji*', 'to sacrifice' (as occurring in the word '*yajatē*' in the sentence in question),—and what are *enjoined* by the terms '*amshu*' and '*adābhya*' are fresh repetitions of the Cup-Holdings at that same sacrifice (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

Adhikaraṇa (10): *The 'Agnichayana'—'Collecting of Fire'—is a Preparatory Act.*

SŪTRA (21).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The term 'agni' should be understood to denote a sacrifice, because of the presence of indicatives."

Bhāṣya.

There is '*Agni*' enjoined in the sentence '*Ya ēvamvidvān agnim chinutē*' ('He who, knowing this, collects the *Agni*'),—and this injunction followed by the sentences—'*Athāto'gnimagniṣṭomēnaivānuyajati, tamukthēna, tamatirātrēṇa, tam ṣoḍashinā, etc. etc.*' (Cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 5. 2. 1.)

[In connection with the term '*agni*' as found in the injunction '*Agnim chinutē*'] there arises the question—Does this term '*agni*' denote a *sacrifice*, different from the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and other sacrifices, which is enjoined by the verb '*chinutē*'? Or does it denote a *material*, and the sentence enjoins an accessory (in the shape of that material) for the Jyotiṣṭoma and other sacrifices?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"*The word 'agni' denotes a sacrifice*;—why?—because *there are indicatives present*; we find an indicative that points to that conclusion, in the shape of such expressions as '*agni's stotra*', '*agni's shastra*', 'the six *upasads* of the *Agni*'; all of which goes to show that the term '*agni*' denotes that of which the '*stotra*', the '*shastra*' and the '*upasads*' form part;—and all these form part of the *sacrifice*;—hence the term '*agni*' should be taken as denoting a *sacrifice*.—'A mere indicative does not prove anything, please point out an Injunction'.—Our answer to this is that, there is the second sentence (quoted above)—'*Athato'gnimagniṣṭomēnaivānuyajati*',—which means that 'one performs the *sacrifice*'; and it is this sacrifice which is specified as '*Agni*'; from which it follows that this sacrifice is named '*Agni*'. It is only when the '*Agni*' is a sacrifice that the preposition '*anu*' becomes a complement of the root '*yaj*' (in the word '*anuyajati*'). From all this it follows that *the word should be understood to denote of a sacrifice.*"

SŪTRA (22).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, it is the substance that is spoken of by the word; because the Injunction is for that purpose.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it is the substance that is spoken of by the word 'agni'.—"Which is that substance?"—It is *the burning substance*, Fire, that is spoken of; in fact, this is the well-known meaning of the word '*agni*'. The verb

'*chinutē*' ('collects') is injunctive of the act of *collecting*, and it cannot denote the act of *sacrifice*. By *collecting* the Fire, one 'prepares' it, that is, places it on the altar;—the preposition '*anu*' will denote sequence; the meaning being that 'one performs the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice *after* the completion of the act of *collecting* the Fire'.

SŪTRA (23).

ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT OF THE CONNECTION OF AGNI WITH ALL SACRIFICES, ANY SACRIFICE MAY BE NAMED 'AGNI'; BUT THAT NAME WOULD ONLY SERVE TO LAY DOWN THE DETAILS OF THE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that by reason of there being indicatives, the term '*agni*' should be regarded as denoting a sacrifice. —But this would be so only in so far as those sentences are concerned where these indicatives occur, not in all cases. The name '*Agni*', however, can be applicable to sacrifices only indirectly (figuratively),—on the basis of all sacrifices being connected with the *Fire on the Altar*. Consequently all those words that appear to be denoting a *sacrifice* would serve the purpose of laying down the details of the sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *Sacrifices like the 'Monthly Agnihotra' are distinct and independent.*

SŪTRA (24).

WHEN THE CONTEXT IS DIFFERENT, THE PURPOSE MUST BE DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

[We have finished the consideration of the Differentiation of Actions by their accessories; and we have also dealt with all side-issues—as to what sort of accessory is that mentioned in a subsequent sentence which, not being applicable to the Action mentioned in the previous sentence, makes that mentioned in the subsequent sentence different from it; and what sort is that which is applicable to the previously-mentioned action, and as such does not point to a different Action.—The other five means of differentiation of actions having thus been dealt with we now proceed the cases of differentiation by *Context*.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 871.]

In connection with the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, we find the sentences '*Māsamagnihotram juhoti, māsam darshapūrṇamāsābhyām yajatē*' and so forth. ['He offers the *Agnihotra*-oblation for a month', 'He performs the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* for a month'.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this time 'month' enjoined here for the original (compulsory) *Agnihotra*, and the original *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices? Or do the sentences enjoin acts distinct from the original *Agnihotra* and the original *Darshapūrṇamāsa*?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"The sentences lay down the time for the original acts (of *Agnihotra* and *Darshapūrṇamāsa*).—Why so?—Because the term actually used, '*māsam*' ('for a month'), has clearly the form of the injunction of time.—'In what way has it the form of the injunction of time?'—The sentence speaks of '(*a*) performing the *Agnihotra*, (*b*) *for a month*'; now of these two that 'the *Agnihotra* should be performed' is already known (as enjoined by the ordinary Injunction of the *Agnihotra*); it is only the other factor, that of its being performed 'for a month', that is not already known from any other source. Under the circumstances, the two terms '*agnihotra*' and '*darshapūrṇamāsa*' (speaking as they do, of what is already known from other sources) could not stand for any other acts; consequently, the sentence must be taken as the injunction of the *time* (which is the only factor not already known from other sources).—'But this would set aside (and be contrary to) the indication of the *Context* [whereby the sentence should be the injunction of acts connected with the *Kuṇḍapāyīnāmayana*, which the ordinary *Agnihotra* and *Darshapūrṇamāsa* are *not*.]'—Well, let the indications of the Context be set aside—we do not mind it; *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context* (and the view set forth above is what is got at through Syntactical Connection)."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—When a sentence is found in a different Context, it can speak of only that act to which the Context appertains.—"But we clearly find the sentence to be injunctive of an accessory (Time) for the *Agnihotra* and the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*."—Not so, we reply.—"Why?"—Because the sentence in question occurs after the phrase '*Upasadbhishcharitvā*', and there are no '*Upasads*' in the *Agnihotra* or in the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*;—hence it is not possible for the sentence to be taken as enjoining the 'month' in connection with these sacrifices.—"The *Upasads* also may be taken as enjoined in connection with the *Agnihotra* and the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* [by the whole sentence '*Upasadbhishcharitvā māsamagnihotram jūhoti, māsam darshapūrṇamāsābhyām yajatē*'.]"—In that case, the sentence being (according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*) injunctive of accessories (for the *Agnihotra*, etc.), would be enjoining several accessories [e.g. (1) the *Upasads*, (2) the sequence to the *Upasads*, and (3) the *month*]; and this would involve a syntactical split.—In accordance with the *Siddhānta*, however, no significance would attach to the term '*agnihotra*', which therefore would not qualify the act enjoined, and hence there would be no syntactical split.

[The *Tantravārtika* (Trans., pp. 873–879) does not accept this presentation of the *Siddhānta*, against which it makes the following observations:—

Such is the Siddhānta as represented by the *Bhāṣya*. But there is something to be said against this. If the two *Agnihotras* are taken as distinct, only because of the fact of there being otherwise a syntactical split,—then the present instance too becomes one of *Differentiation of Actions by means of syntactical split* (already dealt with above), and not by that of *context* (which is what is really meant to be shown here). Or, again, the actions would be different on account of the impossibility of the manifold accessories mentioned in the sentence in question belonging to the original *Agnihotra*; and thus the necessary differentiation being done by Accessories, there would be no room for the functioning of the Difference of Context (towards that differentiation). Because even if the sentence in question had occurred in the same *Context* as that of the original *Agnihotra*, then too, it could not but have been taken as mentioning a distinct Action, because of the fact of the necessary details herein mentioned being inapplicable to the original *Agnihotra*.—And further, even though the reason shown in the *Bhāṣya* might, with difficulty, establish the difference between the two *Agnihotras*, yet it could do nothing with regard to the other sentence in question, wherein the Monthly *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* are not mentioned as preceded by the *Upasads*. That is to say, the sentence '*Māsam darshapūrṇamāsābhyām*' lays down only the connection of the sacrifice with the *month*: and as such there being no syntactical split, there would be nothing to show that the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* herein mentioned is different from that mentioned before.—Thus then, the explanation of the Siddhānta, as given in the Bhāṣya being found to be untenable, we must explain it in the following manner:—

When the accessory, though mentioned in a separate context, is laid down in the manner of an independent injunction,—i.e. forms the predicate of the sentence,—then it can be relegated to the previous action (and should not make any difference in it); when, however, the accessory is mentioned only as an *Uddēshya* (not an object of injunction, but an accomplished thing, forming the *subject* of the sentence), then the action with reference to which it appears must be taken as different from the previous Action. In the case in question, we perceive a difference between the two *Agnihotras*, not because of their being mentioned in separate

contexts, but because of the fact of *all connection with the previous Context having been cut off*. That is to say, when no idea of the original *Agnihotra* is present in the mind at the time that the sentence in question is met with, then the action mentioned in this latter cannot but be recognised as different from the previous *Agnihotra*. And as for the difference of *contexts*, even though it is present, it does not serve any useful purpose with regard to the *differentiation*; as we shall show under Sūtra II—iii—25.—Thus then, in the case in question, the *Month* could not be taken as enjoined with reference to the *Agnihotra* mentioned at a great distance (in a previous sentence). Because it is not possible for any person to bring about the *Month* to-day for the sake of any *Homa*; and as the *Month* can never be the object of an Injunction, and must always retain the character of the *anupādēya*,—it must be admitted that it is the *Homa* that is laid down with reference to the *Month*; and as the injunctive potency of this sentence is not in any way set aside by the former originative Injunction of the *Agnihotra*, the Action which has been taken as being enjoined with reference to the *Month*, comes to be primarily brought up by the sentence in question. As there can be no originative Injunction of that which has already been once enjoined,—we conclude the Action laid down in the sentence in question to be distinct from that laid down in the previous sentence.

If, even when the contexts are different, the former action were mentioned by a word expressive of an unaccomplished entity,—or the *Bhāvanā* meant to be expressed were connected with that unaccomplished entity,—then, in that case, it would be concluded that the second sentence simply brings forward the Action mentioned in the former sentence, with a view to laying it down with reference to a particular *result*, and in this case, there may be non-difference between the Actions. As for instance, in the case of the sentences '*Atirātrashchaturviṁshaḥ,—Prāyaṇīyamahaḥ chatvāraḥ, Abhiplavāḥ ṣaḍahāḥ*', '*Pṛshṭhyaḥ ṣadahāḥ*', etc. etc., and also in the sentence '*Varuṇa-praghāsēṣvavabhṛtham yanti.*'—When, on the other hand, we find that the injunctiveness occurs in a distinct *Context*,—is connected with distinct results, etc.,—partakes of the character of the originative Injunction—and is not set aside by the more authoritative originative injunctiveness of any previous word which is far removed from it,—then, if such an injunctiveness happens to point to a difference between the actions concerned, we cannot but admit such a difference.

It should be noted that the author of the Bhāṣya also has mentioned the Time, which is '*anupādēya*', as the ground of differentiation; though he has referred to this *Time* by means of the sentence—'*upasadbhishcharitvā*' (and hence there is in reality not much discrepancy in the Bhāṣya either.]

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *Sacrifices like the 'Āgneya' are distinct acts performed with a view to distinct results.*

SŪTRA (25).

THE RESULT ALSO (IS A MEANS OF DIFFERENTIATION), WHEN MENTIONED APART FROM ACTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

[All the six Means of Differentiation have been dealt with. We now proceed to show another way in which the Difference of *Context* operates towards differentiation; and it is not a *seventh* means of differentiation that is taken up now. This other way consists in the mention of something which is '*anupādēya*', i.e. which cannot be brought about by human effort, and as such cannot be the object of an Injunction; among such things are—*Place, Time, Occasion, Result, Object to be prepared.* From among these, the case of *Time* has been dealt with under the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*; where the *Place* and *Occasion* also have been shown (by the *Vārtika*). We now proceed to deal in the present *Adhikaraṇa* with the *Result* (and also in the Vārtika, with the *Object to be prepared*).]

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the texts—(*a*) '*Āgnēyamaṣṭākapālaṁ nirvapēt rukkāmaḥ*' [' Desiring effulgence, one should prepare a cake baked on eight pans and dedicate it to Agni'], (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 3. 3),—(*b*)'*Agniṣomīyamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt brahmavarchasakāmaḥ*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 3. 3). [Desiring Brahmic glory, one should prepare the cake baked on eleven pans and dedicate it to Agni-Soma'],—(*c*) '*Aindrāgnamekādashakapālam nirvapēt prajākāmaḥ*' ['Desiring offspring, one should prepare a cake baked on eleven pans and dedicate it to Indra-Agni'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 1. 1).

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these texts lay down the particular results (*effulgence, Brahmic glory* and *offspring*) in connection with the original *Āgnēya* (*Agnīṣomīya* and *Aindrāgna*) sacrifices? Or do they lay down entirely different sacrifices?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The sentences lay down particular results in connection with the original sacrifices;—why? —because in the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices mentioned in these texts we recognise the well-known *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices (already enjoined elsewhere);—hence their mention in the sentences in question must be taken as a mere *reference* to those same sacrifices, for the purpose of laying down their connection with the particular results."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The Result also is a means of differentiation, when it is mentioned apart from actions.* That is to say, if the sentence in question were a mere reference (to a previously enjoined sacrifice), then it could not lay down the result; as in that case, there would be no injunctive word in the sentence; and it is clear that what is not enjoined cannot be the means of bringing about any such result as 'effulgence'. In fact, if the particular result, *effulgence*, were

all that is enjoined, then, as every result must be evanescent,—there could be no connection between such a result and the *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices which are *not evanescent* (eternal).—Similarly with the other results (*Brahmic glory* and *Offspring*).

From all this it follows that the sentences in question lay down sacrifices different from the original *Āgnēya* and other sacrifices.

Adhikaraṇa (13): *The Avēṣṭi brings about its result in the shape of food.*

SŪTRA (26).

When there is proximity, there is no separateness; hence the repeated mention serves the purpose of pointing out another result.

Bhāṣya.

[The present *Adhikaraṇa* is introduced by way of a counter-instance to all the foregoing *Adhikaraṇas* based upon *non-proximity*. The *Result* mentioned in the present Sūtra stands for all *Anupādēyas*—Place, Time, Occasion, etc.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 883.]

There is the *Avēṣṭi* sacrifice spoken of in the text—'*Āgnēyo'ṣṭākapālaḥ puroḍāsho bhavati*' ['The cake baked upon eight pans becomes dedicated to Agni']; and in reference to this *Avēṣṭi*, we have the sentence—'*Etayā annādyakāmaṁ yājayēt*' ['One should make one perform this (Avēṣṭi), if he is desirous of acquiring food'].

In regard to this second sentence, there arises the question—Is the action spoken of in the sentence different from the *Avēṣṭi*? or is it the *Avēṣṭi* itself?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is that it must be taken to be a distinct action, on the grounds set forth in support of the *Siddhānta* of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—As *there is proximity*, the sentence should be regarded as the repeated mention of the *Avēṣṭi* itself, *for the purpose of pointing out another result*;—and it is not a distinct act that is mentioned.—Why?—Because *there is no separateness*; that is to say, the pronoun '*ētayā*' ('this') cannot stand for any action other than the *Avēṣṭi*; as the pronoun 'this' must always stand for what is in close proximity to it. Hence the sentence should be taken as enjoining the same *Avēṣṭi* for one who desires to obtain food.

"What is the practical use of the present *Adhikaraṇa*?"

If the action spoken of is the same as the *Avēṣṭi*, then the materials used would be the *Āgnēya* and other cakes (enjoined in connection with the *Avēṣṭi*);—while if it is a different sacrifice, then some other material would have to be used.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The repeated mention of the 'Āgnēya' is for the purpose of commendation.*

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"FOR REASONS STATED, THE ĀGNĒYA SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS TO BE REPEATED."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, there is the Injunction (of the *Āgnēya*) in the text '*Āgnēyo'ṣṭākapālo'māvāsyāyām paurṇamāsyāñchāchyuto bhavati*';—then comes the text '*Āgnēyo'ṣṭākapālo'māvāsyāyām bhavati*'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—[Do these two texts mean that] the *Āgnēya* is to be performed twice? Or only once?

On this question we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* that—"*For reasons stated, the Āgnēya should be understood as to be repeated*; (the reason being that) '[the repetition of the same word should also indicate difference among acts,]—*because, if there were no difference, the repetition would be useless*' (Sūtra 2. 2. 2)."

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE ACTION BEING FOUND TO BE UNDIFFERENTIATED, THERE SHOULD BE NO REPETITION OF THE SAME ACT SIMPLY BECAUSE IT IS MENTIONED TWICE.

Bhāṣya.

That the *Āgnēya* should be performed twice is not the right view.—Why?—Because there is no word (in the text) signifying such repetition.—"The word '*āgnēya*' itself, being repeated, should lay down the second performance."—Not so, we reply; the repetition of the word cannot convey the idea that what is expressed by it should be repeated; because when something is expressed by the word when pronounced first, it will remain the same thing even though the word be repeated a hundred times,—it will be no other.—"If the word mentioned the same thing that has been mentioned before, without any difference, then it would be useless."—Let it be useless; even so, it cannot signify anything else; in fact, it may be reasonable to regard the repetition as useless, but it can never be reasonable to take it as signifying something different (from what it has signified before).—From this we conclude that the *Āgnēya* is not to be performed twice.

SŪTRA (29).

Or, the repetition may be taken as serving a different purpose.

Bhāṣya.

Or, we need not regard the repetition as *useless*; what we mean is that it may be taken as serving the purpose of *commendation.*

Objection—"What would be the purpose served by this commendation? When the *Āgnēya* has already been enjoined by a previous text, which is already accompanied by a commendatory declaration, for the purpose of enjoining of what would the Veda put forward another commendatory statement? It has already been pointed out under *Sūtra* 1. 2. 1 that 'Inasmuch as the Veda is meant to serve the purpose of enjoining actions, what does not serve that purpose is useless'; so that, if there is a mere assertion, which does not serve the purpose of enjoining anything, it has to be regarded as useless. Because whether the same fact is reasserted or not, it remains just the same; just as whether a Deity is mentioned or not mentioned, it accomplishes the purposes of an accessory.—[The sense of this last clause is not quite clear. The *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 889, has the following interesting note—'We do not quite understand what this means; though on looking into it closely, it seems that it recalls what has gone before under the *Mahēndrādhikaraṇa*, Sū. 2. 1. 18. The sense thus is that, though *greatness* (*Mahattva*) does not form an integral part of the Deity *Mahēndra*, yet, inasmuch as in one case mere *Indra* (without the epithet *mahān*) fulfils the functions of the Deity, the epithet *mahān* would be useless in an *Arthavāda* that would refer to the Injunction; exactly so in the case in question an independent commendation, standing by itself, would be altogether meaningless.']"

Answer—The repetition serves a different purpose; it serves the purpose of enjoining, not the *Āgnēya*, but, the *Aindrāgna*;—the meaning being—'The Āgnēya offering of the cake baked on eight pans performed on the Amāvāsyā day is all right,—but it is not quite perfect when the offering is made to *Agni* alone,—it becomes quite perfect when it is offered to *Agni accompanied by Indra*,—hence the offering should be made to *Indra-Agni*'.

[We have found in this *Pāda* that there are six means of differentiating Actions. The *Tantravārtika* (Trans., pp. 885-886) has the following note—In another commentary (perhaps, by *Bhavadāsa*) only four such means have been mentioned—(1) Different words, (2) Different names, (3) Different Accessories and (4) Different Results. He has included 'Repetition' and 'Number' under 'Different Words', and 'Different Context' under 'Different Results'.—But this is open to objection. (For details of discussion see *Tantravārtika*.)]

End of Pāda iii of Discourse II.

DISCOURSE II.

PĀDA IV.

Adhikaraṇa (1): *Treating of the Life-long Agnihotra.*

SŪTRA (1).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" The Life-long repetition is a property of the Action,—because of the Context ".

Bhāṣya.

In the *Bahvṛcha-Brāhmaṇa* we find the text—' *Yāvajjīvam agnihotraṁ juhoti*' [' One performs the *Agnihotra* as long as he lives'], ' *Yāvajjīvaṁ darshapūrṇamāsābhyāṁ yajēta*' [' One should perform the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* as long as he lives'].

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the Life-long Repetition enjoined here a property of the *act* ? Is the *life-long-ness* enjoined as a property of the *act*, meaning that there is to be a repetition of it throughout one's life ? Or is the *life-long-ness* enjoined as a property of the *Agent*, i.e. a necessary duty for him ? Does the sentence lay down the *life-long-ness* as a property of the *Act*, the sense being that the *Act* is to be repeated as long as the man lives ? Or does it lay down the *life-long-ness* as a property of the *Agent*, the sense being that the act forms his *necessary duty ?*—

Question—" In what case would the *life-long-ness* be a property of the Act—and in what case would it be a property of the Agent ? "

Answer—In case the term '*juhoti*' (' performs') in the first sentence is a mere reference to the *act of performing the Homa* (enjoined elsewhere), and the *life-long-ness* is the object of injunction by the sentence,—the Repetition would be a property of the *Act*; on the other hand, if it is otherwise [i.e. if the *life-long-ness* is a mere reference or reiteration, and *the act of performing the Homa* is the object of the Injunction], then what is enjoined is a necessary duty for the *Agent*.

[The exact significance of this *Adhikaraṇa* in general, and of the Question in particular will be clear from the following extract from the *Tantravārtika* —Trans., pp. 890-891.

Objection : " Whether a word expresses the property of an action or that of the Agent, is a question connected with the subject-matter of the Third Adhyāya; and hence its introduction here seems to be wholly irrelevant."—To this some people make the following reply: The treatment of the subject-matter of the Second Adhyāya itself having been finished, and the Third Adhyāya also being near at hand, there is nothing very incongruous in the introduction, at this stage, of a subject connected with the latter.—But this explanation is scarcely right. Because we have still got to consider the question of the *difference* or *non-difference* of Actions as mentioned in the various texts of the same Veda (and as such all the subjects of the Second Adhyāya have not yet been exhausted).—We must therefore explain the relevancy of the *Adhikaraṇa* in the following manner: Just as the

causes of difference operate towards the differentiation of the *forms* of Actions, so also do they operate towards that of their *performances*. Hence with regard to the Agnihotra, etc., qualified as they are by the mention of 'life-long', there arises a question as to whether each of its *daily performances* is a distinct action in itself, or all the daily performances go to form a single Action meant to bring about a particular desirable end, and the time for whose performance is the whole of one's life ? If then, the time—whole of one's life—were laid down as a property of the *action*, then the mere offering of the Morning and Evening libations—in accordance with the injunctions "he should offer the morning libation with the *mantra* '*Sūryo jyotiḥ*, etc.'," and "he should offer the evening libation with the *mantra* '*Agnirjyotiḥ*, etc.'" would not be enough to complete the Agnihotra, till the specified time—'life-long'—expires; and hence a performance of the *Agnihotra* would come to be made up of many daily repetitions; just as the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is made up of the repetition of the same process with regard to each of the many *Grahas*. If, on the other hand, 'living' be taken as the occasion (or cause), with reference to which the sentence lays down the *Action*,—then, inasmuch as the occasion would last till the performer lasts, the Action would come to be enjoined without reference to any desirable result; and such a neglect of the performance being sinful, it would be necessary for the Man to perform it as long as he lives, either for the fulfilment of his own duty, or for the avoiding of the sin incurred by the non-performance of a necessary duty; and hence in this case, the sentence would lay down a necessary duty for the man. And in this case the occasion of the *Agnihotra performance* would be Morning and Evening together with the *life of the agent*: and hence as this occasion would present itself every day, the Action would be complete every day also; and the complete performance of the Agnihotra would be repeated each day;—the performance of each day forming a distinct Action by itself (independently of the other days' performance).—For these reasons we must conclude that the Bhāṣya has put the question in the form that it has, simply with a view to the distinctness or otherwise of the performance; as it is this that comes to be the upshot of the question put by the Bhāṣya.]

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* :—

["*The repetition is a property of the Action*;—why ?—*because of the Context*. That is to say, the significance of the Context is maintained only if we accept the interpretation that the roots '*hū*' (in the first sentence) and '*yaj*' (in the second sentence) are mere references to the actions (enjoined elsewhere),—and '*Yāvajjīvam*' ('life-long') is what is *enjoined* ;—so that there is repetition (and all the repetitions go to form the complete *Act*, of the *Agnihotra* or the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*).—When this is the explanation, then alone the glorification of the sacrifices, as contained in the sentence, 'Imperishable is the sacrifice called *Agnihotra*, as also that called *Darshapūrṇamāsa*', would be applicable to the sacrifices, on the basis of the common factor of *long time* (implied by 'life-long' and 'imperishable'). For this reason there is to be repetition [and all the daily repetitions constitute a single performance of the one act of *Agnihotra*, and 'life-long' is a qualification of this one act—says *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 891."]

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE PROPERTY IS OF THE AGENT; BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT SIGNIFICATION OF THE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

What we assert is that the sentence should not be taken as laying down the *life-long* character of the whole act (of *Agnihotra* or *Darshapūrṇamāsa*) as consisting of the repetitions of the performance,—and that what the sentence lays down is the necessary duty for the Agent qualified by the property 'life-long' [i.e. the duty to be performed by *the Agent as long as he lives.*] Why so ?—*Because of the direct signification of the text*; that is, it is only thus that the sense of the text would be what is directly signified by it; any other sense would involve recourse to *indirect* (figurative) interpretation. —"How so ?"—If the meaning were taken to be that 'one should perform the act during all the time that one is alive',—then such *performance of the Agnihotra during the whole life-time* could not be accomplished except by repeating the *Agnihotra* which is really completed every evening;—nor could such *performance of the Darshapūrṇamāsa during the whole life-time* be accomplished without repeating the acts of *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa* which are completed on every *Amāvāsyā* and *Pūrṇamāsī* respectively.—It might be argued that—"what is done during a part of the *life-time* may be regarded as done *during the life-time.*"—But that is not so; as such a fact could only be got at by implication, it could not be enjoined by the word; that is, what the sentence means is that 'the act is to be completed during the time that is measured by the life-time of the performer',—and it is this that may imply the idea that 'there should be many repetitions of the act of *Agnihotra*'; such repetition, which would be declared as *to be done*, is not directly signified by either of the two verbs '*juhoti*' and '*yajati*'; it is got at only by *indirect indication*,—the words 'one should perform the *Homa* as long as he lives' being taken as indirectly indicating (through the context) the idea that 'the action should be repeated as long as he lives';—and Direct Assertion is stronger than Indirect Indication.

On the other hand, if the sentence is construed in such a manner as to take the phrase 'as long as one lives' as a mere reference (to what is already known), and the verbs '*juhoti*' and '*yajati*' as injunctive of the acts (*Agnihotra* and *Darshapūrṇamāsa*),—then, in that case, these two words '*juhoti*' and '*yajati*' retain their direct significations,—and the phrase 'as long as one lives' also would, in this case, stand for the 'being alive' of the Agent, which is what is directly expressed by it,—and not for *repetition*, which it can only indicate indirectly. Thus then, what is enjoined by the text is the *act* (of *Agnihotra* or *Darshapūrṇamāsa*) as contingent upon the 'being alive' of the man; the sense being that 'the Homa should be performed *if the man is living*'; so what the performance of the Act is contingent upon is the 'being alive' of the agent, and not the *time* (of his life);—and thus the act being contingent upon a constant factor, it is spoken of as a constant (necessary) duty; hence what is enjoined is a property of the *Agent*, in the shape of a necessary duty.

[In the *Siddhānta* the term '*yāvajjīvam*' directly denotes the *living, being*

alive, of the Agent as the condition essential for the performance of the act; and the word '*juhoti*' also directly denotes the action of Homa done in the *Agnihotra*.—In the *Pūrvapakṣa*, on the other hand, the 'being alive' of the agent is made to indicate the *time* of his *living*, and the word '*juhoti*' is made to indicate *repetition*. In this case therefore it becomes necessary to reject the direct connotation of the words ('*yāvajjīvam*' and '*juhoti*'), and accept the indirect indication of *Time* and *Repetition*; so that the Injunction, instead of being based upon Direct Signification, becomes based upon Indirect Indication.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 893.]

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES; IF THE PROPERTY BELONGED TO THE ACTION, IT WOULD FILL UP THE WHOLE OF IT AND THE REST WOULD BE MEANINGLESS.

Bhāṣya.

The following text is indicative of the *Siddhānta* view—'*Api ha vā ēṣa svargāllokāchhidyatē yo darshapūrṇamāsayājī paurṇamāsīmamāvāsyāṁ vā atipātayēt*' ['That performer of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* becomes deprived of heaven who transgresses the *Amāvāsyā* and the *Paurṇamāsī days*'] (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 5. 4).—"How is this indicative of the *Siddhānta* view?"—If the property belonged to the Act, then the Sacrifice once begun would be completed only after the lapse of the whole life-time of the man; so that in that case, there would be no such 'transgressing' of the *time* of the sacrifice as is mentioned in the sentence just quoted; so that all the rest of the sentence—where expiatory rites are laid down for such transgression—would be meaningless.

SŪTRA (4).

[THERE IS ALSO A TEXT WHICH] SPEAKS OF THE COMPLETION [OF THE ACT]; IF THERE IS TIME LEFT (AFTER THAT COMPLETION), THE ACTS MUST BE DISTINCT.

Bhāṣya.

We find the *completion* of the act spoken of in such texts as '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām iṣṭvā somēna yajēta*' ['Having performed the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, one should perform the *Soma* sacrifice']; if, after the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* has been completed, there is time left for the performance of the *Soma*-sacrifice (as is mentioned in the sentence quoted), then it is clear that the two sacrifices, *Darsha* and *Pūrṇamāsa*, do not require the man's whole *life-time* for their completion.—If on the other hand, 'being alive' is the condition for the performance of the sacrifice, then it becomes possible for the acts (*Darshapūrṇamāṣa* and the *Soma*) to be distinct acts (and to be performed as such); so that the meaning of the sentence would be that 'after having completed the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, one should perform the *Soma* sacrifice.'

Further, there is the text—'*Āhitāgnirvā ēṣa yo'gnihotraṁ juhoti na darshapūrṇamāsau yajēta yā āhutibhājo dēvatāstā anudhyāyiniḥ karoti*' ['If a man who has established the fire performs the *Agnihotra*, but omits to perform the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, he makes these Deities who are entitled to

the offerings pine for them']; here we find the text speaking of the deities as 'pining for the offerings'; and this mention of the 'pining' is justifiable only if the offering that is not made is one that is compulsory (not voluntary); if an offering is not compulsory, then it is not possible for the deities to 'pine' for it; the offering can be regarded as compulsory only in accordance with the view that the sacrifice is enjoined as a necessary duty, not under the view that it is voluntary. If therefore the property in question (*life-long*) belonged to the *Action*, the *Agnihotra* as well as the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* would become voluntary acts. Hence the only correct view is that the act spoken of is a necessary duty.

Lastly, there is the text—'*Jarāmaryam vā ētat satram yadagnihotraṁ darshapūrṇamāsañcha, jarayā ha vā ētābhyām nirmuchyati*' ['The *Agnihotra* and the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* are imperishable, one becomes freed from the responsibility of performing these only by old age or by death']; this declaration of one becoming absolved only through old age or death is compatible only with the view that the act is compulsory; if the acts were voluntary (not compulsory), then the man could escape from their performance by simply not performing them.

SŪTRA (5).

THEN AGAIN, IF THE ACTS WERE NOT COMPULSORY, IT COULD NOT BE SO (AS DESCRIBED IN THE TEXTS).

Bhāṣya.

The term '*tu*' connotes *cumulation*; the sense is that for the following reason also we feel that the sentence lays down the property of the Agent and enjoins a compulsory duty.—If the sentence in question were taken as enjoining an accessory (i.e. time) for the acts already enjoined elsewhere, there would be only one *Agnihotra* offering, and that also would not be compulsory; as no other action which is mentioned as connected with a definite result [as the Agnihotra is mentioned in its original injunction '*Agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*'] is ever regarded as compulsory; and if the acts were taken as ***not compulsory*** (voluntary), that would be repugnant to what is stated in the text '*Jarāmaryam vā ētat satraṁ yadagnihotraṁ darshapūrṇamāsañcha, jarayā vā ētābhyāṁ nirmuchyatē mṛtyunā cha.*'—"Why should it be repugnant to this text?"—The declaration that 'one can escape from the performance of these acts only by old age or death' is justifiable only if the acts are compulsory; if they were voluntary, then one could escape from their performance by simply not performing them.

SŪTRA (6).

THEN AGAIN, THERE IS INCONGRUITY ALSO, AS BEFORE.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason we conclude that the sentence does not lay down the repetition of the previously-enjoined sacrifice, or an accessory relating to it.—Why?—Because *there is incongruity*; the 'incongruity'

would be that the *Saurya* and other sacrifices also—which are modifications of the archetypal *Darshapūrṇamāsa*—would have to be repeated as long as one lived;—and this would be a conclusion not vouchsafed by any text at all.—From this also it follows that the sentence lays down a compulsory duty.—This same compulsory character of the sacrifices is borne out by its glorification also (such as contained in the text '*Jarāmaryam*, etc.').

SŪTRA (7).

INASMUCH AS THE PROPERTY BELONGS TO THE AGENT, WHAT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE TIME SHOULD BE THE CONDITION (ON WHICH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ACT WOULD BE CONTINGENT).

Bhāṣya.

If the sentence is taken as laying down a property of the Agent, and also the compulsory character of the act, then 'being alive' would be the condition,—i.e. the performance of the act would be enjoined as contingent upon the agent 'being alive'; and in that case, the act would be complete with each (daily) performance of it; and this would be in keeping with the mention of completion (spoken of in Sū. 4).

From all this it follows that what is enjoined is the property of the Agent and also the compulsory character of the Act.

———

Adhikaraṇa (2): *If an act is mentioned in several recensional texts, it should be regarded as one and the same.*

SŪTRA (8).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"If an act is mentioned in different recensional texts, it should be regarded as different,—because of differences—(1) in name, (2) in form, and (3) in particular details; and because of (4) repetition, (5) deprecation, (6) incapacity, (7) declaration of completion, (8) expiatory rites and (9) perception of distinct purposes".

Bhāṣya.

[The present *Adhikaraṇa* is taken up with a view to show that there are no grounds for the differentiation of actions except those already described. To this end certain other likely grounds of differentiation are put forward and rejected; and in course of this discussion it will be found that every one of these suggested grounds of differentiation is included in one or other of those already described above—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 902].

The texts to be dealt with here are all the various Recensions of the Veda —such as *Kāṭhaka*, *Kālāpaka*, *Paippalādaka* and so forth.—In this connection there arises the question—If any one Act, such as the *Agnihotra*, has been mentioned in one Recensional Text,—and it is again mentioned in another Recensional Text,—is this latter act different from the former? Or not different from it?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"It should be taken as a different act.—Why?—(1) *Because there is difference in name*: one is called '*Kāṭhaka*' and the other, '*Kālāpaka*'; and this difference in the names makes the actions different.—'But these are names of *texts* (not of *acts*)'.—True: but what we mean is that these are names of *acts* also; inasmuch as they are found to be applied to, and spoken of, by means of words with the same case-endings as—the acts [when, e.g. people speak of '*Kāṭhakam agnihotram*', '*Kālāpakan agnihotram*' and so forth].—(2) *Because there is difference in form*; e.g. in one Recensional Text, the *Agniṣomīya* cake is spoken of as 'baked upon *eleven* pans', while in another the same is spoken of as 'baked upon *twelve* pans'; and when the forms are different, how can the acts be not different?—(3) *Because there is difference in particular details*; people belonging to the *Taittirīya* Recension eat on the ground while they are studying the texts dealing with the '*Kārīrī*' sacrifice; those belonging to

other Recensions do not do so;—similarly, while studying the '*Agni*' Section, some people fetch jarfulls of water for the Teacher, while others do not do so;—similarly while studying the '*Ashvamēdha*' Section, some people fetch grass for the horse, while others do not do so; while there are yet others who perform other details. Thus in the case of persons belonging to one Recension, a sacrifice like the *Ashvamēdha* requires at their hands help in the shape of grass for the horse and such other things,—while in the case of persons belonging to other Recensions, the sacrifice does not require that help;—now if the *Ashvamēdhas* mentioned in the two texts were one and the same, how could it require these from one person and not from another? How too could it require any other help? Hence it follows that the *Ashvamēdha* mentioned in one text is different from that mentioned in the other.—(4) *Because* (*of the incongruity*) *of repetition*; if the act mentioned in all Recensional Texts were one and the same, then the act having been already mentioned in one text, its mention in another text would be a needless repetition. This undesirable contingency does not arise if the act is different;—for this reason also the act must be different.—(5) *Because there are deprecatory declarations*;—persons belonging to some Recensional Texts deprecate the *offering of Homa before sunrise* (at the *Agnihotra*) in the following terms—'*Prātaḥ prātaranṛtantē vadanti purodayājjuhvati ye'gnihotram, divākīrtyam adivā kīrtayantaḥ sūryo jyotirna tadā jyotireṣām*' ['Those who, at the *Agnihotra*, offer the *Homa* before sunrise utter an untruth morning after morning, when they say *not by day* what should be said *by day*: Sūrya is not the light for them at the time'];—while in the following terms some people deprecate the offering of *Homa after sunrise*—'*Yathā atithayē pradrutāya annamāharēyuḥ tādṛk tat yadi uditē juhvati*' ['If people make the offering of *Homa* after sunrise it is like bringing up food for the guest after he has departed'—Shānkhā. Brā. 2. 9; Tai. Brā. 2. 1. 2. 12];—all this would be incongruous if the act mentioned in the several recensional texts were one and the same; not so, if it were different;—for this reason also the act is different.—(6) *Because of incapacity*;—people would never be able to carry out all the details that may have been laid down in all the Recensional Texts in which the particular act may have been mentioned [and it would be necessary to do this if it were the same act mentioned in all the texts]; so that in many cases it might be declared that something is being done which has not been laid down anywhere;—on the other hand, if the act were different, then it would be quite possible to gather all the information bearing upon its details (from the particular Recension where it occurs);—for this reason also the act should be regarded as different.—(7) *Because of the declaration of completion*; there is a declaration of completion even when there is no completion; for instance, some people say 'our fire is complete' at a certain point, while others declare it to be complete at another point;—this would not be possible if it were the same act; because at any one point, one and the same act could not be both *complete* and *incomplete*; such distinction is proper if the actions are different. For this reason also the Actions must be different.—(8) *Because expiatory rites have been laid down*;—some texts lay down an expiatory rite to be performed for the

neglect of the *Homa before sunrise*; others lay down an expiatory rite to be performed for the neglect of *Homa after sunrise*, as also at its prolongation (by reason of the *Homa before sunrise* having been neglected *before sunrise* and hence performed *after sunrise*, thereby prolonging the time of the *Homa after sunrise*). If the acts were the same, there could not be two kinds of 'prolongation'; if, on the other hand, the acts are distinct, the *pre-sunrise Homa* becomes 'prolonged' if done *after sunrise*, as in that case the other (the pre-sunrise) Homa also has to be done *after sunrise*. For this reason also the Acts must be different.—(9) *Also because there is perception of distinct purposes*;—for instance, (*a*) in one text we find the text—'*Yadi purā didīkṣāṇāḥ....atha yadi didīkṣāṇaḥ*', which means (according to the *Tantravārtika*) that 'if the sacrificer happens to be previously initiated, he should employ the *Atirātra* of the *Bṛhatsāma*, as the *Rathantara-Sāma* will have been already employed at the previous initiation, while if he does not happen to have been previously initiated, he should employ the *Rathantara*';—according to this passage, there would be a possibility of the sacrificers at the *Dvādashāha* being found to be such as have previously performed the sacrifice (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), as also such as have not so performed the sacrifice; and this could be possible only if the Act were different; it could not be possible if the act were one and the same.—Why so?—Because in the *Tāṇḍaka* we read that 'the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the very first of (Soma) sacrifices, and if anyone performs another (Soma) sacrifice without having performed the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there would be *falling into a pit*, or he would die' (Tāṇḍya-Brā. 16. 1. 2); and this necessity of the previous performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* would be applicable to all cases (if the Act were one and the same); and it would not be possible to have any *uninitiated* sacrificer at the *Dvādashāha* (as every one would, according to the *Tāṇḍya* text, have already performed the *Jyotiṣṭoma*). For this reason also the Act must be different.—[The first text speaks of the possibility of the performer at the *Dvādashāha* being one who has undergone a previous initiation, as also of his being one who has not undergone it;—according to the second, *Tāṇḍya*, text the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is the sacrifice that should be performed first; according to which the performer of the *Dvādashāha* or any other sacrifice must always be one who has previously performed the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; so that it would never be possible to have a sacrificer of the *Dvādashāha* to be one who has not performed the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—now if the *Jyotiṣṭoma* spoken of in connection with the first text were the same as the *Jyotiṣṭoma* spoken of in the second text, then there should not be any such uncertainty regarding previous initiation as has been mentioned in the first text; for if the *Jyotiṣṭoma* mentioned in all the texts are one and the same, then, according to the second text, in the case of all recensional texts, and in all cases, the first (Soma) sacrifice to be performed would always be the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, at which the sacrificer will have been already initiated; so that the contingency of his being *uninitiated* at the performance of the *Dvādashāha* would be impossible; as it would not be possible for the sacrificer of any other (Soma) sacrifice not to have already performed the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and undergone the initiation in connection with it. —*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 906.]

(*b*) Another text indicative of the same conclusion from a similar reason, we have in the following—' *Yat pakṣasammitām......vēdisammityā minoti*' (Maitra-Sam. 3. 4. 8), which mentions the two methods of *measuring* the *Ēkādashinī* (a set of eleven sacrificial posts) by the '*Pakṣa*' (Axle) and by the '*Vedi*' (Altar), and deprecating and rejecting the former, favours the latter; this would be possible only if the Act were different; for if the act were one and the same, then it would not be possible to do the measuring, in one case, by the '*Vedi*' at all.—Why so?—Because the readers of one Recension declare that 'the interstices of the Sacrificial Posts should be of the measure of the *akṣa* (axle) of the chariot' (Tai. Sam. 6. 6. 4. 1), according to which, at all performances of the act, the measuring would have to be done by the '*axle*' (as herein declared); and there would be no possibility of any measuring being done either by the '*axle*' or by the '*altar*', so that no favouring or accepting of the measuring by the '*altar*' would be possible. For this reason also the act must be different (so that at one the measuring would be done by the '*axle*' and at another by the '*altar*').

(*c*) Another text indicative of the same conclusion is the following:—According to some recensions, we find it declared in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that 'there is to be an excess of only *two* verses in the chant over and above the *Virāj*',—while according to other recensions 'there is an excess of *three* over and above the *Virāj*'; there would thus be an incongruity if the act of *Jyotiṣṭoma* spoken of in the two texts were one and the same; on the other hand, if they are two different acts, then, at one *Jyotiṣṭoma* there would be 'two' and at another 'three'; for this reason also the Act must be different.

(*d*) Further, in connection with the *Sārasvata* sacrifice, we read that 'the *Puroḍāshins* sit down [v. l. *fast*, '*upavasanti*'] while the *Sānnāyyins* hold the calves'; of these the *Sānnāyyins* are those who have performed previously the (Soma) sacrifice, and the *Puroḍāshins* are those who have not performed it; now the presence of both of these at the *Sārasvata* would be possible only if the *Sārasvata* sacrifice mentioned in the different recensional texts were different; for if the *Sārasvata* were one and the same, then (according to the *Tāṇḍya* text quoted above) the *Jyotiṣṭoma* will have been performed before in all cases (by all the persons concerned in the performance of the *Sārasvata* or any other Soma sacrifice); so that there would be no possibility of any such priests being present at the *Sārasvata as have not performed a previous Soma sacrifice* (i.e. *Puroḍāshins*).

(*e*) Then again, in one recension we meet with the text '*Upahavyaḥ-niruktaḥ, agniṣṭomo yajño rathantarasāmā, ashvaḥ shyāvo dakṣiṇā*' (Taṇḍya-Brā. 18. 3)',—while in another we read, '*Upahavyaḥ aniruktaḥ, ukthyo yajño bṛhatsāmā, ashvaḥ shvēto rukmalalāṭo dakṣiṇā*' (which is entirely at variance with the former sentence); if the act (*Upahavya*) spoken of in these texts were one and the same, then the specification of the two *sāmans*, *Bṛhat* and *Rathantara*, would be superfluous; for, according to one or the other of these two texts, the act would be accompanied either by the *Bṛhat-Sāman* or the *Rathantara-Sāman*, and the presence of those *Sāmans* would come in at the *Upahavya* (even without their being mentioned in the texts quoted) as

forming part of its archetype;—on the other hand, if the two *Upahavyas* are different acts, then the one at which *Bṛhat-sāman* is used would be totally different from that at which the *Rathantara-sāman* is used; hence the specification of these in the two texts is quite right and proper.

From all this it follows that the act mentioned in one recensional text is different from the same mentioned in another recensional text."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE ACT IS ONE ONLY, BECAUSE OF THERE BEING NO DIFFERENCE IN (1) CONNECTION, (2) FORM, (3) INJUNCTION, AND (4) NAME.

Bhāṣya.

The view that "the act mentioned in one recensional text is different from the same mentioned in another recensional text" is not right; because as a matter of fact, the act mentioned in all recensional and Brāhmaṇa texts is one and the same;—(1) *because there is no difference in the connection* of the purpose; i.e. we actually recognise the act to be the same and laid down with a view to the same purpose;—(2) the *form* of the act also—as consisting in the Material and the Deity—is the same;—(3) the injunction of human activity also is found to be exactly the same; and (4) there is no difference in the *name*.—Hence the conclusion that the act mentioned in all the recensional and other texts is one and the same.

SŪTRA (10).

[ANSWER TO ARGUMENT (1) OF THE PŪRVAPAKṢA]—THERE COULD BE NO DIFFERENCE BASED UPON NAME; AS THE NAMES BELONG TO THE VEDAS [ACC. TO READING 'CHODANĀBHIDHĀNATVĀT'] OR, THE NAMES DO NOT APPLY TO THE INJUNCTIONS OF ACTS —[ACC. TO READING 'ACHODĀNĀBHIDHĀNATVĀT'].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above [(1) under Sūtra 8] that "the difference of the Act is based upon the difference of the names ('*Kāṭhaka*', '*Kālāpaka*' and so forth]",—this has been answered (in the Bhāṣya under the same Sūtra) by the argument that the names are those of *texts* (not *acts*);—this answer has been met (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, under the same *Sūtra*) by the argument that "the names are actually found to be applied to acts also".

Now the answer (given in the present *Sūtra*) to this argument of the *Pūrvapaksin* is as follows:—The argument propounded does not affect our position; because as a matter of fact, it is by reason of its connection with the *text* that the *act* is called '*Kāṭhaka*' (or '*Kālāpaka*' etc.),—and it is *not* that it is by reason of its connection with the *act* that the *text* is called

'*Kāṭhaka*' (or '*Kālāpaka*' etc.).—"How is this got at?"—As a matter of fact, what we find is that when an act is connected with the *text* called '*Kāṭhaka*', it comes to be spoken of as '*Kāṭhaka*'.—"What even if this is so?"—When the *Act* is called '*Kāṭhaka*' or '*Kālāpaka*' because it is connected with the *text Kāṭhaka* or the *text Kālāpaka*,—then it is possible for one and the same act to be called '*Kāṭhaka*', by reason of its connection with the *text Kāṭhaka*, and also to be called '*Kālāpaka*' by reason of its connection with the *text Kālāpaka* [so that the application of these *names* cannot prove that the Act must be different].

SŪTRA (11).

ALL ACTS WOULD BECOME ONE ACT [IF THE ACTS WERE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT ON THE GROUND OF THE DIFFERENT NAMES 'KĀṬHAKA' ETC.].

Bhāṣya.

If the *act* mentioned in the *Kāṭhaka* recension were to be regarded as different from the same act mentioned in the *Kālāpaka* recension, on the ground of these different names '*Kāṭhaka*' and '*Kālāpaka*' being applied to the act,—then all those acts would have to be regarded as one and the same to which any such single name would be applicable; i.e., all the acts that are called '*Kāṭhaka*' (by reason of their being spoken of in the *Kāṭhaka* recension) would have to be regarded as one and the same; so that the *Agnihotra*, the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* and the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—to which the single name '*Kāṭhaka*' would be applicable (on the ground of their being spoken of in that text)—would have to be regarded as one and the same act, on the ground of the one name being applicable to them all.—In reality, however, all these acts are never regarded as one and the same.

For this reason also, the act (mentioned in one text) must be treated as one and the same as that act (mentioned in another text).

SŪTRA (12).

FURTHER, THE NAME IS ONE THAT HAS BEEN COINED.

Bhāṣya.

Further, the name ('*Kāṭhaka*', as applied to the act) could only be one that has been coined in modern times,—one that did not exist from before, but was applied to the particular recension only since the time of the Teacher of the name of *Kaṭha* who proved himself to be an expert in the teaching of that particular recension. (See under Sūtra 1. 1. 30.) Under the circumstances (if the application of the name were to make the act different, then) it would come to this that the act was not different before (the appearance of that Teacher and the consequent coining of the name '*Kāṭhaka*'), but it is different now;—which is absurd!

SŪTRA (13).

[ANSWER TO ARGUMENT (2) UNDER SŪTRA 8]—EVEN THOUGH THE ACT BE ONE AND THE SAME, IT MAY HAVE DIVERSE FORMS.

Bhāṣya.

Even when the act is one and the same, there may be diversity in its *form*, if there are texts to that effect. But, if there is such difference in the form according to express texts, that does not lead us to regard the act as different when they are not actually recognised as different.

SŪTRA (14).

[ANSWER TO ARGUMENT (3) UNDER SŪTRA 8]—THE INJUNCTION REGARDING DETAILS PERTAINS TO THE LEARNING OF THE TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the argument that "there is difference in the particular details",—these different details have been set forth with reference to the mastering of particular texts, and not with reference to the performance of the act.—"How do you know this?"—This is clear from the fact that in support of the diversity of details of the Rite, there is neither Direct Assertion (nor Indicative mark, nor Syntactical Connection, nor Context, nor Position, nor Name);—and that it is only found with reference to the study of the texts, and not to the performance of the rituals.

SŪTRA (15).

[SAYS THE OPPONENT]—"THE REPEATED MENTION WILL BE AS IN THE CASE OF 'ĀGNĒYA'."

Bhāṣya.

In argument (4) under Sū. 8, the *Pūrvapakṣin* has declared the contingency of needless repetition as a ground for holding the Act to be different; the sense of this argument is that—"in the case of the repeated mention of the *Āgnēya* in connection of the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice (dealt with under Sū. 2. 3. 27–29), the view that the act (*Āgnēya*) should be repeated has been rejected on the ground that it would involve needless repetition of the same act; on the same ground, that it would involve needless repetition, in the present case also, the view that 'it is the same act' should be rejected".—Now this argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin* has got to be answered.—The present *Sūtra* is to be taken as reiterating the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument.

SŪTRA (16).

[ANSWER]—IN FACT, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO REPETITION, AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE METHOD OF DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, there is no repetition at all; it is the same subject of *Agnihotra* that is spoken of again and again by several persons; and when several persons speak of the same subject, it is not a case of '*Repetition*'. If it were so in the case of several Vedic texts, it would be so in the case of the same subject being spoken of several times in the same Vedic text also.—From all this it is clear that there are not several acts in the case in question, but only one act.

[SŪTRA (16A)

BECAUSE OF THE NON-INHERENCE OF TEXTS.

Tantravārtika—This *Sūtra* has escaped the notice of the author of the *Bhāṣya*: what it means is that the texts of several Recensions cannot be retained in the memory of a single person.]

SŪTRA (17).

ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS NOT PRESENT (IN EVERY RECENSION).

Bhāṣya.

The term applied to the Vedic Recensions is '*Shākhā*' (Branch); this name is applicable to particular recensional texts only on the ground that all that is needed is not present (mentioned) in each of them; so that the *Homas* (offerings mentioned in the several texts) are like so many 'branches', hence called '*Shākhā*'; so that there are so many parts of the Veda, as there are *branches* of the tree.—"Wherein does the similarity to *Branches* lie?"—The branches are of different shapes and different positions, and no one branch contains all the flowers and fruits of the tree; similarly in the case in question also, there is no recensional text of the Veda which mentions all the accessories of sacrifices; thus the name '*Shākhā*' is applicable on the basis of this *non-presence of all that is needed.*

For this reason also the Act is one and the same.

SŪTRA (18).

WHAT IS TAUGHT (IN ANY ONE TEXT) IS NOT FOR ANY ONE (CLASS OF BRĀHMAṆAS) ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

The *Agnihotra* mentioned in the *Kāṭhaka* text has not been enjoined for any one (class of) persons: as it has been enjoined for the followers of the *Taittirīya* text also; as nowhere is any particular person mentioned.—The particular details also of the *Agnihotra* which are enjoined in any one text

are meant for all kinds of *Agnihotra*. So that the *Agnihotra* of the follower of the *Kāṭhaka* text is also for the follower of the *Taittirīya* text; as there is no word or expression that would connect it with any particular class of persons only. Hence the conclusion is that all the recensional texts combine to lay down the single act of *Agnihotra* complete in all its details.

SŪTRA (19).

THERE IS DECLARATION OF COMPLETION.

Bhāṣya.

People are found to make such declarations as 'our *Agni* is completed at this point', as we find in the following passage—'The Agni of those belonging to the *Maitrāyaṇī* Recension is completed at the *Anvārohas*—but our Agni is not completed at those'.—Now if the '*Agni*' of the speaker were different from that of the *Maitrāyaṇīs*, how could they say—'our Agnī is not completed here'?—The only reasonable view is that the act is one and the same, so that the *Anvārohas* form part of the same act as performed by the speakers.

SŪTRA (20).

[ANSWER TO PŪRVAPAKṢA ARGUMENTS (5), (6) AND (7) UNDER SŪTRA 8]—EVEN IF THE ACT IS ONE AND THE SAME (5) 'THE DEPRECATORY DECLARATIONS,' (6) 'THE INCAPACITY,' AND (7) 'THE DECLARATION OF COMPLETION' ARE QUITE EXPLICABLE.

Bhāṣya.

(5) A 'deprecatory declaration' is made, not for the purpose of decrying what is deprecated, but for the purpose of glorifying its contrary; so that the deprecation does not necessarily imply the negativing of what is deprecated: what it implies is the *affirming* of its contrary. So that when a text deprecates that time of the *Agnihotra* which has been enjoined by another text, all that is meant is that the two points of time are optional alternatives; and thus there is no incompatibility between the two texts.

(6) As regards people who suffer from 'incapacity', they may not be able to carry out the entire body of details that are found enjoined in even *one* recensional text; on the other hand, for those who have the requisite capacity, they may be able to carry out, not only the details laid down in their own text, but also those laid down in all the texts. This discrepancy regarding *capacity* therefore is not incompatible with the view that the Act is one and the same.

(7) Lastly, as regards the 'mention of completion', people make use of the expression 'it is finished' (complete) in regard to an Act, only after some part of it has been done; e.g., at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, after the operations of the *Adhvaryu* have been finished, people speak of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself as having been 'finished' (complete).

SŪTRA (21).

AS FOR THE MENTION OF THE OCCASION FOR EXPIATORY RITES ;—

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Purvapakṣa* [argument (8) under Sūtra 5] that expiation has to be performed in connection with the *Post-sunrise Homa*, as also in connection with the *Pre-sunrise Homa*, and that this would be incompatible if the act of *Homa* were one and the same;—and this incompatibility ceases if the act is regarded as different.—Now this argument has got to be refuted. This *Sūtra* is meant to recall the *Pūrvapakṣa* argument (8).

SŪTRA (22).

[THE ANSWER IS]—IN REALITY IT (THE EXPIATORY RITE) WOULD ALWAYS BE DETERMINED BY THE METHOD WITH WHICH THE PERFORMANCE STARTED.

Bhāṣya.

The term '*vā*', 'in reality', rejects the opponent's view just set forth. —The argument brought forward by the *Pūrvapakṣa* has no force against us. If the performance of the *Agnihotra* starts with the determination to offer the Homa *after sunrise*, then the performance becomes defective if the *Homa* is offered otherwise (i.e. *before sunrise*); and this makes the agent liable to the Expiatory Rite.—This method would be quite compatible even with the view that the Act is one and the same.

SŪTRA (23).

INASMUCH AS COMPLETION PRESUPPOSES A BEGINNING, IT WOULD BE RECOGNISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT ONE MIGHT KNOW.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'completion' is used only in connection with what has had a beginning;—i.e. it is only what has been *begun* that is *completed*; so that when we have the notion that our '*Agni*' has been completed, what we mean is that 'the act that had been begun is completed'.

[Or, the *Sūtra* might mean that, inasmuch as all verbal usage is dependent upon its previous acceptance by people, we could conclude that the 'completion' spoken of is like what we actually find to be. As for this practice, we find that even when the action has not been completed, as soon as the details mentioned in one recension are completed, the Professors of that Recension declare 'our sacrifice ends here', and hence there is no incompatibility between this declaration and our view—*Tantravārtika*, p. 917.]

SŪTRA (24).

[ANSWER TO ARGUMENT (9a) UNDER SŪ. 8]—THE INDICATIVE TEXT IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE (TO BOTH VIEWS); BECAUSE WHAT IS STATED (REGARDING THE JYOTIṢṬOMA BEING THE VERY FIRST SACRIFICE TO BE PERFORMED) APPERTAINS TO ALL (RECENSIONAL TEXTS); NOR DOES THE TEXT ENJOIN A (JYOTIṢṬOMA) SACRIFICE; CONSEQUENTLY THERE WOULD BE AN INCONGRUITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DVĀDASHĀHA SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (9) that "the text '*yadi purā didīkṣāṇāḥ, etc.,*' indicates the possibility of the sacrifices at the *Dvādashāha* being performed by such men as have previously performed the *first sacrifice* (Jyotiṣṭoma), as also by such as have not performed it,—and this would be possible only if the act were different, not if the act mentioned in all the Recensional Texts were one and the same".—This, however, does not affect our position; because if the previously *initiated* Agent may perform the *Dvādashāha*, then the previously uninitiated Agent may also do it. [That is all that the indicative text indicates].—As regards the *Sāmavēda* (*Tāṇḍya* text quoted by the Opponent), it does not contain an injunction of a different *Jyotiṣṭoma* (in regard to which it might lay down the character of being the *first* to be performed).—"What, if it is so?"—The *Jyotiṣṭoma* could be *referred to* (for the purpose of laying down the said character of being first) only in a passage where it has been enjoined.—So that even under the view that the Act is different (as mentioned in different recensional texts), all *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifices would have to be regarded as having the character of being the *first* to be performed; and hence even under the *Pūrvapakṣa* view that the Act is different, the incongruity—in the shape of the presence of uninitiated sacrificers at the performance of the *Dvādashāha*—would have to be admitted [so that on this point, both the views, the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Siddhānta*, stand on the same footing]; consequently it does not affect the validity of the *Siddhānta* at all.

SŪTRA (25).

[ANSWER TO ARGUMENT (9b) UNDER SŪ. 8]—INASMUCH AS THE 'MEASURING' HAS NOT BEEN ENJOINED IN REGARD TO THE SUBSTANCE, THERE CAN BE NO CHOOSING FROM AMONG THE SEVERAL METHODS (OF MEASURING);—ONE OR THE OTHER MIGHT BE CHOSEN FOR ADOPTION IN THE VARIOUS CASES, ON THE GROUND OF (BOTH THE METHODS) BEING MENTIONED;—FOR THIS REASON THE TEXT SPEAKING OF THE TWO METHODS SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE MERE STATEMENT OF A STANDING FACT (THAT THERE ARE THESE TWO METHODS POSSIBLE).

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as the measuring of the substance has not been enjoined in regard to the '*Agni*' sacrifice, the rule spoken of cannot be adopted in regard to the measuring of the *Ēkādashinī* (at the '*Agni*' sacrifice). As a matter of fact, when the *Ēkādashinī* itself is not enjoined in regard to the 'Agni', how could there be any measuring of it—either 'by the *Axle*' or 'by the *Altar*'? As a matter of fact, both those methods (of measuring) are spoken of for the entirely different purpose of leading up to the injunction of the *Ēkādashinī*,—the meaning of the entire context being—'if the *Ēkādashinī* were of the size of the *Axle*, there would be such and such an incongruity, while there would be no such incongruity if it were of the size of the *Altar*,—who is to put an end to this doubtful state of things?—[the answer is] that '*to a single Post, eleven animals should be tied up*' [this last clause embodying the injunction of what has been called the *Ēkādashinī*, to which the statement of the two methods of measuring is supplementary].—Now, in connection with the *Vāchastoma* and other acts,—as the declaration of the two methods of measuring would be a mere statement of a standing fact,—at the *Yupaikādashinī*, the interstices in the Posts should have to be of the size of the 'axle (*akṣa*) of the chariot';—and again, because of the said declaration (of the two methods) being a mere statement of a standing fact, even though there be no actual measuring, either 'by the *Axle*' or 'by the *Altar*', the said statement could be explained as serving the purpose of leading up to the injunction of the *Ēkādashinī*; so that there is no incongruity at all.

[The Sūtra may also be taken as follows:—If the measuring by the *Altar* were not laid down with regard to a substance, then there would be no restriction in regard to the measuring by the *Axle* and such other things, all of which would be equally implied; and this absence of restriction would be repugnant to the direct assertion of 'measuring by the axle of the chariot'.—In the case in question, however, it is not so; hence there is no incongruity.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 918.]

SŪTRA (26).

[ANSWER TO PŪRVAPAKṢA ARGUMENT (9c) OF SŪ. 8]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS INJUNCTION AS WELL AS PROHIBITION, THERE WOULD BE AN 'EXCESS' IN ONE CASE.

Bhāṣya.

The *Ṣoḍashī* has been *enjoined* in the sentence '*Atirātrē gṛhṇāti ṣoḍashinam*';—it has also been *prohibited* in the sentence '*Nātirātrē gṛhṇāti ṣoḍashinam*'. Thus *in one case, there would be an excess* of *two*, and in another of *three*, verses over a *Virāj*. The difference, being thus explained, does not affect the *Siddhānta* view.

Question—"Why should there be an excess of *two* or *three* verses?"

Answer—(*a*) There is the three-fold *Bahīṣpavamāna stotra*, which makes *9* verses;—(*b*) there are the *fifteen*-fold *Ājyas*, whose number being *four*, these make *60* verses;—(*c*) the number of verses in the Midday *Pavamāna* is 15;—these 15, with the original 9 [under (*a*)], make 24, which, with the 60 [under (*b*)] make *84*;—(*d*) there are 4 *Pṛṣṭhas* of 17, making up 68, and 17 of the *Ārbhava Pavamāna*; thus these being 5 times 17, the number comes to be *85*;—these *85* with the previous *84*, make up *169*;—(*e*) there are 21 verses in the *Yajñā-yajñīya-stotra*, which, along with the said *169*, make up *190* verses;—so say the *Brāhmaṇa-texts*.—

In reference to the *Agniṣṭoma* only, it has been declared that 'a complete *Virāj* consists of a group of ten verses'. [So far as the *Atirātra* is concerned, the number of verses in the *Stotras* is as follows:—]

B (*a*) There are the three (additional) rounds of *stotras* for the *Ukthya*, of 21 verses each, making up the number 63; (*b*) the (additional) *stotra* (for the) *Ṣoḍashī* has 21 verses; with these 21 we get (63+21=) 84 (additional) verses. (*c*) There are three rounds of *stotras* of 15 verses at the night *Extractions*, each round containing 4 such *stotras*; these make up (3×4×15=) 180 verses, which give us complete *Virājas*. (*d*) There is also the three-fold *Rathantara*, the *Pañchasāman*, which contains 9 verses. Thus a group of 9 is added to 84 [under B (*a*) and (*b*), excluding the 180 verses of the night-extractions, under B (*c*), because they make up complete *Virājas*] (and that gives 93, i.e. 9×10+3). Thus three verses are left over in these *stotras* after making up *Virājas*. When the *Ṣoḍashī* cup is not held (and the corresponding *stotra* not used), we have 21 verses less; and in this case we have 2 verses left over in the chants after making up complete *Virājas*. [63, as under B (*a*)+9, as under B (*d*)=72=7×10+2]. [Consequently there is hardly any difference between the *Atirātra* with the *Ṣoḍashin* and the *Atirātra* without the *Ṣoḍashin*.]

Thus it is found that the indicative text quoted is quite compatible with the *Siddhānta* view that the Act is one and the same.

[The principal varieties of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* are *Agniṣṭoma-Ukthya*, *Ṣoḍashin* and *Atirātra*. (A) In the first three there are three *paryāyas* or rounds of the Extraction of Soma all in day time, and in the last there are in addition 3 extractions at night. In the *Agniṣṭoma*, 5 *stotras* are used in the morning-extraction, 5 in the midday-extraction and only 2 in the evening. In the *Ukthya*,

the evening extraction has also 5 *stotras*. The total is 15. In the *Ṣoḍashin*, there is an additional *stotra* corresponding to the additional *Ṣoḍashī graha*. In the night-extractions of the *Atirātra*, there are 4 × 3 = 12 *stotras*; and in the day-time the *Ṣoḍashin* cup and *stotra* may or may not be used. Now a *stotra* is a Sāma-chant based on some verses which are sung with repetition in various groupings. Each constituent verse of a *stotra* is called a *stotrīya*. Now the total number of *stotrīyas* in the *Agniṣṭoma* is 190 which is a complete dividend of 10, which is the number of syllables in a *pāda* of the Virāj metre. And as Virāj stands for completion, Agniṣṭoma is thus complete. In the *nocturnal rounds*, the *Atirātra* has got 180 *stotrīyas*, i.e. 18 complete *Virājas*, in this peculiar Brāhmaṇa-computation; and in its *Day-rounds*, 93 *stotrīyas* with the *Ṣoḍashin* and 82 without; consequently only 3 or 2 are left over after dividing by 10 (the number of a Virāj line). There is thus the difference of only one (1) and Shabara claims that that is no difference. Consequently there is कर्मैक्य.]

SŪTRA (27).

[ANSWER TO PŪRVAPAKṢA ARGUMENT (9d) UNDER SŪ. 8]—IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'SĀRASVATA', THERE BEING AN INCONGRUITY,—THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN WITH A CONDITIONAL 'WHEN'.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued [under (9d)] that "it is possible for both '*Sānnayyins*' and '*Puroḍāshins*' to be present at the *Sārasvata*, etc. etc."—[Our answer to this is that] as a matter of fact, all Soma-sacrifices are preceded by the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, so that (under both views) there would be an incongruity (in the presence of those who have *not* performed a previous sacrifice—i.e. the *Puroḍāshins*,—along with those who have not performed such a sacrifice,—at the same *Sārasvata*); hence (for both the *Siddhāntin* and the *Pūrvapakṣin*) it is necessary to add the conditional '*yadā*' ('when') to the sentence (quoted by the Pūrvapakṣin), which has to be explained as 'when the *Sānnayyins* also are in the position of *Puroḍāshins* [as they are at the Paurṇamāsī], they should sit down (or keep fast), etc. etc.'—[The different sacrificers are thus found to be mentioned only with a view to indicating the different time of the performance, and not for laying down the difference in the character of the sacrificer,—says the *Tantravārtika*. The sense of the argument is that the names 'Puroḍāshin' and 'Sānnāyyin' are not meant to be taken in the technical sense of those who have *not* performed a previous sacrifice, and those who *have* performed a previous sacrifice, but only as indicatives of *time*,—the performers at the *Paurṇamāsī* performance being called '*Puroḍāshins*', as *Puroḍāsha* is the material used at the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, and the performers at the *Amāvāsyā* performance being called '*Sānnāyyins*', because *Sānnāyya* (curd-milk) is the material used at the *Amāvāsyā* (Darsha) sacrifice. Thus it is that the *same* performers who were called '*Sānnāyyins*' in connection with the *Darsha* sacrifice come to be called '*Puroḍāshins*' in connection with the *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice, irrespective of the fact of their having *performed*, or *not performed*, a previous *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice.]

SŪTRA (28).

AS REGARDS THE ARGUMENT THAT "AT THE 'UPAHAVYA', THE TWO SĀMANS WOULD COME IN BY TRANSFERENCE (FROM THE ARCHE-TYPE)",—

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the opponent [under (9e)] that "at the *Upahavya*, the *Bṛhat-Sāman* and the *Rathantara-Sāman* would come in from its Arche-type itself, in the event of the *Upahavya* being one and the same; so that in that case, a separate injunction of the *Sāman* would be entirely superfluous".—This argument has got to be refuted.—The present *Sūtra* is only for the purpose of recalling the previous argument (of the *Pūrvapakṣin*).

SŪTRA (29).

[THE ANSWER IS THAT] IN REALITY, THE REPETITION SERVES THE PURPOSE OF POINTING OUT FURTHER DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

The sentence quoted serves the purpose of pointing out further details,—the construction being—'if *Rathantara* is the *Sāman* sung, then the sacrificial fee should consist of the *white horse*,—if *Bṛhat* is the *Sāman* sung, the sacrificial fee should consist of the *Horse with golden forehead*.

SŪTRA (30).

THE VEDA ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME IDEA (OF THE ACT BEING ONE AND THE SAME).

Bhāṣya.

If the Act mentioned in all Recensions were *not* one and the same,—then, how could the act be enjoined in one Recension and its details laid down in another? For instance, (*a*) the *Maitrāyaṇī* Recension does not mention the *Samid* and other *Prayājas*, and yet it speaks of its details in the sentence '*Ṛtavo vai prayājāḥ samanīya hotavyāḥ*' [Mai. Sam. 1. 4. 12; see Shata. Brā. 1. 5. 31].—(*b*) Similarly, in certain Recensions the *mantra for picking up the stone*, beginning with the words '*Kuṭarurasi*' [Mai. Sam. 1. 1. 6], is not mentioned, and yet even in those Recensions we find the assertion—'*Kukkuṭosityashmānamupādattē, Kuṭarurasēti vā*.—From all this we conclude that it is one and the same act (spoken of in the several Recensions).

SŪTRA (31).

[OBJECTION]—"BUT, THERE BEING DISTINCT ORDERS OF PROCEDURE LAID DOWN IN EACH RECENSION, THE INJUNCTION IN EACH SHOULD BE TAKEN AS DISTINCT."

Bhāṣya.

"If a man follows up the Injunctions laid down in Recensions other than his own, he must surely act against what is enjoined in his own

Recension; for this reason, the act mentioned in the other Recensions should be taken as different."

SŪTRA (32).

[ANSWER]—AS THERE IS NO CONNECTION WITH ANY INCOMPATIBLE PROCESS, THE ACT IS TAKEN AS ONE AND THE SAME; HENCE ALL THE INJUNCTIONS BEARING UPON THAT ACT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AFFORDING INFORMATION ABOUT THAT SAME ACT.

Bhāṣya.

Our answer to the objection is as follows:—If we take the Act mentioned in all Recensions as one and the same, *there is no connection with any incompatible process*; as a matter of fact, there can be no conflict between *Order* and *Syntactical Connection*; as *Order* is the weaker and *Syntactical Connection* is the stronger of the two;—and that all that is laid down in the various Recensions has to be taken together and acted up to (in the performance) is what is indicated by *Syntactical Connection* [while the *Order of procedure* is a matter of *Order*, which is weaker than *Syntactical Connection*].

From all this it becomes established that one and the same Act is laid down in all Recensional and all Brāhmaṇa texts.

End of Pāda iv of Discourse II.

End of Discourse II.

DISCOURSE III.

AUXILIARIES.

PĀDA I.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Declaring the Subject-matter of the Discourse.*

SŪTRA (1).

NOW THERE (FOLLOWS) AN ACCOUNT OF AUXILIARIES.

Bhāṣya.

[For a different explanation of the term '*shēṣalakṣaṇa*'—see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 921–923,—where it is shown that the term may be taken as standing for all the rest of the *Sūtras*, i.e. Discourses III–XII, all of which deal with matters *auxiliary* to Dharma, and as such are included under the term '*shēṣalakṣaṇa*'.]

[Immediately after the treatment of the subject of the Differentiation of Acts, it becomes necessary to treat of the 'auxiliary character', because the due consideration of all other questions of Motive, etc., dealt with under Discourse IV *et. seq.* is dependent upon the question of 'auxiliary character'.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 924.]

The account of 'Different Acts' has been finished; next we shall deal with the account of the 'Auxiliary' [where we shall deal with the following questions]—What is an 'auxiliary'? For what reason is something an 'auxiliary'? In what way is it used? It will be pointed out that 'Direct Assertion' and others are the means by which the use of the Auxiliary is determined; the relative strength of these means will be discussed; and also other matters relating to and arising out of these subjects.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): [*Definition of 'Auxiliary'*].

SŪTRA (2).

THE AUXILIARY IS AN 'AUXILIARY' BECAUSE IT SERVES THE PURPOSES OF ANOTHER.

Bhāṣya.

In this *Sūtra* we have the definition of the Auxiliary, and also the statement of the grounds on which it is an 'auxiliary';—both these are pointed out here. The definition is that 'that which helps another is called *auxiliary*'; for instance, when people help others, they say, 'in this matter we are auxiliaries'.

Objection—"In some cases, even the Principal Factor also *helps another*; e.g. though the Teacher is the Principal person at the institution, yet he helps his pupils by imparting intellectual and moral instruction."

Answer—It is true that the Principal Factor sometimes *helps others*; but we call that thing 'Auxiliary' which exists entirely for helping others; such for instance as the 'born slave' who is purchased for the sole purpose of working for the master, and the ox is purchased only for the purpose of carrying loads for the master.

"But the master also, when making provision for the born slave, would (by that act be helping him and thus) become subservient (auxiliary) to him. [So that even the born slave cannot be said to exist *entirely* for helping others.]"

It is not so, we reply; because even when making provision for the slave, the master subserves his own purpose; the help accrues to the slave only because the master's own interests are inseparably bound up with the well-being of the slave. Similarly in the case of making provision for the Ox. So what we call an 'auxiliary' is that which always and absolutely exists for another.

Objection—"What is it that has already been dealt with before, under the *Sūtra* 2. 1. 8, where it has been stated that—'those that are meant to be productive of a material substance are to be regarded as *subsidiary*'? [That is to say, under the *Sūtra* quoted, the subsidiary character having been already explained, why should the same matter be taken up again?]"

Answer—Under that *Sūtra*, what was shown was that those verbs which spoke of acts bringing about visible results cannot be regarded as serving any transcendental purpose; while under the present *Sūtra* we have the definition of all kinds of *Auxiliaries*.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): [*Enumerating Auxiliaries.*]

SŪTRA (3).

"[THE 'AUXILIARY CHARACTER' BELONGS] TO SUBSTANCES, PROPERTIES AND PREPARATIONS",—SAYS BĀDARI.

Bhāṣya.

The teacher Bādari has opined that the term 'auxiliary' can be applied only to Substances, Properties and Preparations,—not to Sacrifices, Results and Agents.—(*a*) The *Substance* serves the purposes of the Act; if the Act is to be done for a purpose, it must be accomplished by means of a substance;—no Act can be accomplished without a substance;—therefore for the accomplishment of the Act, a substance has to be found out;—thus *Substance* serves the purposes of the Act.—(*b*) The *Property* serves the purpose of distinguishing the particular substance that has been enjoined;—there is need for such distinguishing of it,—as it is only a particular qualified substance that can be the means of accomplishing an act;—thus the Property also helps the Act though the substance, and this 'serves the purposes' of the Act.—(*c*) The *Preparation* is that on the accomplishment of which a certain thing becomes fit for some purpose;—this also 'serves a useful purpose' in the accomplishment of an Act; so that this also 'serves the purposes of another'.—Thus it is that Substances, Properties and Preparations are 'auxiliaries' inasmuch as *they serve the purposes of another.*

Sacrifices, Results and Agents are *not* auxiliaries.—The Sacrifice is to be performed by the Agent, and when that has been performed, there is nothing else to be done by him. The purpose of the Agent is the performance of the sacrifice itself, as for the other things, substance and the rest, they serve the purposes of the sacrifice and are 'auxiliary' thereto; the sacrifice itself is not performed for accomplishing anything (to which it could be 'auxiliary'); as the Result also is not brought about by the sacrifice, the fact being that when the sacrifice is performed, the Result comes by itself;—from the Veda also all that we know is that 'the Result comes about when the sacrifice is performed', and there are no words to the effect that 'the Result is brought about by the Sacrifice'.—Thus the Sacrifice is not 'auxiliary' to anything.—As regards the Result, that also is not enjoined in reference to the Agent;—all that the text of the Veda says is 'one who desires Heaven should perform the sacrifice'; it says nothing as to whether the Heaven is for the Agent himself or for someone else; the term used in the text is '*svargakāmaḥ*', 'desirous of heaven'; and one becomes 'desirous of heaven' merely by having a desire for Heaven;—hence Heaven (the Result) is not understood to be 'auxiliary' to the Agent;—hence the Result also cannot be an 'auxiliary'.—If then, neither the Result nor the Sacrifice is enjoined as an 'auxiliary', in regard to what could the Agent be the 'Principal'? He is however clearly 'auxiliary'

to the Act (Sacrifice), because he is a 'substance' (not because he is the 'Agent').

For these reasons, Bādari has opined that *the auxiliary character belongs to Substances, Properties and Preparations only.*

SŪTRA (4).

ACTIONS AS ALSO (ARE 'AUXILIARY'), BECAUSE THEY SERVE THE PURPOSE OF THE RESULT,—SAYS JAIMINI.

Bhāṣya.

The Teacher Jaimini however has held that Actions also are auxiliaries; he did not, like Bādari, hold that the auxiliary character is restricted to the three aforesaid things only. What Jaimini saw was that the Sacrifice is enjoined, not as something to be accomplished (in itself), but as a means of accomplishing the Result, for one who desires that Result; it is only when thus taken that what is directly enjoined in the texts becomes followed; and there can be no doubt as to the Injunction serving a useful purpose. This same idea is going to be further supported by the *Sūtras* themselves, under Discourse VI; all that is done here is that the idea that 'actions serve to accomplish Results' being accepted as established (under Discourse VI), it is shown that the Action is 'auxiliary' (to the Result).—Thus it is clear that there can be no such restriction as that 'Substances, Properties and Preparations only are auxiliaries',—the Sacrifice also being 'auxiliary' to the Result.

SŪTRA (5).

THE RESULT ALSO (IS AN 'AUXILIARY'), AS IT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE AGENT.

Bhāṣya.

The Result also is declared with reference to the Agent; the meaning of the Injunction is that 'the sacrifice is to be performed by a person who desires that Heaven may become his',—and not that 'the Heaven should obtain itself';—that such is the meaning is clear from the use of the Ātmanēpada ending (in the injunctive word '*yajēta*', 'should sacrifice'), which ending is used only when the Result of the act is meant to accrue to the Agent;—so that the sacrifice is performed in order that the Agent may experience (enjoy) the Result. Thus the conclusion is that the Result is asserted as following from the Sacrifice *for the sake of the Agent*, and not merely for its own accomplishment. Thus the Result also is an 'auxiliary'.

SŪTRA (6).

THE AGENT ALSO (IS AN 'AUXILIARY'), AS HE IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

The Agent also is found to be mentioned as an auxiliary to such acts as the *measuring of the Udumbara Post* (which has to be of the height of the

Agent).—Thus there can be no such restriction as that Substances, Properties and Preparations alone can be 'auxiliaries'.

On the subject-matter of this *Adhikaraṇa*, the revered *Vṛttikāra* has come to the following conclusion:—In relation to the Sacrifice, it is only Substances, Properties and Preparations whose 'auxiliary character' is absolute [these alone are such as are always 'auxiliary' to the Sacrifice]; the 'auxiliary character' of the others (Actions, Results and Agents) is only *relative* [they are both Principal and Auxiliary]; for instance, the Sacrifice (Action) is 'Principal' in relation to the Substance, but 'auxiliary' to the Result; the Result is 'Principal' in relation to the Sacrifice, but 'auxiliary' to the Agent;—and the Agent is 'Principal' in relation to the Result, but 'auxiliary' to acts like *the Measuring of the Udumbara Post*.—Thus then, the Restriction of the auxiliary character to Substances, Properties and Preparations (as held by Bādari) is quite right, as in relation to the Sacrifice, Substances, Properties and Preparations are *always* 'auxiliary'.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *Preparatory Acts like 'Nirvapaṇa' are applicable to definite things, according to the useful purpose served by it.*

SŪTRA (7).

THEY ARE CONNECTED WITH A DEFINITE PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

[The 'auxiliary character' having been defined, we now proceed to consider the manner in which the *auxiliaries* are employed in actual practice. The present *Adhikaraṇa* deals with the employment of *Preparations*, followed by that of *Substances, Objects* or *Implements* in *Adhikaraṇa* 5, and of *Properties* in *Adhikaraṇa* 7.]

There are the two sacrifices of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* enjoined in the text '*Darshapūrṇamāsābhyām svargakāmo yajēta*';—and in connection with these the following accessory details are found mentioned—(*a*) *Nirvapana* (Pouring out), *Prokṣaṇa* (water-sprinkling), and *Avahanana* (threshing) and so forth, in relation to grains;—(*b*) *Utpavana* (clarifying), *Vilāpana* (melting), *Grahaṇa* (holding) and *Āsādana* (placing) and so forth, in relation to *Butter*;—(*c*) *Shākhāharaṇa* (Fetching of Twigs), *Gavām-prasthāpana* (Fetching of the Cows), *Gavām-prasnāvana* (making the cows yield milk) and so on, in relation to the *Sānnāyya* (*Curd-milk*). [All these details are of the nature of 'Preparation', *Samskāra*.]

In regard to these there arises the *question*—are all these details to be performed in connection with all the three kinds of substances—Grains, Butter, and Curd-milk? Or are they to be performed only where they may serve a useful purpose?

Objection to the question:—"As a matter of fact, the preparatory details referred to are always found mentioned along with definite substances—e.g. the text '*Vrīhīnavahanti*' (speaks of the *Threshing* as to be done to the *Vrīhi Corn*), '*Taṇḍulān pinaṣṭi*' (speaks of the *Pounding* as to be done to the Husked Grains). So that there can be no room for any such doubt as finds place in the Question [as none of the Preparatory Details is ever found mentioned except in connection with a definite substance.]"

The answer to this is that it is true that they are found to be spoken of as connected with definite substances; but the fact of the matter is that while the details like *Threshing* are spoken of by *Direct Assertion* (through such words as '*avahanti*'), their connection with the substances like *Vrīhi* is indicated only by *Syntactical Connection* (of the verb '*avahanti*' with the word '*vrīhīn*'); [so that the general applicability to all substances of the *Threshing* is more authoritative than its special application to the *Vrīhi* corn only.]—Thus there is room for the doubt expressed in the Question.

On this question, the view that appears to be most reasonable is that '*they are connected with a definite purpose*';—'*artha*' stands for *prayojana*, *purpose*;—that is, the preparatory acts are to be performed only where, on being performed, they serve a useful purpose; such acts, for instance, as *Prathana* (spreading out) can serve no useful purpose in connection with

Butter and Curd-milk; and hence they are not to be done to those substances; similarly acts like *Utpavana* (clarifying) are not to be done to Grains or Curd-milk; and acts like *Fetching the Twigs* are not to be done to Butter and Grains—"But we actually find it directly declared that 'all are to be done to all'".—We do not yet know whether they are so declared or not; in fact, this is exactly what we have got to consider.—But even if they were so declared, they should not be done where they serve no useful purpose.

[As against this preliminary statement of the *Siddhānta*, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*.]—

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHAT IS ENJOINED SHOULD PERTAIN TO ALL THINGS, BECAUSE IT IS EQUALLY CONNECTED WITH ALL, AND BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE OF CONTEXT".

"What we have to say in answer to the above statement is as follows: If an act were one recognised as to be done, only on the basis of an implication (e.g. the employing of unhusked rice being laid down, it *implies* the doing of the act of *threshing* for the husking),—then such an act would naturally be performed only in cases where it could serve a useful purpose. The preparatory rites under consideration, however, are such as are all directly *enjoined*; so that it is *not* that those should be performed only where they serve a visible purpose;—where then?—wherever they are enjoined; and the acts in question are recognised to be such as are enjoined in all cases.—How so?—*Because it is equally connected with all, and because there is no difference of Context*; that is to say, (*a*) all things—Butter, Grains and Curd-milk—are equally connected with, or related to, the *Apūrva* (Transcendental Result of the main Act), in the relation of cause and effect; i.e. in all these cases, wherever the acts are done, they are recognised as done for the bringing about of the Transcendental Result;—(*b*) secondly, the *Context* also is the same, being enjoined in which, therefore, the details become recognised as enjoined for all the substances.—From these two reasons it follows that all the acts in question are to be done to all the substances.—As for the argument that all the acts do not serve useful purposes in connection with all substances,—our answer is that, on the strength of the injunction itself, they have to be regarded as serving useful purposes with all substances;—this 'purpose' may be of an invisible (transcendental) character."

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—WHERE THERE IS NO USEFUL PURPOSE (TO BE SERVED), THERE SHOULD BE NO ACTION.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that all the acts should be done to all the substances; in fact, acts do not deserve to be performed in cases where they do not serve any useful purpose,—as we have already explained.

Says the Opponent—"But on the strength of their Injunction itself, they should be taken as serving a useful purpose in all cases."

Certainly not, we reply. [For reasons detailed in the following Sūtra.]

SŪTRA (10).

AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE RESULT ALWAYS APPEARS ALONG WITH THE OPERATION; IF THERE WERE NO (VISIBLE) RESULT, THEN ALONE COULD THIS ABSENCE (OF RESULTS) JUSTIFY AN ASSUMPTION ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, there is no such Injunction as would justify the performance of all the acts with all the substances;—nor do we perceive any useful purpose (served by all in all cases) by *Sense-perception* or by any other means of cognition. As for *Presumption*, that also would be necessarily operative (in justifying the assuming of purpose) only in a case where there is a distinct Injunction in actual words,—in no other case; that is to say, when as a matter of fact, we know that such acts as *Prathana* (Spreading out), when performed over Butter and Curd-milk, serve no visible purpose, we could be justified in *presuming* an *invisible* purpose, only if, without such a presumption, the injunction of those acts in that particular context were found to be unjustifiable (meaningless);—as a matter of fact, those acts have to be enjoined in connection with Grains, in connection with which visible results in the form of *unhusking* and the like are found to appear *along with* the operation—of *threshing* and the like;—there is need too for this *unhusking*, as without it, the Cake could not be prepared. Such being the case, the injunction of the act in question in the Context is found to serve a useful purpose. Thus then, when the injunction of the Act is found useful in connection with Grains, there can be no ground for *presuming* an invisible Result (as resulting from the performance of the act in question over *Butter* and *Curd-milk*). Hence no such invisible result can be presumed.—If in the case of the *threshing* done to the *Vrīhi*, no such visible result as the preparation of the Rice (by unhusking) were found to appear, then, *in the absence* of such a result, we might take the purpose served to consist in what is spoken of by the words of the text, irrespectively of any visible Result; so that an invisible result might be taken as following from the act (of Threshing) as done to the *Butter* and the *Curd-milk* [solely on the basis of the fact that these substances also are mentioned in the same Context].—From all this it follows that acts like *Prathana* (Spreading out) are not to be done over all the substances.—Similarly with acts like Clarifying and those like *Fetching the Twigs*.—Thus it becomes established that it is not right that all the acts are to be done to all the substances; and that acts like *Prathana* (Spreading out) should not be done to Butter and Curd-milk,—they are to be done to Herbs only;—acts like *sprinkling* should be done to Butter only, nor to Grains or to Curd-milk; and acts like *Fetching the Twigs* should be done to the Curd-milk, not to Butter or to Grains.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *Implements like 'Sphya' have their employment restricted in accordance with their connections.*

SŪTRA (11).

On account of its connection with the originative text, the Implement should be taken as enjoined for the purpose of that (which is mentioned in that text).

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which we read—'(1-2) *Sphyashcha, Kapālani cha,* (3-4) *Agnihotrahavaṇī cha, Shūrpañcha,* (5-6) *Kṛṣṇājinañcha, Shamyā cha,* (7-8) *Ulūkhalañcha, Musalañcha,* (9-10) *Dṛṣachcha, Upalā cha—ētāni vai dasha yajñāyudhāni'* [where *Sphya* and the rest are laid down as the 'ten sacrificial implements'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 6. 8. 3).

In regard to these there arises the question—Are these implements enjoined here for the doing of everything that can be done with them? Or for doing that only in connection with which they are mentioned?

On this we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"They are enjoined here for the doing of anything and everything that can be done with them;—why?—because it is only thus that the injunctions serve a useful purpose; otherwise they would be mere *references* serving no useful purpose. Further, the circumstance that 'there is no difference of Context' applies equally to all things. Lastly, the fact that they are called 'sacrificial implements' shows that they are all equally connected with the 'sacrifice'.—From all this it follows that all the implements are to be used in all cases."

Against this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—'*On account of its connection with the originative text, the Implement should be taken as enjoined for the purpose of that which is mentioned in that text*';—i.e. when an act is spoken of in the originative text, as connected with an Implement, that act should be done with that Implement; e.g. the originative text being (1) '*Sphyēna uddhanti*' (Digs up with the *Sphya*), where the indication of *Syntactical Connection* is that the *Sphya* is to be used for doing the Digging,—it follows that the Digging is not to be done by any other implement save the *Sphya*. If this view is accepted, then, the using of the *Sphya* having been enjoined in this same text, its mention in the sentence '*Sphyashcha Kapālani cha, etc.*' would be a mere *reference* to it for the purpose of asserting that 'these are the ten sacrificial implements.'—In this way the mention of each one of the implements would be a reference to it as enjoined in the originative text laying down the action to be done with it; these originative texts being—(2) '*Kapāleṣu shrapayati*' ('Bakes on the pans'), (3) '*Agnihotrahavaṇyā havīṃṣi nirvapati*' ('Pours the

grains with the *Agnihotrahavaṇī*'), (4) '*Shūrpēṇa vivinakti*' ('Separates the husks with the winnowing basket'), (5) '*Kṛṣṇājinamadhastāt ulūkhalasyāvastṛṇāti*' ('Spreads the antelope-skin under the mortar'), (6) '*Shamyāyām dṛṣadupadadhāti*' ('Places the lower pounding stone on the *Shamyā* stick'), (7-8) '*Ulūkhalamusalābhyām avahanti*' ('Husks the grains with mortar thestle'), (9-10) '*Dṛṣadupalābhyām pinaṣṭi*' ('Pounds with the two stones').—It is only through *Context* that all the Implements would be indicated as to be used for all the acts, while through *Syntactical Connection* the use of each becomes restricted to the act along with which it is mentioned in the originative text.—As for the term '*Yajñāyudha*' ('Sacrificial Implements'), which may be taken as laying down the use of the implements by means of this common term, the indication of this also would be set aside (by what is indicated by the particular originative texts); because a particular injunction by a general statement is only *indirect*, while a particular injunction by a particular statement is *direct*.—From all this it becomes established that each of the Implements is to be used only for that particular act with which it is connected in the originative text.

Adhikaraṇa (6): *Properties like 'Redness' are restricted, not mixed up.*

SŪTRA (12).

When the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose, they have the same function; and hence there should be restriction.

Bhāṣya.

With reference to the *Purchase* (of *Soma*) at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we have the text—'*Aruṇayā piṅgākṣyā ēkahāyanyā somam krīṇāti*' (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 6. 7) ['One purchases *Soma* with a tawny-eyed and one-year-old (cow), which is *red*', where '*aruṇayā*', 'red', stands for the *property*, and the other two terms stand for the substance, animal. There are other texts such as—'*Ajayā krīṇāti*' ('Purchases it with the she-goat'), '*Vāsasā krīṇāti*' ('Purchased with the cloth'), and so forth].

In regard to this, there arises the following question:—Does the property of Redness go with the entire context (qualifying all that is mentioned in the Context)? Or does it go with the *one-year-old cow* only, and that too in connection with the act of *Purchasing* only?

Objection to the question—"Why should there be any such doubt when the connection of 'redness' with the 'purchase' is clearly expressed by the words '*aruṇayā krīṇāti*'?"

Answer—All that the word expresses is that the unsubstantial (shapeless) property of *Redness* is the instrument of the act (of Purchase),—this fact being expressed by the third case-ending in the term '*aruṇayā*' expressing *instrumentality*; and yet no unsubstantial object can ever be the means of accomplishing an act;—hence it would seem to us that the property of *Redness* has no connection with the act of Purchasing; and yet it is not likely that an authoritative text would assert what is impossible;—there may be all this supposition in our mind. With the notion that some sort of connection might be possible (between the *Redness* and the *Purchasing*), there arises a desire to search out some way of making the text yield some sort of a valid cognition; while pondering over this, if we can find some capacity (in the *Redness*) to be connected with the act (of *Purchasing*), then, on the basis of the two words being syntactically connected, we shall apply the *Redness* to the act of *Purchasing* only;—if, on the other hand, even though looking out with all due care, we cannot find any way of making a connection between the two possible, then, we shall admit a syntactical split and connect the *Redness* with the entire Context.—For these reasons, the question that has been raised is deserving of full consideration.

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"The property of *Redness* is connected with the entire Context;—why?—*because it is equally connected with the whole (all that is mentioned in the*

Context) and because there is no difference of Context [the same reasons that have been put forward by the *Pūrvapakṣa* under Sū. 8].—'*Syntactical Connection* being more authoritative than *Context*, the Redness should be connected with the act of *Purchasing* only'.—Such is not understood to be the sense of the text; not even a hundred texts could lay down what cannot be done; if one were to say 'Burning should be done with *Water* and wetting should be done with *Fire*',—could he ever be regarded as making a reasonable statement? In fact, no unsubstantial thing can ever be the means of accomplishing an act. It is for this reason that no connection between the words '*aruṇayā*' and '*krīṇāti*' being possible, the two cannot be taken as syntactically connected."

Objection (to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*-reasoning)—The word '*aruṇayā*' ('red') does not denote *property*, it denotes the *substance*;—how?—because it is in the Feminine Gender; it is only particular *substances* (objects) that are either *Feminine* or *Masculine* or *Neuter*; and the Feminine ending is appended to that noun-base which denotes a *female substance*; and it is a Feminine ending that we find in the term '*aruṇayā*' (red);—hence we conclude that this term denotes a *substance*.

Answer (given by the *Pūrvapakṣin*)—"This is not right; when a certain substance is characterised by the property of *redness*, then alone it becomes capable of being spoken of as '*aruṇa*' (red); if that same substance were characterised by a property other than *redness*, it could not be spoken of as '*aruṇa*';—thus then, while the term '*aruṇa*' is inseparable from the property of *redness*, it is not so inseparable from the *substance*;—hence it follows that it is the *property* that is denoted by the term '*aruṇa*'. Thus the fact of the term denoting a *property* is perceived directly, while the fact of its denoting a *substance* could only be got at through Inference in the form—'Because the noun-base in the word *aruṇaya* has taken the Feminine ending, therefore it must denote a *substance*';—Direct Perception is always more authoritative than Inference;—for this reason the term '*aruṇayā*' must be taken as denoting the *property*.—'How then is the presence of the Feminine ending to be accounted for?'—Words denoting properties also take the Feminine Gender; for instance, just as we have the expression (*a*) '*aruṇā buddhiḥ*' or (*b*) (v.l.) '*karuṇā buddhiḥ*' [where the substance, Buddhi is spoken of as having the property of *redness*, and the word '*aruṇā*', which denotes the property, is in the Feminine Gender,—(*b*) or in the other reading, the substance, Buddhi, is spoken of as having the property of *compassion*, and the word '*karuṇā*' denoting that property takes the feminine ending],—in the same manner we may account for the Feminine Gender of the word '*aruṇā*' (in '*aruṇaya*', in the sentence under consideration).—And if the word denotes a *property*, then it cannot be connected with the act of *Purchasing*.—Consequently, we must have recourse to syntactical split and connect the term with the entire Context."

Says the Objector (to the *Pūrvapakṣin*)—If the *Redness* is not connected with the act of *Purchasing*, it can be connected with the other term in the same sentence, '*ēkahāyanyā*' ('one-year-old'), so that there would be no syntactical split.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"That cannot be; what the term '*aruṇa*' denotes is the *Property only*, not *the Property and the Substance* both,—while the term '*ēkahāyanī*' denotes the *substance* only, not the substance along with a property;—under the circumstances, how could we recognise any connection between the two in the absence of the Genitive ending?"

The Opponent to the *Purvapakṣin* says—Even in the absence of the Genitive ending, we can regard the two terms ('*aruṇayā*' and '*ēkahāyanyā*') as co-extensive (in apposition), by reason of both having the same case-ending; just as we do in the case of the expression '*nīlam utpalam*'.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* replies—"This is not possible; in fact, by its very form (and nature) the term '*aruṇa*' denotes a property, while its co-extensiveness with the term '*ekahāyanī*' (one-year-old) can only be *assumed* through a Syntactical Connection based upon the fact of the two words ('*aruṇayā*' and '*ekahāyanyā*') having the same case-ending, and also upon the proximity of the term '*ekahāyanī*';—and Syntactical Connection cannot be more authoritative than Indicative Power; hence what has been just said is not right."

The Opponent of the *Pūrvapakṣin* urges the following argument:—When it is found that a word, if taken merely as denoting a *property*, is incapable of being connected with any other word,—then, in order to guard against the word being uninstructive and hence useless, it is taken as denoting a *substance*; and under these circumstances, it comes to be syntactically connected with some other term (like '*ēkahāyanī*') which is in close proximity to it, and has also the same case-ending as the word itself,—and hence co-extensive with it. It is in this same way that we have such expressions as '*nīlam utpalam*'.—The case with the word '*aruṇayā*' is exactly like this; if it is taken in its own sense (as denoting *property*), it becomes dissociated from the sentence and ceases to have any sense at all even in the entire Context.—Why so?—For the same reason that it cannot be connected with the act of *purchasing*,—namely, the reason that what is itself unsubstantial cannot be the means of accomplishing an act;—nor can it be connected with substances conducive to the accomplishment of the act; because a word which denotes a mere property cannot signify a substance;—and this same will be the reason why the word cannot have any connection with the Context; because if it were connected with the Context at all, then it could be so either by being connected with the *act* (spoken of in the Context), or with the substances conducive to the fulfilment of those acts; and both these connections have been shown to be impossible.—For all these reasons, in order to save it from becoming meaningless, we must take the term '*aruṇā*' as connected with the term '*ēkahāyanī*' which is in close proximity to it; and there need be no syntactical split.

"It is not so", replies the *Pūrvapakṣin*; "the term '*aruṇā*' cannot be taken as qualifying the *ēkahāyanī*;—why?—because the term '*aruṇā*' appears along with the *third case-ending*, and through the force of this *third case-ending*, it can only be taken as *qualifying an act*; as agents (*kārakas* denoted by the case-endings) are connected with *acts*, not with *substances*. Thus then, through the direct signification of the third case-ending, the word should be taken as qualifying an *act*,—and on the strength

of *Syntactical Connection*, it should be taken as qualifying the substance, *ēkahāyanī*;—and Direct Signification is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection. Hence the word ('*aruṇayā*') cannot be connected with the *ēkahāyanī*."

The Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent—The *property* not being capable of being connected with the *act*, no significance can attach to the case-ending (in '*aruṇayā*'); it is for this reason that the connection of the property with the *ēkahāyanī* is admitted (even though it is not directly signified).

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"This also is not possible; if the idea is that, inasmuch as no significance attaches to the case-ending, the word '*aruṇayā*', though denoting a *property*, should be taken as denoting a *substance*,—then, in that case (the case-ending having no significance), the *noun-base* would be all that would be significant, and in that case the right ending would be the Nominative one (acc. to Pāṇinī's Sūtra '*Prātipadikārtha* ....*mātrē prathamā*'); specially as a word with the third case-ending (Instrumental) could not express the connection (desired by the Opponent). The mere fact that something is not otherwise possible cannot justify the assumption of such a meaning (of a word) as is impossible; for instance, in the case of the assertion 'the boy is standing in the fire', the mere fact of the *standing* being impossible *in the fire* does not justify the assumption that the word 'fire' means *horse* or *ox*,—all that is admitted is that the word 'fire' signifies *near the fire*. Similarly in the case in question, inasmuch as the word which is without the first case-ending cannot be taken in the sense of the noun-base pure and simple. From all this it follows that the word '*aruṇayā*' might well be regarded as meaningless; it can never be taken to have any connection with the '*ēkahāyanī*'.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent*—We do not say that the term '*aruṇā*' signifies no active agent; for it clearly does signify an active agent characterised by the quality of Redness. What happens is that at one time it is one thing that is meant to be predicated, while at another time it is something else; that is to say, the connotation of a word consisting of a predominant and a subordinate factor, at one time it may be the subordinate factor that is meant to be predicated, and the predominant factor is merely referred to; for instance, the term '*daṇḍī*' ('man with the stick') is known as having a connotation in which the *daṇḍa* (stick) forms the subordinate, and the *man*, the predominant, factor; and yet, when the *man* is already known and it is intended only to state that the *stick* forms his accessory (in this case, the subordinate factor, the stick, is what is predicated and enjoined); as we find in the injunction '*Daṇḍī praiṣānanvāha*' ('the man repeats the directions with stick in his hand');—so also in the case of the sentence '*Lohitoṣṇīṣā ṛtvijaḥ pracharanti*' ('the red-turbaned priests operate') [where, the *Priests* and their *operating* being already known from other sources, what is predicated or enjoined is the subordinate factor of their *wearing red-turbans*].—Similarly in the case in question (in the word '*aruṇayā*') even though the property of Redness is the subordinate factor, and the active agent is the predominant factor, yet the word may be taken as predicating the property of *Redness* as belonging to the active agent, which latter is only referred to (for the purpose of

the said predication). In this way, the connection of the word '*aruṇayā*' with the *ēkahāyanī* becomes possible; and there is no syntactical split.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"There is not much in this argument. In this case the term '*ēkahāyanī*' has been used for the purpose of expressing the connected relationship between the *ēkahāyanī* (animal) and the act of *Purchasing*; how then can it be ever connected with the word '*aruṇayā*'? Though we have already urged this point, yet it is being reiterated again and again."

The Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent asks—When the word '*ēkahāyanī*' has been used along with the act of *Purchasing*, just as much as along with the property of *Redness*,—why should we accept its connection with the *Purchasing* and not with the *Redness*?

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"The reason for this acceptance lies in the authority of the word; that is to say, the case-ending attached to the term '*ēkahāyanī*' signifies its connection with the *act* (of *purchasing*), while there is no such ending expressive of its connection with the *property* (of *Redness*)."

Opponent—What is it that is expressive of connection with the *Act*? and what is it that is expressive of the Property?

Pūrvapakṣin—"When the relation of the action meant to be spoken of is that with an *active agent* (*kāraka*), then we have the second (Accusative) and other case-endings; whereas when the active agent is not meant to be spoken of, and all that is meant to be spoken of as *relation in general*, then we have the sixth (Genitive) case-ending. In the case in question we do not find the *sixth* case-ending at all; what we do find is the *third* (Instrumental) case-ending; that is why we admit the connection of '*ēkahāyanī*' with the verb to *purchase*, not with the word '*aruṇā*' (which signifies *property* of Redness)."

The Opponent retorts—How then do we have the connection that we have in the expression '*nīlam utpalam*'?

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"There certainly is a connection in that case; but it is got at, *not* through *Direct Signification*, but, through *Syntactical Connection*; in proximity to the term '*utpala*' there is the term '*nīla*', which (being an adjective) needs the other term,—and hence becoming syntactically connected with that other term ('*utpala*'), it is taken as so connected by indicating a *particular Utpala*,—its function in this consisting of that process of Indication in which the word does not entirely surrender its own connotation [i.e. the term '*nīlam*' denotes the *blue colour*,—but when connected with the word '*utpala*', it comes to indicate the *blue-coloured utpala*, and thus in the sentence '*nīlam utpalam*' we have the statement of the equation 'the blue lotus is a lotus']."

The Opponent—In the case in question also, there may be connection between the *Redness* and the *Ēkahāyanī*, through Syntactical Connection.

Pūrvapakṣin—"That cannot be, we reply. Direct Signification is stronger than Syntactical Connection; and Direct Signification asserts the connection of the *Ēkahāyanī* with the *act* (of *Purchasing*) and not with the property (of *Redness*)."

The Opponent—"If connection with the Act can be admitted on the basis

of Direct Signification, then connection with the Property may also be admitted on the basis of Syntactical Connection."

Pūrvapakṣin—"That cannot be done; when one thing is spoken of as related to some other thing, no other thing, even though in close proximity to it, can become related to it. For instance, in the expression '*Bhāryā rājñaḥ puruṣo dēvadattasya*', if the term '*rājñaḥ*' be taken as used for the purpose of qualifying the '*bhāryā*', then it cannot be connected with the term '*puruṣa*'. In the same manner, in the case in question, when the term '*ēkahāyanī*' has been used for the purpose of qualifying the *act* (of *Purchasing*), it cannot be connected with the term '*aruṇā*'."

Says the Opponent—It is true that, so long as there is no actual *need* (for one word to be connected with another), mere proximity cannot be a reason (for connecting them);—in fact, in every case, it is only when the meaning of the word alone by itself is found to be incompatible, and is on that account rejected, that there is justification for taking it as part of the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs (i.e. as connected with some other word or words of the sentence); this is not justifiable under any circumstances other than the said one:—and the reason for this lies in the fact that the connotation of the word by itself is of a generic character (as the word always denotes the *Universal*, the *Class*),—while the meaning of the sentence is of a particular character; i.e. the meaning of the sentence is that which restricts to *particulars* the *Universals* denoted by the component words. This is what has been explained under Sū. 1. 1. 25—'*Tadbhūtānām kriyārthēna samāmnāyo'rthasya tannimittatvāt.*'—It may be that the meanings of words are *perceived* directly, while the meaning of the sentence is *inferred*; but so long as the word remains confined to its own denotation, it does not teach anything; that is why it has to be syntactically connected with another word,—not for any other reason. So that in the case in question, even though the term '*ēkahāyanī*', having all its needs fulfilled by being connected with the act of *Purchasing*, does not stand in need of the connection of any other word,—yet the term '*aruṇā*' is such that, unless it be connected with another word, it remains meaningless, and hence it becomes syntactically connected with the term '*ēkahāyanī*'.

Pūrvapakṣin—"It has been already pointed out that the term '*ēkahāyanī*' is meant to be connected with the *act* (of *Purchasing*), not with the property denoted by '*aruṇā*'."

Opponent—What we say is that, with a view to save the term '*aruṇā*' from becoming meaningless we have to take the term '*ēkahāyanī*' to be connected with both (the *act of Purchasing*, as well as the *property of Redness*). In fact, what is done for the sake of one thing may well be done for the sake of another; for instance, canals are dug for irrigating paddy, and yet water from them is used also for drinking and washing; similarly, in the case in question, the term '*ēkahāyanī*', used for the sake of being connected with the *act of Purchasing*, may be connected with the term '*aruṇā*' also; there would be nothing wrong in that.

Pūrvapakṣin—"It is not so; though it may be that, in order to guard against the contingency of making the term '*aruṇā*' meaningless, it is connected with the '*ēkahāyanī*',—yet, in this way, it could be connected

with the entire Context; because this term '*aruṇā*' could not be qualified (restricted) by the words '*somam krīṇāti*' ('purchases *Soma*'); because these words are not used as a qualifying clause; in fact they enjoin an *Apūrva* (something not already known)."

Opponent—Even though enjoined, this *Apūrva* might become connected with something else, just as the term '*ēkahāyanī*' is connected.—How so? —A word is always used for a definite purpose; hence it should be taken as serving all that purpose for which it is used; and so long as such a word is present in the mind, and is found to be in need of some connection, it can become connected with another word, which also may be present in the mind.

Pūrvapakṣin—"It is not so; that word alone is connected with another which becomes meaningless unless so connected,—not any other word.—Why so?—Because when the word becomes so connected, its *universal* connotation becomes restricted to *particulars*; so that *direct signification* (of the *Universal*) suffers at the hands of *syntactical connection* (indicating the *Particular*). (As regards the term '*aruṇā*'), even when it is *not connected* with the act of *Purchasing*, it does not become meaningless; as it can be connected with the several *ēkahāyanī*-animals mentioned in the Context."

Opponent—It has been already pointed out that it is not possible for the term '*aruṇā*' to be connected with the Context.

Pūrvapakṣin—"It is not impossible. The fact of the matter is that in any particular sentence, when a certain factor is enjoined by it, that same factor cannot be connected with any other factor; because of difference in the form of expression; the expression that is used for enjoining a thing is different from that used for connecting it with a property; further, that which is *enjoined* is made known as something *not already known*; while what is meant to be connected with a property is only *referred to* as something *already known*. Now if a certain thing is spoken of only once, it could not be *known* as well as *not known*; so that if the '*ēkahāyanī*' has been *enjoined* in regard to the *Purchasing*, it could be so only as something *not already known*; while if it were connected with the property signified by the term '*aruṇā*', it could be so only as something *already known*.—There would be no such incongruities if the sentence were split up (one connecting the *ēkahāyanī* with *Purchasing*, and another connecting the *ēkahāyanī* with *Redness*);—in the Context itself there are several acts and substances spoken of by means of other sentences; and it is with them that what is enjoined in the latter of the two sentences (into which the first sentence has been split up) becomes connected; so that while it would be *enjoined* in one sentence, it would be *referred to* (for being connected with the other factors) in a different sense; in which case there would be no incongruity.

"From all this it follows that *the Redness is connected with the entire Context, because it is equally connected with all and because there is no difference of Context*".

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*When the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose, they have the same function, and hence there should be restriction* (Sū.); that is to say,

in a case where the Substance and the Property are spoken of as serving the same purpose, these two—the Substance and the Property—should be taken as restricted to one and the same thing;—why?—*because they have the same function*;—i.e. because the function of both is the same; i.e. in the case in question, the only function spoken of as belonging to the Substance (*Ekahāyanī*) and the Property (*Redness*) is that they should be connected with the act of *Purchasing*.—How do you get at this idea?—This is got at by taking the whole as 'one sentence'.—"How are they taken as 'one sentence'?"—The words—'*aruṇayā—piṅgākṣyā—ēkahāyanyā*' ['with the red, tawny-eyed, one-year-old']—do not convey any idea at all; as both the speaker and the person spoken to still need some other word to comprehend the meaning; when however the words '*Somam krīṇāti*' ['he purchases the Soma'] are added, then the idea conveyed becomes completed; as with this addition both the speaker and the person spoken to find all that they need.

Objection—"In case the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose and have the same function, why cannot there be option [the two being treated as optional alternatives]?"

Reply—This cannot be right; as (in the first place) the argument,—that "the two things concerned fulfil the conditions of optional alternatives because of what has been declared (under Sūtra 12. 3. 10) regarding 'things serving the same purpose being optional alternatives'",—has no force against us.—Why?—Because that alone is an effective objection which establishes the objector's own thesis and goes against that of his opponent; your objection (that the two should be treated as optional alternatives) does not go against our view,—our view being that *Redness* is connected with *Purchasing*.—(*Secondly*) there can be no option in this case, as the purposes served are diverse.

"But it has just been asserted that the purpose served is one and the same; so that what you assert now involves a self-contradiction. Then again, it has been explained (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, above) that the Property, being unsubstantial, cannot be connected with the Act; while what is said now is that the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose of accomplishing the *Purchase*,—which is contrary to that statement."

Our answer to the above is that there is no self-contradiction; nor is there any chance of the two being regarded as optional alternatives. It is true that the purpose served by both is one and the same; but there is a difference in the efficiency of the two; the Substance helps the *Act* directly, while the *Property* helps the Act only indirectly, by qualifying and specifying the substances that help the Act.

"In that case the Property does not help in the accomplishment of the Act at all; all that it does is to specify that (*Substance*) which accomplishes the Act."

It is not so; in the accomplishing of the Act, the efficiency of the Property lies in this that it specifies what does accomplish that Act; in fact the Act stands in need of the specification of the means of its accomplishment; the Property serves to specify that means of accomplishment as its distinguishing mark;—in the absence of such a mark, there could be no specification as to which one of the many possible things is the means of

accomplishing the particular Act; and in that case we could not determine how to accomplish the Act. It is in this way that Property becomes the means of accomplishing the Act.

Under these circumstances, the two (Substance and Property) cannot be regarded as optional alternatives.—To take an example, as between the *Locus* (*Adhikaraṇa*) on the one hand and the *Nominative and other Agents* on the other,—the *Locus* contains (supports) the Nominative and other Agents,—until these latter are so supported, they cannot accomplish the act;—similarly the Nominative Agent brings together the Instrumental and other Agents;—and until these latter are so brought together, they cannot accomplish their respective functions. [So that though there are so many agencies at work in the accomplishing of an act, all these agencies cannot be regarded as optional alternatives.]—In fact, it is a case of option only where a second instrument is prescribed for the imparting of that very aid which can be imparted by an instrument already known; e.g. in the case of the sentences '*Vrīhibhiryajatē*' and '*Yavairyajēta*', where both the *vrīhi* and the *yava* accord precisely the same help to the action by supplying the material for the Rice.

"Then it comes to this that the *ēkahāyanī* is enjoined (as a means to the *Purchasing*), and the property of *Redness* is a qualification of the *ēkahāyanī*; and this explanation will involve the same incongruity of a syntactical split."

We do not say that the term '*aruṇā*' is connected with the term '*ēkahāyanī*'; what we say is that it is connected with the verb 'to purchase',—the meaning of the sentence being that 'the act of *purchasing* should be accomplished by means of the *Property of Redness*';—now, according to this, the Agent has to make an effort by which the *Purchasing* could be accomplished by the Property of Redness;—but the Property cannot accomplish the act except by serving as a qualification for the Instrument whereby the act is directly accomplished; so that it follows as a matter of course that the Property becomes a qualification of that Instrument (in the present case, the *Ēkahāyanī*). For instance, when it is said that 'one should cook in a pot',—where the *Pot* is mentioned as a means of accomplishing the *cooking*, it is employed in holding (containing, the article to be cooked); similarly in the case in question also.—Thus there is no possibility of a syntactical split.

"Even so there would be syntactical split.—How?—In the text under consideration, there are several sentences, each complete in itself; just as in the case of the sentence '*Devadatta—Yajñadatta—Viṣṇumitrāḥ bhojyantām*' ['Devadatta, Yajñadatta and Viṣṇumitra should be fed'], where the act of 'feeding' is meant to be complete in itself with reference to each of the three persons,—so also in the case of the sentence '*Yasya pitā pitāmahaḥ somam na pibēt*, etc.' ['One whose father and grandfather have not drunk the *Soma* should perform the *Vrātyapashuyāga*'] [where the condition of 'the non-drinking of Soma' pertains to the *Father* and the *Grandfather*, each by himself];—similarly in the case in question, there would be two sentences, each complete in itself—'*aruṇayā krīṇāti*' and '*ēkahāyanyā krīṇāti*' [and thus there would be a *syntactical split*]."

This argument is not subversive of our main thesis; for, even so, the *redness* is connected with the *purchasing* only, and not with the entire Context.

"True, the argument does not vitiate your main thesis; but (by your interpretation) it would be possible to have the *purchase* effected by an *Ēkahāyanī* which is *not red*, as also by a *red* animal which is *not ēkahāyanī*; and this militates against your thesis that there is 'restriction regarding the *Substance* and the *Property*' (Sūtra 12)."

In that case, we shall assert that there is no syntactical split (involved in our explanation).—How so?—Because what are enjoined are the *Substance* (Animal) and the *Redness* in reference to the *Purchasing*,—and not the *Purchasing* in reference to these two (*Substance* and *Redness*); and the Principal does not vary with each accessory; it is only the accessory that varies with each Principal. We have several instances where a sentence dealing with a large number of factors is taken as one complete unit dealing with all the factors taken collectively; e.g. the sentence '*Gargāḥ shatam daṇḍyantām*' ('The *Gargas* should be fined a hundred'; where, though each member of the *Garga* community is meant to be fined, yet the sentence is taken as one complete unit dealing with them all in the aggregate),—and the sentence '*Abhiṣutya hutvā bhakṣayanti*' [where, though there are two distinct actions, of *extracting the juice* and *pouring the libation*, yet the two together are taken collectively as forming the antecedent of the action of *eating*].—Similarly in the case in question what is enjoined is the *Purchasing* as qualified by the two qualifying factors (of *Redness* and *one-year-oldness*) taken collectively [and thus there is no syntactical split].

"As a matter of fact, in each of the instances cited, the act enjoined is found to be such as is complete in regard to each of the individuals concerned; how then is it concluded that the sentence is one complete unit as dealing with all the individuals taken collectively, and not with each of them severally? [The Fine, for instance, serves to absolve the person fined, and hence it has to be repeated with each person of the *Garga* community; and the *eating* has to be preceded by each of the two acts mentioned as its antecedents.]"

Our answer to this is as follows:—In the case in question, the *Substance* (Animal) and the *Redness* are found to be connected with the *act* (*Purchasing*), and not connected with each other;—the *Purchasing* also is found to be qualified by both, the *Animal* and the *Redness* collectively, not one by one;—under the circumstances, if this sentence were taken as predicating the *animal and the redness*,—then the *Purchasing* would be undoubtedly connected with each of the two factors severally; if, on the other hand, the *animal* as well as the *redness* be taken as enjoined with a view to enjoining the act of *Purchasing*, then this *Purchasing* would be as qualified by the *one-year-old animal* as by the property of *Redness*; so that the connection of *both* would have to be admitted. Further, what is meant to be brought about in this case is the *Purchase*, not the *Animal* and the *Redness*; as it is through this *Purchase* that the *Soma*, which is required as the material for the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, is secured. As for the *Animal* and the *Redness* they would be desired to be brought about only if they

served the purposes of the *Purchase*, not otherwise.—From all this we conclude that what is enjoined is the *Purchase*, and this Purchase is qualified, not by each of the two factors severally [but by both collectively], —so that the sentence is a complete unit as dealing with both collectively. Such being the case, it follows that, with the exception of the *one-year-old Animal*, there is no other means of effecting the *Purchase*,—and that with the exception of *Redness*, there is nothing else to specify the means of effecting the *Purchase*,—so that this 'restriction' becomes duly established.

"What we have to urge against this is as follows:—If the *Property* (*Redness*) simply becomes connected with that by which the *Purchase* is effected, then, even on the split of the sentence, the Redness itself would remain a means of effecting the *Purchase*; so that it would not be necessary for this Redness to enter into the *Animal* as its qualification; under the circumstances, why is so much effort being made to treat the sentence as one composite whole?"

Our answer to this is as follows:—If the sentence is split up, then one *Purchase* becomes recognised as effected by means of the *One-year-old Animal*,—and another Purchase becomes recognised as effected by means of the *Redness*; and the *Redness* does not become predicated in reference to the same *Purchase* that is effected by means of the *One-year-old Animal*;—so that, if there is another *Purchase* effected by means of *Redness*, then, by implication, there should be something else also as a means of effecting the *Purchase* [as the mere property of Redness, by itself, cannot effect any thing]; and the property of *Redness* would, in that case, qualify this *something else* and become connected with it.—If, on the other hand, the whole sentence is taken as one composite whole, then all this becomes avoided.

Thus the only right conclusion is that '*when the Substance and the Property serve the same purpose, they have the same function, and hence there should be restriction*' (Sū.).

Adhikaraṇa (7): *The Cleansing should be done to all the Grahas (Cups): No significance attaches to the Number.*

SŪTRA (13).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"It is qualified by singleness, because singleness is directly mentioned."

Bhāṣya.

[The general question of the employment of Accessories having been dealt with, we now proceed to consider the details regarding special cases.]

(*a*) There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice laid down in the text—'*Ya ēvaṁvidvān somēna yajatē*, etc.' (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 2. 2. 3.);—in connection with this sacrifice we read '*Dashāpavitrēṇa graham sammārṣṭi*'.—(*b*) Similarly, in connection with the *Agnihotra*, we read '*Agnēstṛṇāni apachinoti*'.—(*c*) Lastly, in connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, we read '*Puroḍāsham paryagni karoti*' (Shata. Brā. 1. 2. 2. 13).

In connection with all these, there arises the question—Are the (*a*) *cleansing*, (*b*) the *removing of straws*, and (*c*) *the taking round of the Fire* to be done in connection with (*a*) only *one* Cup, (*b*) only *one* Fire, and (*c*) only *one* Cake,—or with (*a*) *all* Cups, (*b*) *all* Fires, and (*c*) *all* Cakes?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"It should be understood to be done to (*a*) one Cup, (*b*) one Fire, and (*c*) one Cake.—Why?—Because of this being *directly mentioned*; that is to say, every one of these things has been mentioned by a word with the *singular* ending; it is only *one* thing that is found to be mentioned in these texts; and in regard to Acts for which the *Word* (Vedic text) is our sole means of knowledge, we must accept as authoritative whatever the Word says; e.g. when the Word says '*Pashum ālabhēta*', what is sacrificed is a *single* animal and that a *male* one (as such is the signification of the word '*pashum*' which is in the singular number and masculine gender). Similarly in the case in question, (*a*) *one Cup* is to be cleaned, (*b*) straws have to be removed from *one Fire*, and (*c*) Fire has to be taken round *one Cake*."

SŪTRA (14).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the act is to be done to all, because of the distinguishing feature; the distinguishing feature is present equally in all.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the acts should be done to only *one* of the individual Cups (and Fires and Cakes); in reality, (*a*) all the Cups should be cleansed,

(*b*) straws should be removed from all the Fires, and (*c*) all Fire should be taken round one Cake.—Why?—Because the *cleansing* has been enjoined in connection with the substance characterised by the generic character 'Cup' as its distinguishing feature, and this distinguishing feature is equally present in all the individual cups; so that it cannot be understood which *one* vessel should be cleansed, and which should *not* be cleansed; so that inasmuch as we find the *cleansing* laid down in connection with the *Cup in general*, and as we do not find anything pointing to any particular *Cup*, it follows that the act is to be done to *all* the Cups.—Similarly with the Fires and the Cakes.

"But we find the *singular* number, which shall specify (the particular Cup to be washed)."

That cannot be; because what the *singularity* (denoted by the singular number in the word '*graham*', 'cup') may do is to affirm the *singularity* with regard to the Cup (i.e. may denote the *one Cup*)—it cannot deny (i.e. exclude) the second and other Cups; as the singular number only *affirms singularity*, it does not *deny* (exclude) the *second* and the rest;—so that the *second* and the rest not being excluded, why should not the *cleansing* and other acts, which have been enjoined by means of words expressive of the Cup and other things in general—be done to all the individuals?

The following argument may be urged here against our view:—"When the singular number is used in reference to only one possible object (as in the text under consideration), what else could it do except *excluding* in regard to the *second* and the rest; i.e. if the singular number did not exclude the second and other objects, it would be entirely superfluous;—as a matter of fact, it is quite capable of excluding the second and other objects just as the sentence '*Ashvābhidhānīmādattē*' ('He holds the reins of the horse') excludes the reins of the *Ass*, so should there be *exclusion* in the present case also."

Our answer to this is that this cannot be; in the case cited, the connection between the *Mantra* and the *Reins* is laid down by—'*Imāmagṛbhṇan rashanāmṛtasya-ityashvābhidhānīmādattē* (Tai. Saṁ. 5. 1. 2. 1—where the connection between the *Mantra* and the *Reins in general* is expressed by the text of the *Mantra* itself—'*Imāmagṛbhṇan rashanāmṛtasya*';—that the *reins* meant are to be of the *Horse* is not expressed by the *Mantra* (but by the additional sentence '*ityashvābhidhānīmādattē*'); and as for the act of *Holding* itself, it is indicated by the words of the *Mantra* itself;—so that in this case it is only right that there should be *exclusion* of the *Mantra* (from being used in the holding of the reins of the *Ass*). [The *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1007–1010—takes objection to this reasoning.]—In the case in question, on the other hand, the Singular Number that we find used in connection with the *object* (Cup),—even though present,—cannot serve the purpose of *exclusion*, as it is itself not *enjoined*. For example, if one were to say, with reference to cooked rice—'Whoever eats this rice, be it a dog or a cat, should be prevented',—if what is laid down as the condition (for prevention), is the *eating* of the rice,—and not the connection (presence) of dog or cat,—then the crow also, when coming to eat the rice, should be *prevented*; because, even though the Dog and

the Cat are specially mentioned, the presence of these has *not* been laid down as the condition (for *preventing*). Similarly, in the case in question, as the *connection of singleness* has not been enjoined, even though this *singleness* is mentioned,—*all the cups* become connected (with the *cleansing*).

In fact, there is no word injunctive of the connection between the *Object* and *Singleness*.—"But there is the word '*sammārṣṭi*' ('cleanses')".—This word 'cleanses' does not lay down the connection between the *Object* and *Singleness*.—"What then does it lay down?"—It lays down the connection between the *Object* and the *Cleansing*; it is only when this is so that the text lays down what it directly expresses; otherwise it would be taken, on the basis of Syntactical Connection, as laying down what is expressed not by itself but by other words; and *Syntactical Connection* can function only when *Direct Assertion* is not there,—never when the Direct Assertion is there.—Thus it is that, not being enjoined as qualifying anything, the *Singleness* cannot serve the purpose of excluding the second and other cups; and under the circumstances, if the *Cleansing* were done to the second and other cups, it would not be anything not-enjoined, or forbidden; because the *Cleansing* is actually predicated as much of the *one* as of the second and other cups.

Then again, there is the following difficulty also (in the *Pūrvapakṣa* view):—The *Singleness* (if enjoined) could not be restricted in regard to the *Cleansing of the object*; because the *Cleansing* cannot be the qualification of that object in regard to which the *Singleness* would be restricted; as the *Cleansing* is what is enjoined in this same sentence; it is not something enjoined elsewhere and only *referred* to (mentioned) here as the qualification of the object;—nor is it possible for the same thing to be *enjoined* and at the same time to be *mentioned* (referred to) as a *qualification*. A thing can specify (or qualify) another only when it is something of which the connections are well known already; but things like those in question, which are cognisable only by means of Vedic texts, cannot have their connections already known. As a matter of fact, however, the *Cleansing* is actually enjoined; hence it cannot serve as a qualification;—and if it is not a qualification, the *Singleness* cannot be regarded as restricted to the object.

"We shall say then that the *Singleness* is *asserted* in regard to the *Washing*."

Even so, there would be only two possible alternatives—either (*a*) the *Singleness* or (*b*) the *Cleansing* is the primary (predominant factor). As a matter of fact, however, both these alternatives are impossible. (*a*) Because the *Cleansing* cannot be done to the *Singleness* [and this would be the meaning if the *Singleness* is the predominant and *Cleansing* the subordinate factor]; nor does the *Cleansing*, when done to the *Object*, bring any benefit to the *Singleness*;—nor is there any need for any benefit to be brought to the *Singleness*; because (under the alternative proposed) the *Singleness* is not spoken of as the subordinate factor.—(*b*) "Well, we may regard the *singleness* as subordinate to the *cleansing* (the second alternative)."—That also is not possible.—"Why?"—Because it is unsubstantial (formless), and as such it cannot accomplish the *Cleansing*. Though there may be other *formless* things which accomplish actions by qualifying the means by which

those actions are accomplished,—yet it cannot be so in the present case of *Singleness*; because in the present case, it is not the *Cup* that is enjoined for the *Cleansing*; in fact, it is the *Cleansing* that is enjoined for the *Cup* and the *Cleansing* is something that serves a distinctly useful purpose; and we have not got to *assume* a use for the *Cleansing*. If the *Cup* rendered any help to the *Cleansing*, then the *Singleness*, as helping (qualifying) that *helper* (Cup), could be taken to help the *Cleansing* also;—but as a matter of fact, this is not so.—For these reasons, there can be no connection between the *Singleness* and the *Cleansing*.

"The *Cup*, even though the predominant factor, does accomplish the *Cleansing*; so that by qualifying this act of *Cleansing*, as also the means of accomplishing this act, it would render help to it; just as the details of the *Praṇita-water* performed over the curd and milk brought up for sacrificial purposes, help the *cooking* (of the rice),—or the details of the Sacrificial Post performed over the *Paridhi* brought up for the purposes of the *Encircling*, help in the *tying* (of the animal to the *Paridhi*). Thus then, what has been said is no answer (to the *Pūrvapakṣa*-argument). [That is to say, in the first place, the capacity to accomplish the *Cleansing* belongs to the *Cup*, and hence it would be through this that the *Singleness* would help the *Cleansing*; and even though the Cup is the predominant factor, yet it would become the property of a subordinate object by becoming qualified by a property (e.g. Singleness) that is subordinate to the Action. It is not necessary that an accessory must rest upon an accessory; all that is necessary is that it should rest upon something that helps the Action and thereby helps its accomplishment.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1013.]"

Our answer to the above is as follows:—We do not say that they do not help that which is not conducive to the accomplishment of the Action; what we do say is that when the *Cup*, which is the predominant factor, is mentioned as a qualification, then the *Singleness* has no connection either with the *Cup*, or with the *Cleansing*.—Why?—Whenever anything is put forward as a qualification, there is certainly an agreement between the two; but such a thing is not laid down as something to be known.—"Why then is it put forward at all?"—It is put forward with a view to something else being enjoined for it; as for instance, in the case in question, the *Cup* is qualified (by *Singleness*), and the *Cleansing* is enjoined for it. In addition to this, if the *connection with Singleness* were another factor enjoined in regard to the *Cup* or the *Cleansing*, then there would be a split of the sentence, as there would be two connections predicated.—It might be argued that—"the cup having been qualified, what is enjoined in regard to it is connection with *Singleness*, not connection with *Cleansing*".—But in that case it will have to be admitted that the presence, in the text, of the word 'cleansing' would have to be regarded as a mis-reading;—which, in fact, it is *not*. Hence the conclusion is that neither of the two (the *Cup* or the *Cleansing*) has any connection with *Singleness*. Thus it is that *Singleness* renders no help either to the *Cup* or the *Cleansing*; and it has to be taken as only *referred to*. From all this it follows that *Singleness* is not intended to do anything at all, and that the *Cleansing* should be

done to *all the Cups*.—"Why so?"—*Because it is equally connected with all and because there is no difference of Context*.

Objection—"If no significance is meant to be attached to *Singleness*, then why is the Singular Number used? When *several* things were meant to be spoken of, the Plural Number should have been used."

Our answer to this is as follows:—We are not discussing here whether the Singular Number should be used or should not be used; what we are discussing is—when the Singular Number has been used, what should it be understood to mean?—Should it be taken to mean that the *Cleansing* should be done to *one* (Cup) or to *all*?—And it has been established that it should be done to *all*.—Then again, the signifying of the *number* is not the sole function of a case-ending;—what then?—it also signifies an *active agency*; so that, when it is not meant to signify the *Singleness* (Number), its presence would serve the purpose of signifying the *active agency*; so that it would not be entirely superfluous.

Lastly, in the word '*graham*', the *Cup* is denoted by the *noun-base* (the term '*graha*'), and *Singleness* is denoted by the case-ending (in '*graham*').—"What if it is so?"—From this it follows that it is by *Direct Assertion* that the case-ending speaks of its connotation as subsisting in what is denoted by the noun-base.—"Even so, why should that (*Singleness*, denoted by the case-ending) not be connected with *Cleansing*?"—If it were connected with, it could be so only through *Syntactical Connection*; and when a thing has become connected with one thing, by *Direct Assertion*, it cannot be separated from it and connected with another, through *Syntactical Connection*. Thus then, when the *Cleansing* is not connected with *Singleness*, there is nothing lost if it is not done as qualified by *singleness*. Nor is the *Cleansing* qualified by *Singleness*; it is enjoined only for the *Cup*;—why then should it not be done to the second or the third Cup?

SŪTRA (15).

THAT WHICH IS ENJOINED (OR PREDICATED) IS FOR THE SAKE OF SOMETHING ELSE; HENCE IT SHOULD BE TAKEN EXACTLY AS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Purvapakṣin* above (towards the end of the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 13) that—"as in the case of the sentence '*Pashumālabhēta*', what is sacrificed is only *one* animal, and that also a *male* one,—so should it be in the case in question also".—The two cases however are not analogous; (*a*) There is this difference that in the present case the *cleansing* is for the *Cup*, while in the other case, the *animal* is for the *sacrifice*.—"What, if it is so?"—When anything qualifies *that which is for the sacrifice*, then it renders help to the sacrifice; as the sacrifice cannot be performed by means of anything which is not qualified (or specified); in the case in question, on the other hand, the *cleansing* is not to be done by *the cup as qualified* (*or specified*) *by anything*, which latter thing would qualify the *cup* and render help to the *cleansing*.—(*b*) Then again, in the case of the *Animal*, its *singleness* has been

enjoined in reference to the sacrifice.—"It has been asserted that *it is by Direct Assertion that the case-ending expresses its connotation as subsisting in what is denoted by the noun-base* (Bhā. Text, p. 229, line 1); while it is through Syntactical Connection that the *singleness* could be enjoined in regard to the *sacrifice*;—and Direct Assertion is stronger than Syntactical Connection;—all this has been asserted (by the *Siddhāntin* himself)."—True; in a case where the directly-expressed connection is meant to be expressed, it is as has been asserted; but in a case where such a connection is *not* meant to be expressed, what is learnt through *Syntactical Connection* cannot be rejected. It is for this reason that only *one* animal is sacrificed, that too a *male*. In the case in question, the *singleness* of the *cup* does not render any help to the *cleansing*, and hence it cannot qualify the *cup*. Hence it follows that no significance attaches to this *singleness*.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *There is no 'cleansing' of the 'Chamasa-cups': Exception to the foregoing Adhikaraṇa.*

SŪTRA (16).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Because they are of the nature of a purificatory (preparatory) act, the accessory details (like 'cleansing') should not be restricted in their application".

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, in connection with which we read—'*Dashāpavitrēṇa graham sammārṣṭi*'; we have understood (from the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*) that *all the cups* (*grahas*) *are to be cleansed.*—Now there arises the question—Are the *Chamasas* (Soma-cups) also to be washed or not?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*Chamasa-cups* and all similar vessels are to be cleansed.—Why?—*Because they are all equally connected and because there is no difference of Context.* Just as the *Graha-Cups* are connected with a transcendental result, so are the *Chamasa-cups* also; and just as the *Graha-Cups* are mentioned in the Context, so are the *Chamasa-cups* also. Hence the *Cleansing* is to be done to all.

Objection—'What are specially named are the *Graha-Cups*, and these would exclude the *Chamasa-cups.*'

"*Answer*—The mention of the *graha-cup* may be taken as merely illustrative, standing for all *Soma-cups*; so that all those *cups* are to be cleansed which are of this nature that if the Soma-juice were *not* kept in them, there would be fear of its being thrown out.—[Read '*yasminnagṛhyamānaḥ*', *not kept*;—as printed, the passage may be rendered as 'if the Soma-juice were kept in them there would be an idea that it is meant to be poured out'].—For example, when it is said 'dining time has arrived, wash the dishes', all those vessels are washed which are likely to be used at dinner,—and the '*dish*' is taken as mentioned only by way of illustration; similarly should it be in the case in question also."

Says the Purvapakṣin's Opponent—In the world of ordinary experience, all activity is determined by some purpose or need; so that whatever thing may be there which, on being cleansed, would serve a useful purpose,—all that should be cleansed;—in the case of the Veda however, all action is determined by the words of the text,—and in the case in question, the words of the text speak of the *cleansing* of the *graha-cup*; and so long as the adopting of the directly-expressed meaning of the words is possible, why should the term '*graha*' be taken in an indirect figurative sense (of all kinds of *cups*)?

Pūrvapakṣin—"Our answer to this is as follows:—What the word '*sammārṣṭi*' ('cleanses') can enjoin by *direct signification* is the agent's

activity towards the act of *cleansing*,—while the connection with the *graha-cups* can be indicated only through *Syntactical Connection*;—and *Direct Assertion* is always more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*. It is in this sense that connection with the *graha-cup* has been described as *indirectly indicated*, and not as *directly asserted*.—From all this it follows that every cup that is capable of the purification should be cleansed; and such accessory details as *cleansing* are not to be restricted to the *graha-cups* only."

SŪTRA (17).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION, AS THE PARTICULAR OBJECT IS MENTIONED DIRECTLY, AND THE SCRIPTURAL WORD IS THE SOLE AUTHORITY IN THESE MATTERS.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *cleansing* should be restricted to the *Graha-Cups* only, it could not apply to the *Chamasa-cups*.—Why?—Because *the particular object is mentioned directly*; the *Graha-Cup* is directly mentioned in the text; therefore it could not be left out (from being cleansed); for if it were left out, the direct Vedic text would be disobeyed; and it would follow that according to you, the presence of the word '*graham*' in the text is a mistaken reading;—this would not be right. Hence the conclusion is that the text specifies the *Graha-vessel* by means of the term '*graham*' and then enjoins the connection of the *cleansing*; but unless it enjoined the *cleansing* itself, the text could not enjoin the *connection of the cleansing*; hence the text must enjoin the *cleansing* itself.—This would not involve any disobeying of the Veda.—Why?—Because by means of the verb '*sammārṣṭi*' ('cleanses'), the Vedic text can enjoin the agent's activity towards the act of *cleansing*,—and it makes no difference whether the *cleansing* itself is brought about or it is only connected with something else;—so that there would be nothing repugnant to the Vedic text if the *Graha-Cup* were connected (with the *cleansing*); and hence it is only right that the *cleansing* should be restricted to the *Graha-Cups* only.

Objection—"Inasmuch as the connection of the transcendental result is equally present, and as there is no difference of *Context*—the *cleansing* should be applicable to the *Chamasa-cups* also, and its injunction should not be restricted to the *Graha-Cups* only;—as we have already explained above."

Answer—The Injunction (of the *Chamasa-cups*) could be possible only after all the objects mentioned in the text have been syntactically connected into a single sentence,—not until this syntactical connection has been made;—now such a syntactical connection with all the objects could only be *inferred* from the indications of the *Context*; while that of the *Graha-Cups* is directly perceived;—hence the Injunction cannot apply to the entire Context.

In the case of the *connection between the cup and singleness* (dealt with in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*) it was found impossible for the text to enjoin that connection without abandoning what is directly expressed by it. So

that the case of the present *Adhikaraṇa* is not analogous to the case of the injunction of the *singleness of the cup*.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that—"Just as in the case of the expression '*wash the dishes*', the term 'dishes' is taken to be indirectly indicative (of all those things that may be required at dinner-time), so in the present case also (the term '*graham*' should be taken to be indicative of *all cups*)."—This argument has already been refuted by the assertion that in the world of ordinary experience all activity is determined by some purpose or need, while in the case of the Veda, it is determined entirely by the words of the text.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *The measure of 'seventeen cubits' appertains to the Sacrificial Post used at the 'Pashu-sacrifice'.*

SŪTRA (18).

Being of no use in the Primary, it should appertain to its Subsidiaries.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Vājapēya* sacrifice we read—'*Saptadashāratnīr-vājapēyasya yūpaḥ*' ['The Sacrificial Post of the *Vājapēya* is seventeen cubits in height'].—In regard to this there arises the question—Does the measure of 'seventeen cubits' appertain to the upright vessel at the *Vājapēya* sacrifice,—or to the Sacrificial Post at the *Pashu-sacrifice*?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"It appertains to the *upright vessel*.—Why?—Because at the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, there is no *Sacrificial Post* at all; so that the measure can appertain only to that vessel used at the *Vājapēya* which resembles the Sacrificial Post;—there is the vessel named '*shoḍashi*', used at the *Vājapēya*, which resembles the Sacrificial Post in being 'made of *Khadira-wood*' and in being *upright*;—if therefore the measure appertain to this vessel, then the term '*Vājapēya*' retains its direct connotation; otherwise (in the other alternative), the term '*vājapēya*' would have to be taken in its indirect sense, indicating the *Pashu-sacrifice*, which is a subsidiary of the *Vājapēya-sacrifice*.—'In your view also, the term *sacrificial post* has to be taken in the indirect sense, indicating the *Upright Vessel*.'—Our answer to this is that in either case we cannot entirely avoid recourse to indirect indication; in our view however there is this advantage that the connection of the *Vājapēya*, which forms the subject-matter of the Context, is retained; hence the measure should appertain to the *Upright Vessel* (which is used at the *Vājapēya* itself)."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*Being of no use in the Primary, it should appertain to its subsidiaries* (Su.).—The term '*vājapēya*' signifies a particular form of *Soma-sacrifice*;—this sacrifice by itself has no use for the Sacrificial Post;—there is however a subsidiary of the *Vājapēya*-sacrifice, which is called the *Pashu-sacrifice*, whereat there is need for the Post, for the tying up of the animal.—Under these circumstances, if the measure of 'seventeen cubits' were taken as enjoined for the '*Post at the Vājapēya itself*',—then, as there is no such Post,—the Injunction would be meaningless. In order therefore to save it from becoming meaningless, it should be taken as appertaining to the Post at the *Pashu-sacrifice*. The name 'Post' could be applied to the *Upright Vessel* only figuratively (indirectly).—"But in the other view also, the name '*vājapēya*'

could be applied to the *Pashu-sacrifice* only indirectly."—Not so, we reply. In our view, the term '*vājapēya*' stands for the *Vājapēya-sacrifice* itself; only it will specify (qualify) the Post used at the *Pashu-sacrifice*; because this Post is of use to its subsidiary, the *Pashu-sacrifice*; and when one thing helps the subsidiary of another, it becomes related to this latter by direct relationship; and this relationship does not cease simply because it is interrupted (by the intervention of the said subsidiary). For instance, in the case of 'Devadatta's grandson', their relationship is interrupted by the intervention of the 'son', and yet the grandson is related to Devadatta by direct relationship.—Thus then it is our view of the case that should be accepted; as it does not involve the necessity of having recourse to 'indirect indication' in the case of any word at all.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *Acts like 'Abhikramaṇa' (Stepping Forward) are subsidiary to the 'Prayājas' only.*

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS REGARDS AN ACCESSORY PERTAINING TO THE PERFORMER,—INASMUCH AS IT DOES NOT FORM AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE ACTION, THERE WOULD BE A SYNTACTICAL SPLIT [IF IT WERE CONNECTED WITH ANY PARTICULAR ACTION]."

Bhāṣya.

[Subsidiaries in the shape of purely Purificatory Acts, Substances and Accessories have been dealt with; we now proceed to consider those cases where an action, mentioned as related to another action, comes to be regarded as a *purificatory act.*—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1031.]

In the passage relating to the *Prayājas* which form part of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, we read—'*Abhikrāmam jūhotyabhijityai*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 1. 4).—In connection with this sentence, there arises the question —Does this act of '*abhikramaṇa*' (*Stepping Forward*) find place in the Prayājas only?—or in the (acts dealt with in the) entire Context?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"*As regards an accessory pertaining to the Performer,*—what we say is that—*there would be a syntactical split,*—*because one act does not form an integral part of another action.* That is to say, the act of *Stepping Forward* is something *unsubstantial* (formless); hence it cannot help in the accomplishing of the act of '*Homa*' (spoken of by the second term in the sentence, '*jūhoti*');—and hence it cannot be syntactically connected with it.—From which it follows that the said act of *Stepping Forward* should find place in the entire Context,—'*because of its being equally connected with all and because there is no difference of context*' (Sū. 8)."

Objection against the Pūrvapakṣa—'For the same reason that has been propounded (against the *act of Stepping Forward* appertaining to the act of *Homa*), the act in question could not find place in any other act mentioned in the Context.'

Answer (from the *Pūrvapakṣin*)—"In the case of other acts, the act in question would be connected with the Performers."

Opponent—'In the case of the *Prayājas* also, the said act is connected with the Performers.'

Pūrvapakṣin—"That is not so; what the term '*juhoti*' is able to enjoin is only that activity of the Agent which tends towards the offering of *Homa*;—it cannot enjoin the connection between that Agent and the act of *Stepping Forward.*"

Opponent—'In the case of the other acts of the Context also, there could

be no injunction of the connection of the Agent with the act of *Stepping Forward*.'

Pūrvapakṣin—"That does not affect our position; in the case of the other acts, as they are all spoken of in the same Context, they are all recognised as subsidiaries (to the main Act); so that the text laying down the entire procedure would naturally include the injunction of the act of *Stepping Forward* also, which will thus find place in the entire Context."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT BEING COMPLETED WITH WHAT PRECEDES IT, THE ACT IN QUESTION REMAINS INCOMPLETE; IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE SYNTACTICALLY CONNECTED (WITH THE PRAYĀJAS).

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to say that the act of *Stepping Forward* finds place in the entire Context; in fact, it can find place only in the *Prayājas*;—why?—because it is syntactically connected with these; because the sentence speaking of the act of *Stepping Forward*—'*Abhikrāman jūhoti*'—not completed with what precedes it, remains incomplete. And as *Syntactical Connection* (which connects the act with the *Prayājas* only) is more authoritative than *Context* (which connects it with the entire Context), the Act of *Stepping Forward* should find place in the *Prayājas* only.

Objection—"But it has been pointed out that the act of *Stepping Forward*, being unsubstantial (formless) is unable to help the accomplishment of the *Homa*."

Answer—It is true that by itself, the *Stepping Forward* is unable to help in the Homa; but it can help in its accomplishment when connected with the Performer.—How so?—By *Stepping Forward*, the Performer comes close to the *Āhavanīya Fire*;—and the Homa can be done in both ways—from a distance the Performer may extend his hand and pour the libation, or *Stepping Forward*, he may draw closer to the fire (and pour the libation without having to extend his hand). Thus it follows that the act of *Stepping Forward* helps the *Homa*; and hence it should find place in the *Prayājas* only.

Adhikaraṇa (11): *The 'Upavīta' forms part of the entire 'Darsha-pūrṇamāsa', in whose context it is mentioned.—[Exception to the preceding Adhikaraṇa.]*

SŪTRA (21).

In a doubtful case, there being an interruption, the sentence should be split up.

Bhāṣya.

[The fact of one Act appertaining to another having been established, we now proceed to consider the question as to whether such appertaining is determined by the *intermediate* or the *prime* Context.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1034.]

(*a*) In the seventh and eighth *Anuvākas* relating to the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, we find the *Sāmidhēnī* verses mentioned;—(*b*) in the ninth, the *Nivids*;—(*c*) in the tenth, the mention of those *Sāmidhēnīs* that are to be recited with a view to particular results, to the effect that 'if one desires such and such a result, one should recite so many *Sāmidhēnī* verses', 'if he desires another result, he should recite so many' and so forth;—in the eleventh, the *Yajñopavīta* (sacrificial clothing) is mentioned: '*Upavyayatē devalakṣmamēva tat kurutē*' ['when one wears the *Upavīta*, he wears the sign of the gods'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 11. 1).

Now, in regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Upavīta* to be worn only while one is reciting the *Sāmidhēnīs*?—or should it be worn while one is performing all the various acts that have been laid down in the Context?

Question—"Why should such a question arise at all?"

Answer—The question arises because it is not already perceived whether the *Upavīta* is mentioned in course of the (intermediate) context of the *Sāmidhēnīs*, or after the close of the context of the *Sāmidhēnīs*.

Question—"But as a matter of fact, the entire Context is of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, and it is only in the context of the other acts (constituting the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*) that the *Sāmidhēnīs* are mentioned [so that there can be no 'context of the Sāmidhēnīs']."

Answer—It is true that the *Sāmidhēnīs* are mentioned in the Context of something else (the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*); yet of the *Sāmidhēnīs* themselves, there is a distinct *intermediate* Context. The assertion '*Sāmidhēnīranubrūyāt*' ('should recite the *Sāmidhēnī* verses') remains incomplete (wanting something to complete it),—and it is on account of this incompleteness that what is mentioned in proximity to the assertion becomes recognised as pertaining to the said assertion.

Question—"Even so, how can the context of the *Sāmidhēnīs* be said to cease?"

Answer—It ceases because of the interruption caused by the mention of the *Nivids* (in the ninth *anuvāka*, which comes between the seventh and eighth *anuvākas* dealing with the *Sāmidhēnis*, and the tenth *anuvāka* mentioning the *Sāmidhēnī*).

Question—"If that is so, then why should there arise the idea that the context of the *Sāmidhēnis* continues (even after the said interruption)?"

Answer—As a matter of fact, even after the texts dealing with the *Nivids* (ninth *anuvāka*), we find mentioned the details connected with the *Sāmidhēnis* themselves, relating to the recitation of those done with the desire for certain results (in the tenth *anuvāka*); and it is after this latter section that (in the eleventh *anuvāka*) the *Upavīta* is mentioned; so that the treatment of the *Sāmidhēnis* continues all through up to the *Upavīta*; this is what gives rise to the idea that the Context of the *Sāmidhēnis* does not cease (with the mention of the *Nivids*); so that it is the *Nivids* that appear in the midst of the context of the *Sāmidhēnis* and do not intercept it; just as the presence of the *Twelve Upasads* which belong to the *Ahīna* sacrifices appear in the midst of the context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and yet do not interrupt this latter.—Thus it is that there arises the question (dealt with in the present *Adhikaraṇa*).

On this question then, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The *Upavīta* has been mentioned before the context of the *Sāmidhēnis* has ceased.—How so?—Because the mention of the *Upavīta* follows immediately after the texts speaking of that recitation of the *Sāmidhēnis* which is done with a desire for certain results; so that the *Upavīta* is spoken of while the *Sāmidhēnis* are still in our mind. It is only a particular manner of wearing the cloth by the performer that is called '*Upavīta*'; and there arises a question as to the act at the time of doing which the Performer is to wear the cloth in that manner;—and the texts speaking of the *Upavīta* become syntactically connected with the text speaking of the *Sāmidhēnis* which is not far from the former texts and which latter are still in our mind; and thus it is that we conclude that the word '*Upavyayatē*' ('wears the *Upavīta*') lays down the *Upavīta* as to be worn at the time of the reciting of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—In regard to the question at issue, the conclusion cannot be as asserted by you. The conclusion on this question is that '*the sentence should be split up*' (Sū.).—Why?—'*Because there is interruption*' (Sū.);—that is, at one end there is the sentence, complete in all its details, speaking of the *Sāmidhēnī*,—and at the other end there is the sentence speaking of the *Upavīta*,—and in between these two intervenes the text laying down the *Nivids*, which has no connection with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses. In a case where, even on the completion of a sentence speaking of a certain thing, another subject connected with the same thing is introduced,—the context of that thing is not discontinued,—and that thing does present itself to the mind when anything related to it is mentioned. On the other hand, in a case where, on the completion of a sentence, another subject is introduced which is not connected with it in any way, then (the continuity of the Context having been broken up) the thing spoken of in the first sentence does not come to the

mind. What is not present in the mind cannot be syntactically connected; the meaning of a sentence is completed only when there is connection between two things present in the mind,—not when only one of them is present in the mind. In fact this (being present in the mind) is the purpose served by the juxtaposition of two sentences (meant to be syntactically connected); and the meaning of a sentence may be sought to be completed with the help of a thing cognised immediately after that sentence, only with a view to bring about a complex cognition taking in both the things concerned. As a matter of fact, there is no cognition of a thing spoken of immediately after the sentence, if it is spoken of by means of a word which is not connected with it. Thus there can be no syntactical connection between one sentence and another when there is an interruption between the two.

"It may be possible to recall the previously-cognised thing to the mind, by means of contemplation and other means,—and then to connect it with what comes after the interruption."

The meaning of the sentence in such a case could not be regarded as countenanced by the Veda; as it would have its source in human intelligence. In fact, if the meaning of a sentence were evolved by obtaining an idea of a previous object by means of contemplation,—it would be like the meaning of a sentence formed by taking the verb from one chapter and the noun from another.—Thus then we conclude that it is not possible to treat as 'one sentence' a passage the two parts of which are interrupted by something totally unconnected with them; consequently there can be no syntactical connection between the *Upavīta* and the *Sāmidhēnī* verses.

"As a matter of fact, the *Upavīta* is spoken of in close proximity to those optional *Sāmidhēnis* (recited for special purposes), which have been spoken of and cognised immediately before (the mention of the *Upavīta*); and in this manner it would become connected with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses."

Our answer is that this cannot be; the context of the *Sāmidhēnis* is past and gone, having been interrupted by the texts of the *Nivids*;—as for the subsequently-mentioned *Sāmidhēnī-options* recited for special purposes,—though these may be connected through syntactical connection (with the *Upavīta*), yet the context (of the *Sāmidhēnī*) does not continue; because the mere mention of an alternative does not make the *Sāmidhēnī-verses* the subject-matter of the Context; because they are not spoken of as to be 'recited',—all that is said is that they should be connected with certain numbers,—but that also through *syntactical connection*, not through *Context*. Thus then, the *Sāmidhēnī* verses not continuing to be the subject-matter of the Context, if there is an accessory detail which cannot be syntactically connected with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, then that detail can have no connection with them.

From all this it follows as the established conclusion that the performer should wear the *Upavīta* during the performance of all that is mentioned in the entire context (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) (and *not* in connection with the *Sāmidhēnis* only).

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *Vessels like the 'Vāraṇa' and the 'Vaikaṅkata' appertain to all Sacrifices: (Exception to Adhikarana (9).)*

SŪTRA (22).

INASMUCH AS ALL SUBSIDIARIES ARE SUBSERVIENT TO SOMETHING ELSE, AND ARE EQUAL IN THAT RESPECT,—THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION AMONG THEMSELVES.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Fire-laying Rite, *Vāraṇa* and *Vaikaṅkata* vessels are found mentioned,—some of which are for the purposes of the *Homa-offering*, while others are *not* for the purposes of the *Homa-offering*,—in the following text:—'*Tasmāt vārano vai yajñāvacharaḥ syāt, na tvētēna juhuyāt; vaikaṅkato yajñāvacharaḥ syāt, juhuyādētēna*'.—As a matter of fact, however, these *Vāraṇa* and *Vaikaṅkata* vessels have no connection with the Fire-laying Rite;—why?—because they are spoken of in the text as '*yajñāvachara*', which means that these vessels belong to the *sacrifice*; and the Fire-laying Rite is not a 'sacrifice', as there is no injunction of 'sacrificing' in connection with it;—so that this *Syntactical Connection* sets aside the indications of the Context (by which latter the vessels would be connected with the Fire-laying Rite).—Thus then (it being clear that they belong, not to the Fire-laying Rite, but to some sacrificial performance), there arises the question—Do these vessels find a place in the *Pavamāna sacrifices* only? Or in *all sacrifices*, the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* and the rest.

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"The vessels are to be used in connection of the offering-materials of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices.—Why?—It has been declared (in a previous *adhikaraṇa*) that a factor which is found to be inapplicable to the Principal is assumed to appertain to the Subsidiary; then, inasmuch as the *Pavamāna* offerings are mentioned in the context of the Fire-laying Rite, those offerings must be subsidiary to the Fire-laying Rite; hence the vessels in question (not being connectible with the Fire-laying Rite) should be connected with the *Pavamāna* offerings (which are subsidiary to that Rite)."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*All subsidiaries*,—the *Pavamāna offerings* and also the *Fire-laying Rite* (which also is a subsidiary),—*being equal, there can be no connection among themselves*. That is, just as the Fire-laying is subsidiary to the Fire, as tending to sanctify it,—so also are the *Pavamāna offerings* subsidiary to the Fire; how then could there be any mutual connection between these?—As for the argument that, "the *Pavamāna offerings* are mentioned in the context of the *Fire-laying Rite*,"—though they are so mentioned, yet the Context becomes set aside by Syntactical Connection, which makes these offerings belong to the *Fire*.

"Which is the sentence (which, through Syntactical Connection, connects the *Pavamāna offerings* with the *Fire*)?"—

That sentence is "*Yadāhavanīyē juhoti tēna so'syābhiṣṭaḥ prīto bhavati*" [wherein the *Āhavanīya Fire* is clearly spoken of as the most predominant factor, to which other factors would be subsidiary.]

"But in this sentence the *Āhavanīya* Fire is spoken of as the substratum of the sacrifice [that *into* which the *Pavamāna* offerings are offered], and hence subsidiary to it."

True, the *Āhavanīya* Fire is the substratum (of the offerings); and yet the sacrifice in question (i.e., the *Pavamāna-Iṣṭi*) is one that is performed for the sake of the *Āhavanīya Fire*; as it is this Fire which serves a useful purpose, while the *Pavamāna offerings* serve no useful purpose.

"In what way are these such as serve no useful purpose?"

They are so regarded because no result is spoken of (as following from them).

"But the result may be assumed."

True, the result might be assumed; but this result can only be the *sanctification of the Fire*, not *Heaven*; for, if Heaven were assumed to be the result, two unseen factors would have to be assumed—viz: (1) the Heaven following from the *Homa*, and (2) the transcendental sanctification of the *Homa* by the *Āhavanīya Fire*.

From all this it follows that the *Pavamāna-offerings* are for the purpose of the Fire, and hence they can have no connection with the *Fire-laying Rite*; consequently, what is spoken of in connection with the *Fire-laying Rite* cannot belong to the *Pavamāna-offerings*,—it belongs to all the sacrifices, *Darshapūrṇamāsa* and the rest, which are the 'Principal' for which the *Fire-laying Rite* is 'subsidiary.'

Adhikaraṇa (13): *The 'Vārtraghnī' and the other 'Anuvākyās' are subsidiary to the 'Ājyabhāgas': The Vārtraghnī-Nyāya.*

SŪTRA (23).

Because the connection of the two mantras (with the Primary Act) serves no useful purpose [therefore they cannot appertain to the Primary.]

Bhāṣya.

[We now proceed to consider those cases in which *Mantras* are employed in accordance with the order in which they happen to be mentioned.]

In connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Vārtraghnī paurṇamāsyām anūchyētē, vṛdhanvatī amāvāsyāyām*' [The two *mantras* named '*vārtraghnī*' as referring to the *killing of Vṛttra*, and the two called '*vṛdhanvatī*', as referring to *increase*, are given in the chapter on the *mantras* for the *Hotṛ-priest.*] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 2. 5)—In regard to this there arises the question—are the two *Anuvākyā mantras* (the *Vārtraghnī* and the *Vṛdhanvatī*) to be used at the Primary Sacrifice? Or only in connection with the two *Ājyabhāgas*?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"They should be used at the Primary Sacrifice;—why?—because they are found to be spoken of along with the '*Paurṇamāsī*' and the '*Amāvāsyā*'; and it is these two, the *Paurṇamāsī* and the *Amāvāsyā*,—and not the *Ājyabhāgas*—that constitute the Primary Sacrifice. Hence on the basis of direct Syntactical Connection, the two *Mantras* should be used at the Primary Sacrifice (of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*)."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following *Siddhānta*:—

The two *Anuvākyā mantras* together serve no useful purpose at the Primary Sacrifice. That the *Anuvākyās* are to have the character of '*Vārtraghnī*' and of '*Vṛdhanvatī*' is laid down in connection with that act where there are *two Anuvākyās* to be used;—at the Primary Sacrifice, however, there is only one *Anuvākyā*;—under the circumstances, if the sentence in question were taken as laying down 'duality' in regard to that *Anuvākyā*, then there would be a syntactical split.—On the other hand, *two Anuvākyās*—the *Āgnēyī* and the *Saumī*—are already known as belonging to the two *Ājyabhāgas*; hence, if the sentence in question were taken as laying down the character of '*Vārtraghnī*' and of '*Vṛdhanvatī*' in connection with the *Ājyabhāgas*,—then it would be laying down only this one factor (and not the *duality* also); and this it could easily do.

"Even if we take the sentence as laying down a detail pertaining to the Primary Sacrifice,—there would be *two Anuvākyās* at the two primary sacrifices (the *Darsha* and the *Pūrṇamāsa*),—one pertaining to the *Āgnēya*

and the other to the *Agniṣomīya*—[so that there need be no difficulty regarding the injunction of the 'duality' and the consequent syntactical split.]"

Answer—Of the two *Vārtrāghnī Anuvākyās*, one is *Āgnēyī* and the other *Saumī*; similarly of the two *Vṛdhanvatī Anuvākyās* also.—Now it is the *Āgnēyī* one only—not the *Saumī*—which, if enjoined, could be connected with the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice; as *Soma* is not a deity at the *Amāvāsyā*. At the *Paurṇamāsā* sacrifice also, the *Anuvākyā* (connected with *Soma*, i.e., the *Saumī*) could be used only in connection with the offering to *Agni-Soma*; but the *Anuvākyā* which is connected with only *one* deity (*Soma*) could not serve any useful purpose at an act which concerns *two* deities (*Agni* and *Soma*).

Question—"But both the *Anuvākyās* (*Āgnēyī* and *Saumī*) would be connected with the offering to *Agni-Soma*."

Answer—As a matter of fact, a single sacrifice can have no use for two *Anuvākyās*; the *Anuvākyā* has been enjoined as '*upādēya*' (something to be secured or used); and hence the singular number (in the word '*puronuvākyām*' in the injunction '*Puronuvākyāmanvāha*' occurring in connection with *Paurṇamāsī sacrifice*) must be regarded as significant; so that at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice also there could not be *two Anuvākyās*.

From all this it follows that the *two Anuvākyās* should be used in connection with the two *Ājyabhāgas*.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *Acts like 'Muṣṭikaraṇa' appertain to the entire Context*; [*Exception to the preceding Adhikāraṇa*].

SŪTRA (24).

THE IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE IS NOT AUTHORITATIVELY EXPRESSIVE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—(*A*) '*Muṣṭikaroti, vācham yachhhati, dīkṣitamāvēdayati*' ['Closes the fist, keeps silence, has himself referred to as the initiated person'],—and elsewhere (in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) (*B*) '*Hastau avanēnakti, ulapārājim stṛṇāti*' ['Washes the hands, spreads the grass-bundle'].

In connection with this, there arises the question—(*A*) Do *fist-closing* and *silence-keeping* appertain only to the act of *Addressing* the sacrificer ?—or to the entire Context ?—Similarly, (*B*) Is the *hand-washing* for the purpose of *spreading the grass* ? Or for doing all the acts spoken of in the Context ?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* :—

"The *washing of the Hands* is for the purpose of purifying the hands ;—and the *keeping of silence* is for the purpose of sanctifying or preparing the person engaged in the performance who (being thus *prepared* by *silence*) becomes attentive when getting himself referred to as the 'initiated', and is also enabled to carry on the many details.—When the question arises as to the acts that are aided by such purification and preparation,—on seeking for information on this point, we are supplied with it by '*immediate sequence*'; and this 'immediate sequence' [i.e. the fact of their being spoken of in immediate sequence to each other] makes it clear that the *keeping of silence* and the *closing of the fist* help, and appertain to, the *Reference to the Initiated*,—and the *Washing of the Hand* helps and appertains to the *spreading of the grass*."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—The acts in question are related to all the acts spoken of in the Context.—"Why ?"—Because the sentences are distinct.—"How are the sentences distinct ?"—The two sentences are distinct because they convey two distinct ideas. As it is, the verb '*āvēdayati*' ('addresses') does not express the idea of '*for referring to* the initiated' [and it will have to be taken in this sense, if the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is accepted] ;—nor does the verb '*stṛṇāti*' ('spreads') express the idea of '*for spreading*' [and this is what it is made to do in the *Pūrvapakṣa*] ;—as a matter of fact, the *spreading* is enjoined, as also the *washing of hands* :—similarly *fist-closing* and *silence* are enjoined, as also is *Referring*. So that (acc. to Sū. 22 above) there can be no mutual connection among these [i.e. between *spreading* and *hand-washing*, or between *Addressing* and *Fist-closing* or *Silence*].—Further, whenever a

sentence is incomplete (wanting in certain factors), mere 'immediate sequence' cannot be the ground for syntactically connecting it with anything.—From all this it follows that the details of the kind of those under consideration must appertain to the entire Context.

SŪTRA (25).

ALSO BECAUSE THE SENTENCES ARE COMPLETE IN THEMSELVES.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, every one of the sentences is complete with its own words; all the sentences quoted are equally complete.—So that each pair of sentences convey two distinct ideas,—and when they are separated, each is complete in itself; and thus (both the conditions of 'different sentence' being fulfilled, acc. to Sū. 2. 1. 46-47), the sentences must be regarded as distinct.

Thus then, being equally connected with the entire context, and there being no difference of Context, the details in question should find place in the entire Context.

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The 'Chaturdhākaraṇa' (Quartering) appertains to the 'Āgnēya' Cake only.*

SŪTRA (26).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA] "THE SUBSIDIARY, CONNECTED WITH THE AUXILIARY DETAIL, SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE COMMON TO ALL; SPECIALLY AS THERE IS NO MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP AMONG THEM."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Āgnēyam chaturdhā karoti.* ("Quarters the *Āgnēya*").'—In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *Quartering* to be done to all the cakes—*Āgnēya, Agnīṣomīya, Aindrāgna*? Or to the *Āgnēya* only?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"*The subsidiary*—in the shape of the *Quartering*—*connected with the auxiliary detail*—in the shape of the Deity, Agni, in the word '*āgnēya*'—*should be understood to be common*,—i.e. to be done also to the *Agnisomīya* and the *Āindrāgna* (not to the *Āgnēya only*).—Why so?—Because those two (*Agnisomīya* and *Aindrāgna*) also are '*āgnēya*', in the sense that *Agni is their deity*; because that which has for its deity *Agni*, as well as another (*Soma* or *Indra*) is also '*Āgnēya*'; for instance, 'the mother of Ḍittha and Ḍavittha' is 'the mother of Ḍavittha' also; similarly in the case in question also ('that which has *Agni* and *Indra*, or *Agni* and *Soma*, for its deity' is also 'that which has *Agni* for its deity').

If there were no relationship between the *Āgnēya Cake* and the *Agnīṣomīya Cake*, then the Quartering might have been restricted to the *Āgnēya* only;—as a matter of fact, there *is* mutual relationship between them;—hence there should be no restriction. Just as,—though the text states that 'the *Prāshitra* is sliced out after severing the head of the *Āgnēya* Cake', yet the *Prāshitra* is actually sliced off from *all the cakes*,—similarly the *Quartering* also [though spoken of as to be done to the *Āgnēya* only, should be done to *all the cakes*]."

SŪTRA (27).

[SIDDHĀNTA] IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE RESTRICTION; BECAUSE THERE IS CONNECTION WITH THE OBJECT; ALSO BECAUSE THE INDICATIVE POWER IS CONNECTED ONLY WITH WHAT IS 'CAPABLE'; AS FOR THE MENTION OF THE ACCESSORY, IT COULD SERVE THE PURPOSE OF INDICATING [BOTH, ONLY IF THERE WERE NO CAKE DEDIÇATED TO ONE ONLY.]

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*', ('in reality') sets aside the *Pūrvapakṣa*.—The *Quartering* should be restricted to the *Āgnēya* only; it cannot be common to all.

—Why ?—'*because there is connection with the object*' ; i.e. it is only what is dedicated to one deity (i.e. the *Āgnēya* only) which is really related to the 'object', i.e. to the deity '*Agni*'; what is dedicated to *two* deities—the *Aindrāgna* or the *Agniṣomīya*—is not so related to *Agni*.—Why so ?—In the case of the cake related to two deities (*Soma* and *Agni*, for instance), its dedication is done in terms containing the names of both the deities; and of this cake *Agni* is the deity only as accompanied by *Soma*,—not independently by itself;—that of which the deity is *Agni along with Soma*, cannot have the nominal affix (expressing the deific character) added (to the term '*agni*'); because only 'capable' terms take that affix, and what needs the help of another cannot be 'capable';—hence that word with the nominal affix which indicates the cake of which the deity is *Agni by itself* can never signify that which is dedicated to *two* deities. From all this it follows that the *Quartering* should be done to that alone which has been dedicated to *Agni alone* by itself;—because the nominal affix which signifies the deific character can be connected only through 'capability', and not where the terms concerned have no such 'capability'.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that "the Quartering should be done to all the cakes, just as *the slicing of the Prāshitra* is done out of all." —But in the case of the *Prāshitra* it is only right that it should be so; as there is nothing (in the sentence quoted) to show that the *slicing of the Prāshitra* is to be done *out of the Āgnēya*.—"How then do you construe the sentence '*Āgnēyasm mastakam vibhajya prāshitramavadyati*' [which clearly speaks of the *slicing* being done out of the *Āgnēya*] ?"—The text quoted contains *two* sentences: (1) '*Prāshitram avadyati*' (slices out the '*Prāshitra*'), and (2) '*āgnēyasya mastakam vibhajya*' ('after breaking the head of the *Āgnēya*'); so that what is understood to be expressed by this is that *the Prāshitra is sliced out of the head of the Āgnēya*,—that much is certain; but as regards the other cakes, it is uncertain (and indefinite) as to whether the *slicing* is to be done *out of the head* or from some other part of it. [Hence there is no similarity between this case and the case dealt with in the *Adhikaraṇa*—says the *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1051].

If there had been no cake dedicated to only one deity (*Agni*), then even that dedicated to two deities could have been admitted to be intended, with a view to save the sentence from becoming useless.

[This passage explains the last clause of the *sūtra* '*Lakṣaṇārthā guṇashrutiḥ*'; the sense of this is that if there were no cake dedicated to *Agni* alone, then the word '*agni*' could be taken as indicating both *Agni* and *Soma*; and *the mention of the accessory* '*Agni*' would, in that case, serve the purpose of indicating both. As a matter of fact, however, there *is* a cake dedicated to *Agni alone*; hence the term '*agni*' cannot be taken as standing for *Agni* and *Soma*;—hence the quartering should be done to the *Āgneya* only.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1052.]

As regards the expression 'Ḍittha's mother', what has been urged is only right; because the *motherhood* is not such as extends over both; the lady is called 'Ḍittha's mother' simply because *Ḍittha* has been born of her, and no other condition is needed (for applying the name to her); the relationship of 'mother' therefore resting in the lady entirely, it is only right that

she should be spoken of as 'Ḍittha's mother'. [In the case of the *Agni-ṣomīya* cake, on the other hand, the deific character does not rest in *Agni* alone by itself, it rests in *Agni along with Soma*; hence this cake cannot be called '*agnēya*'.]

End of Pāda (i) of Discourse III.

DISCOURSE III.

PĀDA II.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The Mantras speaking of 'Lopping' are to be employed in what is directly expressed by them.*

SŪTRA (1).

THE SUBSIDIARY CHARACTER OF MANTRAS IS BASED UPON THEIR CAPACITY TO EXPRESS A CERTAIN MEANING; THEREFORE THEY SHOULD BE EMPLOYED IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR ORIGINAL (PRIMARY) MEANING; SPECIALLY AS IT IS WITH THAT MEANING THAT THEIR CONNECTION IS ETERNAL (AND INSEPARABLE).

Bhāṣya.

[Other kinds of Accessories having been dealt with, we now proceed to deal with *Mantras*, which are employed in accordance with the indicative potency (*liṅga*) of the component words. This 'potency' of the *mantras* points sometimes to what is directly expressed by the words, and sometimes to what is only indirectly implied by them; the former being regarded as the 'primary meaning' and the latter the 'secondary meaning'. Hence in regard to the actual use of a *mantra*, there arises a doubt as to whether it should be used in accordance with its *primary* or its *secondary* meaning. The actual discussion of this topic is prefaced in the *Bhāṣya* by a discussion regarding the possibility of the two kinds of meaning.]

The texts to be dealt with under this *Adhikaraṇa* are all the *Mantras*;—the one taken as typical is the *mantra* '*Varhirdēvasadanam dāmi*' ('I am lopping the grass which is the seat of the gods').

The question in regard to *Mantras* is—are they to be employed in connection with what is expressed by them primarily? or also in connection with what is indicated by them only secondarily?

Question—"What is the *primary* and what the *secondary* meaning?"

Answer—What is understood directly from the words (of the Mantra) is its prior or primary meaning; it is called '*mukhya*' (primary) because it is like *mukha* (face, the most important part of the body). On the other hand, that which is deduced from the primary meaning, through some sort of relationship, is the *posterior* or *secondary* meaning, called '*jaghanya*' (posterior) because it comes later (second), and hence is like the *thigh* (*jaghana*, which lies very much lower down); it is also called '*gauṇa*' (secondary) because it is connected with a '*guṇa*', *property* (of the primary meaning).

Objection—"If such be the explanation of the *primary* meaning,—then all meanings are *primary*; as every meaning is *understood from the words*; for example, the meaning of the word '*agni*', as applied to the *Fire* in the

sentence '*agniḥ jvalati*' ('Fire burns'), is 'understood from the word' exactly in the same manner as the meaning of the same word '*agni*' as applied to the *Boy*, in the sentence '*Agnirmāṇavakaḥ*' ('The Boy is *Agni*'). [So that there is no difference in the character of these two meanings, which are the stock-examples of the Primary and the Secondary meanings.]—It might be added that—'That meaning which is understood from the word itself independently of qualifying adjuncts is the *Primary* meaning; while that which is derived from the word as accompanied by qualifying adjuncts is the *Secondary* meaning'.—This also will not be right; when the verbal form of a word is expressive of a meaning, that form of the word remains the same, whether it is accompanied or not accompanied by qualifying adjuncts; and so long as the cause (the expressive verbal form) is there, it is not possible for the effect (the expression of the meaning) *not* to be there.—'What if it is so?'—If it is so, then, it cannot be asserted that 'the secondary meaning is not expressed when the qualifying adjuncts are not there, and it is expressed when the adjuncts are there'. Nor can it be said that in the latter case what is expressed and understood is the meaning of the group (consisting of the main word and its adjuncts). Because the distinction among the meanings of words always depends upon affirmation and negation [i.e. if a meaning is expressed when a word *is* there, and is not expressed when it *is not* there, then that meaning is attributed to that word].—'But in the case in question (of the word and its adjuncts), what is understood is the meaning of a *sentence* (not of a *word*).'—This also is not possible; because there is no 'meaning of the sentence' apart from the meanings of the words as correlated together.—Thus then, you must accept the following conclusion—The term '*agni*' is expressive of the *Fire*, and the same term '*agni*' is expressive of the *Boy*; and hence there is no difference between the 'primary' and the 'secondary' meanings of a word.—It might be explained that—'that meaning which is *well known* is *primary*, while that which is only a little known is the *secondary* meaning'.—This also will not be acceptable; 'being well known' is nothing more than *being cognised*, and as regards *cognition*, there is no difference between the two meanings.—It might be added that—'that is the *Primary* meaning in which sense the word is used in most cases, while that is the *secondary* meaning in which it is used in only a few cases'.—This also is not right; even when used in a few cases, the word could not express that meaning unless it had the capacity to do so; so that that meaning also is understood 'from the words', and as such must be regarded as the *primary* meaning."

Answer—There *is* a difference: as a matter of fact, the *Boy* is not understood from the word '*Agni*'.—"How do you know that?"—It has been explained above that it is not right to attribute several meanings to one word.

Question—"Why then can it not be the other way (the *Fire* being the secondary and the *Boy* the primary meaning)?"

Answer—We find people comprehending *Fire* from the word '*Agni*', without paying any heed to, or having any idea of, the *Boy*; but no one even comprehends the *Boy* from the word '*agni*', except through the notion of *Fire*.—"Why is it so?"—As a matter of fact, the word 'fire'

is always applied to things that *resemble Fire*; that is why we find the word ceasing to apply to a thing that has ceased to resemble Fire;—what therefore makes the word '*agni*' applicable to other things is the *similarity* to Fire;—and until we have the notion of *Fire* itself, there cannot be any notion of *similarity* to it;—from this it follows that what the word '*agni*' is expressive of is the *Fire*, not the *Boy*; that is why its *primary* connotation consists of the *Fire*, not the *Boy*.

Similarly the word '*varhiḥ*' has its primary connotation in *grass*, not in *what resembles grass*.

Thus then, there being two kinds of meanings of words, it is only right that there should be a consideration of the question as to whether a certain word is to be taken in its *primary* or *secondary* signification.

On this question as relating to *Mantras*, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The *Mantra* may be used in its primary as well as in its secondary sense.—Why?—Because both the meanings are equally capable of being expressed; for instance, both—*grass* and the *thing resembling grass*—are capable of being signified by the term '*Varhiḥ*' ('grass'),—the only difference being that the *grass* is signified directly, while the *thing resembling grass* is signified indirectly, through the *grass*. So that where the term '*varhiḥ*' is used as expressing something that helps in the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, every one of those things should be understood by it that are capable of being signified by that term; as there is no ground for picking and choosing among them.—Further, if this view is accepted, then it is no longer necessary to transfer, from the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, all those *mantras* that are addressed to *Pūṣan* [the transfer which has been considered necessary on the ground of there being no such deity as Pūṣan at the *Darshapūrnamāsa*];—this transference becomes unnecessary as the term '*pūṣan*' *by indirect indication*, stands for *Agni*, which *is* a deity at the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* [and *ex-hypothesis*, what is *indirectly indicated* by the *Mantras* is as acceptable as what is *directly* expressed]."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The *Mantra* is to be used in its *primary*, not in its *secondary*, sense.—Why?—Because both are not equally capable of being expressed. When a *mantra* is mentioned in a certain *context*, it is in its primary (direct) sense that it comes to be connected with the rest of the context; so that the idea comes to be that 'one should accomplish by this *Mantra* whatever one is capable of accomplishing by it'; it is found that the *mantra* is capable of helping the act by expressing its meaning (and thereby indicating certain accessory details in connection with that act);—it is however not capable of *expressing* what is only its indirect or secondary meaning;—hence it follows that it cannot be used in this secondary sense.

Objection—"The secondary meaning can be comprehended through the primary meaning".

True; but its purpose having been fulfilled by the expressing of the Primary meaning, there is no justification for its being used in its secondary sense. When it is used in its primary sense, its uselessness or meaninglessness becomes set aside;—and when the uselessness has been set aside, there is no more reason for admitting the secondary meaning; specially because the word cannot indicate its secondary meaning without having previously expressed its primary meaning. Thus, there being no justification for it, the *mantra* cannot be used in its secondary sense.

Further, for the signification of the secondary meaning,—which is based upon the capacity of the word,—there are various means (or methods): and 'capacity' is only a part of the word, as has been declared under Sūtra 1. 4. 30, where it is said that 'the deducing of the conclusion may be based upon the capacity of things, because the capacity of things forms an integral part of things'. Under the circumstances, if the *mantra* were always used in accordance with its secondary meaning, then every other means would have to be rejected and there would be no authority for this.

"The fact of the *mantra* occurring in the Veda would be the requisite authority."

This fact has no power to set aside the other means.

"This same objection would apply to the case of the *mantra* being used according to its primary meaning."

Not so, we reply. If the *mantra* were not used even according to its primary meaning, then it would not help the Principal (Sacrifice) at all; and in that case, the very presence of the *mantra* in the Vedic text would be meaningless.—Thus there is a difference between the Primary and Secondary meanings.

Further, the man who employs the *mantra* in its secondary sense, should be asked.—For what purpose do you admit the signification of the Primary meaning at all?—If he says that—"I do so, as otherwise, there could be no cognition of the secondary meaning,"—then the answer to him should be that there are other means also of getting at the secondary meaning.—Being thus pressed, he might say—"The cognition of the Primary meaning also is one of those means."—The *Siddhāntin* should say in reply—In that case, the *mantra* cannot be *always* used in its secondary sense; because in a case where the Primary meaning is admitted for the purpose of getting at the secondary meaning,—it would come to this that the *mantra* would be used according to its primary meaning (which would have come in first).—What is wanted to be known for practical purposes is, not the *expressive mantra*, but the *expressed meaning*; so that if (in any case) there were need for what is sought to be got at indirectly from the words of the *mantra* (as its secondary meaning),—that could be got at through some other means (some other sentence),—and recourse need not be had to the *mantra* in question itself. If, on the other hand, there were need to get at some meaning from the *mantra*, then, that need would be fulfilled by the signification of the *primary* meaning itself, and in that case there would be all the less reason for using the *Mantra* in its *secondary* sense.—Thus it is established that, as between the Primary and the Secondary meaning, it is through the Primary meaning only that the *Mantra* should be used.

SŪTRA (2).

BEING SANCTIFICATORY IN CHARACTER, IT SHOULD NOT BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT IS NOT ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"[if we accept the secondary meaning of *mantras*] there would be no need for transferring *the mantras addressed to Pūṣan* (from the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, on the ground that *Pūṣan* is not a deity at this sacrifice)';—our answer to this is that, it is only right that there should be this *transference* of the *Mantra* in question;—the *mantra* is sanctificatory in character; and as such would be absolutely useless if the *object to be sanctified* were not there; consequently it is only right that it should be transferred to a place where it may serve a useful purpose; and there could be nothing objectionable in this.

Adhikaraṇa (2) : *Mantras indicative of Indra are to be used in approaching the 'Gārhapatya' Fire—[Exception to the foregoing Adhikaraṇa].*

SŪTRA (3).

The 'Aindrī' Mantra should not be used according to its primary signification,—because there is the distinct declaration.

Bhāṣya.

[This is an exception of the general law propounded in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, that 'Mantras should be used according to their primary meaning.']

In connection with the '*Agni*', we read—'*Nivēshanaḥ saṅgamanō vasūnām—ityaindryā gārhapatyamupatiṣṭhatē*' ['With the *Aindrī mantra—Nivēshanaḥ saṅgamanō vasūnām*—one worships the *Gārhapatya* Fire']. (Maitrā. Saṁ. 3. 2. 4).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *worshipping* to be done of *Indra* or of the *Gārhapatya* Fire?

Objection—"Why should there be any such doubt, when there is the clear declaration to the effect that 'one should worship the *Gārhapatya*.'

Answer—When the *worshipping* is done with a certain *mantra text*, it is not mere *worshipping* that is meant to be done, but a 'sanctification' by means of words expressive of glorification;—now as a matter of fact, the *Aindrī-Mantra* (i.e. *a mantra descriptive of Indra*) could not, in any way, be expressive (and eulogistic) of *Fire* (*Gārhapatya*);—so that there might be a suspicion that the sentence '*Gārhapatyamupatiṣṭhatē*' does not lay down the *approaching* (or worshipping) *of the Gārhapatya Fire*, but the *worshipping* (of some other deity) *in the Gārhapatya Fire*;—and yet there is no word in the sentence—either with the Instrumental or the Locative ending—which could express this latter idea. Hence a discussion becomes necessary for the purpose of getting at the right solution of the difficulty.

On the said question then, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"Through the force (of the words), it is the *worshipping of Indra* that is to be done with the *Mantra*; specially as the *worshipping of the Gārhapatya Fire* is something that cannot be done with it.—'How then is the Accusative ending (in '*gārhapatyam*') to be explained?'—The Accusative ending is not meant to signify *what is the most desired*; it is meant to signify *mere connection*; or through the connection, the term '*gārhapatya*' would qualify the act of *worshipping*; the sense of the injunction being that 'the *worshipping* qualified by the Gārhapatya Fire should be done to *Indra*'; and the *Gārhapatya Fire* would thus serve the purpose of specifying the place for that act (of *worshipping Indra*) which forms the primary signification of the *Mantras*."

In answer to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*The 'Aindrī mantra' should not be used according to this primary signification, because there is the distinct declaration.* (*Sū.*).—It is not right that the *approaching* should be done to *Indra*; in fact the *Aindrī mantra* should not be used according to its primary signification.—Why so?—Because of the force of the 'distinct declaration',—i.e. the declaration in the shape of the words '*Aindryā gārhapatyamupatiṣṭhatē*' ['with the *Aindrī mantra* one approaches the *Gārhapatya Fire*']; where the Accusative ending points to the *Gārhapatya* Fire as the predominant factor.—[As regards the objections urged against this interpretation] what is there that a direct Vedic declaration cannot do? In fact there is no burden too heavy for a direct Vedic declaration.—Hence it follows that the *worshipping* to be done is of the *Gārhapatya* Fire.

SŪTRA (4).

EVEN THOUGH THE CONNECTION (BETWEEN WORDS AND THEIR MEANINGS) IS NOT CREATED BY VERBAL DECLARATIONS, YET THERE WOULD BE INDICATION OF FIRE BY REASON OF COMMON PROPERTIES.

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"It has been pointed out above that it is not possible for *the worshipping of the Gārhapatya Fire* to be done with the *Aindrī mantra.*"

It could be done on the strength of the direct declaration ('*gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhatē*').

"Even a hundred direct declarations could not make this possible; in fact, by making the declaration that 'Fire is denoted by the term *indra*' one would be stultifying himself; as such a declaration would be like such absurd declarations as 'one should sprinkle with Fire,' 'one should light with water'.—Then again, the connection between the word and its meaning is not created by scriptural texts; in fact that connection is something eternal and is only learnt from ordinary usage;—as has been explained under *Sūtra* 1. 1. 5.—'The relationship of the word with its meaning is eternal'.—It might be argued that 'sometimes the connection between a word is actually created by verbal declarations, as is found in the case of such artificial names as *Dēvadatta, Yajñadatta* and the like'.—There may be some case where a verbal declaration lays down the connection (between a word and its meaning); but the sentence under consideration is not one laying down any such connection as that 'the term *Indra* is the name of the *Gārhapatya* Fire.' Under the circumstances, how could the word '*indra*', whose meaning is well known, be taken to signify that *the Gārhapatya Fire should be worshipped*;—it is not possible for a word expressive of one thing to signify another. What can any direct declaration do in this matter?"

Our answer to this is as follows:—*Even though the connection is not created by verbal declarations, yet there would be indication of Fire by reason of common properties*—(Sū.)—That is to say, even though the sentence under

consideration has not the efficiency to lay down the connection between a word and its meaning, yet it is possible to have the *Gārhapatya Fire* spoken of by means of the term '*indra*';—how?—*by reason of common properties*; that is, the said indication (of Fire by the word '*indra*') would be *indirect*; there are such indirect indications based upon the presence of common properties; for instance, in such expressions as 'The Boy is Fire', 'Dēvadatta is a lion';—similarly, the term '*indra*' could be applied to the *Gārhapatya Fire*, which is not the God *Indra* (which is what is directly signified by the term '*indra*'); but there is a point of resemblance between the Fire and the god *Indra*,—in the fact that the *Gārhapatya Fire* helps in the accomplishment of the *sacrifice*, just as the god *Indra* does; or the point of resemblance may be that the term '*indra*' is derived from the root '*indi*' (to *be supreme*),—and the *Gārhapatya Fire* also is *supreme* in regard to its own functions. Thus then, that (god) which is directly denoted by the term '*indra*' would indicate the *Gārhapatya Fire* through similarity, or though the common property of *being supreme*;—so that there would be no incongruity at all.

Adhikaraṇa (3): *Mantras expressive of 'calling' should be used in Calling.*

SŪTRA (5).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"So also in the case of the 'Calling'," if this be urged [then the answer is as in the next Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

[We have dealt with the general rule that *Mantras* are to be used in accordance with their primary meaning,—and also with an exception to this rule. We now proceed to consider which special cases come under the general rule and which under the exception.]

There are the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which we read —'*Haviṣkṛt ēhi iti triravaghnan āhvayati*' —In regard to this there arises the question—Is the *mantra* ('*Haviṣkṛt ēhi*') enjoined in connection with the *striking*? or does the *striking* indicate the time (for the Calling)?

Question—"In what way can the *mantra* be taken as enjoined in connection with the *striking*? And in what way can the *striking* indicate the time?"

Answer—If the sentence is construed as '*Haviṣkṛt ēhi-iti triḥ avaghnan āhvayati*', then the *mantra* should be taken as enjoined in connection with the *striking* [the meaning of the sentence being 'while striking with the *mantra*—*O Preparer of offering-materials, come*!—he calls'];—while if the construction is '*Triḥ avaghnan āhvayati—haviṣkṛt ēhīti*', then the *time* (of calling) would be indicated (by the *striking*) [the meaning of the sentence being—'while striking, he calls—*O Preparer of offering-materials, come*!'.]

On the question here propounded, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"*So also in the case of Calling* (Sū.);—i.e. just as the *Aindri mantra* is enjoined in regard to the *Gārhapatya* (as decided in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*), so here also, the *mantra* is enjoined in regard to the *striking*. If this is done, then the *Direct Assertion* of the Veda becomes followed; while if the other construction were adopted, then it would be necessary to have recourse to *indirect indication*, and in that case the connection would be between the *mantra* and the *time of striking*, not between the *mantra* and the *striking*; so that the mention of 'calling' ('*āhvayati*') would become a mere *reference*: that the man should do the 'calling' having been learnt from other sources, the present text would mean that 'He who repeats the *mantra*—*Haviṣkṛt ēhi*—does the *calling*'; and under this interpretation, the *mantra* would have to be taken as indicating the *striking*, through some property [thus involving recourse to *indirect indication*].—From this it follows that the *Mantra* should not be used in *calling*."

SŪTRA (6).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS NOT SO; IT IS THE INJUNCTION OF TIME, [THE 'STRIKING'] HAVING BEEN ALREADY ENJOINED (ELSEWHERE).

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to take the sentence as laying down the *Mantra* in regard to the *striking*.—"What then is the right view to take?"—The right view is that it should be taken as laying down the *time*.—"Why?"—The sentence '*triḥ āhvayati*' lays down the *threefoldness* of the *calling*:—if this same sentence were taken as laying down the *mantra* also, then, by reason of the sentence containing the injunction of more than one accessory detail, there would be a syntactical split. Hence the construction should not be as '*Haviṣkṛt ēhi iti avaghnan, etc.*' ['while striking with the *mantra Haviṣkṛt, etc.* —he calls'],—it should be as '*avaghnan āhvayati*' ['while striking he calls with the *mantra*'].

Objection—"In this construction also, the sentence would contain the injunction of the *Mantra*, and also of the *Time*,—so that there would be the same incongruity (of syntactical split)."

Answer—Not so; as a matter of fact, the Preparer of the Offering-materials has to be *called* at the time of the *striking*,—because her presence is needed at the time; so that in the sentence in question the connection of the *calling* is only *referred to* (not *enjoined*), and all that is *enjoined* is the *threefold repetition* [so that there is no syntactical split involved].

As for the argument that "the proposed interpretation involves the incongruity, that the word has to be taken as *indirectly indicating* the *Time* (which recourse to *indirect indication* cannot be right),"—our answer is that there is nothing wrong in this; because, in the first place, *indirect indication* is after all only an ordinary (secular) process [so that there is nothing inherently wrong in it];—and secondly, the *Mantra*, from its very form, is recognised as to be used for the *calling* (and as such needs no *injunction*); —so that the sentence in question contains only a reference to the *Mantra*; —as for the *striking*, that also is known to be already enjoined by another sentence [e.g '*Vrīhin avahanti*', 'strikes the corn for threshing'];—so that in the sentence in question, the mention of this *striking* can very well be taken as indicating the *time*. From all this it follows that the *Mantra* is to be used in the *calling*.

SŪTRA (7).

BECAUSE THE PROPERTY IS NON-EXISTENT.

Bhāṣya.

This *sūtra* has to be explained after supplying a few preliminary words (presenting the following argument from the *Pūrvapakṣin*)—"Why cannot the name '*haviṣkṛt*' be taken as signifying the act of *striking* itself? As a matter of fact, the *striking* (of the corn, in the process of *threshing*) does tend to *the preparing of the offering material*, and as such it can be called '*haviṣkṛt*' (Preparer of the offering material).—What would be gained by

this ?—The advantage would be that the mantra '*Haviṣkṛt, etc.*' in that case, by its very form, would be recognised as to be used at the *striking*; so that all that would be left to be *enjoined* by the sentence in question would be the *threefold repetition*; and thus there would be no syntactical split."

The answer to this is given in the *Sūtra—Because the property is non-existent*;—the indirect indication of the *act of striking* (by the term '*haviṣkṛt*- cannot be possible. As a matter of fact, the act of *striking* cannot understand that it is being 'called'; so that any 'calling' of it would serve only an invisible (transcendental) purpose; while in the case of the *sacrificer's wife* (who, according to the *Siddhānta*, is the *Haviṣkṛt*, Preparer of the offering materials), the 'calling' serves a visible purpose (the lady coming up actually helps in the performance).—For this reason also, the *Mantra* is not to be used in connection with the *striking*.

SŪTRA (8).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS AN INDICATIVE TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text also (pointing to the same conclusion)—'*Vāgvai haviṣkṛt vāchamēva ētat āhvayati*' (Cf. Shatapatha. Brā. 1. 1. 4. 11). [Where *Vāk*, speech, is spoken of as the '*Haviṣkṛt*']; as a matter of fact, there is no similarity between *speech* and the *act of striking* (which latter, according to the opponent is the *Haviṣkṛt*); while between *speech* and the *sacrificer's wife*, there is a distinct similarity,—the *wife* is a female, and the word '*Vāk*' (speech) also is of the Feminine Gender; the *act of striking*, on the other hand, is neither Feminine, nor Masculine, nor Neuter.—"For *striking* also there is a word in the Feminine Gender—in the shape of the word '*Kriyā*' (act)."—Our answer to this is that the word expressive of the *act of striking* is not always necessarily of the Feminine Gender; there is the word '*avaghāta*' (which means *striking*), which is in the Masculine Gender; there is also the word '*Karma*' (act), which is in the Neuter Gender.—Further, the similarity of the *wife* to the *Vāk* is in her own *form* (the lady herself being a *female*), while that of the act of *striking*, is though a foreign element in the shape of the word expressive of that act.—For all these reasons, the Gender is more compatible if the *wife* (and not the *striking*) is regarded as the '*Haviṣkṛt*'.

SŪTRA (9).

LASTLY, IF THE SENTENCE WERE TAKEN AS LAYING DOWN THE MANTRA IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'STRIKING',—IT WOULD BE REPUGNANT (TO OTHER INJUNCTIONS).

Bhāṣya.

If the *Mantra* in question were taken to be enjoined as to be used in connection with *striking*, it would be repugnant to other injunctions;—such as (*a*) '*Apahatam rakṣa ityavahanti*', (*b*) '*Apahatā yātudhānā ityavahanti*', [where other *mantras* are distinctly enjoined as to be used in connection with

striking]. Now these injunctions would be disobeyed in the event of the *mantra* '*Haviṣkṛt ēhi*' being used in connection with the *striking*.—For this reason also, the *striking* should be taken as indicating the *time* (of the *Calling*), and the *Mantra* also should be taken as to be used in connection with the *Calling*.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The Mantras speaking of acts like the 'Agniviharaṇa' should be used in connection with those same acts.*

SŪTRA (10).

SO ALSO WITH 'RISING' AND 'GIVING VENT'.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—(*a*) '*Uttiṣṭhan anvāha-agnīdagnīn vihara*'; and also '*Vratam kṛṇuta—iti vācham visṛjati*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 4. 4).

In regard to these texts, there arises the question—Are the two *mantras* enjoined here in connection with the two acts of (*a*) *rising* and (*b*) *giving vent to speech*? Or are these acts mentioned only as indicating the time (for the repeating of the Mantras)?

The present *Sūtra* applies to the present case the principle arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*; so that the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the previous *Adhikaraṇa* should be the *Pūrvapakṣa* here, and the *Siddhānta* arrived at there should be accepted as the *Siddhānta* here also.

According to the *Pūrvapakṣa* then, the meaning of the two sentences would be—(*a*) 'While rising with the *mantra*, *Agnīdagnīn vihara* he says', and (*b*) 'He gives vent to speech with the *mantra*, *Vratam kṛṇuta*'.

According to the *Siddhānta* on the other hand,—inasmuch as the acts of *rising* and *giving vent* do not possess the qualifications mentioned in the *mantras*, the meaning of the two sentences should be—(*a*) '*While rising, he repeats the mantra Agnīdagnīn vihara*', and (*b*) '*While repeating the mantra Vratam kṛṇuta*, he gives vent to speech'.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* interpretation is supported by *Syntactical Connection*, while the *Siddhānta* view is supported by *Indicative Power* [and *Indicative Power* is always more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*].

(*a*) Even if the *mantra* '*Agnīdagnīn vihara*' were somehow capable of expressing the act of *rising*, on the basis of the fact that Fire becomes brightened by the act of *rising* and it is the Fire that is 'carried over',—[so that the term '*agnīd*' in the *mantra*, literally meaning *agniridhyatē anēna*, would signify the act of *rising*],—and (*b*) even if the *mantra* '*Vratam kṛṇuta*' were somehow capable of expressing the act of *giving vent to speech*,—the repeating of the *mantra* could serve a transcendental purpose only; hence the two *mantras* cannot be regarded as meant to be repeated in connection with the acts of *rising* and *giving vent* respectively. [What is meant is that, inasmuch as *Rising* and *Giving Vent* do not possess the qualifications spoken of in the *mantras*, these latter could not be used in connection with those acts.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1069.]

If the *mantras* were taken as to be used in connection with the acts of

Rising and *Giving Vent*,—this would set aside another *Mantra* which has been enjoined—viz. the *mantra* '*Yāḥ pashūnām ṛṣabho vāchaḥ, etc.*'

Lastly, if the *mantras* were enjoined in connection with the acts of *Rising* and *Giving Vent*, then they could serve a transcendental purpose only; on the other hand, if they were used as *directions* (addressed to the priests concerned), they would serve a visible purpose.

For these reasons, in this case, the right course would be to have recourse to indirect indication [and take the *mantras* as to be addressed to the priests *at the time* of 'rising' and 'giving vent to speech'].

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The 'Sūktavāka' Mantra is to be used in the 'Prastara-praharaṇa', 'Throwing-in of the Grass-bundle'.*

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE SŪKTAVĀKA-MANTRA THERE IS INJUNCTION OF TIME, AS IT IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE PURPOSES OF SOMETHING ELSE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* we read—'*Sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*' [the *mantra* beginning with '*Idam dyāvāprithivī bhadramabhūt*' (Tai. Brā. 3. 4. 10. 1) is called '*Sūktavāka*'; a handful of kusha-grass is called '*prastara*'; its '*praharaṇa*' consists in its being thrown into the Fire].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Sūktavāka* enjoined in reference to the *Throwing-in of the grass-bundle*? or do we have here an indication of the time?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The sentence should be taken as indicating the time;—why?—because the *Sūktavāka* is for the purpose of pointing out the Deity, and as such cannot have any connection with the *Throwing-in of the Grass-bundle*,—and the *grass-bundle* is for the purpose of being used as a receptacle for the *Sruks* (ladles); [so that this also can have no connection with the *Sūktavāka*;—and thus the two being independent of one another, neither of them could be treated as an auxiliary to the other.]"

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AN INJUNCTION (OF THE MANTRA IN REFERENCE TO THE THROWING-IN); BECAUSE THE NAME 'YĀJYĀ' COULD NOT BE APPLIED TO THE MANTRA HAPHAZARDLY—(WITHOUT REASON).

Bhāṣya.

The sentence should be taken as an injunction of the *mantra* (*Sūktavāka*) in reference to the *Throwing-in of the grass-bundle*; it is only when this is done that the meaning comes to be what is actually declared through *Direct Assertion*, by the Instrumental ending in the word '*Sūktavākēna*';—if the sentence were taken in any other sense, it would involve *indirect indication*,—the meaning being that 'one should throw-in the grass-bundle at the time indicated by the *Sūktavāka*'.—Further, it is only when the sentence is taken as enjoining the *mantra* in reference to the *Throwing-in of the grass-bundle* that the name '*Yājyā*' becomes applicable to the *Sūktavāka*;

for the *Sūktavāka* can be '*Yājyā*' (a sacrificial auxiliary) only if it is to be used in connection with an *offering*, and in the case in question the *grass-bundle* is an *offering* (that is thrown into the fire with the *Sūktavāka-mantra*).

SŪTRA (13).

AS FOR THE POINTING OUT OF THE DEITIES, THE MANTRA SERVES THAT PURPOSE ALSO, BY REASON OF THE CONNECTION OF THOSE DEITIES (WITH THE ACT OF 'OFFERING').

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that the *Sūktavāka* is capable of pointing to the deity, not of being used in connection with the "*Throwing-in of the grass-bundle*".—Our answer to this is as follows:—It is not impossible for the *mantra* pointing to a deity to be used in connection with the *Throwing-in*; the *Throwing-in* is a form of *sacrifice*, and the Deity of that *sacrifice* is pointed out by the *mantra*;—so that the connection between the two is clear.—As a matter of fact, we find that the actual words of the *mantra*—'*Agniridam havirajuṣatāvīvṛdhata*', (Taitti. Brā. 3. 5. 10. 2; Shata. Brā. 1. 9. 1. 9) mention the deity *Agni*;—then come the words '*āshāstē'yam yajamānaḥ*' (Taitti. Brā. 3. 5. 10. 4; Shata. Brā. 1. 3. 1. 12), which go on to mention the several things that the sacrificer hopes for, and then concludes—'*yadanēna haviṣā āshāste tadasya syāt*' (Shata. Brā. 1. 9. 1. 16);—these words point to the *grass-bundle* as the offering-material and *Agni* and the rest as the particular deities of the offering: thus (by virtue of this connection between the deities and the grass-bundle) the *throwing-in* (of the Bundle) becomes an act of *sacrifice*; and hence it is quite possible for the grass-bundle to be 'thrown-in' (i.e. offered in sacrifice) with the *Sūkta-vāka-mantra*,—if the act of 'throwing-in' is a *sacrifice* and of this sacrifice *Agni* and the rest are the deities.—Thus even when the *Sūktavāka* is connected with the act of *Throwing-in*, it is quite possible for it to serve the purposes of the Deity.—If there were only the words '*agniridam havirajuṣatāvīvṛdhata*',—and the other words '*āshāstē 'yam yajamānaḥ*', etc. were not there,—then the sentence would have ended with the declaration that '*Agni* and the other deities are to be sacrificed to', without any other desired factor; as, however, there are the other words also—'*āshāste 'yam yajamānaḥ*', etc.—the full meaning of the sentence comes to be that 'Agni and other deities are sacrificed to with Cake and other substances,—and that whatever else the sacrificer desires, he would obtain by means of the *grass-bundle* (thrown-in).*

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* The sense of this is that, even before the words '*Sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*', it is found that a portion of the *Sūktavāka-mantra* itself is capable of connecting it with the offering in question. Though the indicative power of the *mantra* is equally applicable to all kinds of offering-materials, yet, on the strength of the Direct Assertion in question, the words '*yadanēna haviṣā*, etc.' must be taken as referring to the *grass-bundle*.—Or it may be that from the very beginning, the word '*idam*' refers to the *grass-bundle*; for the simple reason

Objection—"Even though all these words are there, the sentence should be taken as ending in the pointing out of the Deities,—the meaning being that '*Agni* and the other deities have been sacrificed to with Cake and other things,—and from this same act the Sacrificer would obtain whatever else he may desire, in the shape of *longevity* and the like'."

Answer.—If the *mantra* is connected both ways (with the act of *Throwing-in* and with the pointing out of the deity), it should be used in connection with the act of *Throwing-in*, and this would not interfere with the *indicative power of the mantra* (pointing out the deity), and it would also be compatible with the indications of *Syntactical Connection*.

Or, we may take the words '*Agniridam havirajuṣata*' as referring to the *grass-bundle* itself as the '*haviḥ*' (offering-material); so that the pronoun '*idam*', which refers to the factor in close proximity to it, becomes quite compatible.

SŪTRA (14).

"THE ACTION IS OF THE NATURE OF 'DISPOSAL' [HENCE THE MANTRA COULD NOT BE AN AUXILIARY TO IT],"—IF THIS BE URGED, [THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT] LIKE THE 'SVIṢṬAKṚT' OFFERING, IT COULD BE THE SANCTIFICATION OF BOTH.

[This *sūtra* has been taken as *two* separate *Sūtras* in the *Tantravārtika* where it is remarked that this splitting up of the *Sūtra* into two has been indicated by all old teachers.]

Bhāṣya.

The following argument might be urged (by the Opponent)—"The *grass-bundle* having been used for the depositing of the *Sruks*, the act of *throwing it in* would be of the nature of 'disposal' [and hence neither the *mantra* nor the deities could be auxiliary to it]."

The answer to this is that *it would be like the Sviṣṭakṛt*;—that is to say, in the case of the *Sviṣṭakṛt*, it is found that out of the Cake that has been used at the (*Darshapūrṇamāsa*) sacrifice, the *Sviṣṭakṛt*-offering is made, on the strength of the injunction to that effect;—and this *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering is of the nature of a 'sacrifice', as well as of the nature of the 'disposal' of the Cake-remnant;—similarly in the case in question, by the offering of the 'grass-bundle', there would be a 'disposal' of the bundle that has been used, as well as an act of 'sacrifice' would be accomplished. So that there is nothing incongruous in the *Siddhānta* view. In fact, when a substance is 'disposed of', then also there is a 'giving away' (offering);—so that it follows that the substance is directly 'disposed of', and at the same time an act of 'sacrifice' is accomplished, on the strength of the distinct injunction ('*Prastaram praharati*').—Thus then, we conclude that the

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that the other materials—Cake and the rest—are not there at the time.—Thus there can be nothing incongruous in the *Sūktavāka* being used in connection with the *Throwing-in of the grass-bundle*.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1075-1076.

Sūktavāka is the *mantra* to be used in connection with the act of 'Throwing-in'.

[Kumārila suggests two other interpretations of the Sūtra—for which see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1076-1077.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The Sūktavāka-mantras are to be used in accordance with their significations.*

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ENTIRE SET OF SŪKTAVĀKA-MANTRAS IS TO BE USED AT BOTH THE SACRIFICES; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED AS ONE COMPOSITE WHOLE."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Sūktavākēna prastaram praharati*' ['With the *sūktavāka*, he throws-in the grass-bundle']. —In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the entire *Sūktavāka* to be used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice', and the entire one again at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice? Or, are parts of it to be extracted and used according to the signification of each *mantra* (composing the *Sūktavāka*)?

On this, we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* stated in the *Sūtra*—"*The entire set is to be used at both the sacrifices*;—why so?—because it is the entire body of the particular *mantras* that is named '*sūktavāka*'; so that if even a single word were omitted, it would cease to be '*sūktavāka*',—and the act of *Throwing-in* done in that case would not have been done 'with the *sūktavāka*'. —Hence the entire *Sūktavāka* should be taken as to be used at both the sacrifices."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE MANTRAS SHOULD BE USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR SIGNIFICATION; BECAUSE THEY ARE SANCTIFICATORY OF WHAT IS AN AUXILIARY.

Bhāṣya.

Those *mantra-texts* that indicate the deities of the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice should be used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice,—not at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice; similarly, those that indicate the deities of the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice should be used at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice,—not at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice; —It has been explained (under 3. 2. 2) that *Mantras* help in the sacrifice only by 'sanctifying' something that is auxiliary to that sacrifice—not in any other way; hence *mantras* should be used only at that sacrifice to which they render such a help. Consequently it is not right that the entire set of '*sūktavāka*' *mantras* should be used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice, or that the entire set should be used at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice.

SŪTRA (17).

IF IT BE URGED THAT "ON THE STRENGTH OF THE INJUNCTION [THE WHOLE SHOULD BE USED AT BOTH]"—[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

There is the following argument of the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"There is the injunction in the form that 'one throws-in the grass-bundle *with the Sūktavāka*'; and even if a single word were omitted in the *mantras*, the *Throwing-in* would not be done 'with the *Sūktavāka*', as what has been enjoined is the use of the entire set of the *Sūktavāka*."—The answer to this is given in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (18).

THE TERM 'ENTIRE' IS IN REFERENCE TO BOTH (SACRIFICES) TAKEN TOGETHER; AS THE CONTEXT (OF BOTH) IS THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

The term 'entire' (when used in the expression 'the *entire Sūktavāka* should be used') must be taken in reference to what is done at the *Paurṇamāsī* and the *Amāvāsyā* taken together,—because the context belongs to both these sacrifices; so that when the *Sūktavāka* is used at both together,—in parts (one part at the *Paurṇamāsī* and another at the *Amāvāsyā*)—the entire *Sūktavāka* becomes used.

Objection (to this presentation of the *Siddhānta*)—"This explanation is not right; factors dependent upon something else (and hence incomplete in themselves) cannot have any connection with the procedure (of a sacrifice); in fact, it is not the Procedure that is declared (in the Vedic texts) as to be qualified by those factors; it is those factors themselves that are taken as qualified by the Procedure.—Why so?—Because Actions are not enjoined in reference to the Procedure; they are enjoined in reference to the Result; the Procedure itself is enjoined in reference to the Actions. Now, as the entire Procedure is equally circumstanced (in reference to the Actions composing the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*), it cannot be understood which part of the Procedure is enjoined in reference to which particular Action, and is not enjoined in reference to which other.—Thus then, (*a*) because all (the *mantras* of the *Sūktavāka*) have been laid down as helping the action,—(*b*) because the entire Procedure is equally circumstanced in relation to the action,—(*c*) because there is the direct declaration ('with the *Sūktavāka*, he throws-in the grass-bundle'),—(*d*) because the indication of the Context is equally applicable to all,—the entire Context belongs to each of the actions concerned, as taken independently by itself, not as along with the other action. Consequently, it follows that the entire *Sūktavāka* has been enjoined in reference to each of the actions (composing the

Darshapūrṇamāsa); so that even if the two primary actions (the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice and the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice) are separated, it is the *Sūktavāka* in its entirety that has to be used at each of them.—Hence even those words (of the *Sūktavāka-mantra* texts) that have no bearing upon either of those sacrifices have got to be used, and (though having no direct visible bearing upon the action) they would serve some sort of a transcendental purpose;—all this is on the strength of the injunction that 'one should throw-in the grass-bundle with the *Sūktavāka-mantra*'; certainly no burden can be too heavy for a Vedic Injunction. In fact, even those words may, through some quality or the other, serve the purpose of indicating the deities (pertaining to the sacrifice concerned)."

In regard to this last assertion, what we have to say is that it is not right. It has already been explained (under 3. 2. 1), that *Mantras* have to be used according to their direct meaning, not according to their indirect meaning. Being meant, as they are, to be sanctificatory, they may have to be moved away from their Context, but they cannot be taken as making any indications indirectly (through the presence of some quality).

"What answer have you got to the arguments that have been set forth in support of the view that the entire *Sūktavāka* should be used at each of the two sacrifices?"

Our answer is as follows:—The *entire Sūktavāka* is not *one sentence*; it consists, in fact, of many sentences; of these, those sentences that speak of the principal deities appear in the middle, while of those other words that are such as are applicable in common to several sentences, some appear before and some after the aforesaid sentences (speaking of the principal deities).—For instance, sentences speaking of the principal deities are the following—(*a*) '*Agniridam havirajuṣatāvīvṛdhata maho jyāyokṛta* (Taitti. Brā. 3. 5. 10. 2),—(*b*) '*Agniṣomāvidam havirajuṣētāmavīvṛdhētām*';—now the common words preceding each of these *mantras* are '*Idam dyāvāprithivī*, etc.', and those coming after each are '*asyāmṛdhēt*, etc.'—Now every one of these sentences is entitled to be called '*Sūktavāka*', because it contains a *good-declaration* (*sūkta-vachana*) [in that it indicates deities]; and nothing useful is spoken of by all the sentences *taken as one composite whole*. Hence this *composite whole* cannot be regarded as '*Sūktavāka*'. Nor is any such *composite whole* directly helpful in the sacrifice. As for the singular number used,—in such expressions as '*Sūktavāko vartatē*',—it is due to the fact that all the *Sūktavākas* form a single *class* or group, which is one only; hence the injunction that 'one should throw-in the grass-bundle with the *Sūktavāka*' would be strictly obeyed if the grass-bundle were *thrown-in* with any one of the said several *Sūktavākas*. Thus it is that there is no *Sūktavāka* consisting of a *composite whole* (made up of the several sentences).—Under the circumstances, if those words which speak of the deities of the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice are not used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice, the *Sūktavāka* itself does not become rejected by that omission; as in this case what happens is that what is indicated by the *Context* is set aside by what is indicated by the *Indicative power* (of the Mantras): and it is only right that this should be so.

From all this it follows that the *Sūktavāka* should be split up and then used at the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice and at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice.

[Kumārila is not satisfied with this presentation of the *Siddhānta*; he has suggested another and a simpler exposition; for which see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1083–1085.]

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The Kāmya 'yājyā-anuvākyās' are to be used only at those sacrifices that are declared to be conducive to the fulfilment of definite desirable results.*

SŪTRA (19).

ON ACCOUNT OF 'INDICATIVE POWER', 'ORDER OF SEQUENCE' AND 'NAME', THE INJUNCTION IN QUESTION SHOULD BE TAKEN AS RELATED TO THE SACRIFICES DECLARED TO BE CONDUCIVE TO DESIRABLE RESULTS.

Bhāṣya.

There is a section of the Veda wherein the *Kāmya Yājyā-Anuvākyās*—consisting of the verses '*Indrāgnī rochanā divaḥ*', etc. (Mai. Saṁ. 4. 10. 4)—'*Pravarṣaṇibhyaḥ*, etc.' (Mai. Saṁ. 4. 10. 4)—'*Indrāgnīnavatim puraḥ*, etc.' (Mai. Saṁ. 4. 10. 5)—'*Shlathadvṛttram*, etc.' (Mai. Saṁ. 4. 10. 5, also Kātha. Saṁ. 4. 15), and so forth—appear in a certain order.—Then we have certain *Kāmya sacrifices* also (mentioned in a definite order),—such as—(*a*) '*Aindrāgnamēkādashakapalam nirvapēt yasya sajātā viyāyuḥ*', (*b*) '*Aindragnamēkādashakapālam nirvapēt bhrātṛvyavān*', (*c*) '*Agnayē vaishvānarāya dvādashakapālam nirvapēt rukkāmaḥ*', (*d*) '*Agnayē vaishvānarāya dvādashakapālam nirvapēt sapatnamabhidroṣyan*', and so forth.

Now, in connection with the said *Yājyā-Anuvākyās*, there arises the question—Is the couplet of *Yājyānuvakyās* connected with the name of the deity *Indra-Agni* to be used in connection with all those sacrifices that are offered to that deity *Indra-Agni*? Or only at the one particular sacrifice to *Indra-Agni* which has been enjoined in the sentence just quoted (*a*)?—Similarly with the *Yājyā-Anuvākyās* connected with the deity *Vaishvānara*.

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—

"The *Yājyā-Anuvākyās* are to be used at every one of those sacrifices that are connected with the deities, *Indra-Agni*, *Vaishvānara*, *Agni-Soma* or *Jātavedāsa*.—Why so?—Because of the indicative potency of the Mantras concerned.—'But the *Order of Sequence* and the *Name* would restrict the *Yājyā-Anuvākyās* to sacrifices to particular deities'.—True; but even so, Indicative Power would always reject the indications of *Order* and *Name*."

Against this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—On account of 'Indicative Power', 'Order of Sequence' and 'Name', the *Yājyā-Anuvākyās* in question should be used in connection with those same *Kāmya* sacrifices which are mentioned in the texts quoted;—the 'indicative power' and the 'order' of the *Yājyā-Anuvākyās* are the same as those of the said sacrifices; from which it follows that they are auxiliaries to these same sacrifices.

"But it has been pointed out that Indicative Power is more authorita-

tive (than *Order* and the rest; and the Indicative Power of the *mantras* connects them with all the sacrifices, not only with the *Kāmya* ones)."

That is true; but in the case in question what is more authoritative is the *Name*; except through the indication of the 'Name', the Mantras cannot be held to apply to the *Kāmya* sacrifices, and not to the sacrifices mentioned elsewhere.—Why?—Except through the names ('*Yājyā*' and '*Anuvākyā*'), we cannot recognise even the fact of the *mantras* being *Yājyā-Anuvākyā*; (so that it being still unknown what the verses are for), how could the *Yājyā-Anuvākyā* become connected with other sacrifices?—The *Name* ('*Yājyā-Anuvākyā*') itself indicates that it is only the *Kāmya* mantras—and not all verses—that can be recognised as '*Yājyā-Anuvākyā*'. If no heed is paid to the *Name*, then the Mantras are not *Yājyā-Anuvākyā*; if heed is paid to the *Name*, then the Mantras must be only the *Kāmya* ones; inasmuch as the section in which the *mantras* appear is called the '*Yājyānuvākyā-Kāṇḍa*'.

Question—"Why does the *Sūtra* speak of both—(1) Indicative Power and Order, and also (2) Name?" ["The fact of the mantras being connected with the *Kāmya* sacrifices is proved by *Indicative Power* helped by *Order*; or the very *Name* only is enough to prove the same conclusion. Why then should *both* have been put forward?—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1087]".

Answer—There are such sacrifices as the (*a*) the *Pāthikṛtēya*, and (*b*) the *Vrātapatīya*; and at these, there is room for the use of two sets of *mantras* —(1) the *Sāmidhēnī* verses and (2) the *Yājyānuvākyā* verses. If the *Sūtra* had put forward only 'Indicative Power and Order'; then it would be possible for the *Yājyānuvākyā* verses to be used in place of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, as such use would be pointed out by the Indicative Power of the *mantras*. [This anomaly is avoided by mentioning '*Name*' also, which restricts the *Yājyānuvākyā*-*mantras* to their own sphere.]

Question—"Why then should 'Indicative Power' and 'Order' be mentioned [when the necessary conclusion is established by *Name* only]?"

Answer—[If Indicative Power and Order had not been added, and reliance were placed upon *Name* only, then] in that case, all the verses would be used for the purposes of the *Yājyā-Anuvākyā*, and none would be used for the purposes of the *Sāmidhēnī*. If, however, the purposes of the *Yājyā-Anuvākyā* are accomplished through Name, and also through Indicative Power and Order,—then the use of the *mantras* with the *Sāmidhēnīs* becomes possible. For instance, after the place (in the order of sequence) of the *Agni-Vāruṇī* sacrifice has been passed over,—and that of the *Somāraudrī* sacrifices has not yet come up,—there come in certain verses called '*Manoḥ ṛchaḥ*', which, in connection with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, are called '*Dhāyyā*';—and two such *Dhāyyā* verses come to be assumed in this manner.

Thus it is necessary that the *Sūtra* should mention both (*Indicative Power* and *Order* and *Name*).

[There would have been no need for mentioning all the three, if the *mantras* speaking of the deities of the sacrifices were exactly the same in number as the sacrifices themselves; as a matter of fact, however, we find that, in the order of the sacrifice which has a deity other than *Agni*,—and which has a *Yājyā-Anuvākyā* in

keeping with itself,—there are certain *mantras* actually pertaining to *Agni*;—if these were to be used according to the *Name* only, then they would come to be used in connection with the functions of the *Yājyā* (in connection with deities other than *Agni*).—Such use of the *mantras* is not possible; (1) because there is difference in the Indicative Power (of the verses indicating deities other than *Agni*), and (2) because the application of the *mantras* pertaining to *Agni* would be set aside by the other *mantras* which are indicative of those same other deities. Thus then, if the use of the *mantras* rested upon *Name* only, then the *mantras* pertaining to *Agni* would not be used at all.—If, however, we admit the force of *Indicative Power and Order* also in controlling the use of the *mantras*, then,—after the *Name* ('*yājyā*') will have ceased functioning, after having pointed out the fact of the *mantras* being connected with a *sacrifice*, '*yāga*', the precise use of the *mantras* will be determined by their *Indicative Power and Order*; and in this manner, the *mantras* pertaining to *Agni* would come to be used as '*Sāmidhēnī*' *mantras*.—The *Bhāṣya* shows a case where this actually happens: Between the *Yājyānuvākyās* related to the *Agni-Vāruṇī* sacrifices and those related to the *Somāraudri* sacrifices,—we find the *Manu-verses*; and yet these latter are used as '*Dhāyyā*' verses of the Sāmidhēnī; [and this is possible only because we depend upon all the three--Indicative Power, Order and Name,—and not upon *Name* only].—If we did not admit the *Order*, and had only *Indicative Power* and *Name*, then there would be the anomaly that the *first mantra* pertaining to *Indra* would be used at the *second* sacrifice, which is to *Indra-Agni*; when however *Order* steps in, the *first mantra* becomes connected with the *First* sacrifice, the *second* with the *second* and so forth; because as the *order* becomes operative before the *Name*, it controls the Indicative Power also; so that there is no chance for the connecting of the *mantras* with any sacrifices not in keeping with the Order of Sequence.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1088-1089.]

Adhikaraṇa (8): *At the 'Upasthāna' of the Agnīdhra, the mantras to be used must be those appearing in the same Context.*

SŪTRA (20).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—" When mantras are enjoined in a certain connection, that Injunction should include those that do not appear in the same Context; because all are enjoined (as auxiliary to the sacrifice)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Āgneyyā agnīdhramupatiṣṭhatē* (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 1. 6. 1), *Aindryā sadaḥ, Vaiṣṇavyā havirdhānam*' (Tai. Saṁ. 3. 1. 6. 1) [With the Āgnēyi verse, one approaches the *Agnīdhra*,—with the *Aindrī* verse, the Assembly-room,—with the *Vaiṣṇavī* verse, the *Havirdhāna*'].—In regard to this, there arises the question,—Is the *approaching* to be done with only those *mantras* indicative of the said deities that are found in the same Context? or are the *mantras* indicative of the deities to be *culled from the whole ten maṇḍalas of the Ṛgveda* ('*Dāshatayī*') for being used at the *Approaching*?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—" When in a certain connection (context), a *mantra* is enjoined, through its Indicative Power, it should be culled out of the *Ten Maṇḍalas*; as the *mantras* in the *Ten Maṇḍalas* are capable of being called by such names as '*āgnēyi*' and the rest (anyone of which names cannot be confined to the one particular *mantra* appearing in the same context as the action in question); the particular one appearing in the same context is one that has been already used elsewhere in connection with another action [i.e. the main Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice itself], and as such cannot be enjoined in connection with the action in question [i.e. the act of *Upasthāna*]; because, for *mantras* like those under consideration, it is not right that what has been enjoined once should be enjoined again.—'Mantras like what?'—What we mean is that when a *mantra* has been once enjoined in a qualified form, it cannot be enjoined again, in its unqualified (general) form, through its Indicative Power. [For instance, if a certain Mantra speaking of *Agni*—viz. '*Agnirmūrdhā*, etc.'—has been enjoined specifically in its own special form, it cannot be enjoined again under the general name of 'Āgneyī'; and yet this is exactly what would happen if, in the sentence '*Āgnēyyā agnīdhram upatiṣṭhatē*', the term '*āgnēyī*' were restricted to the one *mantra* in the Context].—'Why so?'—Because if the Indicative Power (through which it is meant to be enjoined) is taken as mentioned by way of specifying the *Mantra*, then it could be specified only in the qualified form,—the sense being that 'the act in question (*upasthāna*) is to be done with such *mantras* as contain words indicative of the deity (*Agni*)'; and in this case, the *Mantra* cannot be taken as *enjoined* [as the potency of

the injunctive word is taken up by the said specification]. On the other hand, if the *Indicative Power* is taken as enjoining the *Mantra*, then the sense of the injunction would be 'one does such and such an act by means of the *mantra* possessed of such and such Indicative Power'; and in this latter case there would be no specification of any particular *mantra* [and hence any *Āgneyī mantra* might be taken up]. It is for this reason that when a *mantra* has been enjoined once in this manner, it is not right that there should be another injunction of it of the kind in question. From this it follows that all the *mantras* in the *Ten Maṇḍalas* which are found to have the Indicative Power in question should be culled out for use."

Objection (against the *Pūrvapakṣa*)—Through the force of the Context, the most reasonable course would be to adopt those same *mantras* that are found in the same context.

Pūrvapakṣin's answer—"This cannot be; as *Indicative Power* is more authoritative than Context." [*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1092 notes that henceforward, in the present connection; the term '*liṅga*', 'indicative power' is to be taken in the sense 'Direct Assertion' or Text, which is literally connected with the particular *deity* ?]

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin's* Opponent—Indicative Power would set aside the Context only if there were conflict between the two; in the case in question, there is no such conflict; because if we accept the indication of the *context* and adopt the one particular (Āgnēyī) *Mantra* in the *context* which contains the requisite indicative words also (containing, as it does, words expressive of the deity, *Agni*),—we do not, in any way reject the indications of the Indicative Power; if we adopted some such *Mantra* in the Context as did not contain the indicative word, then alone would we have gone against *Indicative Power*:—but by doing what we do (i.e. by adopting that *mantra* in the context which does contain the requisite Indicative words) we are following both, the *Context* as well as the *Indicative Power*.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"It is not as you put it. What *Indicative Power* indicates is that the act in question may be done by *any mantra* in the *Ten Maṇḍalas* (which possesses the Indicative words); so that all such *Mantras* contained in the *Ten Maṇḍalas* can be spoken of as '*āgnēyī*';—now this notion provided by *Indicative Power* is certainly rejected as *wrong*, if you follow the Context; that is, if you follow the *Context* (and thereby adopt only one Mantra as '*āgnēyī*'), you certainly reject the said indication by *Indicative Power* as wrong; if you do not accept the Context (and apply the name '*āgnēyī*' to all the *Mantras* in the *Ten Maṇḍalas* containing the indicative words), then the notion derived from *Indicative Power* remains correct;—thus there is a clear conflict (between *Context* and *Indicative Power*); and when there is a conflict, the *Context* must be regarded as the weaker of the two."

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin's* Opponent—All that should be done in course of the action of *Upasthāna* is that the condition of the presence of the indicative words should be adhered to; and it is not necessary that we should necessarily admit any *mantra* contained in the *Ten Maṇḍalas*;—now if the *mantra* appearing in the *Context* is adopted, the said condition becomes entirely fulfilled. On the other hand, if we adopt *any mantra* contained in

the *Ten Maṇḍalas*, we set aside the particular *mantra* appearing in the *Context*, —without any such conflict (as would justify this exclusion). Nor is there any conflict between the *Context* and *Indicative Power*; because the *Context* points out the *individual* (*āgnēyī*) *mantra*, while *Indicative Power* indicates the (*Āgnēyī*) *in general*; and the *individual* is different from the *Universal* (or General).—From all this it follows that the *mantra* adopted should be one that contains the indicative words and that appears in the Context.

The *Pūrvapakṣin's* answer—"It is true that by adopting the *mantra* appearing in the context, the indication of *Context* is not infringed, and also that the indication of *Indicative Power* becomes honoured; but all the same the fact remains that a certain notion derived from Indicative Power—that 'any *mantra* in the *Ten Maṇḍalas*, which contains the indicative word may be used'—comes to be regarded as *wrong*."

Pūrvapakṣin's Opponent—As a matter of fact, no *individual* (*āgnēyī*) verse is denoted by the term ('*āgnēyī*'); why then should the said general notion be taken as rejected if a certain individual (*āgnēyī* verse) is not adopted. [The general notion is that '*Āgnēyī* Mantras should be used'; this general notion is not contravened if we adopt one particular *Āgnēyī Mantra* and not adopt any other.]—

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"We do not yet quite know whether what pertains to the case in question is, or is not, *the generic character of containing the indicative word*. What is clear is that the term ('*āgnēyī*) denotes the deity by means of the Nominal Affix, by virtue of which the Deity (so denoted) serves to indicate the particular *Mantra*; what helps in the sacrifice is any individual *mantra*, not the *class* 'Mantra'; *class* also there is none other (in the case in question) than the *deity*; and it is this Deity that *indicates that which helps in the sacrifice*. It is, however, not known that the individual *mantra* to be used is *this one*, and not that other;—and so long as the individual *mantra* is not recognised as the one to be used, all those *mantras* should be admitted which contain the indicative word;—so that the *mantras* in the *Ten Maṇḍalas* would come to be recognised as to be used; such being the case, it would be very wrong to reject these through considerations of the *Context* (and use only that *mantra* which appears in the Context).—Even so, it is not only those appearing in the *Ten Maṇḍalas* that are to be used,—but that also may be used which appears in the Context."

The Opponent argues—It has been said above that the *mantra* that appears in the context has been enjoined elsewhere for some other purpose, and hence it could not be enjoined for any other purpose.

The *Pūrvapakṣin* answers—"It is not necessary that the same *mantra* alone should be used for this other purpose; in fact that same, as also others—which resemble it in having the indicative words,—may be used; and thus there would be no incongruity."

The Opponent—There would be this incongruity that both, *Indicative Power* and *Context*, would not be followed.

Pūrvapakṣin—"True, they would not be followed; but the *Context* does not deserve to be followed, for the simple reason that what it indicates is contrary to what is indicated by the *Indicative Power*.—Then again, it is

not necessary that either the *Indicative Power* or the *Context* should be followed; in fact, though it is true that the activity of the agent tends towards what is indicated by these, yet it is only when this is recognised as something *fruitful* that the agent betakes himself to that activity [and not merely because the action has been indicated by Indicative Power or by Context or by both]."

Question—What if this be so?

Pūrvapakṣin—"The effect of this is that the Indicative Power is not followed in any case; so that there would be no activity towards anything else that may be indicated by that Power.

"From all this it follows that the *mantras* in the *Ten Maṇḍalas* should be admitted."

SŪTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, ONLY THAT MENTIONED IN THE CONTEXT (ARE TO BE ADMITTED); BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT AND OF REASONS.

Bhāṣya.

'*That mentioned in the context*'—i.e. the *mantra* that which is spoken of in the Context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—should be admitted;—why?—*because of the Context and of reasons*;—i.e. the said *mantra* is what is indicated by the Context, and it is only right that the indication of the Context should be accepted.—Why so?—It would not be right to take the sentence in question as laying down merely the fact of the *mantra* having some sort of a function to perform in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*: because this general connection of the *mantra* with that sacrifice is already known from other sources [i.e. by the direct enunciation of the *mantras* to be used at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice—says the *Tantravārtika*]; the sentence may, however, be taken as laying down the particular purpose to be served by the *mantra* in connection with the sacrifice,—because as yet, the fact of the *mantra* serving that particular purpose is not known; [so that what the sentence means is that at the *Upasthāna* only those *āgnēyī mantras* are to be used that are connected with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—says the Tantravārtika]. Such being the case, if the indications of the Context were entirely ignored, and the sentence were taken as laying down any (*Āgnēyī*) *mantra* contained in the *Ten Maṇḍalas*,—there would be a syntactical split; as in that case the sentence would have to be construed as—'one should do the *Upasthāna* of the *Agnīdhra*,—and that with a *mantra* containing such and such indicative words'.

SŪTRA (22).

THE INJUNCTION WOULD BE PURPOSELESS,—AS THERE WOULD BE NO CONNECTION WITH ANYTHING FRUITFUL; BECAUSE THE 'UPASTHĀNA' IS NOT FRUITFUL.

Bhāṣya.

Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*—"On the strength of the indication of the *Context*, any *Āgnēyī mantra* may be taken as helpful to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*".

If the sentence in question is taken as asserting the connection between the act of *Upasthāna* and the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, then the sentence might be taken as laying down the act of *Upasthāna* in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and in that case, on the strength of the *Context*, it might be possible to take the two factors [(*a*) 'should do the Upasthāna,'—(*b*) and 'that with *āgnēyī* mantras'] as syntactically connected and forming 'one sentence'.—When, however, the sentence is taken as asserting the connection of the *mantra* with all kinds of *Upasthāna* (not only that connected with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*),—then all that we get out of it is the *mantra* only, without any reference to the Context (which bears upon the *Jyotiṣṭoma* only); nor can the Context serve the purpose of specifying (the *particular Upasthāna* at which the *Mantra* should be used). In fact, if it did do both these (i.e. if the sentence laid down the use of the *mantra* and also specified the particular *Upasthāna* at which it should be used), then there would be syntactical split.

There is no such incongruity in our view; as, according to that view, that *mantra*—either the one indicating *Agni* or the one indicating *Indra*—which is already known as functioning (in general) at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—comes to be enjoined in connection with the particular function of the *Upasthāna* which is done at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice,—and all the rest of the sentence is a mere *reference* (to what is already known from other sources). Thus there would be no incongruity at all.

Or, the three sentences—[(*a*) '*Āgnēyyā agnīdhramupatiṣṭhatē*, (*b*) *aindryā sadaḥ*, (*c*) *vaiṣṇavyā havirdhānam*']—may be taken as laying down merely the connection of the *Agnīdhra*, the *Sadaḥ* and the *Havirdhāna*,—the verb '*upatiṣṭhatē*' being a mere *reference*; the meaning of the sentence thus is—'with this (*āgnēyī*) *mantra* [which is already known] *one approaches the Agnīdhra*'.

From all this it follows that only those *mantras* containing the indicative word are to be used which are found in the Context.

SŪTRA (23).

ALSO, BECAUSE ALL THE MANTRAS ARE SUCH AS HAVE BEEN ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that the *mantras* in the Context are such as have been already enjoined in connection with another action [i.e. with the main *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice]. Our answer to this is that this argument has been already answered.

Then again, there are no *mantras* that have not been already enjoined (in connection with some action or the other); all *mantras* are such as have been enjoined in the *Vāchastoma* and in the *Āshvina shastra* before the sun rises.—So that on this point of being already enjoined in connection with another action, the *mantra* in the Context does not differ from any other. Hence in the case in question the *mantra* admitted must be that appearing in the Context.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): [*The 'Bhakṣa-mantras' are to be used at the act of 'Holding' and the rest, in accordance with the indications of the words of the mantras.*]

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THROUGH 'INDICATIVE POWER' AND 'NAME', THE ENTIRE ANUVĀKA SHOULD BE TAKEN AS BEING FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE 'EATING'."

Bhāṣya.

We find the following *Bhakṣamantra*—'*Bhakhṣēhi mā visha dīrghāyutvāya shantanutvāya rāyaspoṣāya varchasē suprajāstvāya ;—ēhi vaso purovaso priyo mē hṛdosyashvinostvā bāhubhyām saghyāsam ;—nṛchakṣasantvā dēva soma suchakṣā avakhyēṣam ;—hinva mē gātrā harivo gaṇān mē mā vitītṛṣaḥ, shivo mē saptarṣīn upatiṣṭhasva mā mē'vāṅ nābhimatigāḥ ;—mandrābhibhūtiḥ keturyajñānām vāg juṣāṇā somasya tṛpyatu ; vasumadgaṇasya rudramadgaṇasya ādityamadgaṇasya soma dēva tē matividaḥ prātaḥsavanasya mādhyandinasya savanasya tṛtīyasavanasya gāyatrachchhandasaḥ trṣṭupchhandaso 'gnihuta indrapītasya narāshaṁsapītasya pitṛpītasya madhumata upahūtasyopahūto bhakṣayāmi, etc. etc.*'—(Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 2. 5. 1–3).

[The *Bhāṣya* has quoted the entire *anuvāka* with a view to show which word in it is capable of what use,—questions relating to which will be discussed in the next four *Adhikaraṇas*. As a matter of fact, there are several portions of this *Anuvāka* —e.g. '*Gāyatrachchhandaḥ, etc.*', as also '*Indrapīta*, etc.'—are such as are used separately according to their several significations.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1102.]

In connection with this *Bhakṣānuvāka*, there arises the question—Is the whole of this *anuvāka* to be used in connection with the 'eating'? or may some part of it be used elsewhere also?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*Through 'Indicative Power' and 'Name', the entire Anuvāka should be taken as being for the purpose of the 'eating'* (sū.); i.e. the entire *Anuvāka* should be used in connection with *eating*.—Why?—Because the term '*bhakṣayāmi*' ('I eat', occurring in the *mantra*) is clearly one that should be used in connection with *eating*, as the only thing that it can denote is *eating*, nothing else; as for the other words in the text, they are such as are expressive of qualifications (or concomitants) of the act of *Eating*,—and, as such, are used wherever the term '*bhakṣayāmi*' is used. [The *Anuvāka* begins with the term '*bhakṣē*' and also ends with '*bhakṣayāmi*',—both denoting the act of *Eating* only; this also implies that all the words between these two terms form one composite whole, to be used in connection with *eating*.]"

Objection (against the *Pūrvapakṣa*)—(A) As a matter of fact, that portion of the *Anuvāka* which begins with '*ēhi vaso*' and ends with '*saghyāsam*' must be taken as to be used in connection with the act of *Holding*; as

all the words included herein are such as require each other for the completion of the sentence and are expressive of a single idea (and serving a single purpose); so that it must be syntactically distinct from the sentence speaking of *Eating*.—(B) Similarly, the portion beginning with the word '*nṛchakṣasam*' and ending with '*avakhyēṣam*', is expressive of the act of *Looking into*.—(C) So also, the portion beginning with the words '*Hinva me gātrā harivaḥ*' and ending with '*mā mē* '*vāñnābhimatigāḥ*' is expressive of the act of *Proper Digesting*.—Thus then, as there are several ideas expressed by the several portions of the *Anuvāka*, they should be taken as so many distinct sentences. How then can it be said that the whole of it is a single sentence, to be used in connection with the act of *Eating* ?

Pūrvapakṣin's answer—"It has already been asserted that all the various things expressed by the different portions of the *Anuvāka* are only concomitants of the act of *Eating*".

Objection—Even so, there would be different sentences; as it is not possible for anything to be spoken of simultaneously along with its concomitants.

Pūrvapakṣin—"We do not mean that the concomitants are expressed independently: what we mean is that what is expressed by the sentence is the single factor (of *eating*) as qualified and accompanied by its several concomitants in the shape of *Holding*, *Looking into* and so forth."

Objection—It cannot be right to take the words expressive of the concomitants as *not intended to be significant of* their meanings, and yet *as signifying* the concomitants of the eating; such an idea could be derived only from *indirect indication*; and as between *Direct Assertion* and *Indirect Indication*, it is the former that should be accepted. Hence the whole *Anuvāka* cannot be treated as a single sentence.

Pūrvapakṣin—"Our answer to this is as follows:—Though the act of *Holding* and several other factors are found to be signified by the words of the *mantra*, yet all these factors are not such as are equally meant to be spoken of (or emphasised); it is the act of *Eating* only that is meant to be spoken of (and emphasised); hence it is only this act of *Eating* that is 'directly asserted', the concomitants are not 'directly asserted';—nor is any useful purpose to be served by a cognition of these concomitants;—and that group of words is to be treated as 'one sentence' which is found to serve one single purpose;—thus it is that the whole of the *Anuvāka* is to be treated as 'one sentence' serving the single purpose of speaking of the act of *Eating* along with its concomitants; and for that reason, the whole is to be used in connection with the act of *Eating*."

"Further, there is the name '*Bhakṣānuvāka*' which is applicable to the *whole Anuvāka*, not to any portion of it. [This also shows that the entire *Anuvāka* is to be used in connection with the act of *eating*.]"

Objection (against the *Pūrvapakṣa*)—*Name* is a thing of secular origin, how can it restrict the use of anything that forms part of the Veda ?

Pūrvapakṣin—"Though the Name is something of secular origin, yet its application to the *Anuvāka* has had no beginning in time".

What if it is so ?

"This is what follows.—The name speaks of (signifies) the entire *Anuvāka* along with the *Eating*,—and such signification is possible only when there is a definite connection between the two factors spoken of together: for instance, when we find the 'cooker' and 'the chopper' spoken of together, we at once infer that there is some connection between the two."

Objection—In matters like what we are discussing, the relation of subserviency cannot be a matter for Inference,—it can be learnt only from an Injunction,—not from any other source; and certainly *Name* can never be *injunctive*.

Pūrvapakṣin—"Our answer to this is that what the *Name* does is to bring to our mind the two factors related, and the injunction will be done by the directive sentence laying down the procedure of the action.—From all this it follows that the entire *Anuvāka* is to be used in connection with the act of *Eating*".

SŪTRA (25).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ON ACCOUNT OF THE FORM (WORDS OF THE MANTRAS), AND ON ACCOUNT OF INJUNCTION,—PORTIONS OF THE ANUVĀKA SHOULD BE EXTRACTED (FOR SEPARATE USE); SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE ACTIONS (AT WHICH THE EXTRACTS ARE TO BE USED) ARE ACTUALLY ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the entire *Anuvāka* should be used in connection with *Eating*.—(*a*) In fact, on account of the 'form' (words) of the sentence speaking of the act of *Holding*—i.e. the sentence beginning with '*ēhi*' and ending with '*saghyāsam*'—should be used in connection with the act of *Holding*;—(*b*) the sentence beginning with '*nṛchakṣasam*' and ending with '*avakhyēṣam*' should be used in connection with the act of *Looking into*;—"why so?"—Because, if used in this way, the sentences are used according to their primary meaning; if taken in any other way, they would be used according to a secondary meaning; and it is more reasonable to accept the Primary than the Secondary meaning.

Objection—"It has been pointed out that no useful purpose can be served by the pointing out of the concomitants."

Answer—What the sentences speak of are not 'concomitants': in fact each of these—*Holding, Looking into* and the rest—are independent acts, each spoken of by an independent sentence by itself.

"How is it so?"

(They are to be taken as independent acts) because there is a useful purpose served by the cognition of these acts as spoken of by the sentences; in fact, all these acts are such as have been enjoined,—some by direct independent injunctions, and some by implication;—as such all these have got to be indicated (by *mantras*);—and it is this *indication* of the acts that is done by the sentences in question.—The '*form*' or nature of these also consists in this capacity to indicate things.

Thus, inasmuch as the various sentences (in the *Anuvāka*) serve different purposes (and have different meanings), they are not regarded as 'one sentence'.

Objection—"The 'form' of the sentences is also such as makes them supplementary to the sentence speaking of the act of *Eating*."

Answer—True: that *is* their 'form'; but these acts (spoken of by these sentences) are not to be taken as concomitants (qualifications) of that act of *Eating*.

"Why so?"

Because, if so taken, they would have to be regarded as serving some transcendental purpose; and in that case, whether spoken or not spoken of (by means of a *mantra* recited at the time), they would serve that purpose all the same. [So that there would be no necessity for speaking of them by means of a *mantra*.] In the other case, the sentences would serve the purpose of indicating the acts of *Holding* and the rest, and thus serve a visible purpose.

From all this we conclude that *on account of their form and injunction, some portions of the mantra should be extracted* (and used in connection with different acts).

ADHIKARAṆA (10): [*That portion of the 'Bhakṣānuvāka' which begins with the word 'mandrābhibhūtiḥ' and ends with the word 'bhakṣayāmi' forms a single 'shastra' (mantra)*].

SŪTRA (26).

INASMUCH AS A CONCOMITANT (QUALIFICATION) IS SPOKEN OF, THE PASSAGE BEGINNING WITH 'MANDRA' SHOULD BE TREATED AS ONE MANTRA; SPECIALLY BECAUSE THE TWO SENTENCES (OF WHICH THIS PASSAGE IS COMPOSED) JOINTLY EXPRESS A SINGLE IDEA.

Bhāṣya.

In the *Bhakṣānuvāka* (the whole of which has been quoted as the *Viṣayavākya* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*), we read the passage—'*Mandrābhibhūtiḥ kēturyajñānāṁ vāgjuṣāṇā somasya tṛpyatu,—Vasumadgaṇasya soma dēva tē matividaḥ prātaḥsavanasya gāyatrachchhandaso 'gnihuta indrapītasya madhumata upahūtasyopahūto bhakṣayāmi*' (Taitti. Saṁ., 3. 2. 5. 1-2).

In regard to this passage, there arises the question—In this passage, are there *two mantras*—one beginning with '*mandra*' and ending with '*tṛpyatu*', and the other beginning with '*vasumadgaṇasya*'? Or, is the whole passage —beginning with '*mandra*' and ending with '*bhakṣayāmi*' a single *mantra*?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"there are two *mantras*;—two distinct things are spoken of by the two sentences—'*tṛpti*' (*satisfaction*, spoken of in the first sentence) is one thing, while '*bhakṣaṇa*' (*eating*, spoken of in the second sentence) is an entirely different thing;— thus their meanings being different, the sentences should be taken as two distinct sentences; this would be in accordance with what has been just stated in the foregoing *sūtra*—'on account of the form and the injunction, the portions should be extracted, etc. etc.'"

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*Inasmuch as a concomitant* (*qualification*) *is spoken of, the passage beginning with 'mandra' should be treated as one mantra*;—the '*tṛpti*', 'satisfaction', is spoken of in the first sentence as a concomitant (qualification) of the *eating* (spoken of in the second sentence),—the meaning being that 'the *vāk* (assertion) of *bhakṣayāmi* (eating) shall satisfy'.

Objection—"The term used in the original text is '*tṛypatu*' (with the Imperative termination) which is different from the term '*tarpsyati*', where we have the *Future Termination*; if we connect the two verbs '*bhakṣayāmi*' and '*tarpsyati*', then we get at a logical connection between the two actions of *eating* and *satisfying*,—the idea conveyed being that 'eating *shall* satisfy': with the word '*tṛypatu*' on the other hand, the word '*bhakṣayāmi*'

can have no connection; as the expression '*bhakṣayāmi tṛpyatu*' gives no sense."

Answer—The termination in the word '*tṛpyatu*' cannot be regarded as expressing the sense of the *imperative*; it should be taken as expressing either a *request* or the idea of the *present time*. But whether we construe the words as '*bhakṣayāmi vāk tarpsyati*' ('the assertion of *eating* shall satisfy'), or as '*bhakṣayāmi vāchastarptuṁ kālaḥ*' (the assertion of *eating* is the time for being satisfied'),—in either case the 'satisfaction' shall be the concomitant (qualification) of the *eating*; so that the two sentences together expressing a single idea, they should be taken as forming 'one sentence' and hence treated as *one mantra*.

Objection—"In reality the two sentences are totally distinct, independent of one another; and they are made inter-dependent by force."

Answer—Even if the two sentences served two distinct purposes, were independent of one another, and conveyed two distinct ideas,—it would be the indication of the *eating* that would be found to serve a perceptible purpose,—not that of the *satisfying*; so that on this ground also, the two sentences would really serve a single purpose;—how much more so then is it when one act—(that of *satisfying*)—is distinctly recognised as being a concomitant (qualification) of the other (i.e. *eating*)?

From all this it follows that, *inasmuch as a concomitant* (*qualification*) *is spoken of, the passage beginning with 'mandra' should be treated as one mantra.*

ADHIKARAṆA (11): [*The words of the 'Bhakṣānuvāka', beginning with 'indrapītasya', are to be used in connection with all 'eatings'—with necessary modifications.*]

Preliminary Adhikaraṇa.

SŪTRA (27).

[PRELIMINARY PŪRVAPAKṢA]—WHEN ALL ARE ENJOINED IN THE SAME SENTENCE, THE EATING OF THE OFFERINGS 'NOT MADE TO INDRA' SHOULD BE DONE WITHOUT MANTRAS; BECAUSE THE 'INDICATIVE POWER' (OF THE MANTRA) POINTS TO PARTICULAR 'EATINGS'.

Bhāṣya.

The *mantra* dealt with in the foregoing *adhikaraṇa* forms the basis of the present *adhikaraṇa* also. At the sacrifices with which the *Bhakṣānuvāka* is concerned, there are several offerings made to *Indra*, as also several not made to *Indra* (but to other deities).—In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the *mantra* in question to be used in connection with the eating of both kinds of offerings—those *to Indra* as well as those *not to Indra*? Or is it to be used in connection with the eating of the offerings *to Indra* only, while that of the offerings *not to Indra* is to be done without *mantras*?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The eating of the offerings *not made to Indra* is to be done without *mantras*.—Why?—*Because all the offerings have been enjoined in the same sentence*;—now from among these offerings, that which is *not made to Indra* cannot be taken as spoken of by the *mantra* beginning with '*indrapītasya*' [which clearly speaks of that only which has been 'drunk by' (offered to) '*Indra*'].—Nor is there any *modification* of *mantras* possible in the case of those mentioned in the Context (of a primary act,—and every *eating* is a primary act); because unless there is a distinct declaration to the effect, the *mantra* cannot be taken as expressing any meaning other than the one indicated by its words."

[As against this *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following preliminary *Siddhānta*.]—

SŪTRA (28).

[PRELIMINARY SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, OFFERINGS SHOULD BE MADE WITH MANTRAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DEITY (TO WHOM THE OFFERING HAS BEEN MADE); BECAUSE THERE IS A TEXT INDICATING THE FACT OF THE OFFERINGS TO THE OTHER DEITIES HAVING THE OFFERING TO INDRA FOR THEIR ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the offerings have to be made with *mantras* modified in accordance with the deity to whom the offerings are made.—'Why so?'—Because the *Dhruva-chamasas* (which are offered to *Indra*) are the Archetypes (of the other offerings under consideration).—'What are *Dhruva-chamasas*?'—It is the name of those offerings of Soma that are made in the beginning of the *Savanas* (pressings) at the *Shukrāmanthi Prachāra* (Shukra and Manthi Fore-offering);—these are all related to *Indra*; of these, the act of *offering* is the Archetype and the others, its ectypes.—'How do you know this?'—*Because there is a text indicating the fact of the offering to Indra being the Archetype.*—'How is this indicated?'—This is indicated by the fact that the Vedic text shows modification in the *Bhakṣamantra* in the case of the *Ṣoḍashin* (Sixteenth Cup) in the Atirātra Soma-sacrifice with the word *anuṣṭupchandasaḥ* (in the place of *gāyatrachchandasaḥ*, etc. of the *Bhakṣamantra* in the Agniṣṭoma ceremony, mentioned above).—'What is the *indication* here?'—The term '*namati*' indicates modification.—'But this (that *one modifies the Bhakṣamantra*) would be a *Direct Assertion* (not *Indication*).'—Not so; because the text quoted does not *directly assert* the term '*namati*', all that it does is to mention the term '*namati*' and the term '*anuṣṭup-chhandasaḥ*',—and hence it is indicated that the *Bhakṣamantra is to be modified.*—Now such a *modification* is possible only in the ectypal acts;—whence it follows that these other offerings under consideration are all ectypes;—and consequently even at the *offerings not made to Indra*, the *mantra* to be used must be that whose use is indicated by its having been used at the Archetype (of those offerings), but with necessary modifications.

Objection—'In support of the view that these other offerings are ectypes, you have pointed to *Indication*; please mention some reasons.'

Answer—It is the Soma to *be offered to Indra* that is 'held' and 'measured';—hence it is in the *cups dedicated to Indra* that there is *Soma*,—and there is no *Soma* in the cups *not dedicated to Indra*; so that all the details meant to be performed in connection with *Soma* are to be performed in connection with the cups *dedicated to Indra*,—while the other cups (which are *not dedicated to Indra*) have no details performed in connection with them, and are (to that extent) defective (incomplete).—'How do you know that it is the Soma to *be offered to Indra* that is *held* and *measured*?'—This we learn from the words of the *mantra*—'*Indrāya tvā vasumataē*' (Vāja. Saṁ. 6. 32);—*mantras* like this speak of only that Soma which *is to be offered to Indra*, none

other;—hence there can be *Soma* only in the cups *dedicated to Indra*; and the details relating to *Soma* are performed only in connection with the cups *dedicated to Indra*,—all the other offerings remain incomplete, and hence these latter borrow those details. This is the reason for our conclusion (which had been supported by the Indicative Power of the mantras).

From all this it follows that the offerings *not made to Indra*, are to be made with *mantras* modified in accordance with the deity to whom the offerings are made.

The discussion rests unsettled at this point (with the statement of the preliminary Siddhānta); and at this stage (before it is resumed, the arguments answered, and the final Siddhānta stated under Sūtra 43 *below), we shall proceed with the consideration of certain other matters (related to the question of* mantras *to be used in connection with the eating of remnants of offerings made to the various deities).*

[The position of the *Pūrvapakṣa-Siddhānta*, from this Adhikaraṇa onwards is somewhat obscure: the question dealt with in Adhikaraṇa 11 has been—Is the Mantra to be used in the eating of the remnants of the Indra-offerings only, and that of all the other offerings is to be done *without Mantras*—or is the *Mantra* to be used in connection with all,—the only difference being that while with the Indra-offerings, the Mantra is to be as in the original form, while in the others, the names of the deities have to be modified?—The first alternative represents the *Pūrvapakṣa*—that the Indra-offerings alone are to be done with the Mantra as in the original form and the others are to be done *without Mantras*.—The *Siddhānta* (preliminary and hypothetical) is that all the eatings are to be done with *Mantra*,—but at the Indra-offerings the *Mantra* shall be used in the original form and at the others with modifications of names of deities.—This, however, is not the final *Siddhānta*.—For the present the matter is left here in its '*aparyavasita*', 'unsettled', non-final stage.—Adhikaraṇas 12 to 16, embodied in Sūtras 29–37, deal with other questions relating to *Mantras* to be used at the eatings, with or without modifications, in accordance with the *Preliminary Siddhānta* set forth in Sūtra 28.—The main thread of the discussion on the subject of Adhikaraṇa 11, is resumed in Adhikaraṇa 17, Sūtra 38, and carried on in three *Adhikaraṇas* 17 to 19, Sūtras 38–42, wherein the alternative of using *no Mantras* at certain *eatings* is discussed.—Then at the end of the *Pāda*, the final *Siddhānta* is stated in *Adhikaraṇa* 20, Sūtra 43, which represents the final upshot of all the discussions relating to the use of *mantras* at the eatings of the remnants of offerings.

The position is briefly and clearly stated in *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1110, where, in the introduction to Adhikaraṇa 12, we read—'While the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* (11) still rests in the '*Pūrvapakṣa*' [the *preliminary Siddhānta* stated under Sūtra 25 being so called, in view of, and in relation to, the *final Siddhānta* stated in Sūtra 42, at the end of the *Pāda*], and the *Siddhānta* is not finally stated and established till the end of the *Pāda*,—we take for granted, for the time being, the propriety of having modifications (in accordance with the said *preliminary Siddhānta* in Sūtra 28), and then proceed to consider under what circumstances, the modifications, if allowable, would be possible.]

Adhikaraṇa (12): [*'Indra' should be mentioned in the mantra used in connection with the 'Punarabhyunnīta-Soma' i.e. 'the Soma brought up again.'*]

SŪTRA (29).

In connection with the 'Soma brought up again', all the deities should be mentioned, because there are remnants of both (offerings).

Bhāṣya.

[The preliminary *Siddhānta* of the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* has been that at the eating of the remnants of offerings instead of the term '*Indra*' in the *mantra* '*Indra-pītasya*, etc.,' we should mention the name of the deity to whom the offering in question has been made. We now proceed to consider what names are to be introduced and under what circumstances.]

There are certain 'Soma-offerings brought up again', connected with the beginning of the *Savanas* at the *Shukrāmanthi Prachāra*;—in connection with these what happens is that as soon as the *Hotṛ-priest* has pronounced the '*Vaṣaṭkāra*' and also after the '*Anuvaṣaṭkāra*' [See the T.V.—There are 4 oblations after the *Vaṣaṭkāra* and 4 after the *Anuvaṣaṭkāra*], four libations are (twice) offered with the four ladles of 'Middlemost Persons [i.e. the *Brahman*, the *Hotṛ*, the *Udgātṛ* and the *Yajamāna*]';—then single libations are offered with the *Hotraka* ladles (i.e. the ladles belonging to the assistants of the *Hotṛ*—*Maitrāvaruṇa*, *Brāhmaṇācchaṁsin*, *Potṛ*, *Nēṣṭṛ*, *Acchāvāka*, and *Āgnīdhra*), on the utterance of the '*Vaṣaṭkāra*'; [at all these offerings the deity is Indra];—after this, Soma is again brought up in the ladles containing the remnants of the previous offerings.—In connection with this 'Soma brought up again', the *Adhvaryu-priest* issues the following directions—'Let the *Chamasādhvaryus* offer libations from the ladles of the Middlemost Persons on the pronouncement of '*Vaṣaṭ*' and '*Anuvaṣaṭ*',—let the *Chamasādhvaryus* offer single libations from the ladles of the *Hotrakas* and return after having filled the *Shukra* cup'.—Now in the course of this, the *Hotrakas* offer sacrifices to several deities as follows:—(*a*) the *Maitrāvaruṇa* makes the offering to *Mitra-Varuṇa*, with the *Mantra* '*Mitraṁ vayaṁ havāmahē*, etc.' (Ṛgveda, 1. 23. 4),—(*b*) the *Brāhmaṇāchchhaṁsī* makes the offering to *Indra*, with the *Mantra* '*Indra tvā vṛṣabhaṁ vayam, etc.*' (Ṛgveda, 3. 40. 1),—(*c*) the *Potṛ* makes the offering to the *Maruts*, with the *Mantra* '*Maruto yasya hi kṣayē, etc.*', (Ṛgveda, 1. 86. 1),—(*d*) the *Nēṣṭṛ* makes the offering to *Tvaṣṭṛ* and the *Patnīs*', with the *Mantra* '*Agnē patnīr ihāvaha*, etc.' (Ṛgveda, 1. 22. 9),—(*e*) the *Agnīdhra* makes the offering to *Agni*, with the *Mantra* '*Ukṣānnāya vashānnāya, etc.*' (Ṛgveda, 8. 43. 11). Out of these cups (all of which had been previously dedicated to *Indra*), the offering to *Indra* is made at the first

pronouncement of the '*Vaṣaṭ*',—then after pouring more *Soma-juice* into the same ladles the offerings to *Mitra-Varuṇa* and other deities are made; —thus the ladles come to contain the remnants of all these offerings, those to *Indra* as well as those to *Mitra-Varuṇa* and other deities. [So that when the remnant of the *Mitra-Varuṇa* and other offerings come to be eaten, the ladle contains the remnant, not only of the offerings to those deities, but also that of the offerings previously made to *Indra.*]

In regard to these arises the following question—In the *Mantra* recited in connection with the Eating of this Remnant [viz. the *Bhakṣamantra*, ending with the words '*indrapītasya, etc.*']—are all the deities, the previously worshipped *Indra* as well as *Mitra-Varuṇa* and the rest, to be named (as in '*Indrapītasya*')? Or is *Indra not* to be mentioned? [That is, is the *Mantra* used to be in the form '*Indra-Mitrā-Varuṇapītasya*' or '*Mitrāvaruṇapītasya*'?]

The apparent conclusion is that in connection with the remnants of offerings out of the 'Soma brought up again', all the deities are to be mentioned [i.e. the form used should be '*Indra-mitrāvaruṇapītasya*].—Why so?—*Because there are remnants of both*; i.e. each of the Cups contains the remnant of two offerings; what has been offered to the Deity (*Indra*) at the Archetypal Sacrifice,—the remnant of that offering is said to be '*pīta*', '*drunk*', by that Deity [hence it is that the remnant of the offering made to *Indra* is called '*indrapīta*' in the *Mantra*];—the same should be held to be true in the case in question also [that is, the remnant of the offerings to *Indra, Mitra-Varuṇa* and other deities should be spoken of as '*pīta*', 'drunk', by all these; so that the term '*indrapītasya*' should be modified into '*indra-mitrāvaruṇa-pītasya*'].—Thus it follows that along with each of the cups, two deities should be spoken of.

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THERE HAS BEEN REMOVAL (OF THE REMNANT OF THE PREVIOUS OFFERING), THERE SHOULD BE NO MENTION OF THE PREVIOUS DEITY".

Bhāṣya.

"We think that the remnant of the offering made to the initial deity was '*removed*'—set aside [when fresh *Soma* was poured into the ladle].—Why so?—Because the *Soma* contained in the ladle (after the pouring in of the fresh supply) is all dedicated (by the *Yājyā mantra*) to *Mitra-Varuṇa etc.*—How is that?—The answer is as follows:—The offerings (out of the freshly poured *Soma*) are made to Mitra-Varuṇa etc. (and not to Indra also); and in a case where Dēvadatta eats the remnant of the food eaten by the Teacher and makes over the remnant of what he has eaten to another person, Pūrṇaka,—this latter, *Pūrṇaka*, when referring to it, mentions Dēvadatta—saying 'I am eating the leavings of *Dēvadatta*',—and he does not say 'I am eating the *Teacher's* leavings'.—In the same manner, in the case in question, the deity of the previous offering is not to be mentioned."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO ACTUAL TAKING UP (OF THE REMNANT OF THE PREVIOUS OFFERING, BY THE LATTER DEITY), THERE SHOULD BE NO SETTING ASIDE (OF THE PREVIOUS DEITY).

[The right reading of the *Sūtra* is—*Agrahanād vā anapāyaḥ.*]

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to say that Indra should not be mentioned;—because the remnant is clearly seen to be of the offering made to that deity also.—"But that offering has been removed."—Our answer to that is that it is not removed; because what actually happens is that the performer fills from the Abhidroṇa-jar the ladles out of which a single set of libations has been offered;—and the presence of the remnant of that offering is what distinguishes the ladles when the fresh supply of *Soma* is brought up to it;—so that it is the *Soma* contained in this ladle that can be said to be 'brought up', or to be that in regard to which the directions are given (by the *Adhvaryu*, to the Priests).—As regards the argument—that "the remnant of the previous offering has been dedicated (along with the fresh supply) to the other deities to whom the later offerings are going to be made (so that after this later offering has been made, there would be no remnant of the previous offering,)"—our answer is as follows:—It is true that the *Soma* is dedicated to these other deities; but it is not stated whether *this much* or *that much* is dedicated; hence that alone is really regarded as 'dedicated' which is taken up for being actually poured into the fire. Nor is the connection of the substance with a particular deity established at the time of the 'dedication' [it being established only by the actual offering]; so that what is dedicated is not necessarily what is connected with a deity.—From all this it follows that (even on the pouring in of the fresh supply), the remnant of *Indra's offering* is present, and is actually seen, in the ladle; so that all the deities (*Indra* as well as *Mitra-Varuṇa*) should be mentioned in the *mantra*.

This *Adhikaraṇa* is only a hypothetical discussion (which has proceeded on the basis of the hypothetical *Siddhānta* of Adhikaraṇa 11); hence it is not necessary to explain the purpose served by it; specially as the purpose served by this *Adhikaraṇa* (as also by the following *Adhikaraṇas*) is the same as that served by the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): [*At the eating of the Remnant of the 'Pātnīvata' offerings, Indra and the other deities are not to be included*]—[*First counter-instance to the foregoing Adhikaraṇa*].

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE 'PĀTNĪVATA' OFFERING, IT SHOULD BE AS IN THE PREVIOUS CASE."

Bhāṣya.

There is the '*Pātnīvata* offering-cup'—laid down in the text 'With the *Upāṁshupātra* he takes up the *Pātnīvata* offering out of the *Āgrayaṇa* vessel';—in the *Āgrayaṇa* vessel there are collected the remnants of those offerings that have been made to *deities in couples*; and it is out of this that the *Pātnīvata* offering is taken out. After this *Pātnīvata* offering has been actually made, when its remnant comes to be eaten, there arises the question—Should *Indra* and the other deities also be mentioned or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that they should all be mentioned; as the Remnant in question is as much the remnant of the offerings to these other deities as of that of the one deity to whom the final offering is made—[according to the *Siddhānta* of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*].

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THERE IS ACTUAL TAKING UP (OF THE REMNANT OF THE PREVIOUS OFFERING, BY THE LATER DEITY), (THE CONNECTION OF THE PREVIOUS DEITY) SHOULD BE SET ASIDE.

Bhāṣya.

In the present case, the remnant of the previous offering is set aside; hence this case is not similar to that dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*. In the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Soma* is mentioned as an indication of the particular vessel, not as something to be *taken up*; while, in the present case, the words are 'he *takes it* out of the *Āgrayaṇa*', whereby the *Soma* contained in the vessel becomes pointed out as something to be offered as a libation for the deity to whom the sacrifice is going to be offered.

Objection—"As a matter of fact, the *Āgrayaṇa* vessel contains both kinds of *Soma*—the *Āgrayaṇa* as well as the *non-āgrayaṇa* (*Sampāta*); so that out of these that alone is the *Pātnīvata* Soma which is taken out of the *Āgrayaṇa*-portion, while that which is taken out of the *Sampāta* (the *non-āgrayaṇa* portion decanted from the remnant of the previous *dvi-devatya* cups) should not be the *Pātnīvata*."

Answer—The *Āgrayaṇa* vessel is the source (from which the *Pātnīvata* offering is taken out); hence all the *Soma* that comes out of that vessel—be the *Soma* itself *āgrayaṇa* or *non-āgrayaṇa*—should be meant for *Patnīvat*; for the simple reason that all this has been *taken out of the Āgrayaṇa* vessel (which is the only condition laid down by the Injunction).

Objection—"But some part of the *Soma* thus taken out would have come out of the *non-āgrayaṇa*-portion also."

Answer—That does not affect our position; the mere fact of the *Soma* having *come out of the Āgrayaṇa* cannot justify its being described as 'drunk' by the previous deities. At the archetypal sacrifice that remnant alone is spoken of as '*indrapīta*' ('Drunk by Indra') which formed part of the *Soma-juice* that was intended for *Indra*; and in the present case also, that remnant alone should be spoken of as 'drunk by the previous deities' which formed part of the *Soma-juice* intended for those deities.

Objection—"In the present case also, the *Soma-juice* in question is that which formed part of what was intended for the previous deities."

Not so, we reply. In the case of libations poured into the fire, we do not perceive any 'parts'.

Opponent—"At the archetypal sacrifice also, no part can be perceived of what has been offered into the fire."

Answer—At the archetypal sacrifice, what is perceived is the part of that composite *whole* offered to the previous deity which is made up of portions out of which libations have been offered, as well as of those out of which no libations have been offered.

Opponent—"In the present case also, there was a *composite whole* consisting of what was offered to the previous deities,—and it is of this whole that the *Pātnīvata* offering forms part."

Not so, we reply. It is true that there was 'a composite whole consisting of what was offered to the previous deities'; but at the time of the offering in question the part of that whole has become offered to another deity (*Patnīvat*), and hence the said composite whole has ceased to be related to the previous deities.

Objection—"The part in question having been a part of what has been 'drunk' by the previous deities, it would still continue, on the basis of that previous connection, to be regarded as part of the same."

Answer—In connection with the archetypal sacrifice, the part was *not* spoken of as such, on the basis of any *previous* connection; hence in the case in question also, it should not be so described on that basis.

Then again, at the archetypal sacrifice, what had been offered to *Indra* was spoken of as 'drunk by *Indra*',—and its connection with *Indra* had not ceased (when it came to be offered to the latter deity); in the present case, however, the connection of the previous deities has ceased (before it is offered to *Patnīvat*); consequently, these previous deities should not be mentioned.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): [*'Tvaṣṭṛ' should not be mentioned at the eating of the remnant of the 'Pātnīvata' offering.*— Second counter-instance to Adhi. 12.]

SŪTRA (34).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"TVAṢṬṚ SHOULD BE MENTIONED, BECAUSE OF THE DRINKING."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Pātnīvata Soma* (*Soma* offered to *Patnīvat*); in connection with which there is the *mantra*—'*Agnā³ i patnīvā³ḥ sajūrdēvēna tvaṣṭrā somam piba.*' (Taitti. Sam. 1. 4. 27. 1)—

In regard to this there arises the question—Should *Tvaṣṭṛ* be mentioned or not (in the *mantra* used at the eating of the *Pātnīvata* remnant)?

On this, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*Tvaṣṭṛ* must be mentioned.—Why?—*Because of the drinking*; as a matter of fact we find 'drinking' mentioned in the text (as done by *Tvaṣṭṛ*)—'*Sajūrdēvēna tvāṣṭrā somam piba*'; from which it is clear that the offering is made to *Patnīvat accompanied by Tvaṣṭṛ*; and what is offered to a person accompanied by another is regarded as offered to both; for instance, when it is said that 'a hundred should be given to Dēvadatta accompanied by Yajñadatta',—the 'hundred' is given to both. Consequently, the *Soma-remnant* in question is '*tvāṣṭra*' (related to *Tvaṣṭṛ*) (as well as '*pātnīvata*'); hence *Tvaṣṭṛ* must be mentioned in the *mantra*; because, like *Indra*, he also 'drinks' the *Soma*.'

SŪTRA (35).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—BECAUSE OF INEQUALITY, SUCH SHOULD NOT BE THE CASE.

Bhāṣya.

The view expressed above is not right. As a matter of fact, the Vedic Word is our sole authority; what the Word says that alone we regard as authoritative. In the case in question, what the Word (of the Text) declares is the actual 'drinking' by *Agni-Patnīvat* only,—and of *Tvaṣṭṛ*, it declares the mere fact of his *association* (with *Agni-Patnīvat*);—under the circumstances, the actual 'drinking by *Tvaṣṭṛ* can only be *inferred* from the fact that the said 'association' is not established without the *drinking* [and *Inference* is not as authoritative as the Vedic word].

"But the actual *drinking by* (or v.l., 'offering to') *Tvaṣṭṛ* is distinctly enjoined."

True, it is enjoined, but only through the words of the *mantra*, not by a *direct Injunction*;—all that the direct Injunction says is that 'one holds the

Pātnīvata'; in ordinary life, an act—whether enjoined or unenjoined—is performed whenever a need is perceived for it; but there ordinary practice is the determining factor; but texts like those under consideration do not establish any connection between the *Soma* and the deity *Tvaṣṭṛ*.

Adhikaraṇa (15) : *At the eating of the Remnant of the 'Pātnīvāta' offering there should be no mention of the 'Thirty'*.—Third counter-instance to *Adhi.* (12).

SŪTRA (36).

So also the 'Thirty',—as these have been mentioned for another purpose.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the same *Pātnīvata* offering, there is another *mantra* —'*Aibhiḥ agnē sarathaṁ yāhyarvāk nānāratham vā vibhavo hyashvāḥ, patnīvatastrimshatastrīṁshcha dēvānanuṣvadhamāvaha mādayasva*' (Ṛgveda, 3. 6. 9).

In regard to this there arises the question—Should, or should not, mention be made of the *Thirty-three Deities* (in the *mantra* used at the eating of the remnant of the *Pātnīvata* offering) ?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* :—" The Thirty-three Deities must be mentioned.—Why ?—Because the *Soma* is actually offered to the Thirty-three Deities, with the following *mantra*—' *Agnimagnīdadhīchchhati āyāhyagnērvāchīnam trayastriṁshatā dēvaiḥ saha samānam rathamadhiṣṭhāya nānārathairvā vibhavanti hi te' shvāḥ tadidamanuṣvadhamāvaha trayastriṁshatam patnīvato dēvānāgamaya tarpaya cha*' ; from this we understand that when the *Agnīd Priest* approaches *Agni* (Patnīvat), it is for the satisfaction of the *Thirty-three Deities* ;—the *Soma* spoken of here must be taken as related to that Deity which appears to be the predominant factor in the *mantra* ; hence it is that we hold that the *Thirty-three Deities* should be mentioned.—' But in the Injunction itself, the deity spoken of is *Agni-Patnīvat*'—True ; in the Injunction the only deity spoken of is *Agni-Patnīvat*, but the connection of other deities is not denied.—What if it is so ?—What follows from this is that the *Thirty-three Deities* indicated by the words of the *mantra* are recognised to be not incompatible with the Injunction (which while enjoining the one deity, *Agni-Patnīvat*, does not shut out the possibility of other deities)."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The *Thirty-three Deities* should not be mentioned. In the *mantra* quoted, *Agni* is not spoken of either as the *inviter*, or as the *server*, or as the *satisfier* [of others] ;—nor is there any purpose served by sacrifices offered to the *Thirty-three Deities*.—" What then is the deity to whom the sacrifice is to be offered ? " —It is *Patnīvat* (Agni).—" How is that ? "—Because it is *Patnīvat* (Agni) that is enjoined by the words 'one takes up the *Pātnīvata*'.—" But then there is mention of the *Thirty-three Deities* who are indicated by the words of the *mantra*."—The answer to this is that these are mentioned in the *mantra* for a different purpose.—" How so ? "—Until the *Soma* has been actually offered,

it does not belong to *Agni*,—and what belongs to one cannot be offered to another; hence any such assertion as that 'you please give this to the Thirty-three Deities' [which is the sense attributed to the *mantra* by the *Pūrvapakṣin*] would be most incongruous. In fact, even such an assertion would imply that the offering is made *to Agni*.—"How so?"—It is only when one owns a thing that he gives it to another; hence if the *mantra* speaks of *Agni* giving the *Soma* to the Thirty-three Deities, it implies that 'you (*Agni*) are the *owner* of it'.—"But what *Agni* is requested to do is to *intoxicate* (render happy, '*mādayasva*'), not to *give*."—The answer to this is that deities are never 'intoxicated'; hence if the *mantra* spoke of *intoxication*, such mention could be only for some transcendental purpose; on the other hand, if the words are taken as speaking of *giving*, it would do so by indirect indication, and serve a visible purpose;—and Indirect Indication, being based upon a reliable source of knowledge, is more reasonable than the assumption of a transcendental purpose.—"Even if *giving* be taken as *indirectly indicated*, it is *Agni* who is mentioned as *the agent doing the act of giving*."—Such mention of *Agni* as the agent could only serve a transcendental purpose. For these reasons the only right interpretation of the sentence (in the *mantra*) is to take it as indicating the *ownership of Agni* (over the *Soma*).—Then again, the fact remains that the *Soma* is enjoined as to be offered to *Patnīvat* (*Agni*), in the sentence 'one takes up the *Pātnīvata*'.—"But it has already been pointed out that this Injunction does not preclude the deity indicated by the words of the *mantra*."—The answer to this is that it has been already explained that there is no deity indicated by the words of the *mantra*. Then again, in reality, the connection of other deities is precluded by the Injunction, *by implication* (if not *directly*); when the fact of *Patnīvat* being the deity is expressed by the nominal affix in the term '*pātnīvata*', this deific character of *Patnīvat* is not understood as being dependent upon anything else; so that the only deity in the case is *Patnīvat* pure and simple.—In fact, the *mantra* has to be explained on the basis of this Injunction (regarding the *Pātnīvata Soma*); hence the only way in which the *mantra* can be explained is as we have explained it.

The deity *Patnīvat* (spoken of above) is *Agni*, as is clearly indicated by the expression '*agnē patnīvan*'—where the two appear in apposition to each other.—From all this it follows that the deity to be mentioned is *Agni* only, not the *Thirty-three Deities*.

Adhikaraṇa (16): *At the eating of Remnants, there should be no mention of the deity of the 'Anuvaṣaṭkāra'*—Fourth counter-instance to *Adhi.* (12).

SŪTRA (37).

Like the Performer, the 'Vaṣaṭkāra' also [should not be mentioned].

Bhāṣya.

The deity of the *Anuvaṣaṭkāra* is spoken of in the *mantra*—'*Somasyāgrē vīhityanuvaṣaṭkaroti*' (Aita. Brā. 3. 5).—In regard to this there arises the question—Should, or should not, this deity be mentioned (in the *mantra* used at the eating of Remnants)?

On this question the Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"the deity in question should be mentioned; because in this case we do not find—as we did in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*—anything to indicate that the deity has been spoken of for some other purpose; hence it must be mentioned."

As against this we have the following *Siddhānta*—The deity of the *Anuvaṣaṭkāra* should *not* be mentioned,—*like the Performer*; the *Performer* of the acts is not mentioned in the *mantra*,—in which no such expressions are used as '*Hotṛpītasya*' or '*Adhvaryu-pītasya*' (where the performing priest, *Hotṛ* or *Adhvaryu*, might be spoken of in the *mantra* recited at the time of the eating of Remnants);—similarly the deity of the *Anuvaṣaṭkāra* also should not be mentioned; specially because this deity has not been mentioned at the Archetypal Sacrifice; and at the *ectype* only that should be done what has been done at the *Archetype*. Hence we conclude that the deity in question should not be mentioned.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *Remnants of offerings other than those to Indra should be eaten without mantras.*

[This and the next two *adhikaraṇas* are purely *hypothetical*, since they only traverse the *Preliminary Hypothetical Siddhānta*, left incomplete at the end of Adhikaraṇa (11); these three *Adhikaraṇas* may be taken as setting forth the view which has been spoken of in Adhikaraṇa (11) as the second possible alternative (*Pūrvapakṣa*).]

SŪTRA (38).

AS THE SOMA BELONGS EQUALLY TO ALL [THERE CAN BE NO DISTINCTION OF 'ARCHETYPE' AND 'ECTYPE' AMONG THE SEVERAL OFFERINGS]; [AS FOR THE MENTION OF THE OTHER METRE] THAT IS MEANT ONLY TO PRECLUDE THE PREVIOUS METRE.

Bhāṣya.

Now follows the answer to what had been set forth (under Adhikaraṇa 11) as a preliminary (hypothetical) *Siddhānta*. It has been asserted (as the conclusion of adhī.11) that the eating of remnants should be done with *mantras* duly modified (according to the names of the deities to whom the offering may be made);—this, however, is not right; because the right course is that the eating should be done without *mantras*.—Why?—The answer is—because of all being equally enjoined, there is no relation of 'archetype' and 'ectype' (among the several offerings).—Why so?—Because the Context pertains equally to all.

Then as regards the argument urged (under Sū. 28) on the basis of a text indicating (the fact of the offering to *Indra* being the *Archetype*),—that text only serves the purpose of precluding the previous metre. That is to say, on the analogy of the third *Savana*, it is understood that the metre to be used should be the *Jagatī*;—in order to set aside this notion we have the said text mentioning the '*anuṣṭup*' metre as the one to be employed with the *Bhakṣa-mantra*.

As regards the argument based upon '*namati*' (see under Sū. 28),—that is not incompatible with the view that all the offerings are equally important.

Then as regards the argument that 'it is the offering to Indra that is held and measured' (see under Sū. 28),—the fact of the matter is that *the sacrifices offered to Indra* and *the sacrifices not offered to Indra* are not distinct sacrifices; they are so many repetitions of the same sacrifice; all the sacrificial accessories also do not belong to these repetitions; in fact they belong to the sacrifice itself. Hence the whole lot of them—the *Soma*, as well as the details regarding the *Soma*—should be taken as enjoined in connection with the sacrifice.—As regards the cup for *Indra* being 'held and measured', as a distinct *mantra* is specifically laid down for *Indra*, the 'holding' in connec-

tion with that deity has to be indicated by the words of the *mantra* itself; while that in connection with the other deities is to be remembered by means of contemplation and other means.

From all this it follows that the eating of the remnant of the offerings *not made to Indra* should be done *without Mantras*.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *The eating of the remnant of the offering made to Indra-Agni is to be done without Mantras.*

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"IN THE CASE OF THE OFFERING TO INDRA-AGNI, MANTRAS SHOULD BE USED; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF INDICATIVES".

Bhāṣya.

As in the foregoing *adhikaraṇa*, so here also, the discussion starts on the basis of the *Preliminary Siddhānta* (set forth under Adhi. 11).

An offering of *Soma* to Indra-Agni is laid down in the text 'One holds the *Aindrāgna* cup (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 5. 4. 1).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the eating of the remnant of this offering to be done with *Mantras*?—Or without *Mantras*?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The *mantra* should be used in the case of the offering to *Indra-Agni*; because *Indra* is certainly the deity of the offering of which *Indra-Agni* (jointly) constitute the deity; so that that offering is capable of being spoken of as '*indra-pīta*' ('drunk by Indra'); for that of which a part has been 'drunk' by *Indra* is certainly '*indrapīta*' ('drunk by Indra'); because when the Soma-juice was offered to, and drunk by, *Indra-Agni* (jointly), a part of it was certainly 'drunk by Indra'.—Hence it follows that the eating of the remnant of the offering in question should be done with the *mantra*".

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE MANTRA SHOULD BE USED IN THE CASE OF THE OFFERING TO A SINGLE DEITY; BECAUSE 'INDRA-AGNI' IS A DEITY DISTINCT FROM 'INDRA',—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'QUARTERING' (OF THE 'ĀGNEYA' CAKE).

Bhāṣya.

It is not any *part* of the offering that is 'drunk' by *Indra*; even if a part of it were 'drunk' by *Indra*, it would not become 'drunk by *Indra*'; in fact, the phrase 'drunk by him' is a figurative expression [as there is no actual *drinking* or *eating* of the offerings by the deities]; what is really meant is that it has been 'dedicated to Indra', i.e. 'that of which Indra is the deity'.

Then again, just as any factor which is incomplete without something else [as for example, any one member of a *couple*] can have no connection with what is connoted by a Nominal affix,—so also compounding like '*indrapīta*-

sya' ('drunk by Indra') is not possible with any factor which is incomplete without something else; [i.e. no such form as '*āgnēya*' is possible, when the deity is *agni* with some other deity, not *Agni* by itself,—in the same manner, the compound '*indrapītasya*' is not possible when the 'drinking' is done by *Indra along with some other deity.*]—This has been made clear under '*Vyavasthā vā, etc.*', Sūtra 3. 1. 27.

Objection—"If this is so, then this matter has been already settled under that *adhikaraṇa* (3. 1. 27); why should it be discussed here over again?"

Answer—What has been discussed there is already an established fact.

Question—"Then why is it discussed again and urged that there is no connection (in a compound) with the name of a deity which is incomplete without something else?"

Answer—In the present discussion, the *Pūrvapakṣa* does not consist of the proposition that "there is connection *with a deity*" (i.e. 'each one of the two should be regarded as the deity')—it consists of the proposition that there is *connection with drinking* [i.e. each of the two deities is the 'drinker']; and the *Siddhānta* consists in the proposition that 'in a case where the drinking is done by *two deities*, either one of them singly *cannot* be regarded as the deity [and hence in that case the *mantra* '*Indrapītasya, etc.*' cannot be used].—Thus the present *adhikaraṇa* is not a repetition of what has gone before (under Sūtra 3. 1. 27).

[The difference is thus explained by *Kumārila*—In the present case what the *Pūrvapakṣin* holds is that the distinguishing character expressed by the term '*indrapītasya*' is not the *deific character*, but the character of being the *drinker*, subsisting in the Receiver of the Gift,—and that it is present in each of the two deities (*Indra* and *Agni*);—while the *Siddhāntin* answers that the actual character of 'drinker' cannot belong to the deities, hence what the term '*indrapītasya*' indicates is the fact of *Indra* being the deity (and '*Indra*' is not the *deity* of what is offered to *Indra-Agni*)— *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1126.]

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *The mantra beginning with 'gāyatrachchhandasaḥ' is to be used in connection with the eating of the remnant of the Soma-offerings at which several metres are used.*

SŪTRA (41).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE METRE IS LIKE THE DEITY."

Bhāṣya.

In the *Bhakṣamantra* we are discussing, there occurs the term '*gāyatrachchhandasaḥ*' (Tai. Saṁ. 3. 2. 5. 2).—In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this section of the *mantra* to be used at the eating of the remnant of only that Soma-offering at which a single metre (*Gāyatrī*) is used?—Or is it to be used at the eating of the remnant of that also at which several metres are used?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* on this question is that '*the mantra is like the Deity*'; that is, just as the *mantra* (containing the term '*indrapītasya*') is not to be used in a case where the Deity is *Indra along with another Deity* (as decided in the foregoing *adhikaraṇa*),—so also the *mantra* (containing the term '*gāyatrachchhandasaḥ*') should not be used in a case where several metres have been used; for here also the compound '*gāyatrachchhandasaḥ*' could not apply to a case where the '*chhandaḥ*' (metre) was the '*gāyatra*' *along with soma other metre*'.

SŪTRA (42).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE MANTRA SHOULD BE USED IN ALL CASES; BECAUSE THERE IS NO CASE WHERE A SINGLE METRE IS USED.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *mantra* should be used in the case of all offerings.—Why so?—*Because there is no case where a single metre is used*;—i.e. there is no *Soma-offering* at which a single metre is used,—of which the association of another metre could be a qualification. Consequently, the *mantra* in question should be used in connection with the *Soma-offering* at which several metres are used.

[*Next follows the final Siddhānta on the whole question discussed under Sūtras* 27 *to* 42, *Adhikaraṇas* 11 to 19].

SŪTRA (43).

[FINAL SIDDHĀNTA ON THE WHOLE QUESTION]—AS HELD BY AITISHĀYANA, ONE AND THE SAME MANTRA SHOULD BE USED AT THE EATING OF THE REMNANTS OF ALL OFFERINGS;—BECAUSE WHAT THE MANTRA CONTAINING THE TERM 'INDRAPĪTASYA' REFERS TO IS THE 'SAVANA' [NOT THE 'SOMA'],—THE TERM 'PĪTA' BEING FIGURATIVE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been asserted above (under *Adhikaraṇa* 17) that the eating of remnants of offerings *not made to Indra* should be done without *mantras*.—This is not right. In fact, all the eatings should be done with *mantras*; and the *mantra* should be used just as it stands in the text (without any modifications).—As a matter of fact, the term '*indrapīta*' refers, not to the *Soma*, but to the *Savana*,—as is clear from the fact that the term '*indrapītasya*' is in the same case (genitive) as the term '*prātaḥsavanasya*'.—"But we have the genitive ending in '*somasya*' also".—True, the genitive ending is there; but that does not make the two (*indrapīta* and *soma*) appositional. Because the *Soma* (that remains) is not *drunk* by *Indra*;—nor is it given to *Indra*;—what has been drunk was something else; and this something else has ceased to exist; and what has ceased to exist is not pointed out by the pronoun 'this', which refers to something that is present.—All these objections are not applicable to the case of the *Savana*; the *Savana* is '*indrapīta*' in the sense that the drinking has been done by *Indra* during that *Savana*; in this sense that offering also which has not been made to *Indra* becomes included under the *Savana* named '*indrapīta*',—and as such can be taken as spoken of by the *mantra* (containing the term '*indrapītasya*'). When it can be so taken, and it is enjoined as equally applicable to all,—why should the *mantra* not be used in all cases?—It is in the figurative (indirect) sense that what is *not* 'drunk by Indra' comes to be spoken of as 'drunk by Indra'.

Such is the opinion of the revered Teacher Aitishāyana;—such also is our own view. The Teacher has been named, only with a view to show that the view was originally propounded by him.

End of Pāda ii of Adhyāya III.

DISCOURSE III

PĀDA III.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Properties like 'Loudness' appertain to the entire Veda, not to the form of the Mantra.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT ASSERTION, THE WORDS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THE TYPES".

Bhāṣya.

[Having dealt with the use of *Mantras* according to the *indication* of their words, we now proceed to deal with their use, in accordance with *Syntactical Connection.*]

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'*Uchchair-ṛchā kriyatē, uchchaiḥ sāmnā, upāṁshu yajuṣā*' (Maitrā. Saṁ. 3. 6. 5).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do the words ('*ṛk*', '*sāman*' and '*yajuṣ*') as found in this text stand for the *types*—'*Ṛk*' (Verse), '*Sāman*' (Music) and '*Yajuṣ*' (Prose-passage)—[i.e. for these *kinds* of *mantras* wherever found, irrespectively of the *Vedic saṁhitā* of which they form part]—or to the *Vedas*—*Ṛgvēda*, *Sāma-Vēda* and *Yajurvēda*—themselves [i.e. each of the *Saṁhitās* taken as a whole, composed of *mantras* in both prose and verse]?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"*They should be taken as standing for the types*;—why?—*because of the Direct Assertion*; by merely *hearing* the words as used in the text, we understand that it is the *type* that is meant; hence the *quietness* (*softness*) becomes connected with the *type referred to* (i.e. the *yajuṣ*); and there is no word that would connect it with the entire *Vēda* (Yajurvēda).—Then according to this view, those portions of the Yajurvēda which are in verse—and yet not found in the *Ṛgveda*—would come to be recited *loudly*; otherwise (if the properties applied to the *Vedas*, then all that forms part of the Yajurvēda,—be it in verse or in prose—would have to be recited quietly, and hence one and the same verse (that is found in the *Yajurvēda* as also in the *Ṛgvēda*) would have both the properties alternatively; and this would mean the rejection of the injunction in one case [because when the common verse is read *loudly*, the Yajurvedic injunction is violated, and when it is read softly, the Ṛgvedic injunction is violated].—Lastly, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is in conformity with the indications of the *Context*; otherwise, if the property (*quietness*, for instance) applied to the *Vēda*, then, at all sacrifices, the same property of *quietness* would have to be adopted (for which there is no justification) [according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the quietness would have to be adopted only in connection with those *Yajuṣ*,—i.e. Prose,—*mantras* that are used at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*].—From all this it follows that *the words apply to the types*."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE WORDS SHOULD BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THE ENTIRE 'VĒDA'; BECAUSE THEY ARE FOUND IN A CONTEXT DEALING MOSTLY WITH THE 'VĒDA'.

Bhāṣya.

What is declared in the text should be taken as referring to the *Vēda*;—why?—'*prāyadarshanāt*' [*because they are found in a context dealing mostly with the Vēda*].—"What is the '*prāyadarshana*' (on which the *Siddhānta* is based)?"—The words in question are found in a passage dealing mostly with the *Vēda*,—the passage starting with a reference to the *Vēdas*, and ending with the sentence containing the words in question;—this passage is as follows—'Prajāpati alone existed at the time,—he performed austerities,—while he was performing austerities, the three Deities, *Agni*, *Vāyu* and *Āditya*, came out of him;—these Deities performed austerities,—and while they were performing austerities, there came out from them the three Vēdas—the *Ṛgvēda* from *Agni*, the *Yajurvēda* from *Vāyu*, and the *Sāmavēda* from *Āditya*';—starting thus, the passage concludes with the following words—'what is done with the *Ṛk* is done *loudly*,—what is done with the *Sāman* is done *loudly*,—what is done with the *Yajuṣ* is done softly' ['*Uchchair-ṛchā kriyatē, uchchaiḥ sāmnā, upāṁshu yajuṣā*'].—For this reason, we assert that the *loudness* and the *quietness* have to be adopted with what are mentioned in the Context [i.e. the *Vedas* themselves], and not with the types of *mantras*, the (metrical) *Verse* (the verse set to *music*, and the *prose*).—"How is this conclusion deduced?"—Inasmuch as we find the words ('*ṛk*' and the rest) in the concluding portion of the entire passage—which means that 'inasmuch as the Vedas were produced in this manner, they should be used with *loudness*, etc.',—we conclude that the concluding sentence also must be taken as containing the terms '*ṛk*', '*sāman*' and '*yajuṣ*' in the sense of the three *Vēdas*; specially as, if not so taken, there would be no syntactical connection between the two portions of the passage, and this would make the words entirely meaningless.—From this it follows that the words should be taken as standing for the *Vedas*.

SŪTRA (3).

ALSO BECAUSE OF INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text also which is indicative of the fact that the words '*ṛk*', '*sāman*' and '*yajuṣ*' stand for the *Vēdas*; this text is—'(*a*) In the morning, the Deity moves with *ṛks*,—(*b*) at mid-day, he stays by the *Yajurvēda*,—(*c*) at sunset, he is worshipped with the *Sāmavēda*;—(*d*) so that the Sun moves along, never bereft of the three *Vēdas*' (Taitti. Brā., 3. 12. 9. 1);—here the first three parts speak of the '*ṛk*' and the two '*vēdas*' (Yajurvēda and Sāmavēda), and then the fourth part—'the sun moves along, never bereft of the three Vēdas'—recapitulates the whole lot by means of the common word '*Vēdas*' in the plural; which indicates that the term '*ṛk*' (in the first

part) also is meant to stand for the *Vēda* [as otherwise, the plural number would be unjustifiable, as standing for only two Vēdas, the *Yajūrvēda* and the *Sāmavēda*].—From this also, we conclude that the terms in question stand for the *Vēdas*.

SŪTRA (4).

ALSO, BECAUSE THERE IS A DISTINCT INJUNCTION OF PROPERTY (FOR THE SĀMAVĒDA);—AND IT COULD HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH THE SUBSTANCE ITSELF.

Bhāṣya.

There is a distinct injunction of the property (of *loudness*), in connection with the *Sāman*,—in the sentence 'what is done with the *Sāman* is done loudly';—this distinct injunction would be justifiable only if it referred to the *Vēda*; if it referred to the *type* of *mantra* (i.e. the *verses set to music*), then, inasmuch as the *loudness* of the *Sāma-verse* would have been established by the mere fact of its being a *Ṛk* (the *loudness* whereof has already been enjoined by the foregoing sentence) [as the *Sāman* is nothing more than *the 'ṛk' verse set to music*],—its connection with the thing '*Sāman*' would not need to be reiterated. [So that the distinct injunction in regard to the *Sāman* would be entirely superfluous].—From all this it follows that the words in question should be taken as standing for the *Vēdas*.

SŪTRA (5).

THE NAME 'TRAYĪVIDYA' IS APPLIED TO ONE WHO KNOWS THE THREE VEDAS ('TRAYĪ').

Bhāṣya.

That person is called '*Trayīvidya*' whose learning (*vidyā*) consists of the '*Trayī*,'—i.e. one who reads the *three Vēdas* is called '*trayīvidya*'. As a matter of fact, the term '*trayī*' is well known as applying to the *Ṛk*, *Sāman and Yajuṣ*; and it is only by reason of these three terms—'*ṛk*', '*sāman*' and '*yajuṣ*'—standing for the *three Vedas*, that the name '*Trayīvidya*' is applicable,—and actually applied—to the person knowing the *three Vēdas*.—For this reason also the words in question must stand for the *Vēdas*.

SŪTRA (6).

[OBJECTION]—"IN THE CASE OF VERSES (OF THE YAJURVĒDA WHICH ARE NOT FOUND IN THE ṚGVĒDA), THE INJUNCTION (OF 'LOUDNESS') COULD BE FOLLOWED LITERALLY [ONLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PŪRVAPAKṢA VIEW]"—IF THIS BE URGED, [then the answer is as given in the next Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that—"Those *metrical verses* of the Yajurvēda which are not found in the *Ṛgvēda* could be recited with

loudness—only if the Pūrvapakṣa view were accepted (by which *metrical verses* wherever found should be recited loudly); so that the injunction would be literally followed in this case."—Now this argument has got to be refuted.

This *Sūtra* serves the purpose of stating the argument to be refuted [and the refutation follows in the next *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (7).

[ANSWER]—IT IS NOT SO; BECAUSE THE QUALITY BELONGS TO THE WHOLE.

Bhāṣya.

The argument that has been urged does not vitiate our position; because as a matter of fact, the quality of 'loudness' belongs to the *entire Ṛgvēda*, and the quality of '*quietness*' belongs to the *entire Yajurvēda*; under the circumstances, if those verses in the *Yajurvēda* that are not found in the *Ṛgvēda* come to be recited *quietly*, there is nothing wrong in this; because the quality pertains to the *Vēda*, not to the *Ṛk*; and the *Vēda* does not come to have the two qualities (as urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*).

SŪTRA (8).

INASMUCH AS THE CONNECTION OF THE VEDA (WITH 'LOUDNESS' ETC. IS VOUCHED FOR BY SYNTACTICAL CONNECTION), IT COULD NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THE CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that it is only the *Pūrvapakṣa* view that is in keeping with the indications of the Context.—But, as a matter of fact the connection of the entire Vēda (with 'loudness', etc.) is vouched for by *Syntactical Connection*; and if *Context* is set aside by *Syntactical Connection*, there is no incongruity in this.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *At the 'Fire-laying', the singing is to be done quietly.*

SŪTRA (9).

WHEN THE PRIMARY AND THE SUBSIDIARY BELONG TO TWO DIFFERENT VEDAS, THE VEDIC CHARACTERISTIC OF THE SUBSIDIARY IS TO BE DETERMINED BY THAT OF THE PRIMARY; AS THE SUBSIDIARY IS SUBSERVIENT TO THE PRIMARY.

Bhāṣya.

The Fire-laying Rite has been spoken of in the text—'*Ya ēvamvidvānagni mādhattē*' (Maitrā. Saṁ. 1. 6. 6.);—it is a rite enjoined in the *Yajurvēda*; at this rite, the singing of the *Sāman* is laid down in the text—'*Ya ēvamvidvān vāravantīyam gāyati*' (Maitrā. Saṁ. 1. 6. 7.), '*Ya ēvamvidvān yajñāyajñiyam gāyati*',—'*Ya ēvamvidvān vāmadēvyam gāyati*' (Maitra. Saṁ. 1. 6. 7.).

In regard to this there arises the question—This singing at the Fire-laying Rite—is it to be done 'loudly' (in accordance with the character of the *Sāmavēda*, to which all Sāma-singing belongs)—or 'quietly' (in accordance with the character of the *Yajurvēda* to which the Primary Rite of Fire-laying belongs)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that the singing is to be done 'loudly';—why?—because what is done through the *Vāravantīya* and other *Sāmans* is done through the *Sāmavēda*; hence all these *Sāmans* are to be sung 'loudly.'

On this we have the following *Siddhānta*—If there is a doubt as to whether the character of the Primary is to be altered in consideration of the character of the Subsidiary—or that of the Subsidiary should be altered in consideration of the character of the Primary,—the only reasonable conclusion is that the character of the Subsidiary is to be altered, and that of the Primary is to be left intact.—Why so?—*Because the Subsidiary is subservient to the Primary*;—that is, the Performer takes up the performance of the Subsidiary solely for the purpose of making the Primary complete in all its details; if the performance of the Subsidiary brings about any defect in the character of the Primary, then nothing is gained by the performance of that Subsidiary, (since the main purpose of making the Primary complete in all details fails entirely). On the other hand, with a view to accomplish the details of the Primary, if the Performer undertakes the Subsidiary, and (in this performance) drops a characteristic of that Subsidiary,—then no harm is done to his main purpose; because the main purpose of his undertaking the Subsidiary does not lie in making the Subsidiary complete in all its details.—The singing of the *Sāmans* is after all a Subsidiary to the Fire-laying Rite, which is the *Primary*. This Fire-laying Rite belongs to the *Yajurvēda*;—hence its characteristic feature is 'quietness',—which characteristic sets aside 'loudness'

which is the characteristic of the *Sāmavēda* (to which the *Sāma-singing* belongs).—From all this it follows that the *Sāmans* (at the Fire-laying Rite) are to be sung 'quietly'.

[Kumārila has proposed a somewhat different presentation of the *adhikaraṇa* :—He puts the *question* in the form—In a case where a thing (e.g. *Sāma-singing*) has its origin in one Vēda (the *Sāma-Vēda*), but its application or use is laid down in another Vēda (the *Yajurvēda*), should that thing be equipped with the properties peculiar to the former Vēda, or with those of the latter ?—The *Pūrvapakṣa*—" Inasmuch as the origination of a thing always precedes its application, the properties adopted should be those of the Vēda in which the thing has its origin."—The *Siddhānta*—The properties should be those of that Veda which lays down its application, —(1) because the origination of a thing is only for the sake of the uses to which it may be applied,—(2) because it is only when the thing in question—i.e. the *Sāma-singing*—is applied to actual use, that it stands in need of some *tone* (*loud* or *quiet*) to be applied to it ; and hence the *tones* enjoined in the texts '*Uchchaiḥ ṛchā* etc.' are those that can be perceived only at the time of *application*, not at the time of *origination* ; as at the latter time it is not in use at all.—There are three other forms proposed for this *Adhikaraṇa*. See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1150-1151.]

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The Jyotiṣṭoma belongs to the Yajurvēda.*

SŪTRA (10).

IF AN ACTION IS LAID DOWN IN TWO VĒDAS, IT IS TO BE TAKEN AS BELONGING TO THAT IN WHICH MOST OF ITS CONSTITUENT DETAILS ARE FOUND.

Bhāṣya.

The *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is laid down in the *Yajurvēda*, in the text—'*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' ('One desiring heaven should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice');—there is a similar injunction of it in the *Sāma-Vēda* also. As a rule, when an action has been laid down in one text, the mention of it in another text can only be for the purpose of laying down accessory details relating to it.

In regard to this, therefore, arises the question—Is the injunction in the *Yajurvēda* to be taken as serving the purpose of laying down the actual performance of the sacrifice,—and that in the *Sāma-Vēda* to be taken as serving the purpose of laying down accessory details relating to it? Or is it the other way about?—[This enquiry is necessary, as] the performance will take up the characteristics of that Vēda whose text is taken as laying down the performance.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that "it cannot be definitely ascertained whether it is the *Sāmavēda-text* or the *Yajurvēda-text* that is to be regarded as laying down the performance,—as we do not find any determining factor in the case."

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The question should be determined by the fact of one or the other Veda providing the larger number of details of the sacrifice in question; so that the text of that Veda should be regarded as laying down the performance of the sacrifice which provides the larger number of the sacrificial details. As a matter of fact, when a Veda lays down the performance of a sacrifice, it is there that there arises the need for information regarding the details of its procedure; and an injunction of these details of procedure has its right place only where such information is needed;—wherever the larger number of sacrificial details are laid down, that is what constitutes the 'Procedure';—so that it is on the basis of this principle (of the laying down of the larger number of sacrificial details) that we shall determine by inference which particular text is to be regarded as the injunction of the performance.—In a case where many persons resembling the king are seated, we infer that one to be the king who has a white umbrella (over his head) and *chowries* (on his two sides),—even though he may not be actually pointed out as the *King*;—in this same manner, when we find that it is the *Yajurveda-text* which lays down the larger number of sacrificial

details of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—which fact is a sign of its being the injunction of its performance,—we conclude that this text is the injunction of the performance.

From this it follows that the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* should be done 'quietly'; as it is by the *Yajurveda* that the sacrifice is enjoined, and hence it is by means of that *Veda* that the sacrifice is performed;—and what is not enjoined cannot be performed.

[Kumārila is not satisfied with this explanation of the *Sūtra*. He explains the meaning of the *Sūtra* to be as follows:—'That action which is mentioned in two Vedas should have its appellation determined by the mention of a larger number,—i.e. *the whole*—of its constituent details, which may be capable of supplying all its requirements'. See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1154.]

ADHIKARAṆA (4) : *The 'Context' is indicative of the connection of subsidiaries.*

SŪTRA (11).

THAT WHICH IS NOT CONNECTED (OTHERWISE) BECOMES CONNECTED THROUGH CONTEXT; BECAUSE DETAILS OF PROCEDURE ARE ALWAYS WANTED.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) *Direct Assertion*, (*b*) *Indicative Power*, and (*c*) *Syntactical Connection*,—these three means of determining the connection of subsidiaries have been duly described (in the foregoing Adhikaraṇas): (*a*) The *Direct Assertion*—'*Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhatē*' (Maitrā-Saṁ. 3. 2. 4)—has been found to determine, through the Accusative ending (in '*gārhapatyam*'), the use of the *mantra* (under Sū. 3. 2. 3);—(*b*) *Indicative Power*, which consists in the force of words contained in the *mantra*, has been found to determine the application of the *mantra* '*Varhirdēvasadanam dāmi*' [Maitrā-Saṁ. 1. 1. 2] (under Sū. 3. 2. 1);—(*c*) *Syntactical Connection* has been shown to determine the connection of subsidiaries (under Sū. 3. 1. 12) as in the case of '*aruṇayā krīṇāti*', Tai. Saṁ. 6. 1. 6. 7].

Now there arises the question—Are these the only means of determining the use of *mantras*?—The answer is—*No*.—What then is the other means?

It is with this question that the present investigation starts; just as in the case of such questions as—What is the name of this river?—What is the name of this mountain?—What fruit is this?

The answer to the said question is provided by the *Sūtra*—*That which is not connected (otherwise) becomes connected through Context, because details of procedure are always wanted.* That is to say, that which is not connected (with any act), through either *Direct Assertion*, or *Indicative Power*, or *Syntactical Connection*,—becomes connected through *Context*,—*because details of procedure are always wanted*; that is, when a certain statement (injunction of action) is found to stand in need for the statement of the details of procedure (of the action enjoined),—and in close proximity to it is found a statement which is capable of supplying this need,—then this latter statement becomes syntactically connected with the aforesaid injunctive sentence; and hence that procedure comes to be adopted at the action enjoined.

"What is the example for such connection?—What too is the purpose served by this enquiry?"

In connection with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*-sacrifice, we read—'*Samidho yajati, tanūnapātaṁ yajati, iḍo yajati, varhir yajati, svāhākāraṁ yajati*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 1. 1); and through the force of *Context*, all these acts (sacrifices)

come to be performed in connection with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa-sacrifice*,—not with either the *Agnihotra* or the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.

[So long as the continuity of the details of procedure relating to the Primary Action has not been broken,—whatever other action happens to be mentioned, without the mention of a distinct result, is to be taken as an auxiliary of the said Primary;—and this conclusion is based upon the force of the *Context*.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1156.]

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The connection of subsidiaries indicated by the Order of Sequence.*

SŪTRA (12).

THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE ALSO (DETERMINES THE CONNECTION OF SUBSIDIARIES), ON THE GROUND OF THE SAMENESS OF PLACE.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"Are these [Direct Assertion, Indicative Power, Syntactical Connection and Context] then the only means of determining the connection of subsidiaries?"

Answer—No.

Question—"What else then?"

Answer—*The Order of Sequence also, on the ground of the sameness of place.* When one set of actions and another set of accessories are laid down in a definite order of sequence,—then there is inferred a sort of mutual need between the action mentioned in one place in the series of actions, and the accessory mentioned in the same place in the series of accessories; and when this need is there, the two become syntactically connected;—consequently the accessory in question is used at the action in question.

"Where is there an instance of such use? What too is the use of this enquiry?"

A set of three sacrifices is mentioned in a definite order of sequence [(1) *Āgnēya*—, (2) *Upāṁshuyāja*—, (3) *Agniṣomīya*]; among the three *mantras* mentioned, the *mantra* mentioned in the same place (i.e. the second) as the *Upāṁshuyāja* is '*Dabdhirnāmāsi*, etc.' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 6. 11. 6; See *Mānava Shrautasūtra*, 1. 4. 2. 4) [the *first mantra* being '*Agnēraham dēvayajyayā, etc.*', and the *third*, '*Agnīṣomīyayoraham, etc.*'];—a mutual need thus being inferred between the *second sacrifice* and the *second mantra*, the two are syntactically connected and the *mantra* comes to be used accordingly.

Similarly, there is the *Aindrāgna* sacrifice laid down as to be performed by one whose kith and kin have been ruined and one who has enemies [Maitrā-Saṁ. 2. 1. 1]; in connection with this there are two *Yājyānuvākyās* laid down, both related to *Indra-Agni*—*first*, '*Indrāgnī rochanā divaḥ*' '*Pravarṣaṇibhyaḥ*' (cf. Maitrā-Saṁ. 4. 10. 4),—and *second*, '*Indrāgnī navatim puraḥ Shnathadvṛtram*' (Maitrā-Saṁ. 4. 10. 5);—the use of these *mantras* at the *Aindrāgna* sacrifice having been already indicated by the Indicative Power of the words of the *mantras* themselves,—it is through the *order* in which the two *mantras* occur in the text that we get at the particulars of their use, to the effect that the *first mantra* is to be used at the *first Aindrāgna* sacrifice and the *second mantra* at the second *Aindrāgna* sacrifice.

These are the examples; and this also makes clear the use of the *Adhikaraṇa*.

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The connection of subsidiaries determined by 'Name'.*

SŪTRA (13).

'NAME' ALSO (DETERMINES THE CONNECTION); BECAUSE IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"Are the aforesaid the only means for determining the connection of subsidiaries?"

Answer—No; Name also is a means of determining the same.

Question—"How can Name be the means of determining the connection of subsidiaries?"

Answer—A Name is applied to things only on the basis of some connection or relationship; for instance, in ordinary parlance the name 'cooker' is applied to one who is connected with the action of *cooking*, and the name 'chopper' is applied to one who is connected with the act of *chopping*.—Similarly in the Veda also, when we find a term expressing connection with things eternal, we have the cognition of that *connection*.

Question—"What instance is there of this? What too is the use of this investigation?"

Answer—Those acts that are found to be named as '*Ādhvaryava*' should be performed by the *Adhvaryu* priest,—and those named as '*Hautra*', by the *Hotṛ* priest.—This is the instance of the connection of things being indicated by *Name*; and the purpose also served by this is that we get at the said conclusion regarding the performance of the acts.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Among the six means of determining the connection of subsidiaries—'Direct Assertion', 'Indicative Power' and the rest,—that which precedes is more authoritative than that which follows.*

SŪTRA (14).

AMONG 'DIRECT ASSERTION', 'INDICATIVE POWER', 'SYNTACTICAL CONNECTION', 'CONTEXT', 'PLACE' AND 'NAME',—THAT WHICH FOLLOWS IS WEAKER THAN THAT WHICH PRECEDES;—BECAUSE IT IS MORE REMOTE FROM THE FINAL OBJECTIVE.

Bhāṣya.

The means of determining the connection of subsidiaries—'Direct Assertion', 'Indicative Power', 'Syntactical Connection', 'Context', 'Place' and 'Name'—have been described.—Now arises the question—Which of these is to be regarded as most authoritative in a case where they are all applicable (but in conflict with one another)? As a matter of fact, one sentence can have only one meaning; so that no one thing can be taken as connected with two things at one and the same time; consequently there is likely to be a conflict between any two of the said six means.

(A)—'*Direct Assertion*' *more authoritative than* '*Indicative Power*'.

(1) The first question therefore that has to be considered is—Between 'Direct Assertion' and 'Indicative Power', which is to be regarded as the more authoritative?—"Which is the particular instance where there is such a conflict?"—In regard to the Injunction '*Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhatē*' ('With the *Aindrī* verse, one should worship the *Gārhapatya Fire*' Maitrā-Saṁ. 3. 2. 4),—there is the question as to whether the 'worshipping with the *Aindrī* verse' may be done of *Indra* or of the *Gārhapatya Fire* (as one may choose)—or is it to be done of the *Gārhapatya Fire* only?—If the two means (*Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*) are of equal authority, then there would be option (one may do the 'worshipping' either of *Indra* or of the *Gārhapatya Fire*);—if however *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative, then the 'worshipping' should be done of the *Gārhapatya Fire* only.—"In this case what is the *Direct Assertion* and what the *Indicative Power*?"—The *Direct Assertion* consists in the presence of the term '*gārhapatya*' itself in the Injunction [whereby the *worshipping* should be done of the *Gārhapatya Fire* only]; and *Indicative Power* consists in the presence of the term '*indra*' in the *Aindrī* verse itself, which reads as '*Kadā cha na starīrasi nēndra sashchasi dāsuṣē* (Mai.-Saṁ. 1. 3. 26; Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 5. 8. 4; Ṛgveda, 8. 51. 7),—this term '*indra*' having the *power* of

indicating the *deity Indra* (to whom the *worshipping* would be done with the *mantra*).

Question—" What is a ' sentence ' ? "

Answer—When a number of words combine to express an idea, they constitute a *sentence*.

Objection—" If that is so, then the *injunction*, '*Aindryā gārhapatyamupatiṣṭhatē*' is a sentence, and so also is the *mantra*, '*Kadā cha na starīrasi, etc.*' ; as in both these a number of words combine to express an idea. Such being the case, the instance cited is one of conflict between one *Sentence* (Syntactical Connection) and another *Sentence* (Syntactical Connection), not between *Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*.—Or, the discrimination may be made among all these three—*Direct Assertion*, *Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection*,—it being determined that such is the difference between *Direct Assertion* and *Syntactical Connection*, and such between *Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection*."

Answer—*Indicative Power* is the power or capacity of a word to denote a certain thing ;—while *Direct Assertion* consists in the expression of that meaning which is understood on the mere hearing of the word ; this being called '*Shruti*', i.e. *Hearing*.—It has already been explained that when several words express a single idea, they constitute a ' sentence '. Now as a matter of fact, all these three contingencies are present, either collectively or severally, in all sentences.—In the case in question, however, the idea that '*Indra* is to be worshipped with the mantra '*Kadā cha na starīrasi, etc.*' is not got at on the mere *hearing* of any word ;—nor is there any word which, uttered in proximity to another word, could supply this idea ;—all that happens is that in the *mantra* the term '*indra*' is present, which has the power to indicate a certain deity, by the denoting of which a useful purpose is served ;—viz. that the idea is provided that in the ' worshipping ' of the deity *Indra*, the term '*indra*' should be used,—as also the other words (of the *mantra*) that are syntactically connected with that term ;—on the other hand, there is no word in this *mantra* which has the power to indicate the *Gārhapatya Fire* as the deity to be ' worshipped ' ; in fact the idea that the *Gārhapatya Fire* is to be worshipped we obtain from *directly hearing* the term '*gārhapatya*' itself (in the injunction '*Aindryā gārhapatyamupatiṣṭhatē*'), —not from the *Indicative Power* (of any word).—Thus then, it comes to this : If *Indicative Power* is more authoritative than *Direct Assertion*, then *Indra* should be worshipped with the *mantra* ; whereas if *Direct Assertion* (of *gārhapatya*) is more authoritative than *Indicative Power*, then the *Gārhapatya Fire* should be worshipped with the *mantra*.

Objection—" If such is the case then the comparison to be instituted in this instance is between *Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection* (Sentence),—not between *Indicative Power* and *Direct Assertion*. Because *Indra* is to be taken as to be worshipped, on the strength of the *power* of the term '*indra*' to *indicate* the particular deity, *Indra*,—in the event of *Indicative Power* being more authoritative ;—if, on the other hand, *Syntactical Connection* (Sentence) is the more authoritative, then *Gārhapatya Fire* is to be worshipped ; as this is what is expressed by the injunction '*Aindryā gārhapatyamupatiṣṭhatē*', which is a *sentence*."

Answer—It is not so; even though the injunction ('*Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhatē*') is a *sentence*, yet it also contains a *Direct Assertion*; and what is actually contradicted by *Indicative Power* is this *Direct Assertion*, not the *sentence*.—"How so?"—Even if *Indicative Power* were the more authoritative, the meaning indicated by it (that 'Indra should be worshipped'), could be got at only through the said term '*indra*' being syntactically connected with the word '*gārhapatyam*' (in the Injunction); if it were not so syntactically connected with the term '*gārhapatyam*', then the idea expressed by this term would be incompatible with the said *Indicative Power*; so that if the *Indicative Power* is the more authoritative, then, what is expressed by the term '*gārhapatya*' will have to be rejected; as this would have no connection with the act of 'worshipping'; and in that case the term '*gārhapatya*' would have to be taken as (somehow) denoting the deity *Indra* itself, or *proximity to the Fire* [the meaning being that 'with the *Aindrī* verse one should worship Indra *near the Gārhapatya Fire*'].—If, on the other hand, *Direct Assertion* were the more authoritative, then the idea of 'worshipping *Indra*', which is expressed by *Indicative Power*, would be set aside.—Thus then, the instance cited is one really of conflict between *Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*, not between *Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection*.

Or [we may put the case differently]—The idea of *Indra* or *Gārhapatya* being the deity to be worshipped is not obtained through the Syntactical Connection (of the term '*Indra*' or '*Gārhapatya*'); in fact, the idea of *Indra* being the deity to be worshipped is deduced from the fact of the *Mantra* containing the term '*indra*',—and the idea of the *Gārhapatya Fire* being the deity to be worshipped is obtained from hearing the Accusative ending (in '*gārhapatyam*').—Thus also the conflict is between *Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*.

Now then (on this question of conflict between *Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*), we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"Both these (*Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*) are of equal authority;—why?—because this and that—i.e. *Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*—are the means of determining the connection of subsidiaries;—between one cognition and another, there is no difference in form,—as that this has a form like that of an ephemeral thing and that has a form like that of a lasting thing.—'But as a matter of fact, the form of *Indicative Power* is like that of an ephemeral thing, inasmuch as the cognition obtained from it is always doubtful, while that obtained from *Direct Assertion* is certain.'—This is not right; because if the cognition derived from *Indicative Power* were doubtful, then there could be no conflict or comparison between *Indicative Power* and *Direct Assertion*. In fact, it is because the cognition derived from *Indicative Power* is certain that it can be treated as an alternative to *Direct Assertion*.—'But, as a matter of fact, the cognition derived from *Indicative Power* is never free from doubt.'—It is not so; because in that case *Indicative Power* could not be a valid means of cognition at all.—'It may not be a valid means of cognition; but in regard to things cognised by means of *Indicative Power* there is always a doubt (as to its being true or otherwise). Or, we may

go further; the cognition derived from Indicative Cognition is not even doubtful; it is entirely invalid, wrong. For all that is learnt from *Indicative Power* is that such and such a word has the power to accomplish such and such a purpose; and when one thing is capable of accomplishing a certain thing, it is not necessary that it should accomplish it only when there is no verbal declaration to that effect. Hence we conclude that *Indicative Power* is not a means of determining the connection of subsidiaries.'—Our answer to this is as follows:—When a thing is spoken in proximity to a certain thing in a context dealing with this latter,—then the former is regarded as a means of accomplishing the latter;—and when the question arises as to how it will help in the accomplishment of that thing,—we obtain definite information regarding it from the *Power* or capacity of the thing,—i.e. the thing will be useful for the purpose to the extent that it may be capable of doing. It is thus that *Indicative Power* comes to be a valid means of determining the use of things.—Nor is there any ground for discriminating between the validity (and authority) of *Indicative Power* and that of *Direct Assertion* (whereby we could reject the authority of one or the other).—Hence it follows that these two means (*Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*) are of equal authority; so that on the strength of *Indicative Power*, the mantra '*Kadā cha na starīrasi*, etc.,' is to be used in worshipping *Indra*, and on the strength of *Direct Assertion*, it is to be used in worshipping the *Gārhapatya Fire*.—Further, we accept this conclusion (viz. that the two courses are optional) on the ground that there is no incompatibility between the two alternatives. Even in a case where one reason is stronger than the other, it sets aside this latter only when there is an incompatibility between the two,—not when there is no incompatibility. And there is no incompatibility in the conclusion that 'with the *mantra* in question one should worship *Indra or the Gārhapatya Fire*'.—'There is certainly this incompatibility (or incongruity) in this conclusion that while only one act of *worshipping* has been enjoined, the act is done more than once (once of *Indra* and then of *Gārhapatya*)'.—But subsidiary acts are always repeated along with each of the several primaries,—so that the act of *worshipping* is repeated only with reference to the different deities to be worshipped; and this is quite logical, there is no incongruity in it.—'Well, then, there is this incongruity: when the *mantra* is used in worshipping the *Gārhapatya Fire*, the term '*indra*' (contained in the *mantra*) would be taken as denoting the *Fire*, and it would stand in need of some *quality* or *function* (establishing the similarity of the *Fire* to the deity *Indra*);—and when it is used in worshipping *Indra*, the term '*indra*' would denote the deity *Indra*, independently by itself; and as between the indirect and direct signification, the direct one is to be accepted.'—It is not so, we reply. The direct meaning is to set aside the indirect meaning only when there is an incompatibility between the two; in the present case, there is no incompatibility; because there would be incompatibility only if the two meanings were expressed at one and the same time; as a matter of fact, however, the term '*indra*' is taken as denoting the *Fire* at one act (where the worshipping is done of the *Gārhapatya Fire*), while it is taken as denoting the deity *Indra* at an entirely different act (where the worshipping is done of *Indra*).—

From all this it follows that the two—*Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*—are of equal authority."

In reply to the above *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta* :— Between *Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*, *Direct Assertion* is the more authoritative.—Why?—*Because of remoteness from the final objective.*— "What is this *remoteness from the objective* ?"—It is *remoteness*—'*viprkarṣa*' —of the *objective*, '*artha*' ?—"What is this *objective*, '*artha*' ?"—It is what is expressed by the Vedic text directly. For instance, in the case in question the idea that 'one should worship the *Gārhapatya Fire*' is what is expressed most proximately by the *Direct Assertion* (contained in the injunction '*Aindryā gārhapatyam upatiṣṭhatē*'),—while the idea that '*Indra* should be worshipped' is very much '*remoter*' ; that is, the idea that '*Indra* should be worshipped with the *mantra*, *Kadā cha na starīrasi*, etc.' is not directly expressed by any Vedic text ; even though the *mantra* contains a word capable of denoting *Indra*, since there is no assertion regarding the use of the *mantra* in worshipping that *Indra*, it is understood that *Indra* is *not* to be worshipped with the *mantra*.

Opponent—"It has already been explained that, inasmuch as the *mantra* occurs in the *Context* of a particular sacrifice, it is regarded as an accessory of that sacrifice ;—and on the strength of its *Indicative Power*, it is taken as to be used in the worshipping of *Indra*."

Answer—It is not so ; it has already been declared above that—'inasmuch as Dharma is based upon the Veda, what is not Veda should be disregarded' (*Sūtra* 1. 3. 1).—As a matter of fact, both of what have been cited —*Context* and *Indicative Power*—are *not Veda* ;—and in the matter of things beyond the range of Sense-perception, there is no means of cognition available except the *Veda*. It is for this reason that we hold that *Indicative Power* is very remote from the *objective* of *Direct Assertion*.

Objection—"If such is the case (and *Indicative Power*, being *not Veda*, is no authority in super-sensuous matters), then, *Indicative Power* could never be a means of determining anything, even where there is no *Direct Assertion* to the contrary ; so that it comes to this that there is no truth in the assertion that '*Indicative Power* is a means (of determining the connection of subsidiaries)' ; and in that case how could there be any conflict between *Indicative Power* and *Direct Assertion* ? For all these reasons we assert that there is no ground for instituting any comparison between the authority of *Indicative Power* and that of *Direct Assertion*."

Reply—When a certain act mentioned in a context stands in need of the mention of its details of procedure, and a *mantra* is found in close proximity to it,—the *mantra*, by the force of its presence in the text, comes to be syntactically connected with the words speaking of the act,—and this gives rise to the idea that 'one should perform the act of sacrifice with this *mantra*' ; —that is to say—'when one is seeking to obtain the desired result by means of the sacrifice, one should help the performance of the sacrifice with this *mantra*'. Now, in the case in question, the *mantra* concerned ('*Kadā cha na starīrasi*, etc.') cannot help the sacrifice except by indicating the deity *Indra* ; it is thus that we come to the conclusion that '*Indra* should be

taken as indicated by the *mantra*'.—This idea is thus one that is based upon the Vedic Text (*Direct Assertion*) itself.

Objection—"If the idea is based upon *Direct Assertion*, it cannot be set aside by any other *Direct Assertion*; so that either *Indicative Power* should not be regarded as authoritative or it should be treated as optional with (equal in authority to) *Direct Assertion*."

We assert that it is neither to be regarded as devoid of authority nor to be treated as optional with *Direct Assertion*.—How so ?—It has been explained that the idea (derived from *Indicative Power*) is based upon *Direct Assertion*; hence it cannot be totally devoid of authority;—and yet, there is a *remoteness from the objective*, inasmuch as the idea that '*Indra* should be worshipped with this *mantra*' is derived from *Direct Assertion* indirectly, through the inference of a syntactical connection (between the *mantra* and the injunction of the *sacrifice*) and of a power (in the *mantra*) of indicating (the deity, *Indra*);—while the idea that 'the *Gārhapatya Fire* is to be worshipped with this *mantra*' is obtained directly from the *Direct Assertion* in the text 'with the *Aindrī mantra* one should worship the *Gārhapatya Fire*'.—(In the case of *Indicative Power*) thus, in the first place, there is to be a recognition of the *Indicative Power* itself, and then by the force of this power, the particular idea becomes indicated;—now all this cannot be possible when the idea (to be thus got at) is one that is contrary to the *Direct Assertion* which clearly declares that 'the *Gārhapatya Fire* is to be worshipped with this *mantra*', and from which we already obtain the idea as to the manner in which the *mantra* is to help the sacrifice;—when this idea has been already obtained (from *Direct Assertion*), there is no justification for the assumption that the idea of *Indra* being worshipped with the *mantra* is derived from *Syntactical Connection* and *Context*, which (in face of the *Direct Assertion*) could not acquire the capacity to provide any such idea.

From all this it follows that by reason of its 'remoteness from the objective', *Indicative Power* is set aside by *Direct Assertion*.

This same conclusion is to be accepted also on the ground that it is not right to admit of an *Option* (as suggested in the *Pūrvapakṣa*). As a matter of fact, it is not right to admit an *Option*; because when an option is admitted, it means that in one alternative something that is directly enjoined is to be rejected; for instance, in the case in question, the idea that 'the *Gārhapatya Fire* is to be worshipped with the *Aindrī mantra*' having been directly expressed by the Text as unalterable (eternal),—if we accept the negation of this idea (when we accept the other alternative of *Indra* being worshipped, as indicated by *Indicative Power*),—it means the rejection of what has been *directly asserted* by the Veda, and the acceptance of what is not so *asserted*;—and the acceptance of what is not asserted is as open to objection as the rejection of what is asserted; because in both cases, a well-ascertained idea is rejected.—Thus then, on account of the fact that it is not right to admit an Option, we conclude that between *Direct Assertion* and *Indicative Power*, *Direct Assertion* is the more authoritative.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣa*) that the rejection (of *Indicative Power* by *Direct Assertion*) could be right only if there were a conflict be-

tween the two, and in the case in question, there is no conflict.—As a matter of fact, however, there *is* actual conflict; as the Vedic text could be taken as expressive of the idea that '*Indra* should be worshipped' only on the basis of *Syntactical Connection* and *Context*, which (in face of the *Direct Assertion* to the contrary) have not acquired the capacity of providing such an idea;—no such idea can be expressed by any such *Syntactical Connection* and *Context* as have acquired the requisite capacity (from *Direct Assertion*); nor is it possible for *Syntactical Connection* and *Context* to be regarded, at one and the same time, as having acquired the requisite capacity and also as having not acquired the requisite capacity.—Thus there is a real conflict; and when there is conflict, between the two, *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative than *Indicative Power*.

(B) '*Indicative Power*' *is more authoritative than* '*Syntactical Connection*'.

Question—"What is the example of conflict between *Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection*?"

Answer—There is a *mantra* '(*a*) *Syonantē sadanam kṛṇomi ghṛtasya dhārayā sushēvaṁ kalpayāmi*—(*b*) *tasmin sīdāmṛtē pratitiṣṭha vrīhīṇām mēdha sumanasyamānaḥ*' [(*a*) 'O Cake, I am preparing a pleasant seat for thee and am making it comfortable with a stream of butter;—(*b*) O essence of corns, with mind at ease, please sit and remain steady on this seat'] (Taitti. Brā. 3. 7. 5. 2-3; see Māna. Shrau. Sū. 1. 2. 6. 19).—In regard to this *mantra* there arises the following question:—Is the entire *mantra* to be used at the *preparing of the seat* and the *placing of the Cake*? Or the portion (*a*) ending with '*kalpayāmi*' is to be used at the *preparing of the seat* (by spreading *Kusha* grass), and the portion (*b*) beginning with '*tasmin sīda*' at the *placing of the Cake*? The point to consider is that, if *Syntactical Connection* has a higher authority than *Indicative Power*, then the entire *mantra* is to be used at both the acts.—"How so?"—The phrase '*tasmin sīda*' is grammatically dependent upon the sentence ending with the words '*sushē-vaṁ kalpayāmi*" and hence becomes *syntactically connected* with that preceding sentence, the construction being—'*yat kalpayāmi tasmin sīda*' ['Please sit on what I am preparing'].—If, on the other hand, *Indicative Power* has the higher authority, then the portion (*a*) ending with '*kalpayāmi*' should be used at the *preparing of the seat*,—because the sentence '*syonantē sadanaṁ kṛṇomi*' ['I am preparing a seat for thee'] is sufficient to indicate *the act of preparing the seat*,—and the portion (*b*) beginning with '*tasmin sīda*' is sufficient to indicate the *placing of the Cake*, and hence this latter portion should be used at the *placing of the Cake*.

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"Both these means (*Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection*) are of equal strength (authority); because, as a matter of fact, *Indicative Power* is not held to be superior (in authority) to *Syntactical Connection*, in the same way that *Direct Assertion* has been held to be to *Indicative Power*.—Or (we may go even further), it is *Syntactical Connection* that is superior to *Indicative Power*. —'Why?'—Because *Indicative Power* is what is set aside by *Direct Assertion*, and what is really authoritative can never be set aside; hence we conclude

that *Indicative Power* is something ephemeral (and not possessed of any lasting authority); because what is set aside by one is liable to be set aside by another also."

Against this *Pūrvapakṣa* we have the following *Siddhānta* :—Between *Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection, Indicative Power* is possessed of higher authority ;—why ?—*because of the remoteness of the objective.*—"What is 'the remoteness of the objective' in this case ? "—Inasmuch as the *mantra* occurs in proximity to the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice with which the Context deals, we conclude that it is subsidiary to that sacrifice ;—now as regards the portion (*b*) of the *mantra* beginning with the words '*tasmin sīda*', it has the power to indicate the act of *placing the Cake* ; hence when it comes to be used at this *act of placing the Cake*, the presence of the *mantra* becomes justified and the purpose of its indication becomes fulfilled. There is, on the other hand, no authority whereby this portion of the *mantra* could be used also at the *preparing of the seat.*—Similarly, the other portion (*a*) of the *mantra*—'*Syonantē sadanaṁ kṛṇomi, etc.*'—is regarded as subsidiary to the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* on the ground of its occurring in the *Context* of that sacrifice,—and when, on the basis of its indicative power, it comes to be used at the *preparing of the seat*, it has its purpose fulfilled, and hence cannot be used at the *placing of the Cake*, specially as there can be no useful purpose served by its being used at this act of *placing.*—Then again, the portion (*b*) beginning with '*tasmin sīda*' has no 'power' (or capacity) to be used at the *preparing of the seat*; nor has the portion (*a*) beginning with '*syonantē*' the 'power' to be used at the *placing of the Cake.*—What may be possible is that the second portion (*b*) may acquire the 'power' to be used at the *preparing of the seat* after becoming syntactically connected with the first portion (*a*),—and the first portion (*a*) may acquire the 'power' to be used at the *placing of the Cake* after becoming syntactically connected with the second portion ;—and neither of the two portions, by itself, has the said power ;—this is the 'remoteness of the objective' (in the event of *Syntactical Connection* being taken as the determining factor in the case in question).

Further, the inherent (direct) 'power' that the portion (*a*)—'*Syonantē*, etc.'—possesses of indicating *the act of preparing the seat* is *primary* ;—while the 'power' (to indicate *the act of preparing the seat*) which the second portion (*b*)—'*Tasmin sīda, etc.*'—acquires by becoming syntactically connected with the first portion is only *secondary*. Thus then, the use of the first portion of the *mantra* at the *preparing of the seat* becomes declared directly by the *indicative power* inherent in the *mantra* itself, and hence the meaning of the *Direct Assertion* (Vedic) is in close proximity to the *Indicative Power* ;—on the other hand, in the case of a similar use (at the act of *preparing the seat*) of the second portion of the *Mantra*, the requisite meaning of the *Direct Assertion* could be got at only indirectly, after its power 'to indicate' that act had been brought into existence (by its becoming syntactically connected with the first portion) ;—so that in this case, the meaning of *Direct Assertion* becomes intervened by *Indicative Power* (whose functioning is necessary before the required meaning is obtained through *Syntactical Connection*) and hence, to that extent, it is '*remote*'.—Similarly, in the case of the act of *placing the Cake*, its connection with the second portion is *proximate* (direct), while

that with the first portion is intervened by *Indicative Power* (whose functioning is necessary before the required meaning can be obtained from Syntactical Connection).—From all this it follows that between *Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection*, *Indicative Power* is possessed of higher authority; hence, even though the first portion of the *mantra*,—'*Syonantē*, etc.'—is needed (syntactically) by the second portion,—and as such might be used at the *placing of the Cakes*—yet, what should be done is that the sentence should be split up and the first portion used only at *the preparing of the seat*,—and the second portion,—'*Tasmin sida*, etc.'—only at *the placing of the Cake*.

Objection—"The words of the first portion of the *mantra*—'*Syonantē*, *etc.*'—possess the 'power' of becoming *syntactically connected* with the second portion, exactly as they possess the 'power' of indicating the act of *preparing the seat*;—and it is only *power* that is called '*Liṅga*', *Indicative Power*. So that when the *sentence* is split up (in the manner just explained), what becomes set aside is an *Indicative Power* itself (and not *Syntactical Connection*)."

Answer—True; this (what is set aside) also is an 'Indicative Power'; but even though it is *Indicative Power*, if it is of the nature described, it is one that is '*remote*' from the objective,—in the sense that (1) first of all, the *Indicative Power* brings about *Syntactical Connection*,—(2) then the *mantra* attains the 'power' to indicate,—and then (3) the meaning of *Direct Assertion* (to the effect that 'the first portion of the *mantra* should be used at the *placing of the Cake*);—it is in this sense that there is 'remoteness of the objective'; and it is this '*remoteness*' that is the ground for the *Indicative Power* being set aside;—and when it is thus set aside, the first portion cannot become syntactically connected with the second portion. Similarly, the second portion—'*Tasmin sida, etc.*'—cannot become syntactically connected with the first portion.

Further, there is no perceptible purpose served by the first portion of the *mantra* through being syntactically connected with the second portion, —while by itself (through its *Indicative Power*) it serves the perceptible purpose of indicating the *preparing of the seat*.—"How so?"—Because the *preparing of the seat* (by spreading grass), and the *placing of the Cake*, have been declared to be the desired objectives [so that there can be no other objective in the case which could be fulfilled by the connecting of the two portions of the *mantra*].—Similarly, the second portion of the *Mantra* serves the perceptible purpose of indicating the *placing of the Cake*, without living syntactically connected with the first portion. And the two portions are not incapable of accomplishing their own respective purposes without being syntactically connected with one another.—From this it follows that the first portion is to be used at the first act (of *preparing the seat*) and the second portion at the second act (of *placing the Cake*).

It has been argued above that—"that which has been set aside by *Direct Assertion* shall be set aside by *Syntactical Connection* also [so that *Indicative Power* cannot be superior to *Syntactical Connection*]."—This is not right. Because one thing has been set aside by one thing, it does not necessarily follow that it should be set aside by another also. Because even

though *Indicative Power* has been *set aside* as against *Direct Assertion*, on the ground of its being remoter than *Direct Assertion* from the objective, yet when serving a useful purpose, it may be admitted to be authoritative as against *Syntactical Connection*, on the ground of its being nearer to the objective than this *Syntactical Connection*.—Thus also is *Indicative Power* possessed of higher authority than *Syntactical Connection*.

(C)—'*Syntactical Connection*' *is more authoritative than* '*Context*'.

Now the question arises as between *Syntactical Connection and Context*.—But first what we have to consider is—what is '*Prakaraṇa*', *Context?* —*Prakaraṇa* (Context) is the declaration of *what is to be accomplished and which stands in need of the procedure*; it is the *beginning* ('*pra*') *of the action* ('*kriyā*') of *declaring*;—this is also called '*vidhyādi*' (Beginning of Injunction) standing in need of (and taken along with) '*vidhyanta*' (End or Sequel of Injunction).—What 'Syntactical Connection' (*Vākya*) is has already been explained. *

Now, what is the example of conflict between these two (*Syntactical Connection* and *Context*)?

The *Sūktavāka-nigada* provides the requisite example—[This *Sūktavāka* contains the *Mantra-passage*—'(*a*) *Agniṣomāvidaṁ havirajuṣētām avīvṛdhētām maho jyāyo*' *krātām*—(*b*) *Indrāgnī idaṁ havīrajuṣētām avīvṛdhētām maho jyāyo* '*krātām*'—and so on, with the names of other deities as variants].—Here we find one set of deities (*Agni-Soma*) mentioned in connection with the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice, and another set (*Indra-Agni*) in connection with the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice. These two sets of deities do not

* The *Bhāṣya* explains the signification of the component parts of the term '*prakaraṇa*'. '*Pra*' means *beginning*, and '*karaṇa*' or '*kriyā*' means *act*; hence '*prakaraṇa*' or '*prakriyā*' means the *beginning of an act*; the particular *act* of which *Prakaraṇa* is the *beginning* is explained to be the act of *declaring* or *expressing*: that is to say, *Prakaraṇa is the beginning of the act of expressing the Bhāvanā*,—i.e. the beginning of the operation of the sentence laying down the performance of an action. Of any such action, the factor of the *Result* and that of the *Instrument* are expressed by single words, while the declaration of the factor of *Procedure* is done by means of sentences. Briefly then, *Prakaraṇa, Context*, may be defined as the entire passage describing the details of Procedure of any particular action.—'*Vidhyādi*', 'Beginning of Injunction', is another synonym for '*Prakaraṇa*'; and it stands in need of the '*vidhyanta*', 'End of Injunction', by which is meant the *cognition* of the entire mode of the action. Every Injunction of action has (*a*) for its beginning' (*ādi*) the cognition of its procedure, (*b*) for its 'middle' the cognition of the subsidiaries of the action enjoined along with their results,—and (*c*) for its 'end', the cognition of the Result accomplished by the act enjoined.—What distinguishes *Context* from *Syntactical Connection* is the fact that, for a definite purpose, we connect, over again, several *sentences* that have already served their purpose through the expression of the meaning of their component words; whereas *Syntactical Connection* does not operate, for the slightest purpose, in *disjoined* parts, and its purpose is served only by the connecting together of the parts in a definite relationship.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1208-1209.

become syntactically connected with one another;—hence on the basis of the *Indicative Power* of the *Mantra* the term '*indrāgnī*' should be withdrawn at the performance of the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice, but retained at that of the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice. [And similarly, at the performance of the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice, the term '*Agnī-ṣoma*' should be withdrawn: but it should be retained at the performance of the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice.]

Now in connection with this, there arises the question—after withdrawing the reference to the deities (which have no connection with the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice), is the rest of the passage (*b*)—i.e. the words '*avīvṛdhētām maho jyāyo 'krātām*' Taitti. Brā. 3. 5. 10. 3)—to be repeated at both sacrifices, the *Paurṇamāsī* and the *Amāvāsyā*, as many times as it occurs in the entire *Sūktavāka*-hymn;—greater authority being attached to *Context* [all the *mantras* that constitute the *Sūktavāka* being found in the *context* of both sacrifices]?—Or is the remaining passage to be used only at that sacrifice at which the reference to the deities—Indra-Agni—has been retained (i.e. at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice)—greater authority being attached to *Syntactical Connection* [the passage in question being syntactically connected with the reference to *Indra-Agni*]? [That is, at the Paurṇamāsī sacrifice, the passages (*a*) and (*b*) should be read as '(*a*) *Agnīṣomāvidaṁ havirajuṣētām maho jyāyo' krātām*—(*b*) *avīvṛdhētām maho jyāyo krātām*', the reference to *Indra-Agni* in (*b*) being dropped out?—or as only '(*a*) *Agnīṣomāvīdaṁ havirajuṣētām avīvṛdhētam maho jyāyo' krātām*,' the whole of (*b*) being dropped out?—Similarly, at the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice, should the *mantras* be read as '(*b*) *Indrāgnī idaṁ havirajuṣētām avīvṛdhētām maho jyāyo' krātām*,—(*a*) *avīvṛdētām maho jyāyo' krātām*'? or as '*Indrāgnī idaṁ havirajuṣētām maho jyāyo' krātām*'?]—Similarly, in regard to the other *mantras* (composing the *Sūktavāka*).

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*.—"Both these means (*Syntactical Connection* and *Context*) are of equal authority.—Why?—There is as much 'need' (incompleteness) in one case as in the other; and when the need is equal in both, there can be no ground for discriminating between them;—hence both should be regarded as of equal authority.—Or we may regard *Syntactical Connection* as the weaker of the two; as it has been shown to be liable to be set aside by *Indicative Power*."

In answer to the above we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context*.—How?—*Because of the remoteness of the objective*.—"What is the *remoteness of the objective* in this case?"—In the case of Syntactical Connection, each individual word of the sentence, detatched from the rest, becomes incomplete,—and the sentence is complete only when the whole of it is taken together;—in this case therefore the fact of *Syntactical Connection* (all the words forming *one sentence*) is directly perceived;—in the case of *Context*, on the other hand, the fact of the whole of it forming one connected unit is *not perceptible*.—"How is that?"—In the case of *Context*, what happens is that when some detail is found mentioned in close proximity to an act which stands in need of the mention of the details of procedure, then, the latter becomes complete (by being supplemented by the former);—so that what is inferred in this case is that the act in question was incomplete (without the supplement),—and *not* that the two together

form 'one sentence' (are syntactically connected). It is only when there is *Syntactical Connection* that, on the basis of that connection, we assume the *power of indicating* (the requisite detail), and this detail then becomes duly indicated.—Thus the 'remoteness of the objective' in this case is that *Direct Assertion* is nearer to *Syntactical Connection* than to *Context*, from which latter it is far removed.*

Thus then, when action is taken according to the Injunction, 'with the *Sūktavāka* one should offer the Kusha-bundle'—and when *mantras* are used after omitting the names of the deities of the *Paurṇamāsi* or those of the *Amāvasyā*, as the case may be,—then the rest of those *mantras* also is to be used after similar omissions. So that even though, on the strength of *Context*, the portion of the *mantra* (*a*) left after omitting the names of the deities of the *Paurṇamāsī* (*Agni-Soma*) may be *inferred* to be syntactically connected with that *mantra-portion* (*b*) which speaks of the deities of the *Amāvāsyā* (*Indra-Agni*),—yet the connection of this latter portion with the names of the deities of the *Amāvāsyā* (*Indra-Agni*) is *directly perceived*;—as a matter of fact, however, there can be no valid Inference contrary to a fact of Perception. Further, the purpose of the Context having been thus accomplished, the several factors in it become complete, and not being in want of anything, they cannot be made to be in want (and incomplete).

It has been argued that "Being set aside by *Indicative Power*, *Syntactical Connection* should be set aside by *Context* also."—If a means of right cognition has been set aside once, it does not necessarily follow that it is entirely evanescent (and hence rejected) in other cases also. If it were so evanescent, it would not be a 'means of right cognition' at all. The fact of the matter is that a certain thing is effective against one thing (but not against another); for instance, though *Syntactical Connection* has the power to set aside *Context*, it has no such power against *Indicative Power*; and the reason for this lies in the fact that, while as compared to *Indicative Power*, *Syntactical Connection* is *remoter* from the '*objective*',—as compared to

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* If we accept *Context* as the authority in this case, then,—(1) inasmuch as there is no syntactical connection perceived between the *mantra-portion* (*a*) from which the names '*Agni-Soma*' have been omitted and the names '*Indra-Agni*',—it will be necessary to assume this Syntactical Connection;—(2) then, on the basis of this *Syntactical Connection*, it would be necessary to assume in the *mantra* (*a*) the *Indicative Power* to indicate the deities *Indra-Agni*;—(3) when this *Indicative Power* has been assumed, on its basis, there could be the assumption of the *Direct Assertion* to the effect that 'such and such a portion of the *mantra* is to be used at the performance of such and such an act';—thus then between the *Context* and the actual use of the *mantra*, there are *three* intervening steps to be assumed.—In the case of *Syntactical Connection*, on the other hand, the connection between the mantra-words and the Deity is directly perceived;—and (1) on the basis of this connection there is assumption of the *Indicative Power* in the *mantra* to indicate the deities concerned;—and (2) then follows the assumption of the *Direct Assertion* laying down the actual using of the *mantra*;—so that in this case between *Syntactical Connection* and the actual using, there are only *two* intervening steps to be assumed.—It is in this sense that the 'objective' is 'remoter' in the case of *Syntactical Connection* than in that of *Context*.

Context, it is *nearer* to the '*objective*'. Thus it is that *Context* is set aside by *Syntactical Connection.*

(D) ['*Context*' *is more authoritative than* '*Order*'].

Question—"What is the instance of conflict between *Context* and *Order* ?"

Answer—There is the *Rājasūya* sacrifice which consists of several (primary sacrifices) enjoined in a definite order ;—one of these is the *Abhishēchanīya* sacrifice ;—among the details of those sacrifices there is enjoined the *Reciting of the story of Shunaḥshēpa*, which occupies the same place in the order of sequence among the details which the *Abhiṣēchanīya* does among the sacrifices.—Now if 'Context' is to be regarded as of higher authority, then the said Reciting of the story should be taken as forming part of all the sacrifices ;—on the other hand, if higher authority attaches to 'Order', then it should form part of the *Abhiṣēchanīya* sacrifice only. [The question thus is—of which sacrifice does the Reciting of the story form part ?]

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* ;—"Both these means of knowledge ('Context' and 'Order') are of equal authority.—Why ?—Because we do not find any grounds for discriminating between the two, whereby we could determine that this one is possessed of superior authority ; hence we conclude that both are of equal strength.—Further, we have seen that 'Context' is rejected by 'Syntactical Connection'; it will then be equally liable to be rejected by 'Order'."

Against this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—'Context' is superior to 'Order'.—Why ?—'*Because of the remoteness of the objective*' (Sū.).—"What is *the remoteness of the objective* in this case ?"—In cases like the one under consideration the connection of the details with sacrifices would depend upon the 'Syntactical Connection' (between the texts enjoining them) ;—now among a number of details mentioned in the same 'Context',—inasmuch as there is likely to be a 'need' of supplementing,—it may be possible to syntactically connect a sacrifice even though complete in all its details,—with a further detail mentioned in close proximity to itself (in the same *Context*) ;—but it is not equally possible to syntactically connect a sacrifice mentioned in a certain order of sequence with a detail that may be found to be mentioned (elsewhere) in the same order of sequence. The 'Order' of a thing consists only in the particular position that it occupies among a number of things mentioned together ; so that it has to be admitted that when we connect a thing mentioned in a certain 'Order' with others mentioned along with it, simply on the basis of that proximity,—we do not really perceive any 'need' in the thing in question (for such connection). In the case of 'Context', on the other hand, such need (among the several details mentioned in the same Context) is directly perceived.—It is not possible for what is mentioned in the same 'Context' and what is mentioned in the same 'order' to be syntactically connected with the sacrifice in question.—Thus it is that there is a conflict between the two ('Context' and 'Order').—Now, in the case of 'Context', the 'need' (for mutual connection) is directly *perceptible* ; and as such it can set aside

the assumption of 'need' based upon 'Order', which could only be *inferred*. [The process by which these means of knowledge function in the case, leading up to the assumption of the necessary 'Direct Assertion' is as follows]—(1) There is the assumption of mutual 'need',—which leads to (2) the assumption of 'Syntactical Connection',—which leads to (3) the assumption of the 'power to indicate',—and this leads to (4) the assumption of 'Direct' Assertion'. Now this 'objective', 'Direct Assertion', is nearer to the 'Context' than to the 'Order' [because in the case of 'Context', the first step of 'need' is directly perceived, while in that of 'Order', the recognition of 'need' involves an inferential process, which is less direct].—For these reasons, as between 'Context' and 'Order', 'Context' should be regarded as more authoritative.

As regards the argument that "having been set aside by 'Syntactical Connection', 'Context' could be set aside by others also",—this is not right; because what is proper is that what has been set aside (once) should be helped (by another), and not that it should be further set aside.

(E) [*'Order' is more authoritative than 'Name'*].

Question—"What is the example of conflict between 'Order' and 'Name',—and which of the two is more authoritative?"

Answer—Under the section *named* '*Pauroḍāshika*' ('Pertaining to the Cake'),—but in a place in the 'order of sequence which is the same as that of the *Sānnāyya*' (Curd-Butter),—we find the *mantra* '*Shundhadhvam daivyāya karmaṇē*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 1. 3. 1), laid down for the purposes of *purification*.—In regard to this, there arises the question—'Name' being regarded as more authoritative, should the *mantra* be used for the purification of the vessels containing the *Cake*?—Or 'Order' being regarded as more authoritative, should it be used for the purification of the vessels containing the *Curd-Butter*?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The two means of knowledge are of equal authority.—Why?—Because there is no difference between the two.—Or, we may regard 'Name' as the more authoritative of the two; as 'Order' has been found to be liable to rejection by 'Context' also."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—'Order' is the more authoritative of the true.—Why?—'*Because of the remoteness of the objective*' (Sū).—"What is *the remoteness of the objective* in this case?"—(In the case of the use of a *mantra* being indicated by 'Order') what happens is that the 'Syntactical Connection' (of the *mantra*) with something (in the same *context*) having been recognised by means of 'Context',—if any particular thing happens to be mentioned in proximity to it (i.e. in the same order of sequence), there follows the assumption of mutual 'need', which again leads to the assumption of 'Syntactical Connection' (of the *mantra*) with that particular thing.—As for 'Name' on the other hand, it is only a *secular* (non-Vedic) term, and nothing *secular* can have any authority on matters like the one under consideration.—Consequently 'Order' should be regarded as more authoritative (than 'Name').

Objection—" If that is so, then what follows is that in matters like the one under discussion, the use of *mantras* is indicated by 'Order',—not that 'Order' is more authoritative because of the *remoteness of the objective* (in the case of 'Name') [which is the thesis desired to be proved by the *Siddhānta*]. It is when two means of knowledge appertain to the same matter that there is a comparison between the two regarding their authoritative character; in the way in which it has been argued, however, 'Name' is not a *means of knowledge* at all, because it is a secular word, and in the case of secular words it is the *person* (the speaker) who is the authoritative *source of knowledge*."

Reply—This does not affect the position at all. As a matter of fact, in the case in question the fact of the *mantra* being subsidiary to one thing or the other is not cognised through the authority of any Person; what *is* cognised through the *Person* is the fact that *the name 'Pauroḍāshika' applies to this particular section of the Veda*; in reality, our sole source of information consists in the *Person* (or Persons who, in the course of their reading, have given definite names to certain sections of the Veda);—just as such person or persons are the sole authority for such ideas as—(*a*) 'this *mantra* is mentioned in the same order of sequence as the *Sānnāya*', (*b*) 'it occurs in such and such a *Context*', (*c*) 'it is thus syntactically connected',—(*d*) 'this is a Vedic term'.—These ideas do not pertain to matters beyond the senses;—hence trustworthy persons are the source of knowledge in regard to such matters; it is only in matters beyond the senses that *trustworthy persons* are not the source of knowledge. [This is what is meant by our argument that 'Name' is a secular word.]—So that 'Name' is a real means of knowledge; and in so far as it is a means of knowledge, its authority has to be examined.

Says the *Opponent*—" In that case you have to explain *the remoteness from the objective* in the case of 'Name'."

The remoteness from the objective is as follows:—As a matter of fact, the definite connection of the *mantra* with the *Sānnāyya* is indicated by the fact of its occurring in the same 'Order' of sequence (as the *Sānnāyya*); but no such definite connection of the *mantra* is indicated by the 'Name' ('*pauroḍāshika*';—all that happens is that when we find the term ('*pauroḍāshika*') pronounced, we gather, from *Presumption*, that there must be some sort of connection (between the *mantra* and the *Puroḍāsha*).—Thus it is that, as before (in other cases), there is *remoteness from the objective* (in the case of 'Name'); and (for this reason) 'Name' is set aside by 'Order'.*

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* What is meant is that in all cases the action of one man depends upon what he has seen in other men; nor do we find the Veda making any such declarations as 'this thing is mentioned in the same order of sequence as something else', 'this occurs in such and such a Context', and so forth;—it is only when men are reciting the Veda, that we come to notice these facts;—those readers themselves must have noticed the same facts when some other men had been reciting the Veda; and so on and on, such noticing of the facts could be traced to time without beginning, and as such these facts would come to be regarded as authoritative. Otherwise, from the point of view of the Veda alone, the 'Context' as well as 'Non-Context' (*per se*)

(F) [*The setting aside is possible even for such cognitions as have got at their objective.*]

Question (against the entire *Adhikaraṇa*)—"When it is said that 'this means of knowledge is set aside by that' and 'that by this' and so on,—that which is set aside,—is it one that has got at the objective of that which sets it aside? [i.e. Is the *rejected Pramāṇa* one that has got at the same objective as the *rejecting Pramāṇa*?]—'What are you driving at?'—Well, if the former has not got at the same objective, what would be set aside? [as there would, in this case, be nothing to be set aside—says the *Ṛjuvimalā*]—If, on the other hand, it *has* got at the objective, then how could it be set aside?"

Answer—The previous cognition is certainly one that has got at the objective of the subsequent rejecting cognition.—How so?—We infer this from the fact that the general causal agency that brings about cognitions is present (in the case of the previous cognition also).—"Then, how is it set aside?"—It is not quite *set aside*; what happens is that there follows another cognition to the effect that 'this previous cognition is wrong'.—"What would be the character of a cognition that is *not-wrong*?"—When, even upon pondering over it, it is found that the cognition is not followed by a contrary cognition sublating it, then that cognition is regarded to be *not-wrong*.—It is on this principle that among the several means of knowledge in the case in question—viz. (1) 'Direct Assertion', (2) 'Indicative Power', (3) 'Syntactical Connection', (4) 'Context', (5) 'Order' and (6) 'Name',—the one that precedes is more authoritative than what follows, because in the case of the cognition obtained through it, even pondering over it, it is found that there is no contrary cognition sublating it.—It is for this reason that *when there is a collision—i.e. conflict—among these, the one that follows is weaker than what precedes, because of the remoteness of the objective.*

[The whole of this last discussion (F) has been alternatively explained as having a wider scope and referring to all cases of the setting aside of one cognition by another. See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1217-1222]—Maṇḍana Mishra, however, in his *Anukramaṇikā* has treated this as a distinct *Adhikaraṇa*, under Sūtra 14, just like the foregoing five *Adhikaraṇas* (A to E).

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would be equally without authority.—Then, inasmuch as the above facts will have been noticed by many persons, there could be no suspicion of their being defective through discrepancies in the perceptive faculty of any one person.—Thus then, it is clear that due authority does attach to 'Name', as a means of knowledge; but though it is so in certain places, yet in others, it is set aside whenever it is found to be more remote from its objective than other means of knowledge.—[*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1215.]

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The number 'twelve' in connection with the 'Upasads' pertains to the 'Ahīna' sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ON ACCOUNT OF THE 'CONTEXT', THE TERM 'AHĪNA' SHOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE TAKEN IN THE SECONDARY (FIGURATIVE) SENSE."

Bhāṣya.

[We have dealt with cases of conflict between one means of knowledge with the one that follows immediately after it, in the enumeration; we are now going to deal with cases of similar conflicts at random; and the present *Adhikaraṇa* is going to deal with a case of conflict between 'Direct Assertion' and 'Context'; according to the *Ṛjuvimalā* this a case of conflict between 'Syntactical Connection' and 'Context'.]

In the context of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, we find the text—'*Tisra ēva sāhnasya upasadaḥ, dvādasha ahīnasya*' ['There are three *Upasads* at the *Sāhna* sacrifice and twelve at the *Ahīna*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 2. 5. 1)—['*Sāhna*' is a name for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, based on the ground of its being completed in *one* day;—'*Upasads*' are the *homa-offerings* made during the time following the Initiation-day and before the day of the Soma-extraction;—'*Ahīna*' is the name given to those sacrifices which consist of several repetitions of the Soma-sacrifice lasting for two, three or more days.]

In connection with this text, there arises the question—Does the number 'twelve' mentioned in connection with the *Upasads* pertain to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* or to the *Ahīna* sacrifice?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The number should be taken as appertaining to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.—Why?—*Because of the 'Context'*;—i.e. it is only when it is thus taken that the 'Context' is honoured.—"But 'Context' should be set aside by 'Syntactical Connection' (as the *sentence* '*dvādasha ahīnasya*' distinctly says that the number of *Upasads* is 'twelve' *at the Ahīna*)."—It is *not* set aside.—Why?—Because the term '*ahīna*' literally means 'what is not *hīna* or poor',—i.e. the sacrifice which is *not poor*, either in the point of sacrificial fee, or of sacrificial implements, or of results;—and in this sense the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself would be *Ahīna* (in the said figurative sense) [so that the said *sentence* also would connect the number 'twelve' with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself, and not with any *other* sacrifice of the name of '*Ahīna*']."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE NUMBER SHOULD BE SEPARATED (FROM THE CONTEXT), BECAUSE THE WORD ('AHĪNA') IN ITS PRIMARY SENSE HAS NO CONNECTION (WITH JYOTIṢṬOMA).

Bhāṣya.

The number 'twelve' of the *Upasads* 'should be separated' (from the Context);—why?—*because there is no connection* with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.—"Why should there be no connection (with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)?"—Because it is clearly perceived that the number in question is syntactically connected with the *Ahīna*.—"But the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself is '*Ahīna*' in the figurative sense."—It will not be right to take it in that sense; so long as the primary sense is applicable there can be no justification for the word being taken in a figurative sense.—"But the term '*ahīna*' can be taken as a negative compound (meaning that which is *not-hīna*, not poor); and this will be a primary signification of the term."—This is not possible, we reply; for if the term '*ahīna*' were a negative compound, then it would have the accent on the first syllable; as it is, however, it has the accent on the middle (second) syllable [See *Vārtika* under Pāṇini 6. 2. 2].—From all this it follows that the indications of the 'Context' should be set aside and the number 'twelve' should be taken as appertaining to the *Ahīna* sacrifice.

Further, we have the assertion also in the text itself, to the effect that 'at the *Sāhna* there are three Upasads, but there are twelve at the *Ahīna*';—this assertion becomes explicable only if the *Ahīna* is a sacrifice different from the *Sāhna* (Jyotiṣṭoma); so that, the said assertion being there, the number 'twelve' must appertain to the *Ahīna* sacrifice.

[Kumārila has taken exception to this presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa*, and proposed a somewhat different presentation,—for which see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1226-1227.]

Adhikaraṇa (9) : *The two 'Pratipads' are to be separated from the 'Context' and connected with 'Kulāya' and other sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (17).

WHAT IS CONNECTED WITH DUALITY AND PLURALITY (SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM THE 'CONTEXT'), BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ENJOINED (ELSEWHERE).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Yuvam hi sthaḥ svapatī* (Sāmaveda 2. 351) *iti dvayoryajamānayoḥ pratipadaṁ kuryāt* (cf. Pañchavimsha-Brāhmaṇa 6. 10. 14);—*Ētē asṛgramindavaḥ* (Sāmaveda 2. 180) *iti bahubhyo yajamānēbhyaḥ*' (cf. Pañchaviṁsha-Brāhmaṇa 6. 9. 13). ['*Pratipad*' is the name given to the verse that is recited before the singing of the *Stotra-hymn*; the meaning of the texts therefore is that 'for two sacrificers, the *Pratipad* should consist of the verse '*Yuvaṁ hi sthaḥ svapatī* etc.', and for several sacrificers, the *Pratipad* should consist of the verse '*Ētē asṛgramindavaḥ*, etc.']

In connection with this, there arises the question—Are the two *Pratipads* here laid down to be used at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice itself?—Or should they be separated from the Context and used at a sacrifice performed by two sacrificers, such as the *Kulāya* and the like—and at one performed by several sacrificers, such as the *Dvirātra* and the like?

The conclusion (*Siddhānta*) that suggests itself is that '*what is connected with duality and plurality*' (i.e. what is spoken of in connection with *two* sacrificers and *several* sacrificers), not having any connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (which has a single sacrificer),—the two *Pratipads* should be separated from the 'Context': because in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we do not find *two sacrificers* mentioned,—as we do in connection with the *Kulāya*, in regard to which the injunction is—'The *King and the Priest*, desiring absorption into God-head, should perform this *Kulāya* sacrifice' (Jaiminīya-Brā. 2. 132).

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA—*urged against the Siddhānta stated in the foregoing Sūtra*]—"THEY MIGHT FIND PLACE (IN THE JYOTIṢṬOMA), IN THE EVENT OF TWO OR MORE SACRIFICERS BEING ENGAGED IN IT FOR SOME SPECIAL PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"If you hold the opinion that the two *Pratipads* should be separated from the 'Context',—then, this cannot be right; as it

would mean the rejection of the authority of the 'Context'.—'Let the Context be rejected (it is only right that it should be rejected), on the ground that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* has no connection with *two* or *several* sacrificers'.—Even though there may be no texts laying down *two* sacrificers for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, it would be possible for two sacrificers to be there *for some special purpose*; for instance, there may be some act (connected with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) which the sacrificer would be unable to accomplish singly by himself, and which he could accomplish with the help of an assistant; as a matter of fact, when a man has to perform a sacrifice, he should perform it in any way he can do it; consequently, it would be open to the sacrificer to take an assistant, even though this might involve the disobeying of certain injunctions (regarding the performance of certain acts by the *sacrificer himself*, for instance). In this manner, the two *Pratipads* would remain within the Context. Consequently they should not be separated from the Context."

SUTRA (19).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS THE ARCHETYPE IS CONNECTED WITH ONE ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

The 'archetype' in this case is the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; of this the accessory details have been all clearly laid down by the texts themselves, and none of it has got to be deduced from the general maxim (that 'the Ectype is to be performed like the Archetype').—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then what is clearly laid down by the texts cannot be rejected. In the case of *ectypal* sacrifices, on the other hand, as details would be deduced from the said general maxim, they would be merely *inferred*, and as such liable to rejection. Then again, due significance is meant to be attached to the *singleness* of the performer of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, which, being thus *directly asserted*, could not be set aside by mere *Indicative Power*.—Even in cases where the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is found to be laid down as compulsory, we find only a *single* sacrificer spoken of;—e.g. in such texts '*Vasantē vasantē jyotiṣā yajēta*' [where '*yajēta*' is in the singular number]. From all this it follows that the two *Pratipads* in question should be separated from the 'Context'.

Question—"Why should not the text containing the terms in the Dual number (i.e. the first text '*Yuvaṁ hi sthaḥ*, etc.') be taken as referring to the sacrificer's wife? The two persons meant by the Dual number in the text '*yuvaṁ hi sthaḥ*, etc.' would thus be the sacrificer and his one wife; and cases where the sacrificer has several wives would come under the second text '*Ētē asṛgramindavaḥ*, etc.'—Just as the injunction of wearing silk—'*kṣaumē vasānāvagnimādadhīyātām*' (where we have the Dual number) [has been taken as referring to the sacrificer and his wife,—in the same manner the injunction of using the *Pratipads* (which has the Dual or the Plural number) [may be taken as referring to the sacrificer and his one or several wives]."

Answer—In the case of the injunction (of wearing silk), it is impossible

to take the direct primary meaning (of the Dual number, as referring to *two male sacrificers*; as there is no performance of the *Agnihotra* laid down as to be done by *two sacrificers*), and hence the word (with the Dual number) is taken in a figurative sense, whereby the word in the masculine gender ('*vasānau*') is taken as including a female member (the sacrificer's wife). In the case in question, on the other hand, the Dual number and the Plural number, in their direct signification, are found to be applicable to the sacrifices actually laid down as to be performed by two *men* and several *men*; and hence there can be no justification for taking in an extended sense such expressions as '*bahubhyaḥ yajamānēbhyaḥ*' ('for several sacrificers'). As for the expression with the *Dual* number,—'*dvayoryajamānayoḥ*' ('for two sacrificers'),—the explanation that has been suggested,—that the term is to be taken as an *Ēkashēṣa* copulative compound made up of the terms '*Yajamānaḥ*' (Masculine) and '*Yajamānā*' (Feminine), and as such standing for the *two* persons, the sacrificer and his wife—also takes the expression in a figurative (extended) sense.

Further [if, at all performances of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Pratipads* to be used were the two that we are considering—viz.: (*a*) '*Yuvam hi sthaḥ*, etc.' and (*b*) '*Ētē asṛgramindavaḥ*, etc.', on the ground that in every case the sacrificer would be accompanied by one or more wives, as suggested by the *Pūrvapakṣa* then], there would be no room for the *Pratipad* in the form of the *mantra* '*Upāsmai gāyatā naraḥ* etc.' (Sāmaveda 2. 1-3) [which is the special *Pratipad* prescribed as the invarible concomitant of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice].

From all this it becomes established that the two *Pratipads* under discussion should be separated from the 'Context'.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The 'Jāghanī', 'Tail', should not be separated from the Context.*

[We now proceed to consider cases which form exceptions to the principle of factors being removed from their Context.—*Tantravārtika.*—It has been established that *sentence* (i.e. *Syntactical Connection*) is more authoritative than *Context*; and we are now going to consider a case where the exact meaning of the *sentence* itself is doubtful.—*Bṛhatī.*]

SŪTRA (20).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'JĀGHANĪ' ALSO (SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM THE CONTEXT) BECAUSE IT IS A PART."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Jāghanyā patnīḥ saṁyājayanti*'—['*Jāghanī*' is the tail of the animal;—and the term '*patnī*' here stands for the action consisting of four oblations to the wives of the deities, which is, on that account, called '*Patnīsaṁyāja*', 'sacrifice to the wives'].—In regard to this there arises the question—Does this injunction pertain to the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*-sacrifices? Or is it to be separated from the 'Context' and attached to the *Pashu* (dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice)?

Question—"On what grounds should it be attached to the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*? and on what grounds to the *Pashu*?"

Answer—If the *Patnīsaṁyājas* are taken as enjoined in reference to the '*Jāghanī*', then the injunction in question should be separated from the context. If, on the other hand, the *Jāghanī* is taken as enjoined in reference to the *Patnīsaṁyājas*, then the injunction must remain in the context and be attached to the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"What is laid down in the Injunction should be removed from the Context.—'Why should it be removed?'—Because as a matter of fact, the *Patnīsaṁyājas* are enjoined (as a *Saṁskāra*, sanctification) in reference to the *Jāghanī*.—How so?—Because the injunction of the *Patnīsaṁyājas* is got at directly by means of the words (of the text '*Jāghanyā patnīḥ saṁyājayanti*'); while that of the *Jāghanī* (Tail) is got at through 'Syntactical Connection'; and what is authoritative (as a means of knowledge) is the direct *word*, not 'Syntactical Connection'.—'But the *Patnīsaṁyājas* have been already enjoined (by another text)'.—True, they have been already enjoined; but they are again enjoined (by the text under discussion) in reference to the *Jāghanī* (Tail),—the sense being that the *Jāghanī* is to be made connected with the *Patnīsaṁyājas*. Such being the case, at the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, even if the *Patnīsaṁyājas* were performed without the *Jāghanī*, they would not be defective; and yet the *Jāghanī* is brought up at it; hence it follows that the *Jāghanī* is to be used at a sacrifice where it might serve some useful purpose; and this is possible

at the *Pashu*-sacrifice, not at the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*-sacrifices. The *Jāghanī* too being only a part (of the animal) could not justify the employment of the entire animal (and it could be taken out of the animal that has been killed and used elsewhere).—From all this it follows that the injunction should be taken out of the Context."

SŪTRA (21).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY IT IS AN INJUNCTION (OF THE TAIL); AS IT IS THE TAIL THAT IS SOMETHING NEW (NOT HAVING BEEN ENJOINED ELSEWHERE).

Bhāṣya.

In reality it is the *Jāghanī*, Tail, that is enjoined by the text in question as an accessory of the *Patnīsaṁyājas*.—Why?—*Because it is something new*; that is to say, nowhere else has the *Tail* been prescribed as an accessory of the *Patnīsaṁyājas*. In another text (as has been pointed out above) though the *Patnīsaṁyājas* themselves have been enjoined, their connection with the *Tail* has not been prescribed. As a matter of fact, whenever the connection between two things is enjoined, one of the two members connected is always such as has been enjoined elsewhere, and the connection comes in as its invariable concomitant. Or, we may take it that the injunction is of the *connection*, and the members connected come in as invariable concomitants (of the Connection). So that, in a case where both members come in as mere indicatives of the Connection, it is the Connection that is enjoined directly by a word expressive of itself; whereas in a case where only one of the two members comes in as the indicative (of the Connection), what the injunction does is to point to that indicative member and enjoin the other member;—in the case in question it is the *Patnīsaṁyājas* that are pointed out as members indicative of the Connection.—"How do you know that?"—Because of the presence of the term '*Patnī*' ('wife') in the name,—which term certainly could not be understood as indicating all sacrifices (by reason of the presence of the *wife* being necessary at all performances); in fact, it indicates only that sacrifice of which the wives are the direct means of accomplishment [and the *Patnīsaṁyājas* constitute such sacrifices].

Question—"Why cannot we take it the other way—i.e. it is the *Tail* that is pointed out as the member indicative of the connection, and it is the *Patnīsamyājas* that are enjoined?"

Answer—The sacrifice spoken of in the text in question being something new (not already enjoined elsewhere), it is not possible for the 'wives' (alone) to be taken as enjoined in connection with that sacrifice;—and if the *Tail* were pointed out (as the member indicative of the connection), if the text were taken as enjoining *the sacrifice along with the 'wives'*, then there would be syntactical split. As a matter of fact, *the sacrifice along with the 'wives'* (i.e. the *Patnīsaṁyājas*) is one that is already enjoined elsewhere; and it is this sacrifice that is merely pointed out in the text in question (as the member indicative of the connection); it is for this reason that we

conclude that what the text in question does is to point to this sacrifice as the member indicative of the connection and to *enjoin* the *Tail*.

As regards the argument that "the injunction of the *Tail* could be obtained only through 'Syntactical Connection', whereas that of the *Patnīsamyājas* is obtained from 'Direct Assertion',"—it has been already explained that it is not possible for the text in question to be taken as an injunction of the *sacrifice* (*Patnīsaṁyāja*), because such an interpretation would involve a syntactical split.

For these reasons, the text must be taken as enjoining the *Tail*. And such being the case, the performance of the *Patnīsaṁyāja* sacrifice *at the Darsha-pūrṇamāsa itself* would remain defective, without the *Tail*: hence the *Tail* should not be removed from the *Context* (of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, where it happens to be enjoined).

SŪTRA (22).

"IT IS ONLY A PART",—IF THIS ARGUMENT BE PUT FORWARD [then the answer would be as given in the next Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, above) that "the *Tail* being only a part of the animal, it could not justify the use of the entire animal,—and hence the *Tail* should be removed from its Context".—Now this argument has got to be refuted [and this is done in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (23).

[REPLY].—NOT SO; BECAUSE THE SCRIPTURE DOES NOT LAY DOWN THE 'TAIL' IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE (DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA) ITSELF.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the 'Tail' is not laid down in connection with the Primary Sacrifices of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa* [it is laid down only in connection with the *Patnīsaṁyājas*, which are subsidiary to the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*]; so that the *Patnīsaṁyāja* sacrifices would be performed with the 'Tail' obtained from the animal killed at the *Pashu-sacrifice*; specially as all that is prescribed for the *Patnīsaṁyājas* is the 'Tail', without any qualifications; so that when the *Patnīsaṁyājas* are being performed in connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, the 'Tail' could be obtained (if not from the body of the animal killed at the *Pashu-sacrifice*) even by purchase and such other means; and hence there need be no removal of the 'Tail' (from the context of the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*).—[For the *Patnīsamyājas*, Butter also is found to be prescribed by another text as the material to be used; hence when the *Patnīsamyāja* comes to be performed in connection with the *Darsha-pūrṇamāsa*, one may use, at his option, either the *Tail* or the *Butter*].

Adhikaraṇa (11): *The 'Cementing of the Slabs' is to be done at the 'Ectypes' or 'Forms' of the Agniṣṭoma.*

SŪTRA (24).

[Preliminary Pūrvapakṣa]—"The 'Cementing' should be done at the Archetypal Sacrifice (Jyotiṣṭoma), because, like 'Purchase', its usefulness does not cease".

Bhāṣya.

[This is another instance of conflict between 'Syntactical Connection' and 'Context'.—*Tantravārtika.*]

In the section on *Jyotiṣṭoma*, in connection with the two slabs used for pounding the *Soma-shoots*, we read—'*Dīrghasomā santṛdyād dhṛtyai*' (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 2. 11. 3) ['At the *Dīrghasoma* one should cement the slabs for securing proper support'].—In regard to this, there arises the following question—Is this 'cementing' to be done at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself [the term '*dīrghasoma*' in this case being taken as standing for the *Jyotiṣṭoma*],—or at those performances of the Soma-sacrifice which extend over a long period of time?—[The *Tantravārtika* sets forth five alternatives in this connection—(1) Is the cementing to be done at the main *Jyotiṣṭoma*?—or (2) at that Jyotiṣṭoma which is performed by a *tall* (*dīrgha*) sacrificer?—or (3) at the *Ukthya* and such other 'forms' of the Agniṣṭoma which extend over longer periods of time than the other 'forms'?—or (4) at the *Sattra* and *Ahīna* sacrifices only, which extend over several days?—or (5) at all sacrifices other than the *Agniṣṭoma*?]

[Before taking up the consideration of the several alternatives, the first point to determine is whether or not the 'Cementing' is to be disjoined from the 'Context' in which it is laid down. Because if it is decided that it *cannot* be taken away from the *Context*, then it will have to be done at the main *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself.]

On this preliminary question, we have the following *Purvapakṣa* (A):—"Inasmuch as the usefulness of the cementing '*does not cease*' (is not absent) in the main *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—it should not be removed from the Context [i.e. it should be done at the main *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself].—'But in connection with the main *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is another declaration that the two slabs *should not be cemented*.' (Cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 2. 11. 3; Mai.-Saṁ. 1. 10. 13.)—The answer to this is that there should be option, as in the case of the 'Purchase' (of *Soma*); that is to say, there are several things laid down (in Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 10. 1-2) as the price to be paid for the *Soma*—such as 'gold', 'cow' and so forth; and these are regarded as so many optional

alternatives; in the same manner, in the case in question there should be option—so that the 'cementing' may or may not be done." *

SŪTRA (25).

[PRELIMINARY SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE REMOVAL (OF THE 'CEMENTING') FROM THE CONTEXT; BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF A SPECIAL QUALIFICATION.

Bhāṣya.

[In answer to the *Preliminary Pūrvapakṣa* (A), we have the following *Preliminary Siddhānta* (A)]—The 'Cementing' should, in reality, be removed from the Context; as the text mentions a 'special qualification'—viz. 'The Cementing should be done at the *Dīrgha*-Soma' (where the 'Soma' has been qualified by the epithet '*dīrgha*', 'long-protracted'), and it is the *Sattras* that are 'long-protracted' in comparison with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* [so that the 'Cementing' should have to be done at the *Sattras*, and not at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* to which the Context belongs.]

SŪTRA (26).

[OBJECTION]—"THE 'SPECIAL QUALIFICATION' MAY PERTAIN TO THE PERFORMER; AS IT IS BASED UPON HIM".

Bhāṣya.

[Says the Opponent]—"The 'Cementing' should not be removed from the main *Jyotiṣṭoma*; thus would the 'Context' be honoured.—As

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* Kumārila is not satisfied with this explanation of the example of 'purchase' cited in the *Sūtra*. He supplies the following explanation—The objection being that, since the main *Jyotiṣṭoma* is finished in a short time, there should be no need for the *cementing* of the slabs, as there would not be much strain on them,—the answer is that even so, the *Cementing* will have its use, '*like the Purchase*'; that is to say, in the case of the Purchase of Soma, even though the purchase is duly effected by the payment of any one of the alternative prices prescribed, yet in actual practice, all these prescribed articles are given to the vendor, in strict accordance with the scriptural text which lays down the giving of those in exchange for the *Soma*; and though the payment of all these is not necessary, yet it is not entirely useless; as it serves the purpose of winning the good graces of the owner of the *Soma*, and the scriptures declare that great prosperity accrues to the purchaser of the *Soma* if the purchase is effected to the entire satisfaction of the owner. In the same manner, in the case in question, even though the *uncemented* slabs would be quite sufficient for the purpose of pounding the *Soma* for the main *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—yet, as we are cognisant of the fact that the *cementing* of the slabs brings prosperity, the *cementing* should be done; and it would serve the useful purpose of bringing prosperity to the performer.—See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1240.

for the term '*dīrgha-soma*', this may be taken as pertaining to the performer,—the Soma-sacrifice performed by a 'tall' ('*dīrgha*') person being called '*Dīrgha-Soma*'."

SŪTRA (27).

[ANSWER]—IT MUST PERTAIN TO THE SACRIFICE: AS OTHERWISE THE COMMENDATION WOULD BE INEXPLICABLE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the 'cementing' should find place in the main *Jyotiṣṭoma*; it should be done only at that Soma-sacrifice which is *long-protracted*,—the '*dīrghatva*' (*length*) pertaining to the *sacrifice*, not to the *performer*.—Why?—Because '*otherwise the commendation would be inexplicable*'; in the text in question, we have the commendatory term '*dhṛtyai*' which means 'for the purpose of securing proper support'. What happens at the long-protracted Soma-sacrifice is that the *Soma* is pounded with stones over and over again; so that there is fear of the slabs on which *Soma* is pounded breaking under the strain; and hence in this case the 'cementing' serves the purpose of making the slabs capable of 'supporting' the strain,—and thus the commendatory term becomes applicable [which could not be the case in the main *Jyotiṣṭoma*, where there are only three extractions of juice and hence the pounding is done only thrice].—For this reason the 'cementing' should be removed (from the 'context' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and done at the long-protracted *Soma-sacrifice*).

[The conclusions hitherto reached are—(1) That the 'cementing' is *not* to be done at the *main Jyotiṣṭoma* in general,—nor (2) at the *main Jyotiṣṭoma performed by a tall person*.—Then the third alternative is taken up—viz. that it should be done at the other 'forms' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. Sūtra (28) objects to this view;—Sūtra (29) answers these objections and sets forth the *final Siddhānta*—viz. that the 'cementing' should be done at those 'forms' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* which are *long-protracted*.—It has to be noted that the *Bhāṣya* urges, in favour of this *Siddhānta*, the argument that this preserves the connection of the 'Context', as the 'Forms' are *forms* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and the Context is of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; so that in this *Siddhānta*, there is no 'removal' of the *Cementing* from the 'Context' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.—It has to be borne in mind that according to what follows under 3. 6. 41–43, the other 'forms' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* do not belong to the same 'Context' as the main *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself; they are so many *modifications* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and have distinct results of their own.—See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1243 and p. 1579.

It may be pointed out here that the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is made up of seven '*Saṁsthās*' or 'Forms',—of which the following four are the more important ones—(1) The '*Agniṣṭoma*', which ends with the *Yajñāyajñīya Hymn*, (2) the '*Ukthya*', ending with the *Ukthya Hymn*, (3) the '*Ṣodashin*', and (4) the '*Atirātra*'.—Of these the *Agniṣṭoma* is the one most intimately related to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; as there can be no *Jyotiṣṭoma* without the *Agniṣṭoma*: while, even without the *Ukthya* and the other 'forms', the character of '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' remains intact. The 'Context' therefore belongs to the *Jyotiṣṭoma in its Agniṣṭoma form*; and the other 'forms' are therefore out of that 'Context'.]

SŪTRA (28).

[FINAL PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"AS REGARDS THE '(OTHER) FORMS', [IF THE TERM 'DĪRGHA-SOMA' WERE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR THESE], THERE WOULD BE NO PECULIARITY IN THE 'SUPPORT' REQUIRED; JUST AS THERE IS NONE IN THE CASE OF THE TERM STANDING FOR THE PERFORMER [so that the commendatory term '*dhṛtyai*' would remain inexplicable]."

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* should be taken as following after a few words.—What are these words ?—They are as follows—"Why cannot the *cementing* find a place in the other *Forms ?* If it did, then the Context would be duly honoured, and the term '*dīrgha-soma*' also would become applicable,—because the 'Soma-sacrifice' is longer protracted at the *Ukthya* and other *Forms* than at the *Agniṣṭoma* (which is the first and the inseparable *Form* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)."

It is in answer to these words that we have the *Sūtra* (28), which embodies the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"Even though the *Forms* be *long-protracted*, the commendatory term cannot be applicable to them; because the quantity of *Soma* at these is the same (as that at the ordinary *Jyotiṣṭoma*), —the injunction on this point being that 'one should measure out *ten handfulls*'. So that in the case of the other *Forms* also, there would be no more 'support' needed for the slabs than in that of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. For these reasons, the 'cementing' must be removed from the 'context' (and should not be done either at the main *Jyotiṣṭoma* or at its other *Forms*)."

SŪTRA (29).

[FINAL SIDDHANTA]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE DONE AT THE 'UKTHYA' AND OTHER FORMS; AS THE PURPOSE TO BE SERVED IS PRESENT IN THEIR CASE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that there should be 'removal' of the 'cementing' (from the Context); in fact, in consideration of the *Context*, there should be no such 'removal'.—As for the term '*dīrgha-soma*', this is quite applicable to the said *Forms*, because they extend over a long time.—As regards the quantity of *Soma*, that also is larger at these Terminuses than at the *Agniṣṭoma*; because the number of offerings go on increasing at the said *Forms*,—and until there is an increase in the quantity of the substance offered, there can be no increase in the number of offerings.—[It might be argued that the number of offerings might be increased by increasing the number of offering-cups, among whom the same small quantity of *Soma* might be distributed; but]—The name '*graha*' (offering-cup) is applied to the cup only when it is full: hence one could not take up for offering,

the cups that would be *not full*. Thus then there being a large quantity of Soma to be pounded, there would be fear of the slabs breaking, and hence the securing of proper 'support' becomes desirable; and this renders the commendatory term '*dhṛtyai*' quite explicable (and applicable).

SŪTRA (30).

[OBJECTION]—"THERE BEING NO DIFFERENCE IN THE TWO CASES, THE COMMENDATION WOULD BE MEANINGLESS IN BOTH",—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer would be as in the following Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

[Says the Opponent]—"If you hold the view that in the case of the other *Forms*, there being an increase in the quantity of the substance to be offered, the commendatory word becomes quite applicable,—then our answer is that it is not so; because even so, the commendation would be meaningless.—Why so?—Because *there would be no difference in the two cases*, regarding the quantity of *Soma*; that is to say, the quantity of *Soma* required at the *Ukthya* and other *Forms* would be the same as that at the *Agniṣṭoma*; as at the *Ukthya* and other *Forms* also, only 'ten handfulls' of Soma would have to be secured.—'But for special purposes, the quantity of the substance to be offered would have to be increased.'—The substance to be offered having been declared to be 'ten handfulls' how could that be increased? For instance, in a case where the number of *parvas* (joints) in the *Soma-twig* has been fixed at *three*, it will not do for one to have a piece with a large number of joints.—Thus then, the *support* required being the same in both cases, the commendatory word remains inapplicable in the case of the other Forms. Consequently, there should be 'removal' (of the 'Cementing' from the Context)."

SŪTRA (31).

[ANSWER]—IT WOULD BE QUITE APPLICABLE, AS THERE IS NO FIXITY* (IN THE QUANTITY PRESCRIBED).

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to say that there should be 'removal' (of the 'Cementing'); because it could be done at the *Forms* (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), whereby the Context would be duly honoured.—As for the commendation, it would be quite applicable when the quantity of the offering-substance is increased in accordance with the needs of the situation.—As to *how* the

* The term '*Anityatvāt*' has been translated in accordance with the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*; according to Kumārila, who rejects this interpretation, the term stands for the absence of restriction regarding the quantity of *Soma*, which is distinctly declared in such texts as '*Avishiṣṭān aṁshūn abhyūhēt*'.—See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1245.

quantity could be increased (when the quantity has been fixed at 'ten handfulls' of *Soma-twigs*, each of which should be *three-jointed*),—this could be done by taking up twigs in which the joints would be at longer intervals (so that the *three-jointed twig* in this case would make a much larger bulk than the same in the other case);—further, at the third '*Extraction*', one *piece* of *Soma* is pounded,—the exact size of this 'piece' is nowhere laid down; so that one could take up a piece which may have several joints or thicker joints,—whereby there would be an increase in the quantity of the offering-substance; and in this manner the commendation becomes quite applicable.—For these reasons it becomes established that the 'Cementing' is to be done at the *Forms* (other than the *Agniṣṭoma*) [i.e. at the *Ukthya* and other *Forms* of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*]; [and as for 'removal' or 'non-removal', this would be a case of 'non-removal' if the 'Context' of the *Forms* is taken to be the same as that of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself; and it would be one of 'removal' if the 'Context' of those *Forms* is different from that of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—as has been proved to be the case under 3. 6. 41-43].

[Kumārila finds fault with this form of the *Siddhānta*; according to him the *Siddhānta* should be that the Cementing should find a place,—not only at the Ukthya and other Forms of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* itself,—but *at all Soma-sacrifices with the single exception of the Agniṣṭoma*.—See *Tantra-vārtika*—Trans., pp. 1245-1246.]

Adhikaraṇa (12): *The prohibition of the 'Pravargya' pertains to the first performance of the Jyotiṣṭoma.*

SŪTRA (32).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The text containing the numerical adjective should pertain to the sacrifice, because of the Context."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the Jyotiṣṭoma, with reference to the *Pravargya*, we have the text—'*Na prathamayajñē pravṛñjyāt—dvitīyē tṛtīyē vā pravṛñjyāt*' ['One should not perform the *Pravargya* at the first sacrifice; one should perform it at the second or third'].

[As a matter of fact, the *Pravargya* is laid down without reference to any particular sacrifice,—the injunction, '*Yat pravargyam pravṛñjyāt*', standing by itself; and it is only through the syntactical connection of such sentences as—'*Purastādupasadām pravargyam charanti*' ['Before the *Upasads*, they perform the *Pravargya*']—that it becomes connected with a sacrifice; and this *Pravargya* betakes itself to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in accordance with *Sūtra* 3. 6. 2; specially as it is only in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that the *Upasads* are performed. It is in this sense that the *Bhāṣya* has spoken of the *Pravargya* as connected with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.—Or, it may be that in the *Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa*, the injunction of the *Pravargya* is found in the section on *Jyotiṣṭoma* (8. 2), and the statement of the *Bhāṣya* is based upon this.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1247.—The latter explanation is better; for, if the *Bhāṣya*—and the *Sūtra*—had in mind that injunction of the *Pravargya* which is not found in the section on any sacrifice, then in the *Sūtra*, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view could not have been based upon 'Context'. It is clear, therefore, that the *Sūtrakāra* and the *Bhāṣyakāra* both had the *Kauṣītaki* Text in mind.]

In regard to the said prohibition of *Pravargya*, there arises the question—Is the *Pravargya* to be omitted at all performances of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*?—Or, does the prohibition apply only to its first performance?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—The prohibition pertains to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* absolutely (in all its performances).—Why?—Because of the mention of the *sacrifice*; that is, the term '*prathama*' stands for the *sacrifice of the Jyotiṣṭoma*; because that the name '*prathama*' (first) applies to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is clear from the following text '*Ēṣa vāva prathamo yajñānām yat jyotiṣṭomaḥ, ya ētēna aniṣṭvā athānyēna yajatē* etc.' ['The first of sacrifices is the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, if one performs any other sacrifice without having performed this etc. etc.']. Here we find that it is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* that is spoken of by the expression '*yajñānām prathamaḥ*' ('the first of sacrifices'). Thus, then, if the prohibition in question is taken as pertaining to this sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*), the 'Context' becomes honoured.—For these reasons the prohibitive text containing the numerical adjective ('*prathama*') should be taken as prohibiting the *Pravargya* at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE NUMERICAL ADJECTIVE IS A RELATIVE TERM, IN REFERENCE TO THE PERFORMER; BECAUSE THE INDICATIVE POWER OF THE TERM IS ACTUALLY DETERMINED BY THAT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that the prohibition pertains to the *sacrifice* (*Jyotiṣṭoma*); because in all the four Vedas there is no mention of any sacrifice of the name of '*Prathama-yajña*' ('first sacrifice'). What is '*first*' is the performance of a sacrifice, by a certain person; the term 'first' applying to the performance, in relation to the second and subsequent performances; and hence this term can pertain to the *performance* of a sacrifice, not to the *sacrifice* itself. Then again, that the term 'first' refers to the *performance* of a sacrifice we learn *directly* from the word, while the idea of its referring to the sacrifice can be obtained only through the connection of the sacrifice with the performance; and Direct Assertion is more authoritative than Indirect Indication. Hence the *Pravargya* is to be omitted at the *first performance* (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

As for the argument that "inasmuch as the phrase '*prathamaḥ*' is in the same case as '*Jyotiṣṭoma*' [in the text '*Ēṣa vāva prathamo yajñānām yat jyotiṣṭomaḥ*'], it must be taken as denoting that sacrifice",—this co-extensiveness (apposition) between the two can be based only on indirect indication; and this has been already rejected (on the basis of Direct Assertion).

Lastly, as for the argument that "in the compound '*prathamayajñaḥ*', the term '*prathama*' is co-extensive with the term '*yajña*' [and hence it must stand for the *yajña*, not for the *performance*]",—this does not militate against our view, as the term '*yajña*' is connotative of the *yāga, sacrificial performance.*

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The grinding of 'Pūṣan's share' is to be done only at the Ectypal Sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (34).

THE GRINDING OF 'PŪṢAN'S SHARE' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO THE ECTYPE; AS IT HAS NOT BEEN ENJOINED IN REFERENCE TO THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

[Though this *Adhikaraṇa* is on the same lines as *Adhikaraṇa* (11), yet it has been brought in here as serving to introduce the next two *Adhikaraṇas* bearing upon 'Pūṣan's share'.]

In connection with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, we have the text—'*Tasmāt pūṣā prapiṣṭabhāgaḥ adatko hi saḥ*' ['Therefore Pūṣan has his share ground, as he is toothless'] (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 8. 5).—In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this grinding of Pūṣan's share to be done at the Archetype (the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*)?—Or at the Ectype (some modification of the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that it should be done at the Archetype;—why?—because of the Context.—It might be argued that *Pūṣan* has not been declared to be the recipient deity of any offering at the Archetype.—As for that, the term '*Pūṣan*' may be taken as denoting any one of the several deities to whom offerings *are* made at the Archetype.

As against this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The grinding of 'Pūṣan's share' can be enjoined only in connection with a sacrifice where an offering is actually made to Pūṣan;—at the Archetype, Pūṣan is not a deity to whom an offering is made;—hence the *grinding* has to be removed from the Context.—As regards the statement that "the term '*pūṣan*' may be taken as denoting any one of those to whom offerings are made at the Archetype",—the word could be taken in this (indirect) sense, only if there were no deity to whom the name '*pūṣan*' applied directly.—"If the *grinding* is done at another sacrifice, then the Context would be discarded".—Let it be discarded, when what discards it is *Syntactical Connection* (which is more authoritative than Context).

In reality however, there can be no doubt on this point at all; we may assert it as an established fact that the grinding of *Pūṣan's share* should be done at the *Ectype*, not at the *Archetype*, for the simple reason that *Pūṣan* has not been enjoined as a deity at the *Archetype*.

"Why then should this *well-established fact* be introduced here at all?"

It is introduced here with a view to pave the way for the following discussion.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'grinding of Pūṣan's share' can be done only when the material is 'Charu', Cooked Rice.*

SŪTRA (35).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE GRINDING IS TO BE DONE TO ALL OFFERING-MATERIALS; AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION AMONG THEM."

Bhāṣya.

It has been asserted that 'the grinding of *Pūṣan's share*', laid down in the 'Context' of the Archetype, should be done at the Ectype.—Now there arises the question—Is the grinding to be done to (all offering-materials)—Rice, Animal-flesh and Cake?—or to Rice only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that it is to be done to all—the Rice, the Animal-flesh and the Cake;—why?—*because there is no distinction among them*; as there is no ground for discrimination, the 'grinding' should be done to all the offering-materials.

SŪTRA (36).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY THE 'GRINDING' SHOULD BE DONE TO THE RICE ONLY; IN THE CASE OF THE CAKE, IT IS IMPLIED BY ITS VERY NATURE; AND IN THE CASE OF ANIMAL-FLESH, IT COULD NOT BE DONE TO IT, AS ITS VERY PURPOSE WOULD BE DEFEATED.

Bhāṣya.

The 'grinding of Pūṣan's share' is to be done to the *Rice* only.—As regards the *Cake*, the grinding of the corn is implied by its very nature, as unless the corn is ground (there could be no flour and hence) no Cake could be made; therefore in connection with the Cake, no injunction (of grinding) is necessary.—The grinding could not be done to the *Animal-flesh*; for if the Heart and other limbs of the animal's body were ground down, then they would lose their shape.—"What is the harm if they do?"—In that case, there could be no 'slicing' of the *Heart* and other limbs, in accordance with the injunction that 'one should slice the Heart first, etc. etc'.—(Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 3. 10. 4.)—In the same manner the other slicings also could not be done.—"It is quite possible to make slices out of the Heart that has been ground down".—We say, *no*; it is the particular *shape*, not the lump of flesh, to which the name 'Heart' is applied; as has been declared under the *Sūtra* 1. 3. 33, where it has been shown that 'what is denoted by the word

is the *shape*'.—Even though it may be possible to make out of the ground flesh a lump having the shape of the Heart and other limbs, yet people would be bewildered regarding the exact point at which the slicing should be done. —From all this, the injunction of 'grinding of Pūṣan's share' should be taken as pertaining to the *Rice* only.

SŪTRA (37).

[OBJECTION]—"THE SAME MAY BE SAID OF THE RICE ALSO,"—IF THIS IS URGED [then, the answer would be as in the following Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

[Says the Opponent]—"If your view is that 'the grinding could not be done to the Animal-flesh *because its very purpose would be defeated*'—then our answer is that the purpose would be similarly defeated in the case of *Rice* also; as a matter of fact, the name '*Charu*' is applied to the rice when each grain is cooked and stands distinct from the rest; if the rice were ground down, it would become either *dough*, or gruel or like oil-cake [and it would not be 'cooked rice']."

SŪTRA (38).

[ANSWER]—NO; AS IT IS A NAME BASED UPON 'BEING COOKED'.

Bhāṣya.

Our answer to the objection (put forward in Sū. 37) is as follows:—It is true that the word '*charu*' is applied to the rice when each grain is cooked and stands distinct from the rest;—as we find in such assertions as 'such *charu* is given in which each grain is cooked and stands distinct from the rest';—but the use of the name '*charu*' is not based upon the fact of 'each grain being cooked and standing distinct from the rest'; if this fact of 'each grain being cooked and standing distinct from the rest' were the basis of the use of the name '*charu*', then it could not be applied to *cooked rice-flour*; while as a matter of fact, the name *is* applied to *cooked rice-flour*. Therefore the basis of the application of the name '*charu*' must consist in some factor that is common to both (*cooked grains of rice* and *cooked rice-flour*).—It is this common factor that is pointed out in the *Sūtra* 'because it is a name based upon *being cooked*'. The sense of the reply is that the purpose is not defeated in the case of grinding being done to the *charu*;—why?—*because it is a name based upon* '*being cooked*'; i.e. the name '*charu*' is one that is based upon 'being cooked'; so that what is connoted by the term '*charu*' is *that rice which has been cooked by internal heat and from which the water has not been* '*strained*'; it is in this sense that people are found to apply the name '*charu*' to *cooked rice-flour* as well as to the *rice cooked with grains standing apart.*

The use of this discussion as already indicated under the two views, is this that according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the 'grinding' is to be done to the *animal-flesh* also, while according to the *Siddhānta*, it is to be done to the *cooked rice* only.

ADHIKARAṆA (15) : *The grinding of 'Pūṣan's share' is to be done only in cases where the offering is made to Pūṣan alone.*

SŪTRA (39).

IT SHOULD BE DONE ONLY WHEN THERE IS A SINGLE DEITY; AS IT IS MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH ONE (DEITY) ONLY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been established that 'the grinding of *Pūṣan's share*' should be done at the Ectype,—and only to *cooked rice.*—Now there arises the question—Is the *grinding* to be done only when the substance is to be offered to the single deity, *Pūṣan*? Or also when the substance is to be offered to two deities?—"What is an instance of an offering being made to two deities?"—In the second *Iṣṭi* of the three offerings in the *Rājasūya* sacrifice, *we have the injunction 'Saumāpauṣṇē ēkādashakapālē aindrāpauṣṇashcharuḥ shyāvo dakṣiṇā'*, where we find mentioned the '*aindrapauṣṇa charu*', i.e. 'cooked rice dedicated to *Indra-Pūṣan*', wherein we have an instance of an offering to two deities.

On this point, the apparently right view is that the grinding should be done to only that substance which is meant for being offered to a single deity;—why?—*because it is mentioned in connection with a single deity*; just as we found in the case of the 'quartering' (of the cake dedicated to *Agni* alone)[—*vide* above, 3. 1. 26-27].

SŪTRA (40).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT OF CHARACTER INVOLVED.

Bhāṣya.

In the case of the substance to be offered to two deities, there would be a conflict of character; (strictly according to the injunction) the share of Pūṣan would be ground, not the share of the other deity; so that if *Pūṣan's* portion would be *ground*, that of the other deity would have to be left *un-ground*; and the cooking of the whole would be very uneven; so that, as the name '*charu*' is based upon 'being cooked', there would be an incongruity in the application of this name to what has not been properly (evenly) cooked.—If then, people were to grind the whole of the substance—the portion of *Pūṣan* as well as that of the other deity,—then there would be a confusion regarding their respective portions (which could not be distinguished from one another).—"Where would be the harm in that?"—The portion of one would become offered to the other, and in this something

would be done which would not be in strict accordance with the Veda.—For these reasons, the *grinding* should be done to only that substance which is meant to be offered to the single deity (*Pūṣan*).

SŪTRA (41).

[SAYS THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN]—"IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE DONE TO A SUBSTANCE MEANT FOR PŪṢAN COUPLED WITH A SECOND DEITY; AS THE PRESENCE OF THAT DEITY IS THE ONLY CONDITION LAID DOWN."

Bhāṣya.

"We find the *grinding* laid down on the ground of the substance being meant to be offered to the particular deity in the text—'*Pūṣan* should have ground substance assigned as his share'. Even when the 'grinding' is done to the substance intended for being offered to two deities (*Pūṣan* coupled with another deity), the portion assigned to Pūṣan continues to be 'of ground substance'.—Such is not the case with the *Quartering of the Cake* (which has been cited by the *Siddhāntin* as an analogical case); because the Quartering is laid down as to be done to the '*Āgnēya* cake', where the nominal affix ('*ḍhak*', in the term '*āgnēya*') is such as can be there only when the name of *Agni* appears singly, not when it is coupled with the name of another deity.—Similarly in the case of the term '*indrapīta*' (see 3. 2. 39-40), the compounding is with '*indra*' standing by itself, and not as coupled with the name of another deity. In the case in question on the other hand, the compound '*prapiṣṭa-bhāgaḥ*' (as qualifying '*Pūṣan*') is a *Bahuvrīhi* compound (meaning 'one whose portion consists of ground grains');—and this compounding is possible in the case of the component words being 'capable' of being compounded; so that there would be no incongruity in the grinding of the substance meant for two deities [as even so *Pūṣan* could continue to be 'one whose portion consists of ground grains'].—Because, whether the Rice is meant to be offered to *Pūṣan* only, or to *Pūṣan along with another deity*,—in either case—'*Pūṣan's* share' should be ground."

SŪTRA (42).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA ARGUMENT CONTINUED]—"ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE SAME CONCLUSION."

Bhāṣya.

"There are texts also, indicative of the same conclusion: For instance, in the text—'*Pūṣan* is one whose share consists of ground grains, *as he is toothless*' (Tai. Saṁ. 2. 6. 8. 5),—the commendatory expression ('he is toothless') indicates that the *grinding* is to be done on account of the connection with the particular deity (Pūṣan).—Similarly, there is the text—'*Saumāpauṣṇam charum nirvapēt nēmapiṣṭam pashukāmaḥ*' ['One desiring cattle should offer half-ground *charu* to *Soma-Pūṣan*'—Mai. Saṁ. 2. 1. 5], which shows that the Rice is to be *half-ground*; i.e. half of it is to be ground

and half left unground,—when it is meant for two deities; so that this text also indicates the fact that the *grinding* is to be done on account of the connection of the particular deity (*Pūṣan*)."

SŪTRA (43).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA ARGUMENT CONCLUDED]—"THERE WOULD BE GRINDING OF ALL, IF IT WERE AN INJUNCTION; AS THE GRINDING WOULD BE SCRIPTURALLY AUTHORISED IN REFERENCE TO THAT; AND FOR THE 'CHARU', THERE WOULD BE NO GRINDING, AS THERE WOULD BE NO USE FOR IT."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Sūtra* is to be taken as providing the answer to the question—'why cannot the text "*Saumāpauṣṇam charum nirvapēt nēmapiṣṭam*" be taken as an injunction by itself (laying down the *half-grinding* of a certain substance intended for the joint-deity *Soma-Pūṣan*; and not as simply indicating the fact of the grinding being dependent upon the connection of a certain deity)?'—The answer to this (provided in the *Sūtra*) is as follows:—If this were an injunction, then it would enjoin, in reference to *Soma-Pūṣan* only, the grinding of all the three substances—Rice, Animal-flesh, and Cake;—and then, if the sentence were taken as enjoining the connection of *Soma-Pūṣan* with the 'Rice', as also with the 'half-ground' character,—then there would be a syntactical split. Hence all that the injunction could be taken to mean would be that 'there should be *half-grinding* of whatever is meant for *Soma-Pūṣan*'; so that what would be 'scripturally authorised' would be the 'half-grinding' only with reference to *Soma-Pūṣan* [and this would mean the grinding of all the substances, Cake, Animal-flesh, and Rice, that might be meant for *Soma-Pūṣan*].—In fact, the sentence in question could be taken as an injunction only (*a*) if in the case of the *Cake*, the grinding of all the grain needed for it were taken as implied by the very nature of the cake itself,—and (*b*) if, on account of no useful purpose being served by it, the *grinding* were taken as not applicable to the Animal-flesh and the Rice:—and in that case the word '*charu*' in the sentence could not be taken as meant to signify its own meaning [i.e. it would be meaningless].—If, on the other hand, the sentence is taken as a mere *reference* to the *grinding* (and not as an *injunction* of it), then there would be none of these incongruities; and being a mere reference, the sentence can be taken as a mere *indicative* (of the fact of the *grinding* being done on account of the connection with a particular deity).—'But in the case of the Animal-flesh, there could be no *grinding*, for fear of the disappearance of the limbs (required)'.—Not so, we reply; no limbs would be destroyed in the case of *half-grinding*, as the offering could be made out of the *unground* portion of the limb; and after all the *grinding* is meant to serve only a transcendental (not a visible purpose). [So that the cutting out of the Heart and other limbs to be offered could be done before the flesh is ground,—says *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1266.]"

SŪTRA (44).

[SIDDHĀNTIN ANSWERS]—IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE DONE WHEN THERE IS ONLY ONE (DEITY); BECAUSE WHAT IS ENJOINED IS A DETAIL APPERTAINING TO AN OBJECT; AND, AS IN THE CASE OF INDRA-AGNI, IT COULD NOT APPERTAIN TO BOTH (INDRA-PŪṢAN); BECAUSE IT IS NOT ENJOINED AS SUCH.

Bhāṣya.

The *grinding* can be done only to the substance meant for being offered to a single deity, *Pūṣan*,—and not to that intended for two deities, *Indra-Pūṣan*;—why?—because when it is said that 'a ground substance should be used as the portion of Pūṣan', what is enjoined is not a characteristic of the deity,—but 'a detail appertaining to an object'.—"What is that *object*?"—It is the *sacrifice*.—"How do you know that what is laid down is not a characteristic of the deity?"—Our answer to this is that there is no *share* (or *portion*) of the deity at all.—"Why? certainly what is offered to a deity, becomes its *portion*".—What we hold is that what is done in the case of a sacrifice is that the substance is offered (given away) with reference to the deity; but by this mere *offering*, the ownership of the deity over the substance does not become established; because the ownership is established by the *acceptance* (by the recipient of the gift);—and there can be no evidence to prove that the substance offered has been *accepted* by the deity; it is only when one accepts, takes up (*bhajatē*), a certain thing that that thing becomes his *portion* (*bhāga*);—and the deity never takes up the substance offered to it;—hence there can be no such thing 'Pūṣan's portion or share'.

Even if the substance could somehow be regarded as the 'portion' of the deity,—the 'grinding' could never be something appertaining to the deity; because, if it did not appertain to the *sacrifice*, it would be entirely useless.—"But being enjoined in a totally different Context, how could it be something appertaining to the *Sacrifice*?"—Our answer to this is that it would appertain to the sacrifice, on the strength of 'Syntactical Connection'.—"But in reality, we find the *grinding* laid down in connection with a *deity*, not in connection with a *Sacrifice*".—Our answer to that is that it has already been pointed out that it cannot be connected with the *deity*, (1) because there is no such thing as the 'portion' (of the deity), and (2) because it would be entirely useless (if it were connected with the *deity*).—"And yet it behoves you to explain how the *grinding* can be connected with the *Sacrifice*".—That we are going to explain:—The substance that is offered (at a sacrifice) in reference to *Pūṣan* is what is called 'Pūṣan's portion',—i.e. it is that substance in the offering whereof the deity is *Pūṣan*;—now when the offering is made to the joint deity *Indra-Pūṣan*, the deity of that offering is not '*Pūṣan*'; as the rice that is offered does not become subject to the ownership of '*Pūṣan*'; hence it follows that when the offering is made to *Indra-Pūṣan*, there is no connection established between the Rice (offered) and '*Pūṣan*'. It is only when *Pūṣan* alone by

himself is the deity of the offering that what is dedicated to him may become his 'portion'.—"Why so?"—Because it is a well-known fact that it is only when something is dedicated or made over to one that it becomes one's 'portion'.—Thus, even though *Pūṣan* would be helping the joint-deity 'Indra-Pūṣan' by utterance of his name,—i.e. by reason of the presence of his name in the name of the joint deity, he may be rendering some help to that joint deity,—yet what has been offered to the two deities (i.e. joint deity) does not become his (*Pūṣan's*) 'portion'; for the simple reason that it has not been dedicated to him.—From all this it follows that the *grinding* is to be done to that Rice in the offering of which the deity is '*Pūṣan*' (alone), and not to that in the offering whereof there are two deities.

SŪTRA (45).

AS FOR 'TOOTHLESSNESS', IT IS ONLY A COMMENDATORY REASON.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under *Sūtra* 42) that—"the phrase 'because he is toothless' indicates that the *grinding* is something appertaining to the deity".—But this phrase is 'only a commendatory reason', and as such could be explained also on the basis of the *Siddhānta* view.

SŪTRA (46).

AS FOR THE OTHER SENTENCE, IT WOULD BE AN INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

The other argument that has been urged (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, under Sū. 42) is to the effect that—"the sentence '*Saumāpauṣṇam charuṁ nirvapēt nēmapiṣṭam*' indicates that *grinding* is to be done in the case of the substance offered to *two deities*, and by declaring that half of the substance is to be ground and the other half is to be left unground, it indicates the *grinding* to be something appertaining to the deity".—Our answer to this is that, if such were the meaning of the sentence, then,—inasmuch as it would be dealing with what has not been enjoined elsewhere,—'*it would be an Injunction*'.—"But, if it were an injunction, then a single sentence would be injunctive of several things."—The answer to this is that, if, according to one view, it becomes injunctive of several things, then that contingency could be avoided by accepting the other view; and if there were no other view possible, then, with a view to save the sentence from becoming useless, we might even accept the view that it is injunctive of several things.

Thus it becomes established that there is to be no *grinding* of Rice meant for being offered to *two deities*.

Thus ends Pāda iii of Adhyāya III.

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA IV.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The Declaration regarding 'nivīta' is purely commendatory.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"THE 'NIVĪTA' SHOULD BE REGARDED (AS ENJOINED) AS AN ATTRIBUTE OF THE MAN; BECAUSE THE TEXT SPEAKS OF MAN AS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Nivītam manuṣyāṇām—Prāchīnāvītam pitṛṇām—Upavītam dēvānām—Upavyayatē dēvalakṣmamēva tat kurutē*' ['The *Nivīta* is for men, the *Prāchīnāvīta* for the *Pitṛs* and the *Upavīta* for celestial beings; when one adopts the *Upavīta* form, he wears the mark of celestial beings'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 11. 1).—[These three are the names given to the three modes of wearing the upper cloth:—(1) When it is worn over the neck, the two ends hanging along the two sides of the neck, or the chest, it is the *Nivīta* form; (2) when it is worn over the right shoulder and passes under the left arm-pit, it is *Prāchīnāvīta*; (3) when it is worn over the left shoulder and passes under the right arm-pit, it is *Upavīta*.]

Now, in regard to the clause '*Nivītam manuṣyāṇām*' ('the *Nivīta* is for men'], there arise the following questions:—(*a*) Is this an *injunction* or a commendatory declaration? [i.e. is it mandatory or only commendatory?]—(*b*) If it is an Injunction, is what is enjoined an attribute of the *Man* or of the action (sacrifice)?—and (*c*) Does the injunction appertain to those acts of men [such as the *Anvāhāryapachana* and the like—*Tantravārtika*] which are laid down in the same context (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) or to those acts in which men are the predominant factors [such as the *honouring of guests* and the like—*Tantravārtika*]?

On these questions, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The clause in question is an injunction, and what is enjoined is an attribute of the Man.—If the sentence is taken as an Injunction, then alone it can lay down something not already known, and hence serve a useful purpose; otherwise (if it is not taken as an Injunction), it remains a mere assertion, and hence useless.—If the sentence is an Injunction, then the attribute laid down in the sentence '*Nivītam manuṣyāṇām*' must belong to Man; as the declaration is one in which *man* figures as *the predominant factor*.—'How do you know this?'—In the sentence, the *men* are not enjoined;—what is enjoined is the *Nivīta* 'for men'; as what is not enjoined cannot become an accessory to anything:—if *men* also were taken as enjoined by the sentence,

then there would be a syntactical split. Hence it is concluded that the *Nivīta* (which is enjoined) is helpful to man.—'From the *Context* it is clear that it is helpful to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice.'—But *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context*. Further, if *Men* were the subordinate factor, then as case-terminations are meant to be significant, the term denoting *men* would have taken the instrumental ending; as a matter of fact, however, we find the Genitive ending (in the word '*manuṣyāṇām*), which denotes *relationship*. In fact, if the *men* were the subordinate factor, then, it would not be necessary to mention the *men* at all: as, naturally, what had to be *done* could be done by men only; if, on the other hand, *Men* form the predominant factor, then it is necessary to mention them."

SŪTRA (2).

[OBJECTION TO THE PŪRVAPAKṢA]—THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS MERELY DESCRIPTIVE, AS THE THING (NIVĪTA) EXISTS ALREADY.

Bhāṣya.

'*Apadēsha*' stands for *what is already known*; the sense of the argument is that the sentence in question cannot be taken as an Injunction, it is purely descriptive;—why?—because *the thing exists already*: that is to say, it is already known that *Nivīta* is the mode for men; in fact, as a rule, men adopt the *nivīta* form for their own use. Hence the sentence must be taken as merely descriptive.

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S ANSWER TO THE OBJECTION]—"BUT IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AN INJUNCTION; AS IT LAYS DOWN SOMETHING NOT ALREADY KNOWN."

Bhāṣya.

"The sentence must be an Injunction; as it is only as an Injunction that it can serve a useful purpose; otherwise it would be a mere assertion, and hence useless. Then again, a sentence is to be regarded as descriptive only when it speaks of something already known; the sentence in question however *lays down something not already known*,—viz.: that 'men must *always* wear the upper cloth in the *Nivīta* form'."

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)—REJECTING PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"INASMUCH AS IT IS MENTIONED IN A CONTEXT ABOUNDING IN THE MENTION OF PROPERTIES OF ACTIONS,—THE 'NIVĪTA' ALSO SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A PROPERTY OF ACTIONS."

Bhāṣya.

"We accept the proposition that the sentence is an Injunction; but we do not accept the proposition that *Nivīta* is an attribute of Man;—in fact it

must be the property of the Sacrifice, as is indicated by the *Context*; it is mentioned among many such properties as belong to Actions; hence it must be a property of Actions."

SŪTRA (5).

"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE CLOSING WORDS OF THE SENTENCE."

Bhāṣya.

"The closing word with which the sentence '*Nivītam manuṣyāṇām*' ends is the name '*ādhvaryavam*' ('Pertaining to, done by, the Adhvaryu Priest'); and it is only if the *Nivīta* is an accessory of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice* that it could be 'done by the Adhvaryu Priest'; and it is only thus that the indication of the Name would be honoured."

SŪTRA (6).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C), SLIGHTLY MODIFYING (B)]—"IT MUST BE CONNECTED WITH THE CONTEXT; AS SUCH CONNECTION WOULD INVOLVE NO INCONGRUITY."

Bhāṣya.

Objection against the *Pūrvapakṣa* (B)—'From *Context* and from *Name*, the *Nivīta* appears to be a property of actions; and from *Syntactical Connection* it appears to be an attribute of man; hence (*Syntactical Connection* being more authoritative than Context and Name), the *Nivīta* should be removed from its context (and connected with Man)'.

"Not so, we reply. Even while retaining its place in the Context, the *Nivīta* may be taken as appertaining predominantly to Man.—How so?—It would find place in that act—of *Anvāhāryapachana*, for instance,—which, while forming part of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, is connected chiefly with Man; and in this way both 'Context' and 'Syntactical Connection' would become honoured."

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (D)—MODIFYING (C)]—"IT MUST APPERTAIN TO AN ACTION WHEREIN MAN IS THE PREDOMINANT FACTOR; BECAUSE ITS MENTION IS SIMILAR (TO THAT OF THE OTHER MODES OF WEARING THE CLOTH, 'UPAVĪTA', ETC.); AND THE OTHER FACTOR ('MEN') IS MENTIONED FOR THE PURPOSE OF CONNECTING WITH THE NIVĪTA."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not right that the *Nivīta* should find a place in the *Context*; in fact, it should be adopted at that act in which man is the predominant factor,—such as the act of *Honouring the Guest*.—Why so?—*Because its mention is similar to that of the other modes*; i.e. all the three modes are mentioned as being similar; so that (1) when it is said that '*Upavīta* is for

celestial beings', what is enjoined is that the *Upavīta* is to be adopted at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* (at which the deities form the predominant factor),—(2) when it is said that '*Prāchināvīta* is for *Pitṛs*', what is enjoined is that the *Prāchināvīta* is to be adopted at the action whereat the *Pitṛs* form the predominant factor; similarly (3) when it is said that '*Nivīta* is for men', what is enjoined independently of the *Context* is that the *Nivīta* is to be adopted at the act of Honouring the Guest.—'How do you get the idea that it enjoins the *Nivīta* as to be adopted at the act whereat Man forms the predominant factor?'—We gather this from the connection of '*nivīta*' with the word '*manuṣyāṇām*', which has the Genitive ending.—'In that case the *Nivīta* should belong to the *men themselves*, not to an action whereat man is the predominant factor.'—If it were taken as belonging to the *men* themselves, then it would be necessary to assume a result (following from such connection of *Nivīta* with *men*); when, on the other hand, it is taken as appertaining to the action whereat *man* is the predominant factor, the Genitive ending will remain, which will bring about the necessary connection (between the *Nivīta* and *Man*), and yet it would not be necessary to assume a result [as the result of the *action* would be there already]. This is what has been explained under Sūtra '*Samēṣu vākyabhēdaḥ syāt*' (2. 1. 47).—'Having become syntactically connected with the action whereat Man is the predominant factor, the *Nivīta* would again become similarly connected with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* to which the *Context* belongs.'—Two connections cannot be enjoined by one sentence; for, if it did, there would be syntactical split. In fact, inasmuch as '*the other factor*'—i.e. the mention of 'men'—is for the purpose of connecting with *Nivīta*,—the connection of the *Nivīta* with 'men' would be established directly by the words of the text, and when this connection would be found to serve a useful purpose, there would be no occasion for connecting it with the sacrifice of the 'Context' (i.e. the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*).—For these reasons, the indication of the 'Context' should be set aside and the *Nivīta* should be adopted at the act of *Honouring Guests*."

SŪTRA (8).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION; BECAUSE OF THE CONTEXT.

Bhāṣya.

It is not true that the sentence in question is an Injunction, and that Injunction pertains, to an action whereat Man is the predominant factor. What is asserted in the term '*manuṣyāṇām*' is *connection with men*, not connection with an action at which Man is the predominant factor; if it were connected with an action at which Man is the predominant factor, it would be necessary to assume a result;—and lastly, if it were connected with the act of *Honouring Guests*, it would be connected with an act which is not mentioned, which has nothing to do with the Context, and which can only be inferred.—"What would be the harm in that?"—The harm would be that the sentence in question, even though quite capable of being taken in connection with the Context, would be removed from it.—

"How would it be capable of being taken in connection with the Context?"—It could be so taken, as connected with the Context, because it is a *commendatory declaration*, and as commending what appears in the Context, it would remain within the *Context* itself; while if it were taken as an *Injunction*, it would have to be removed from the *Context*.—From all these we conclude that the sentence is not an injunction of something in connection with an act at which *Man* is the predominant factor.

SŪTRA (9).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SYNTACTICALLY CONNECTED WITH AN INJUNCTION.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also, the sentence '*Nivītam manuṣyāṇām*' cannot be taken as an injunction.—"For what reason?"—*Because it is syntactically connected with an Injunction*: The sentence '*Upavyayatē dēvalakṣmamēva tat kurutē*' [which follows the sentence '*Nivītam manuṣyāṇām*'] is an Injunction; and with this Injunction, the sentence in question is syntactically connected; under the circumstances, if the sentence in question also were an injunction, then there would be a syntactical split; because there can be no syntactical connection between one Injunction and another Injunction, as the verbal expressions are different; consequently (if the sentence in question were taken as an Injunction) the indication of syntactical connection would become set aside.—"What is 'the indication of a syntactical connection'?"—The indication of the syntactical connection is that the sentence '*Nivītam manuṣyāṇām*' is a declaration of what is already known (from other sources).—"Why then should there be a declaration of what is already known?"—For the purpose of commending the *Upavīta* form.—"In what way is the *Upavīta* commended (by the sentence '*Nivītam manuṣyāṇām*')?"—The idea meant to be conveyed is that 'the *Nivīta* form is not fit to be adopted at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, which is a sacrifice offered to the deities,—*because it belongs to men*,—similarly the *Prāchīnāvīta* form also is for the *Pitṛs*, and not fit for an offering to the deities,—it is the *Upavīta* which is fit for that offering,—hence the *Upavīta*-form should be adopted (at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice).' Just as we find in the case of such assertions as—'The dress that this man is wearing is the dress of dancers,—the dress that Dēvadatta is wearing is the dress of Brāhmaṇas'—where, for the purpose of commending Dēvadatta's dress, the other dress (that of dancers) is mentioned. Similarly in the case in question, for the purpose of commending the *Upavīta*-form, the *Nivīta* has been mentioned.—There is no such injunctive word in the sentence as that 'the *Nivīta should be adopted* for men.'—"But there is the text laying down the method of *Honouring Guests*,—and this would be the injunction laying down that the *Nivīta should be adopted*."—Not so; no such assumption would be justified when the sentence is capable of being taken as serving the purpose of commending a certain act;—because such an injunction is not perceptible,—it could therefore be assumed only with a view to avoiding the contingency of the sentence in

question becoming entirely useless;—when, however, this *uselessness* has become avoided (by other means), there can be no justification for assuming anything at all. For these reasons, the sentence in question must be taken as a commendatory declaration; and thereby the Context, becoming reconciled with Syntactical Connection, comes to serve a most useful purpose.

[Between Sūtras 9 and 10, there are six *Sūtras*, embodying four Adhikaraṇas, which have not been noticed in the *Bhāṣya*, nor by Maṇdana Mishra in his *Mīmāṁsānukramaṇī*, nor in *Bṛhatī* or *Ṛjuvimalā*.—On this omission the following remarks by Kumārila (*Tantravārtika*, Trans., p. 1275) are instructive :—' After this (Sū. 9) there follow six *Sūtras* which we do not find treated in the *Bhāṣya* ; and there is a difference of opinion among the commentators regarding this omission. Some people say that the *Bhāṣyakāra* forgot them; others say that he wrote commentaries upon these *Sūtras* also, but this portion of the *Bhāṣya* has become lost to us ; some say he found them easy and not of much importance, and hence omitted them ; while others declare that he omitted them because they are not Jaimini's *Sūtras* at all.—In support of this last theory we have the form of *Sūtra* (10) dealt with in the *Bhāṣya*—' *Digvibhāgashcha, etc.*'—which distinctly shows that in Jaimini's *Sūtra-text*, this *Sūtra* (10) must follow immediately after *Sūtra* (9) (' *Vidhinā-chaikavākyatvāt* ').—We find however that all other commentators, from Kumārila downwards, on the *Sūtras* have dealt with these six *Sūtras*.]

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The distribution of the directions is a commendatory declaration.*

SŪTRA (10).

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DIRECTIONS ALSO SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE THE FOREGOING; SPECIALLY AS ITS CONNECTION IS FOR A DEFINITE PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Prāchīm dēvā abhajanta, dakṣiṇām pitaraḥ, pratichīm manuṣyāḥ, udīchīmasurāḥ* [or, according to others, '*udīchīm rudrāḥ*]' ['Celestial beings took over the East, the Pitṛs the South, human beings the West, and Asuras (or according to others, the Rudras) the North']. (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 1. 1.)

In regard to the sentence '*Pratīchīm manuṣyāḥ,*' there arises the question —(*a*) Is this sentence an *injunction* or a declaration?—(*b*) If it is an Injunction, does it enjoin an attribute of Man or a property of Action?—Or (*c*) Is what is enjoined to find a place in the Context in which it occurs, or in some such act, in the Context, in which Man is the predominant factor, or in the act of the Honouring of Guests?

The apparent conclusion on these questions is that '*this distribution of the directions should be treated like the foregoing, specially as its connection is for a definite purpose*' (*Sūtra*). That is to say, the distribution of the directions that we find in the sentence in question should be treated like the sentence speaking of '*Nivīta*' (dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*); so that the view that we had as '*Pūrvapakṣa*' in regard to *Nivīta* should be the *Pūrvapakṣa* here,—the view that was the 'middle view' (a compromise) in the former case should be the 'middle view' here,—and the view that was the *Siddhānta* in that case should be the *Siddhānta* here also.—For instance, the *Pūrvapakṣa* (A) in the present case would be that—"The sentence should be regarded as an injunction, as it serves a useful purpose, —and what is enjoined is an attribute of *Man*; the idea expressed being that men facing the west or the north have the sun behind them and hence are able to perform the acts more comfortably."—The *Pūrvapakṣa* (B) would be that—"It is an injunction and what is enjoined should, in consideration of the *Context*, be taken as a property of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and in consideration of the *Context and Syntactical Connection*, it should find a place at that act which forms part of the Jyotiṣṭoma and at which Man is the predominant factor,—such, for instance, as the act of giving the sacrificial fee." —*Pūrvapakṣa* (C) would be that—"The sentences being distinct from one another, what is enjoined should find place in the act of *Honouring Guests*." —The *Siddhānta* is that, in consideration of the *Context*, the sentence is to be taken as a commendatory declaration, as it is manifest that it is syntactically connected (and is to be taken along) with the injunction of 'making the *Prāchīnavamsha* chamber'.

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *The expressions 'Paruṣi ditam' and the rest are commendatory declarations.*

SŪTRA (11).

THE SAME IS THE CASE WITH THE EXPRESSIONS—(*a*) 'PARUṢI DITA', (*b*) 'PŪRṆA', (*c*) 'GHṚTA', AND (*d*) 'VIDAGDHA'.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Yat paruṣi-ditam tad dēvānām, yadantarā tanmanuṣyāṇām, yat samūlam tat pitṝṇām*' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 6. 8. 6) ['That which is cut at the joints is for celestial beings, that which is cut in the middle is for men, that cut at the root is for Pitṛs']; also (*d*) '*Yo vidogdhaḥ sa nairṛtaḥ, yo'shṛtaḥ sa raudraḥ, yaḥ shṛtaḥ sa sadēvatyaḥ, tasmādavidahatā shrapayitavyam sadēvatvāya*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 3. 4) ['What is burnt is for the *Nirṛts*, what is uncooked is for Rudra, what is cooked is for celestial beings, etc.'];—and (*b*) in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Yat pūrṇam tat manuṣyāṇām upari ardho dēvānām, ardhaḥ pitṝṇām*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 6. 8. 4) ['What is full is for men, what is above half for celestial beings, and half for Pitṛs'];—and again (*c*) '*Ghṛtam devānām, mastu pitṝṇām, niṣpakvam manuṣyāṇām*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 1. 4) ['Clarified butter is for celestial beings, the curd-gruel is for the *Pitṛs*, and the melted butter is for men'].

In regard to the sentences speaking of man, and the one that refers to *Rudra*, there arise the following questions:—Are these *injunctions*—and of properties of men? Or are they commendatory declarations, and what are spoken of are properties of actions?—And further, should these find place in that action mentioned in the context at which *Man* or *Rudra* is the predominant factor? Or at the action of *Honouring Guests*? Or is it all a purely commendatory declaration?

The apparent conclusion is that the case of all these is analogous to what has gone before (in the case of *Nivīta*); that is, the view that was *Pūrvapakṣa* in connection with *Nivīta* is the *Pūrvapakṣa* here also; that which was the 'middle view' there is the 'middle view' here also; and that which was the *Siddhānta* there is the *Siddhānta* here also.—For instance, here also, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"the sentences should be taken as injunctions, because in this way they serve a useful purpose; and what are enjoined should be regarded as attributes of Men, because they are connected with men";—and the final conclusion is that what are spoken of, being already known by implication, the sentences should be taken as commendatory declarations; these are known by implication, because—(*a*) as there would be no definiteness regarding the *cutting* to be done at the *top* or at the *root*, it would be easier to cut at the joints [hence the propriety of the *cutting being done at the joints*, which is regarded by the *Pūrvapakṣin* as what is enjoined, is already got at by implication];—(*b*) similarly, what is *uncooked* causes

illness, hence it is '*raudra*', terrible [this implies the propriety of *proper cooking*, which is regarded by the *Pūrvapakṣin* as the object of Injunction]; —(*c*) similarly, what is *full* is soft, and hence it is easier to deal with it [this implies the propriety of having *fulness*, which is regarded by the *Pūrvapakṣin* as the object of Injunction];—(*d*) similarly, if Butter is put on the head, it is very pleasing to men [this implies the propriety of using Butter, which is regarded by the *Pūrvapakṣin* as the object of injunction].—Similarly, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "the sentences are injunctions, and what are enjoined should be taken as properties of action (mentioned in the context itself), because of 'Name' and also because most of the details spoken of pertain to action";—another *Pūrvapakṣa* is that, "in consideration of the *Context and Syntactical Connection*, the properties should be taken as pertaining to only such actions as the *Anvāhārya-cooking* and the *giving of the sacrificial fee* (at which Man is the predominant factor)";—the third *Pūrvapakṣa* is that—"the properties must pertain to the act of *Honouring Guests*, as otherwise there would be syntactical split";—and the *Siddhānta* view is that the sentences should be taken as commendatory declarations, because of the 'context' and because they are connected with other Injunctions;—these injunctions being—(*a*) 'The cutting should be done at the joint' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 1. 5), (*b*) 'One should hold it above the hole,' (*c*) 'One should besmear the body with fresh butter,' and (*d*) 'One should cook the substance without burning it' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 3. 4).—From all this it follows that the sentences in question are commendatory declarations, not Injunctions.

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The Prohibition of 'Telling Lies' is a detail pertaining to the Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (12).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE NEGATIVE ACT APPERTAINS TO THE SACRIFICE, AND THE SENTENCE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS A REFERENCE TO A PERMANENT INJUNCTION, BECAUSE IT IS RELATED TO SUCH AN INJUNCTION."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we meet with the text—'*Nānṛtam vadēt*' ['One should not tell a lie'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 5. 6).

In regard to this there arises the question—Does this prohibition (of *Lying*) apply to the context of what is done in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*? Or, is it the prohibition of an act to which ordinary man is mostly prone, and is addressed to man and hence appertains to him?

On this point we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"It should be regarded as appertaining to man (in his ordinary life); as the prohibition is addressed to the man, not to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.—Why so?—Because the words of the text denote the effort of man; what the word '*vadēt*' ('one should tell') directly expresses is that 'one should do the telling'; and in this the connection of the man (the speaker) is *directly asserted*; the connection of the action (sacrifice), on the other hand, would be only indirectly indicated by 'Context'; and 'Direct Assertion' is always more authoritative than 'Context'.—Otherwise (i.e. if the prohibition were taken as appertaining to the sacrifice), the expression 'one should do the telling' would have to be taken as conveying the sense that 'there *is* telling'; so that the expression would be taken in a sense other than the one that it really expresses, and the sense of the injunction would thus be something different from its own; on the other hand, if the prohibition is taken as addressed to man, the expression would retain its own sense. For this reason the advice conveyed (by the term '*vadēt*', 'should tell') should be taken as addressed to man; such being the case, the prohibition also must be taken as addressed to the same person to whom the injunctive word (affirmative) was addressed.—Now this fact—i.e. the prohibition of 'telling lies'—has been well known to the man ever since his *Upanayana* (at which his Teacher addressed to him the admonition 'never tell lies'); hence, being related to that admonition, the prohibition in question must be taken as a *reference* to that permanent admonition.—'In fact the text in question being a *Shruti* should be regarded as the basis for the *Smṛti*-text (according to which the admonition at the *Upanayana* is addressed by the Teacher) [so that it is the *Shruti*-text under discussion that should be regarded as the *injunction*, and it is the *Smṛti*-text that should be regarded as a *reference* to it].'—The *Shruti*-

text under discussion cannot be the basis for the said *Smṛti-text*; if the *Smṛti* had been based upon this *Shruti*-text, then the *Shruti*-rule also would have mentioned the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; as a matter of fact also, the admonition (according to the *Smṛti*) is addressed to the pupil at the time of the *Upanayana* only; and they also teach it as a duty of the man. For these reasons the *Smṛti*-text in question cannot be regarded as based upon the *Vedic*-text in question."

SŪTRA (13).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AN INJUNCTION, BECAUSE THE CONNECTION IS DIFFERENT.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the sentence 'One should not tell a lie' should be taken as an injunction, pertaining to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices,—and it is not a mere reference or reiteration.—Why so?—*Because the connection is different.*—That is to say, the Smṛti-rule declares the connection of the man with the *observance* of the rule (that 'one should never tell a lie'); while what the sentence in question would do would be to declare the connection of the man with the *prohibition* of a certain thing. Under the circumstances, what is found in the *Shruti*-text being entirely different from what is found in the *Smṛti*-rule, how could one be a *reiteration* of the other? Consequently the sentence in question should be taken as the injunction of the prohibition.

Says the Opponent—"We accept the conclusion that the sentence is an injunction; but what we hold is that what is enjoined pertains to the man (in ordinary iife), because the effort of the human agent is directly expressed by the words."

Our answer to this is as follows:—In the case of all verbs, what is directly expressed is the performance of an act, not any active agency.—"How is that deduced?"—It is deduced from our own experience; we actually cognise an action as to be performed.—"But people cognise also the nominative agent (as expressed by the verb)."—True, they cognise it, but not through the word;—then through what?—through implication; i.e. when the action is enjoined as to be performed, then the functioning of the active agency also becomes cognised by implication; and what is cognised by implication cannot be accepted as *directly asserted*; and what is not directly asserted cannot be regarded as cognised through the *syntactical connection*; under the circumstances, how could it set aside the indications of the *context*?

Says the Opponent—"The teaching of the teachers is that 'the base and the affix jointly express what is expressed by the affix'; and from this it follows that the nominative agent as well as the accusative object are denoted by the word; because the teachers have made it clear—by means of such *sūtras* as '*Kartari shap*' (Pā. 3. 1. 68), '*Karmaṇi yak*' (Pā. 3. 1. 67)—that the nominative and the objective are both denoted by affixes (the affix '*shap*' denoting the nominative, and the affix '*yak*' denoting the objective). Hence we conclude that the nominative agent and the objective are both expressed by words."

Answer—Simply on the strength of the word of Teachers, or of the authors of *Sūtras*, nothing can be taken to be expressed by a word; it can be taken to be so only on the basis of our own cognition (experience). As a matter of fact, when an act is recognised as to be done, it implies all the active agencies; this has been already explained above. Further, the Teachers have nowhere declared that the nominative agent, or the objective, is expressed by the affix.—" But the conjugational affix has been declared to be expressive of the nominative agent and of the objective."—The affix is nowhere declared to be expressive of the nominative agent or of the objective; all that is declared is that 'when there is only one factor, the singular number should be used,—when there are two things, the dual number; and when there are several things, the plural number should be used.' There is also another declaration, which is construed to man that 'when there is one nominative agent (the singular number is to be used),—when there are two nominative agents (the dual number is to be used), and when there are several nominative agents (the plural number is to be used)';—it is in this way that the act becomes connected with the singular and other numbers. But there is no such construction as that '*Kartari bhavati ēkasmiṁscha*' ('it is used when there is the *agent* and the one'); in fact it is in the form '*Kartari ēkasmin ēkavachanam*' 'when there is *one agent*, the singular number is to be used,—i.e. when the agent is one only'; similarly in the case of there being two or more agents. If we construe the sentences in this manner the meaning of the *Sūtra* becomes explained in accordance with logical principles,—and the words of the *Sūtra* become logically connected. The teaching of the scriptures is also to the same effect—that when unity, duality and plurality are expressed by the affix, then the *objective* and the rest come in as qualifying factors.

Objection—" It has also been found that when the objective and other things are expressed by the affix, *unity* and the rest come in as qualifying factors."

Answer—As for the *objective* and the rest, they are got at by implication, and they are never regarded as being expressed by words; *unity* and the rest, on the other hand, are never got at by implication, and hence they *are* regarded as being expressed by words. Such being the case, even though *unity* and the rest are qualifying factors, yet in this case it is the qualifying factor that is regarded as being expressed. For example, in the case of the statement—'Priests with golden necklaces proceed':—the *wearing of the golden necklace* is a qualifying factor, yet it is this factor that has been accepted as being enjoined by the sentence. For these reasons, it follows that what is expressed by the word is the *unity* of the nominative agent, not the *nominative agent* himself.

Objection—" As a matter of fact, where the nominative agent is one, the singular number is used, where there are two nominative agents, the dual number is used, and where there are several nominative agents, the plural number is used; and from this it is clear that the nominative agent (which remains the common factor, while *unity*, *duality* and *plurality* are variable) is what is expressed by the word."

Answer—This matter cannot be determined by Inference; in fact it is

a clearly perceptible fact that the cognition of the nominative agent follows directly from the cognition of the act to be done; and this clear fact cannot be set aside. As for *unity* and the rest, when the singular number is used, it is the unity *of the nominative agent* that is cognised;—when the dual number is used, it is the duality *of the nominative agent* that is cognised;—and when the plural number is used, it is the plurality *of the nominative agent* that is cognised; this also is a clearly perceptible fact.—Now, which of these two perceptible facts can an Inference set aside?—In the case of words, it is found that though the word denotes the *Class* (which is *one*), yet when it takes the dual number, the diversity (duality) is understood as pertaining to the individual objects (included under the *Class*), and when it takes the singular number, the unity cognised is that of the individual substance;—the same thing happens in the case in question also.

From all this it follows that the *active agent* is not *directly expressed* by the word ('*vadēt*'); and when there is no *Direct Assertion*, there is nothing to reject the indications of the *Context*.

It has been argued that—"if what is mentioned pertains to the sacrifice, then the man's effort (expressed by the term '*vadēt*') becomes useless, as all that has to be done in connection with the sacrifice is laid down in the passage that lays down its entire procedure."

Our answer to this is as follows:—If what is spoken of in the sentence were subsidiary (to the sacrifice), then it could be taken in by the *Context*; as a matter of fact however, what is not *enjoined* cannot be subsidiary to a sacrifice; hence in order that it may be subsidiary to the sacrifice, it is necessary that it should be enjoined,—even according to this view.—It is for this reason that we think that the prohibition relates to the *speaking* that may be done in course of the sacrifice in whose 'Context' the sentence occurs; and hence the advice that 'what is a lie should not be told' is subsidiary to the sacrifice; so that it is what has been determined upon that is subsidiary to the sacrifice and should be done; for instance, having determined upon an offering of *Vrīhi* corn, one should not make an offering of *Yava* (barley).

Says the Opponent:—"When the teaching that 'a lie should not be told' is accepted in both the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the *Siddhānta*,—what is the use of all this discussion?"

Answer—The need for enquiry arises from the fact that if, according to the *Pūrvapakṣa*, the teaching pertains to the *Man* (in ordinary life),—then a transgression of it would entail the Expiatory Rite laid down in the *Smṛtis* [as the prohibition of *Lying* in general occurs in *Smṛtis*]; while if, according to the *Siddhānta*, it pertains to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, a transgression of it should entail the Expiatory Rite prescribed in the *Yajurvēda*.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *Details relating to the 'Yawning Person' appertain to the Context.*

SŪTRA (14).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The details in question should appertain to the Man, as they are for his purpose [and hence should find no place in the Context in which they are mentioned], as in the case of the Ahīna (Sū. 3. 3. 1. 5)."

Bhāṣya.

[This is a case of conflict between *Indicative Power* and *Syntactical Connection*.]

(A) In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Aṅgiraso vā, etc.*' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 1. 1. 2) [' The excellent Aṅgirasas, going to the celestial region, introduced Initiation and Austerity into Water; when one bathes in water, he directly acquires Initiation and Austerity; when one bathes in a sacred water, he becomes a sacred place for his relatives '].—(Where *bathing in sacred waters* is spoken of.)—(B) Again in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* there is the text—'*Tasmāt jañjabhyamāno'nubrūyāt mayi dakṣakratū iti prāṇāpānāvēvātmandhattē*' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 2. 4.; Vājasa. Sam. 38. 27) [' The yawning person should recite the mantra *Mayi dakṣakratū, etc.*, thereby he draws within himself Prāṇa and Apāna '].—[Where the reciting of the *mantra* is laid down for the 'yawning person'.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—What is laid down here (*the reciting of the mantra by the 'yawning person'*, as also *the bathing in sacred waters*), is it to be done in connection with the action to which the Context belongs (i.e. the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* or the *Jyotiṣṭoma*)? Or is it meant only for men in ordinary life (apart from any sacrificial performance)?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*As in the case of the Ahīna sacrifices, the details in question should appertain to the Man, as it is for his purpose* (Sū.); and hence the Injunction in question should be taken away from the 'Context' in which it occurs.—Why so?—Because the *man* (human agent) is directly expressed; that is, the term '*bruyāt*' ('should recite') is clearly meant to express the *effort of the agent* (towards the act of *reciting*).—' But in that case, the indication of the Context would be rejected.'—The answer to this is that, let the indication of the *Context* be rejected; in fact, *Syntactical Connection* is what rejects it, because what is laid down is in connection with the 'yawning person'. The indication of the *Context* is that the *reciting* is laid down as to be done at the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*; while from *Syntactical Connection* it follows that it is laid down for the 'yawning person' (in general);—and *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context*. For these reasons the injunction should be taken away from the *Context*.—The result also of the *reciting* has been declared to be that 'he draws within himself *Prāṇa* and *Apāna*' (which means *longevity* of the man); and this also tends to preclude the

connection of the act in question with the sacrifice.—From all this it follows that the act laid down appertains to the *man*, and should therefore be taken away from the *Context*; just as it is in the case of *Ahīna* (see Sū. 3. 3. 15), the 'twelve *Upasads*' have been taken away from the *Context* (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and taken as connected with *Ahīna*),—in the same manner the reciting of the *mantra* '*Mayi dakṣakratū*' should be taken away from the *Context* (of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, and taken as connected with *Man*), because of its being mentioned in connection with the 'yawning person'."

SŪTRA (15).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, FROM THE PECULIARITY OF THE CONTEXT, THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PURIFICATORY OF THE MAN CONNECTED WITH THE SACRIFICE (TO WHICH THE CONTEXT BELONGS),—JUST AS (WASHING, ETC. ARE PURIFICATORY) OF THE SUBSTANCE.

Bhāṣya.

In reality the act in question should not be taken away from the Context;—why?—*because of the peculiarity of the Context*. As a matter of fact it is only when the 'yawning person' is connected with the sacrifice of the Context that he becomes purified by the reciting (of the mantra '*Mayi dakṣakratū* etc.');—just as such substances as Barley and the like are purified by such acts as *washing* and the rest.

Objection—"But the Context cannot restrict the term 'yawning person' to one person (connected with the sacrifice); because *Syntactical Connection* (which connects the *reciting* with the 'yawning person' *in general*) is more authoritative than Context."

Answer—We do not say that the *Context* entirely precludes the term 'yawning person' from all connection with men not connected with the Context; what we mean is that it will be necessary to assume some result that would follow from the reciting of the *mantra* by a man apart from the sacrificial performance.

"The result has been clearly declared in the text itself,—that 'the man draws within himself *Prāṇa* and *Apāna*'."

We say—it is not so; because we do not find any injunctive term in this sentence; all that we find is the mere statement of something *present* at the time,—'*he draws* within himself *Prāṇa* and *Apāna*,' where we have the *Present Tense*, not the *Injunctive* form of the Verb; and as such it can be taken as *commending* the act of reciting the *mantra*. From this it follows that the result spoken of does not follow (from the reciting of the *mantra*) apart from the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices. From all this it is concluded that the reciting of the *mantra* serves to purify the man (yawning) while he is performing the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.

Objection—"We admit that the act (of *reciting*) is purificatory of the man; but we do not admit that it is so only while the man is performing the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.—Why so?—As a matter of fact, whenever a man *yawns*,—even apart from the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—he is spoken

of as a 'yawning person'; and it has already been said (by the *Siddhāntin* himself) that the *Context* does not exclude (from the connotation of the term 'yawning person') one not engaged in the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*. Hence we conclude that the action of *reciting* should be taken away from the *Context*."

Answer—It is true that the man not engaged in the sacrifice is not excluded; but there is no purpose to be served by the purification of such a man.

Opponent—"Nor is there any purpose to be served by the purification of the man connected with the Context."

Answer—[There is this purpose served in that case that] it would be a purified person that would perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.

Opponent—"Even when the act is taken elsewhere, away from the Context, there would be this purpose served that it would be a purified person that would perform the other acts."

Answer—The *purification* could not form an accessory to any other act; as any such other act could not have any connection with the Context (in which the act of *reciting* is mentioned).

Opponent—"Nor can the *purification* be an accessory to the sacrifice mentioned in the Context, as through *Syntactical Connection*, it is found that it is a quality pertaining to *man*."

Answer—The act of reciting is not understood to appertain to the man (in general), as it would be useless in that case.

From all this it follows that the act of *reciting* is syntactically connected only with the two sacrifices of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* which are mentioned in the Context,—and not with any other action, even though such other action be fruitful; as there would be no *Context* to indicate such connection. For this reason the act of *reciting* is not to be taken away from the *Context*.

It might be argued that—"in the event of the act of *reciting* being retained in the *Context*, the word '*brūyāt*' ('should recite'), which denotes an activity of man in general, would have to be taken as used in a sense other than its own."—But, under the circumstances (if the term were taken as enjoining the activity of man) the word would be a mere reference to what is already known; as there can be no need for enjoining the connection of *man* (in general, with any mere activity).

SŪTRA (16).

A DETAIL CAN BE TAKEN AWAY FROM THE CONTEXT ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF A DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that—"just as the 'twelve *Upasads*' are taken away from their Context (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) (and connected with the *Ahīna*)—in the same manner, the act of *reciting* should be taken away from the Context."—Our answer to this is that in the case cited, the 'twelve *Upasads*' are distinctly declared, by *Syntactical Connection*, as belonging to the *Ahīna* sacirfices;—these *Ahīna* sacrifices are fruitful;—

the term '*Ahīna*' cannot apply to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (the 'sacrifice' of the Context), because any such application could be only indirect and figurative; —and lastly, there is the direct declaration to the effect that—'There are only three *Upasads* in the *one-day* sacrifice, and there are twelve at the *Ahīna*' (Taitti. Sam. 6. 2. 5. 1). For all these reasons, it is only right that the 'twelve *Upasads*' are taken away from the *Context*; specially as in this case there is no connection with any *man*, as such connection would be useless, and there is no other fruitful action mentioned in the *Context*. [Hence the case of the act of *reciting* is not analogous to that of the 'twelve *Upasads*' and the *Ahīna* sacrifices.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *Acts like 'Threatening' appertain to the man in general.*

SŪTRA (17).

IN THE CASE OF 'SHAṀYU' (WHAT IS SPOKEN OF IS TO BE TAKEN AWAY FROM THE CONTEXT), BECAUSE IT APPLIES TO ALL CONDITIONS (OF THE BRĀHMAṆA).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Dēvā vai shaṁyum etc.*' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 6. 10. 1). [The deities said to Shaṁyu, the son of Bṛhaspati, 'Please forward our offerings'..........They said—'What is the use to us of offspring?' If a man threatens a Brāhmaṇa, he should be fined a hundred; if he strike him, he should be fined a thousand; if he fetches blood, as many particles of dust may be wetted by the flowing blood, for so many years he should be kept away from the region of the Pitṛs; for this reason *one should not threaten a Brāhmaṇa, or strike him, or fetch his blood.*]—[In view of this passage, the term '*Shaṁyu*' is taken as standing for the prohibition, contained in the last sentence, of threatening, striking, and fetching blood from, a Brāhmaṇa.]

In regard to this there arises the question—Does the prohibition of *threatening* appertain to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*? Or is it addressed to man in general?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"On account of the *Context*, the prohibition of *threatening* and other acts should be taken as appertaining to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—the meaning being that 'at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* the Brāhmaṇa should not be threatened, or hurt, or wounded so as to fetch blood;—other methods should be employed to win him over: it is for this reason that they win him over by means of the *Anvāhārya*',—such is the sense of the prohibition, deduced from the Context."

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*In the case of 'Shaṁyu'* (i.e. the Prohibitions in question), it has to be taken away from the Context;—why?—*because it applies to all conditions*; that is, the Prohibition contained in the text refers to the Brāhmaṇa in all conditions;—and it does not mean that the threatening is not to be done by the Brāhmaṇa when *engaged in the performance of the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa.*

Objection—"But, from the *Context*, it is clear that it appertains to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*."

Answer—True; that is so, from the *Context*; but from *Syntactical Connection* it is clear that it appertains to the *threatening person* (in general); and *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context*.

Objection—"But as in the case of the *yawning person*, the prohibition in question could find place in the Context itself."

We say—*no*. As in that case a result will have to be assumed; while in the case of the *Siddhānta*, the result is already definitely declared, and there is the injunctive affix also present—'*Shatēna yātayāt—Sahasrēṇa yātayāt—Svargam lokam prajānīyāt*'.

From all this it follows that details like the Prohibition of *Threatening* and the like have to be taken away from the *Context*.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The prohibition of conversation with a woman in her courses appertains to Man in general.*

SŪTRA (18).

INASMUCH AS THE WOMAN IN HER COURSES HAS ALREADY BEEN REMOVED PREVIOUSLY [FROM THE SACRIFICE, THE PROHIBITION CANNOT APPERTAIN TO THE SACRIFICE; IT MUST APPERTAIN TO MAN IN ORDINARY LIFE].

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—" One should not converse with a woman in her courses, nor should one '*eat her food*' " (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 1. 5-6).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this a prohibition of conversation with a woman in her courses during the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices? Or is it meant for man at all times?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that in view of the *Context*, the prohibition should be taken as pertaining to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices.

Against the *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*—The 'conversation with a woman in her courses' meant here should be taken away from the Context;—why?—because such a woman *has already been removed previously*. It is declared (in Taitti. Brā. 3. 7. 1. 9) that—'If the wife of a man happen to be untouchable on the preceding day, he should remove her and then proceed with the performance of the sacrifice'. Conversation with the sacrificer's wife is carried on by the *Adhvaryu* priest at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, during which conversation he says to her 'O wife, wife! this is thy region' (Mai. Saṁ. 1. 4. 3); it is this conversation which is likely to be carried on that could be a subject of prohibition;—but when, in the event of the wife being in her courses, she has been already removed on the preceding day, there could be no possibility of any conversation with her being carried on by persons who are performing the sacrifice after having removed her; how then could there be any likelihood of their conversing with her, which should have to be prohibited?—For these reasons, 'the conversation with a woman in her courses' (which is prohibited by the text in question) should be taken away from the *Context*.

SŪTRA (19).

ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS PROHIBITION OF 'INTERCOURSE'.

Bhāṣya.

There is prohibition also of 'eating her food'—'one should not eat her food; rubbing her body is the woman's food' (Taitti. Sam. 2. 5. 1. 6).

and this 'rubbing' stands for 'intercourse'; hence the sentence 'one should not eat her food' means that 'one should not have intercourse with her'; and there is no possibility of this 'intercourse' in connection with the *Context* (i.e. in course of the performance of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice);—from this also it is definitely concluded that the Prohibition (of *conversation*, and also of *intercourse*) should be taken away from the *Context* and treated as appertaining to Man in general.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The 'wearing of gold' and such details appertain to Man in general.*

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT WHICH DOES NOT OCCUR IN THE 'CONTEXT' OF ANY PARTICULAR SACRIFICE SHOULD APPERTAIN TO MAN IN GENERAL; BECAUSE IT DIFFERS ON THAT POINT FROM THOSE OTHERS (THAT OCCUR IN PARTICULAR CONTEXTS).

Bhāṣya.

Without reference to any sacrifice, there is the text—'*Tasmāt suvarṇam*, etc.' (Taitti. Brā. 2. 2. 4. 6) ['For this reason bright gold should be worn, thereby one's enemy becomes *un-bright* (pale)']; and again '*Suvāsasā bhavitavyam rūpamēva bibharti*' ['One should be well-dressed, thereby he acquires beauty'].

In connection with such texts there arises the question—Does what is laid down here appertain to the *Context* (of a sacrifice) or to Man in general?

The apparent conclusion on this question is that '*that which does not occur in the Context of any particular sacrifice should appertain to Man in general; because on that point it differs from those others that occur in particular Contexts*' (Sū.). That is to say, what is laid down in texts like those under consideration must appertain to Man in general;—why?—because '*from those others*' that occur in particular contexts, it is different, on the point that it does *not* occur in any particular Context. In fact, what does not occur in any particular Context must appertain to *all Contexts*; as on account of its not occurring in any particular Context, it could not be connected with any one *Context*; hence such details must appertain to Man in general.

SŪTRA (21).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S OBJECTION (*a*)]—"BUT INASMUCH AS NO SUBSTANCE IS MENTIONED, THE TEXT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS AUXILIARY (TO THE AGNIHOTRA AND OTHER SACRIFICES)."

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' denies the view set forth in the preceding Sūtra.

"What is laid down in the text in question cannot appertain to Man in general; it must be auxiliary (appertaining) to the *Agnihotra* and other sacrifices.—Why so?—Because *no substance is mentioned*; neither a substance (offering material) nor a deity is mentioned in the text, by virtue of which it could be assumed that the term '*bhāryam*' in the text stands for 'should be offered in sacrifice';—and when no substance or deity is found, the root '*bhṛ*' (in '*bhāryam*') must be taken as denoting 'to wear', and

hence standing for some sort of *purification*; and *purification* is possible only when the thing purified is auxiliary to a sacrifice, not otherwise. Hence what is laid down (i.e. the wearing of gold) should be taken as auxiliary (appertaining) to the *Agnihotra* and other acts."

SŪTRA (22).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S OBJECTION (*b*)]—"SECONDLY, BECAUSE OF ITS CONNECTION WITH THE VEDA."

Bhāṣya.

The text under consideration occurs in that section of the Veda which is called '*Ādhvaryava*' ('Pertaining to the *Adhvaryu*'), which, as denoting connection with the Veda, is applicable only to what is auxiliary to a sacrifice; as it is only what is auxiliary to a sacrifice that 'pertains to the *Adhvaryu* Priest',—and not anything pertaining to Man in general; as a matter of fact, the *Adhvaryu* Priest is the performer of only such acts as the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and other sacrifices along with their auxiliaries, as also the acts that are auxiliary to those sacrifices.—For this reason also the acts like those under consideration should be taken as pertaining to sacrifices."

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S OBJECTION (*c*)]—"THIRDLY, ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS CONNECTION OF A SUBSTANCE."

Bhāṣya.

"Further, the statement '*suvarṇam bhāryam*' ('gold should be worn') is one in which the substance is the principal factor, as is clear from the sense of the objective (implied in the phrase '*suvarṇam bhāryam*'). The wearing of this substance 'gold' being purificatory in character, such purification would serve a useful purpose only if the *wearing* laid down were auxiliary to a sacrifice; it would serve no such purpose if it appertained to *Man in general.*"

SŪTRA (24).

[ANSWER TO PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S OBJECTIONS]—IN REALITY THERE MUST BE SOME CONNECTION BETWEEN THE ACTS UNDER CONSIDERATION AND A RESULT; JUST LIKE THE CONNECTION (OF OTHER THINGS WITH PARTICULAR RESULTS); IT MUST THEREFORE BE REGARDED AS AN ACTION (ACCOMPLISHING THE PURPOSE OF MAN IN GENERAL); SUCH IS THE OPINION OF AITISHĀYANA.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, acts like those we are discussing must have some connection with a result; i.e. they must appertain to Man in general. If the act (*of*

wearing) appertained to (were purificatory of) the *gold*, or to the *clothes*, it would be entirely useless.

Opponent—" But with the *purified* 'gold' and the *purified* 'clothes', the sacrifice would be accomplished (so that it would not be useless)."

Answer—It is not so. What is auxiliary to the *gold* could not help the sacrifice ; and the act in question cannot be taken as auxiliary to the sacrifice, because neither 'Direct Assertion' nor any other means of knowledge points to any such auxiliary. Thus we conclude that acts like those under consideration are connected with results—such as the one spoken of in the sentence 'His enemy becomes pale'.

Opponent—" But this ('his enemy becomes pale') only mentions a present fact (not a future result)."

Answer—True, that is so. But in order to save the passage from uselessness it becomes necessary to seek out its connection with some injunction of results ; and rather than hunt out any other connection, it is much simpler to make some modification in the words occurring in the same sentence.—Why so ?—Because its syntactical connection with that modification would be directly perceptible, while that with any other sentence would be indirect and *not* perceptible. And the only modification that would be needed would be—(1) *not* to attach any significance to the Present Tense (in the word '*bhavati*' in the sentence 'His enemy *becomes* pale'), and (2) to determine the exact import of the connection (between the act of *wearing gold* and the result expressed in the sentence 'His enemy becomes pale'). For these reasons sentences like the one in question should be taken as laying down the *Primary sacrifice* (to which the *wearing of gold* would be an auxiliary, leading to a particular result), just as the *Prajāpati-Vratas* ('one should not look at the rising sun' and so forth) are connected with the result spoken of in the sentence 'By this one becomes absolved from sin',—so it should be understood to be the case with the act under consideration.

From all this it follows that the act of *wearing gold* appertains to *Man in general*.

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The 'Jaya' and other Homas are subsidiaries to actions laid down in the Veda.*

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"WHAT IS NOT MENTIONED IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY PARTICULAR ACTION MUST BE SUBSIDIARY TO ALL ACTIONS, AS THERE CAN BE NO SPECIFICATION."

Bhāṣya.

[We now proceed to consider the special relationship of such factors as are clearly indicated by *Syntactical Connection* to be subsidiary to actions in general—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1387.]

The cases to be considered in this connection are the '*Jaya*' and other oblations which are known to be connected with sacrifices in a general way, such as we find in the following texts—'If one desires to succeed in a transaction, he—(*a*) should offer at it the *Jaya* and other oblations,—(*b*) should offer the '*Rāṣṭrabhṛt* oblations,'—(*c*) should offer the '*Abhyātāna* oblations' (see Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 4. 6. 2). [Here every one of these three oblations is laid down as to be offered *at any sacrifice* where one desires prosperity. (*a*) The '*Jaya*' is the name given to the oblations offered with the *mantra* '*Chittañcha svāha, etc.*' (Hiraṇyakeśi-Gṛhyasūtra, 1. 3. 9); (*b*) '*Rāṣṭrabhṛt*' is the name given to the oblations offered with the *mantra* '*Ṛtāṣāḍ, etc.*' (Vājasa. Saṁ. 18. 38);—and (*c*) '*Abhyātāna*' is the name given to the oblations offered with the *mantra* '*Agnirbhūtānām, etc.*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 4. 5. 1).]

In regard to these oblations there arises this question:—Are they auxiliary to (to be performed in connection with) actions of all kinds,—such as land-cultivation and the like? Or only to those actions that are laid down in the Veda,—such as the *Agnihotra* and the rest? That the oblations in question are auxiliary to other acts (and not independent actions by themselves) is clear from the fact that they are clearly recognised (through the opening words of the text quoted) as being connected with certain transactions, and also from the fact that no separate results are mentioned as following from them (the only result mentioned being the *success* of the transaction in connection with which they are performed).

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is that "the oblations in question should be taken as auxiliary to actions of all kinds, because the text speaks of no specification".

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, BEING OF THE NATURE OF 'HOMA' (OBLATION INTO FIRE), THEY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED (TO THE VEDIC SACRIFICES); BECAUSE OF THEIR CONNECTION WITH THE 'ĀHAVANĪYA' (SACRIFICIAL FIRE).

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that the oblations in question should be taken as auxiliary to all kinds of actions, including even land-cultivation and the like. In fact, these are *of the nature of* '*Homa*' (Oblation into Fire), *and as such should be restricted*; because in *Homas*, the connection of the Sacrificial Fire is essential; as is made clear in such texts as 'when one offers oblations into the Sacrificial Fire then does his desired object become fulfilled' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 10. 5);—from this it follows that the oblations in question can be auxiliary to only such acts as are connected with the Sacrificial Fire.—Now, as a matter of fact, such acts as land-cultivation and the like are not connected with the Sacrificial Fire; in fact they are not connected even with the '*Gārhapatya*' (Domestic Fire), out of which the '*Āhavanīya*' or Sacrificial Fire could be obtained.—From all this it follows that the '*Jaya*' and other oblations are *not* to be offered in connection with such acts as land-cultivation and the like.

SŪTRA (27).

THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AUXILIARY (TO VEDIC SACRIFICES), —ALSO BECAUSE OF THE NAME.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we hold the view that the oblations are subsidiary to *Vedic* actions.—Why?—*Because of the names*; that is, the '*Jaya*' and the other oblations in question have been laid down in that section of the Veda which has been named '*Ādhvaryava*' ('pertaining to the Adhvaryu Priest'), and hence they should be offered by the *Adhvaryu* priest. In the case of land-cultivation and such acts, there is no *Adhvaryu* priest; so that if the oblations in question were offered at these acts, they would be offered by one who is *not an Adhvaryu*; and this would be contrary to the indication of the *Name*.—From this also it follows that the oblations in question are subsidiary to Vedic acts only.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The prescribed 'Iṣṭi' is to be performed in connection with the 'acceptance' of the gift of a Horse at a Vedic sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SACRIFICE SHOULD BE PERFORMED ON THE 'ACCEPTANCE' OF THE ORDINARY HORSE-GIFT, AS IT IS THIS 'ACCEPTANCE' THAT WOULD BE SINFUL; AND AS FOR THE 'ACCEPTANCE' OF THE VEDIC HORSE-GIFT, NO SINFULNESS COULD ATTACH TO THAT, AS IT IS SANCTIONED BY THE SCRIPTURES."

Bhāṣya.

[Here 'acceptance' stands for 'giving'.—See next *Adhikaraṇa.*]

There is a sacrifice called the '*Ashvapratigrahēṣṭi*' (Sacrifice performed in connection with the acceptance of a Horse-gift), enjoined in the text—'*Varuṇo vā ētam gṛhṇāti yo'shvam pratigṛhṇāti; yāvato'shvān pratigṛhṇiyāt yāvato vāruṇān chatuṣkapālān nirvapēt*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 12. 1) ['Varuṇa seizes him who accepts the gift of a horse; as many horses one may receive in gift, so many offerings on four pans should be made to Varuṇa'].

In regard to this there arises the question—Is this expiatory sacrifice to be performed at the 'acceptance' of the Horse-gift in ordinary life, or at the acceptance of the Horse-gift sanctioned by the Veda?

Question—"When is it the 'acceptance of the horse-gift' *in ordinary life*? and when is it the 'acceptance of the horse-gift' *sanctioned by the Veda*?"

Answer—When in ordinary life, one receives the gift of a horse, either on asking for it, or even without asking,—it is a case of 'acceptance of the horse-gift in ordinary life';—and it is a case of 'acceptance of the horse-gift sanctioned by the Veda', when one receives 'a thousand horses' as the sacrificial fee prescribed for the *Pauṇḍarīka* sacrifice, or when one receives a horse at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* where 'the horse, cow, etc.' have been prescribed as the sacrificial fee.

The ordinary notion being that as the expiatory sacrifice itself is a *Vedic sacrifice*, it must be performed in connection with the gift sanctioned by the Veda,—we have, against it, the following *Pūrvapakṣa* view:—"*The sacrifice should be performed at the 'acceptance' of the ordinary Horse-gift, as it is this 'acceptance' that would be sinful*; the sinfulness of the acceptance is clearly asserted in the sentence '*Varuṇa* (Dropsy) seizes him who accepts the gift of a horse';—this descriptive text must refer to a case where there is *sin* (in the acceptance); and this *sinfulness* is possible only in cases where the gift of a horse is 'accepted' in ordinary life at the hands of a *Shūdra* or some other sinful person; hence inasmuch as this *sinfulness* is possible only in the case of an *ordinary* Horse-gift, it follows that the

expiatory sacrifice should be performed only at such an 'acceptance' in ordinary life.—*Objection*—'The descriptive text just quoted is meant, not to qualify the occasion for the expiatory sacrifice, but only to commend the expiatory sacrifice.'—*Answer*—It could be so only if the sacrifice served the purpose of removing the *sin*; the sacrifice however is meant to save one from *Varuṇa* (i.e. Dropsy); and this is possible only in ordinary life; as it is only in ordinary life that *Dropsy* actual seizes a man. In the case of the acceptance of the Horse-gift sanctioned by the Veda, on the other hand, such would not be the case; because that this gift should be accepted (at the sacrifice) is sanctioned by the scriptures—i.e. by direct injunctive texts. If there were *sin* in such an 'acceptance', then it could never be enjoined as something that *should be done*; because what tends to bring about sin is something that *should never be done*.—*Objection*—'Even in the case of the acceptance of the horse-gift sanctioned by the Veda, there is *sin* if it is accepted from a person from whom gifts should never be accepted.'—*Answer*—That might be so if the expiatory sacrifice were to be performed by the person *accepting* the gift; as a matter of fact, however, it is to be performed by the *person who makes the other person accept the gift* (i.e. the *giver* of the gift),—as we shall explain under the next *Adhikaraṇa*.—For all these reasons, it should be taken as established in the present *Adhikaraṇa* that the expiatory sacrifice in question should *not* be performed at that 'acceptance of the Horse-gift' which is sanctioned by the Veda."

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE TEXT (SPEAKING OF VARUṆA SEIZING THE MAN) SHOULD BE TAKEN AS ONLY COMMENDATORY; AS NO SUCH SEIZURE IS ACTUALLY FOUND TO TAKE PLACE; HENCE THE EXPIATORY SACRIFICE SHOULD BE TAKEN AS TO BE PERFORMED IN CONNECTION WITH THE GIFT AT A SACRIFICIAL PERFORMANCE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not the correct view to take that "the sacrifice in question should be performed by one who, in ordinary life, accepts the gift of a horse from a *Shūdra* or from some other sinful person". The person accepting the gift has been spoken of as 'seized by *Varuṇa*', i.e. one who is attacked by Dropsy, one whose abdomen becomes distended on account of the accumulation of fluid within; this is a disease known in common parlance as '*Jalodara*' ('Water in the Abdomen', Dropsy):—and certainly the text could not be meant to assert that the 'acceptance of the gift of a horse' in ordinary life is the cause of the said disease; nor can this (cause of the disease) be taken as enjoined by the text itself. Thus we conclude that there is no '*seizure*' by Dropsy, following from the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift.

Opponent—"The term '*varuṇa*' stands (not for the disease of *dropsy*, but) for *sin*,—in the etymological sense of the term—'*varuṇa*' being derived from the root '*vṛ*' 'to hinder' or 'hide'."

Answer—This argument would involve the unnecessary trouble of abandoning the well-known signification of the term; because, even, in the said etymological sense, '*Varuṇa*' would be *that which hinders*,—and such a '*Varuṇa*' could seize a man also at the acceptance of the gift at a sacrifice. Even if the 'hindrance' ('*varuṇa*') be taken as consisting in the trouble involved in the keeping, feeding and general care (of the horse received in gift), there would be nothing to justify the view that this applies *only* to the case of the *ordinary* horse-gift [as the horse received at a Vedic sacrifice has to be kept and fed and cared for exactly in the same manner as that received in ordinary life];—and yet the recourse to the etymological explanation would set aside the well-known signification of the term (to no purpose).

For these reasons the text in question must be taken as purely *commendatory*; the commendation consisting in the likening of the expiatory sacrifice to freedom from dropsy, the sense being that 'the result brought about by the sacrifice is as desirable for the performer as freedom from dropsy is for the man seized by dropsy'; the 'acceptance' of the gift being likened to the 'attack of dropsy' and the 'sacrifice' to the 'freedom from dropsy'; the sense thus comes to be that 'just as for the man attacked by dropsy it is necessary to take measures for its cure, so is it necessary for the man accepting the gift to perform the sacrifice'.

Thus for all these reasons, *the expiatory sacrifice should be taken as to be performed in connection with the gift at a sacrificial performance*. Because if it were applicable in the case of the *ordinary gift*, it would be necessary to assume a result for it; in the case of the gift at a sacrifice on the other hand, the expiatory sacrifice would be an auxiliary to that sacrifice at which the gift of the horse has been accepted; this will mean that the expiatory sacrifice has to be taken as syntactically connected with the text laying down the entire procedure of that other sacrifice (at which the gift is received), on the ground of the two being directly connected (as shown above); and this would certainly be much simpler than the assumption of a syntactical connection, which is not direct, with a declaration of the result (assumed to follow from the expiatory sacrifice performed in connection with the ordinary gift).—Thus it is only right that the expiatory sacrifice should be performed in connection with the gift of a horse sanctioned by the Veda.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'Vāruṇī Iṣṭi', prescribed in connection with the gift of a Horse is to be performed by the giver of the horse.*

SŪTRA (30).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SACRIFICE IS NOT PRESCRIBED [FOR THE GIVER], AS THE ACTION [OF 'GIVING'] IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT [FROM THE ACTION OF 'ACCEPTING' IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH THE SACRIFICE IS PRESCRIBED]."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the text '*Yāvato'shvān pratigṛhṇiyāt tāvato vāruṇān chatuṣkapālān nirvapēt*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 12. 1) ['As many horses one receives in gift, so many offerings on four pans he should make to *Varuṇa*'],—we have learnt (in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*) that the sacrifice herein prescribed is to be done in connection with the gift of a horse at a Vedic sacrifice. Now, there arises the question—Is this sacrifice to be performed by the *acceptor*, i.e. the person *to* whom the horse is given, or by the person who makes the other accept the gift, i.e. the person *by* whom the horse is given ?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* :—"*The sacrifice is not prescribed for the giver, as the action of 'giving' is different from the action of 'accepting'* ; that is, as a matter of fact, the sacrifice in question has not been prescribed for the person making the gift, and we clearly understand it as laid down for the person who does the *acceptance* of the gift, by the text—' as many horses one *receives in gift* so many offerings on four pans he should make to Varuṇa'. Hence the conclusion is that the sacrifice should be performed by the Priest who accepts the gift of the horse."

SŪTRA (31).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY THE PERSON EMPLOYING THE PRIESTS, AS IS CLEARLY SHOWN BY INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

The sacrifice is to be performed, not by the person *accepting* the gift, but by the person who makes the person accept it ;—"why ?"—because this *is clearly shown by indications.*—"What is the *indicative* that shows it ?" —The 'indicative' consists in the connection between the words that follow and the words that have gone before ; that is to say, there is the text (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 12. 1), (*a*) '*Prajāpatir varuṇāya ashvamanayat*' ['Prajāpati presented a horse to Varuṇa'], where Prajāpati is spoken of as the *giver* and Varuṇa as the *receiver* of the Horse ;—(*b*) then follows the sentence *Sa svām devatām ārchhat*' ['He lost the divinity within himself']

which needs to be construed with the foregoing sentence, so that the pronoun '*sa*' ('he') stands for *Prajāpati* (of the preceding sentence), and the two sentences become syntactically connected. The pronoun 'he' is taken as standing for Prajāpati, as it is in the same case as the word '*prajāpatiḥ*' (in the preceding sentence)—and it is not taken as standing for Varuṇa, as it is not in the same case as '*varuṇāya*' (in the preceding sentence);—(*c*) next follows the sentence '*Sa paryadīryata*' ['He became torn (afflicted with disease)']; here also the pronoun 'he' stands for *Prajāpati* mentioned before,—and the sentence becomes syntactically connected with the first sentence;—(*d*) next comes the sentence—'*Sa ēvaitam vāruṇam chatuṣkapālam apashyat*' ['He perceived the cake baked on four pans dedicated to Varuṇa'], where again 'he' stands for the same *Prajāpati*;—then it goes on, '*Sa niravapat*' ['He offered it'],—again 'he' is *Prajāpati*;—then, '*Tato vai sa varuṇapāshāt amuchyata*' ['thence he became freed from the clutches of Varuṇa'],—here also 'he' is Prajāpati. The sentence 'Varuṇa seizes him' is the statement of the reason; the sense being—'Because Prajāpati, on giving a horse to Varuṇa, became afflicted with disease, therefore the person who receives (i.e. *gives*) a horse is seized by Varuṇa, and becomes afflicted with disease';—and 'because Prajāpati became free by offering the *Vāruṇa* sacrifice, therefore the man who gives a horse should offer the *Vāruṇa* sacrifice.'—In this manner the performance of the *Vāruṇa* sacrifice by the *giver of a horse* becomes commended by the verb 'should be performed'.—From this it follows that when a man gives a horse, he should offer the *Vāruṇa* sacrifice.

Objection—"What is actually asserted in the text is that the person who *accepts* the gift of a horse should offer the sacrifice."

Answer—If such were the meaning, then the opening of the passage would be asserting one thing and its concluding portion something quite to the contrary; so that the opening as well as the conclusion would both be meaningless. Hence we have either to assume a different meaning for the opening sentence, in accordance with what is said in the concluding sentence, or assume a different meaning for the concluding sentence, in accordance with what is said in the opening sentence; that is, either the opening sentence 'Prajāpati *presented* a horse *to Varuṇa*' will, in accordance with what is said in the concluding sentence, have to be taken to mean that 'he *received the* horse *from Varuṇa*',—or, in accordance with what is said in the opening sentence, the concluding sentence, 'He who *receives* a horse' will have to be taken to mean 'one who *gives* a horse'.—Under the circumstances, it is what comes first that is to be respected (kept intact), as there is nothing to contradict it (at the time of its appearance),—whereas what comes later has to be taken in an indirect sense by reason of a contrary idea having already appeared on the scene;—this according to the maxim, 'That which comes first is to be accepted, as its injunction comes first, as in ordinary practice' (*Mīmānsā-Sūtra* 12. 2. 23).

Further, if the statement that 'Prajāpati *presented* a horse *to Varuṇa*' were taken to mean that 'he *received* it *from Varuṇa*', many incongruities would be involved in such an interpretation. On the other hand, the word 'receives' is capable of somehow expressing the idea of *giving*; because the

man who does an act,—as also the man who, even indirectly, helps in the accomplishment of the act,—both can be regarded as the 'doer' of that act; for instance, when a man *arranges* for the ploughing of a field, he is spoken of as 'ploughing the field with six ploughs', even though he may not do the actual *ploughing* at all; and this because it is he who enables the act to be done and hence 'does' it;—in the same manner, in the case in question, the man who enables the *acceptance* to be done is he who *gives* it;—and hence the man *giving* the horse can be spoken of as 'accepting' it. Thus, it is after full consideration that it has been decided that it is the person *giving* the horse who is spoken of as 'accepting' it (in the text under consideration); and it is for him that the performance of the *Vāruṇa* sacrifice has been prescribed.

[Kumārila offers other interpretations of this and the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*; for which see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1407–1410.]

Adhikaraṇa (12): *Cooked 'Charu' is to be offered to Soma-Indra on the occasion of vomiting the Soma drunk at a Vedic sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (32).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The case of the vomiting of the Soma drunk is similar [to that of the Horse-gift]."

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Somaindram charum nirvapēt shyāmākam somavāminaḥ*' ['Cooked *shyāmāka* rice should be offered to *Soma-Indra*, on behalf of one who vomits *Soma*'] (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 2. 7).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this cooked rice to be offered to *Soma-Indra*, on the occasion of vomiting the ordinary Soma-drink or on that of vomiting the Vedic Soma-drink ?

Question—"What is *ordinary Soma-drink ?* and what is *Vedic Soma-drink ?*"

Answer—The *Vedic Soma-drink* is the *Soma* drunk at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and allied sacrifices; and it is *ordinary Soma-drink* when *Soma* is drunk for seven or ten days for the purpose of securing the equilibrium of the bodily humours.

On the question stated, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* :—"*The case of the vomiting of the Soma drunk is similar to that of the Horse-gift.* That is to say, the sacrifice in question is to be offered in the case of the *ordinary vomiting*, not in that of the *Vedic vomiting*. The words 'is similar' refer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (of Adhikaraṇa 10); the sense being that—just as in the case of the Horse-gift, the expiatory sacrifice was declared (in the *Pūrvapakṣa*) as to be performed at the acceptance of the Horse-gift in ordinary life, on the ground of its performance having been laid down in connection with an evil effect (the attack of dropsy),—in the same manner, in the case in question also, we find the sacrifice mentioned in connection with an evil effect in the text 'one who drinks Soma (and vomits it) becomes weak in his sense-organs and in vigour';—now it is only in ordinary life that the *Soma* being regularly drunk for the purpose of securing the equilibrium of the bodily humours, if the drink is lost by vomiting, the equilibrium of the humours becomes lost; so that it is only in this case that the 'weakening of the sense-organs' becomes possible (as the result of the vomiting). In the case of *Soma* drunk during a Vedic sacrifice, as the drinking is done simply in obedience to the scriptural injunction (and not for any special purpose), there could be no evil effect (resulting from the *vomiting*); because in this case, the *Soma-drinking* is done simply in obedience to the injunction that 'the remnant of the *Soma* at a sacrifice should be drunk'; and so long as this 'drinking of the *Soma*' is done, there can be no evil effects; so that even though the man might vomit the *Soma*

drunk, yet the enjoined act of *Soma-drinking* will have been duly accomplished, and the scriptural injunction will have been duly acted upon ; and hence there could be no evil effects. For these reasons, we conclude that the offering to *Soma-Indra* should be made when the *Soma* drunk in ordinary life is vomited."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE OFFERING SHOULD BE MADE AT THE (VOMITING OF THE SOMA DRUNK AT THE) VEDIC SACRIFICE ; AS IT IS ONLY AT THIS THAT IT CREATES AN EVIL EFFECT ; AS REGARDS THE (VOMITING OF THE SOMA DRUNK IN) ORDINARY LIFE, AS IT IS DONE FOR A VISIBLE PURPOSE, THERE COULD BE NO EVIL EFFECTS.

Bhāṣya.

The offering in question can be made only at the vomiting of the Soma drunk at a Vedic sacrifice, not at that of what is drunk in ordinary life.—Why ?—*Because it is only at this that it creates an evil effect ;* in connection with the vomiting at a Vedic sacrifice, we find its evil effect described in the text—'He becomes weak in the sense-organs and in vigour.' In the case of the *ordinary* Soma-drinking on the other hand, as it is done for the purpose of securing the equilibrium of the bodily humours, there would be no evil effects resulting from the vomiting : in fact, it is for the very purpose of vomiting it that they drink *Soma* in ordinary life.

Even if we take the text just quoted ('He becomes weak, etc.') to be purely commendatory, the only reasonable hypothesis would be that the offering is to be done on vomiting the Soma drunk at a Vedic sacrifice ; as it is only by this means that we could avoid the necessity of assuming a distinct result (for the offering to Soma-Indra). [Under the *Siddhānta*, this assumption is not necessary because the offering forms part of the Vedic sacrifice and thus helps in the bringing about of the result of that sacrifice itself.]

Adhikaraṇa (13): *The offering of Cooked Rice to Soma-Indra is to be made only when the 'Vomiting' of the Soma-drink is done by the Sacrificer.*

SŪTRA (34).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The offering should be made in all cases (of vomiting), as there is no distinction."

Bhāṣya.

[In connection with the offering of Cooked Rice to Soma-Indra, at the vomiting of Soma drunk at a Vedic sacrifice, there arises the question as to whether the offering is to be made when the vomiting is done by the sacrificer? or when it is done by the priests? Or when it is done by both?] On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* :—"The sacrifice consisting of the offering of cooked rice to Soma-Indra should be performed at all cases of vomiting—by the Priests and by the sacrificer.—Why?—Because we find no distinction made—such as that 'it should be offered at the vomiting done by such and such a person, and not at that done by such and such another person';—for this reason it should be performed in all cases of vomiting *Soma*."

SŪTRA (35).

[Siddhānta]—In reality the offering should be made when the vomiting is done by the sacrificer; as it is for his sake (that the whole sacrifice is performed).

Bhāṣya.

The offering should be made at the vomiting done by the sacrificer;—why?—*because it is for the sake of the sacrificer that the sacrifice is performed*; that is to say, the sacrifice at which the *Soma* is vomited is performed '*for his sake*',—i.e. for the sake of the sacrificer; consequently the offering to *Soma-Indra* should also be made for his sake. As a matter of fact, what is declared in the text under consideration (regarding the offering to be made to *Soma-Indra*) is for the benefit of the *Soma-vomiter*, and that alone benefits the *Soma-vomiter* which is capable of benefiting the sacrificer, —not what is done for the Priest; as the sacrifice at which *Soma* is vomited is not done for the sake of the Priests. [If the expiatory offering were made on the vomiting by the Priest, then that sacrifice could not be performed in the Fire kindled for the sacrificer, in which the main sacrifice is being performed.]

The following might be urged here—"When the *Adhvaryu* Priest or the *Hotṛ* Priest would vomit the *Soma*, their own priests could make the expiatory offering in *their* fires (not in the fire set up for the sacrifice that is performed for the sake of the sacrificer)."

In that case, there would be two possibilities :—(1) the expiatory offering would (be made on behalf of the vomiting priests, and hence through other priests and in other fires, and as such) not form part of the main sacrifice at which the *Soma* has been vomited ; or (2) the expiatory offering would *not* be made on behalf of the vomiting priests, *Adhvaryu* and *Hotṛ*.—Of these two alternatives, if (according to the first alternative) the *Adhvaryu* and other priests were to have the expiatory offering made by distinct priests of their own, then on account of the former occupying, as they do, a very subordinate position at the whole performance, could not obtain the fruits of the action ; and what would be done on behalf of the priests could not benefit the sacrificer at all. For these reasons, we conclude that the expiatory offering should not be offered at the *vomiting* by the priests.

SŪTRA (36).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES (TO THE SAME EFFECT).

Bhāṣya.

There is a text indicative of the fact that the offering is to be made on behalf of the vomiting *Sacrificer*.—" How ? "—The text is—' *Somapīthēna vā ēṣa vyṛdhyatē yaḥ somam vamati* ' [' If one vomits *Soma*, he is ruined '] ;—this means that when the *Soma* loses its sanctity (by the vomiting) the sacrificial performance *of the Sacrificer* becomes defective and thereby he is ruined ;—now this ' *ruin* ' could never be that of the Priest. If it were meant to apply to the case of vomiting by the Priests, then the form of the text speaking of the *vomiting* would have been (' that sacrificer is ruined) *whose priests* vomit the *Soma* ', not ' *he who* vomits the *Soma* '.—From all this also we conclude that the offering (in question) to *Soma-Indra* should be made when the *Soma* is vomited *by the sacrificer.*

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *Out of the 'Cake baked on Eight Pans' dedicated to Agni, only 'two slices' are to be offered.*

SŪTRA (37).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ENTIRE SUBSTANCE SHOULD BE OFFERED, AS IT IS MEANT FOR THAT PURPOSE."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; in connection with these, we read—'*Yadāgnēyo'ṣṭākapālo'māvāsyāyām paurṇamāsyāñchāchyuto bhavati*' ['The Cake baked upon eight pans dedicated to Agni is never absent at the *Amāvāsyā* and the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifices'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 3. 3).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the entire substance (cake) to be offered to *Agni*? or only a little is to be offered and a little is to be retained?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"*The entire substance should be offered*;—why?—*because it is meant for that purpose*; the injunction on the point is that 'The Cake should be made *āgnēya* (dedicated to *Agni*)'; hence the whole of it should be offered."

SŪTRA (38).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS WHAT IS LAID DOWN AS TO BE OFFERED IS A 'SLICE,' THERE MUST BE A REMNANT.

Bhāṣya.

'*Niravadāna*' stands for '*niṣkṛṣya avadāna*', i.e. 'offering after being sliced out'; and it is this 'sliced offering' that is laid down in the text, 'Out of the substance, one should make two slices for offering'; there is another text also, to the effect that 'one should offer into the Fire an offering consisting of two slices.'—From all this it is clear that only 'two slices' have to be offered and the rest is to be retained.

SŪTRA (39).

[OBJECTION]—"WHAT IS LAID DOWN IN THESE TEXTS IS ONLY THE METHOD (OF MAKING THE OFFERING); IN REALITY THE WHOLE OF THE SUBSTANCE IS MEANT TO BE OFFERED."

Bhāṣya.

"It is not meant that only 'two slices' should be offered; what is meant is that 'the substance to be offered should be *prepared* (sanctified) by slicing it twice'; so that all that is enjoined by the texts quoted is that

'the substance to be offered *should be sliced twice*'; and it is not meant that what is *not* 'sliced twice' should *not* be offered. Hence the only right course to adopt is that the whole of the Cake should be offered,—none other."

SŪTRA (40).

[ANSWER]—THE OFFERING SHOULD BE DONE ONCE ONLY, AS THE ACTION (OF 'OFFERING') WILL HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED (BY THAT SIMPLE OFFERING); SPECIALLY AS THE SUBSTANCE IS ONLY SUBSERVIENT (TO THE ACT OF 'OFFERING').

Bhāṣya.

Answer—When the substance to be offered has been declared to be that which is qualified by 'double slicing', then by the offering of that 'double-sliced' substance, all that is declared has been accomplished, and in reality there is no substance left (of what has been declared to be meant to be offered); and hence the offering should not be repeated.—Why so?—Because the substance is meant only to subserve the purpose of accomplishing the *offering*; and it is not that the substance must be brought into contact with the *offering*. If it were incumbent upon us to bring the substance into contact with the offering, then, it might be conceded that, even after the 'double-sliced' substance has been offered, there is some of the substance left which should be brought into contact with the act of *offering*; so that for this purpose the offering may have to be repeated. As a matter of fact, however, the *act of offering* is there, not for the purpose that the substance may be brought into contact with it,—but in reality it is the *substance* that is subservient to the *offering*; i.e. the substance is taken away only for the purpose of accomplishing the *act of offering*. Consequently, when the *offering* has been accomplished (by the offering of the 'double-sliced' cake), and the man's purpose has been fulfilled, it is not necessary that the primary act (of *offering*) should be repeated, simply for the sake of the substance (that may have been left after the 'double-sliced' offering has been made).

Question—"Why should the substance be regarded as *not predominant*, and hence not necessitating the repetition of the act of *offering*?"

Answer—Because the result follows from the *offering*; and also because of the maxim that 'when *an already accomplished entity* is spoken of along with *an entity still to be accomplished*, the former is to be taken as mentioned for the purposes of the latter'.—Nor does the substance accord any perceptible help to the offering.—From all this it follows that a remnant is to be kept after the 'double-sliced' substance has been offered.

It has been argued that—"in view of the substance being spoken of (in the text) as '*āgnēya*' (dedicated to *Agni*),—it must be admitted that the whole of it should be offered (*to Agni*)".—But in this view, the connection of the *whole substance* with the *offering* would be based upon *Inference*; that of the 'double-sliced substance', on the other hand, is based upon the directly perceived text.—Further, the nominal affix ('*ḍhak*', in the term '*āgnēya*' 'dedicated to Agni') would be applicable also when the *whole of* the sub-

stance is *not* offered,—in the sense that 'the substance to be offered to *Agni* is to be taken out of the Cake' (which, on that account is called '*āgnēya*', 'dedicated to *Agni*'). '*Āgnēya*' is a generic term, while the term 'double-sliced' in the sentence 'the *double-sliced substance* is to be offered' is a particular term [and there is thus no incongruity in the term '*āgnēya*'].

From all this it follows that some portion of the substance is to be retained.

SŪTRA (41).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THE 'REMNANT' SPOKEN OF (IN THE VEDA).

Bhāṣya.

We actually find the 'remnant' (of the Cake) spoken of in such texts as—'One should slice the *Iḍā* out of the *remnant*', 'one should make the *Sviṣṭakṛt* offering out of the *remnant*'; [which is a clear indication of the fact that only a portion of the Cake is to be actually offered to *Agni*, and a portion is to be retained as the 'remnant' to be used for various purposes].

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The 'Sviṣṭakṛt' offering is to be made out of the Remnants of all the substances used at the Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (42).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THEY ARE NOT THE MOTIVE FOR THE ADMITTING OF THE SUBSTANCES, THE REMNANT-OFFERINGS SHOULD BE MADE OUT OF A SINGLE SUBSTANCE; SPECIALLY AS THE REMNANT IS ONLY A SECONDARY FACTOR."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; at these there are some doings with the remnants of the offering-substances,—such doings, for instance, as the offerings of the '*Iḍā*', the '*Prāshitra*' and the '*Sviṣṭakṛt*'.

In regard to these there arises the question—Are these doings to be done with the remnants of each of the substances offered at the sacrifice? or with the remnant of only one of them?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"*Inasmuch as they are not the motive for the admitting of the substances, the Remnant-offerings should be made out of a single substance*;—that is to say, what may be done with the Remnants does not tend to admit the substances [i.e. substances are brought into a sacrificial performance, *not* because the Remnant-offerings have to be made out of them, but because the main sacrificial offerings are made out of them, and the offering of the Remnant is only for a secondary purpose]; if the substances had come in simply for the purpose of the remnant-offerings being made out of them, then, without doubt, the Remnant-offerings would have been made out of all the substances used; as a matter of fact, however, the substances are brought in for a different purpose (i.e. for the purpose of the making of the main sacrificial offerings); and as such they need not necessarily be used for purposes of the remnant-offerings; in fact, on account of all the substances being near to hand, the remnant-offerings may be made out of any one of them; because the remnant is only a means of the offerings (and hence a secondary factor)."

SŪTRA (43).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE THE EMBELLISHMENT IS ACCOMPLISHED (BY A SINGLE OFFERING)."

Bhāṣya.

"As a matter of fact, the embellishment of the primary act (which is the sole purpose of the offering of Remnants) is accomplished by a single Remnant-offering; in view of this fact, offerings should not be made out of any other remnant."

SŪTRA (44).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE MADE OUT OF ALL THE SUBSTANCES, BECAUSE THE MOTIVE IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL, AND BECAUSE THE EMBELLISHMENT IS FOR THE SAKE OF THE SUBSTANCES.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the Remnant-offerings *should be made out of all the substances* (used at the sacrifice);—*why?—because the motive is equally present in all*; i.e. the reason that there is for the making of the remnant-offering out of one substance is present in the case of all the substances;—hence a *remnant* has to be secured of all; that substance of which no remnant is secured, remains deprived of that embellishment which is brought about by the offering. —For all these reasons remnant-offerings should be made out of all the substances.

SŪTRA (45).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

We find texts also indicative of the same conclusion; e.g.—'*Dēvā vai sviṣṭakṛtamabruvan havyam no vaha iti; so'bravīt varam vṛṇai; bhāgo me'stviti; vṛṇīsvēti tē' bruvan; so'bravīt uttarārdhādēva mahyam sakṛt sakṛdavadadyāt*' [The deities said to *Sviṣṭakṛt*—'carry to us our offerings'; he said—'I would ask for the boon that I may receive a share of the offerings'; they said—'Do ask for it';—he said—'One should make an offering to me, one by one, out of the latter half'];—here the term '*sakṛt*' has been repeated; which shows that the offerings have to be made out of every one of the Remnants.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *In the event of the Remnant-offerings being made out of a single substance, they should be made out of the first Remnant.*

SŪTRA (46).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" IF THE REMNANT-OFFERING IS TO BE DONE OUT OF ONLY ONE SUBSTANCE, ONE MAY DO AS ONE LIKES (OFFERING IT OUT OF ANY SUBSTANCE HE LIKES), AS THERE CAN BE NO DISTINCTION AMONG THEM.

Bhāṣya.

This is a hypothetical discussion ; the question being—In case the remnant-offerings were to be made out of a single substance [which we have just decided cannot be done]—what is to be done ? can the offerings be made out of any one of the substances one likes ? or are they to be made out of the *first* one ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—" it may be made out of any substance one likes ;—why ?—because we do not find any ground for distinction among them ; hence there can be no hard and fast rule as to the substance out of which the single offering is to be made."

SŪTRA (47).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE OFFERING SHOULD BE MADE OUT OF THE FIRST SUBSTANCE, BECAUSE OF ITS PRIORITY IN TIME.

Bhāṣya.

The Remnant-offerings should be made out of the remnant of the first (i.e. principal) substance ;—why ?—*because of its priority in time.* As it is the first in point of time, if one were to make the offerings out of it, there would be no absence of the requisite conditions ; so that when the conditions would be there, it is only right that what is conditional on those conditions should be done ; as regards the second and other substances, on the other hand, when the offerings would have been once made out of the first substance, the necessary conditions would cease to exist ; and hence the offerings would not be made out of these.—For all these reasons, the offerings should be made out of the remnant of the *first* substance.

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *The division of the cake is for the purposes of 'Eating'.*

SŪTRA (48).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS WE DO NOT FIND ANY MENTION OF 'EATING', THE TERM INDICATING 'GIVING' SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE SENSE OF 'INDUCEMENT FOR SERVICE'."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Idam brahmaṇaḥ, idam hotuḥ, idamadhvaryoḥ, idamagnīdhaḥ* ['This is for the *Brahman*-priest, this for the *Hotṛ*-priest, this for the *Adhvaryu*-priest, this for the *Agnīd*-priest'] (Taitti. Brā. 3. 3. 8. 8). [The Cake having been divided into four parts, each part is assigned to each of the four principal priests, with the words herein prescribed.]

In regard to this there arises the question—Is this assignment of shares for the purpose of inducement for willing service? or for the purpose of 'eating'?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"the assignment of shares is for the purpose of inducement for willing service;—why?—*because we find no mention of the 'eating'*; we find no such word as 'it should be eaten'; and it is as wrong to *do* what is *not enjoined* in the Veda as to *omit* what *is enjoined*;—and we find that the parts are given to those who have rendered service (at the performance);—hence it follows that the assignment in question is for the purpose of inducement for willing service."

SŪTRA (49).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—"ALSO BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN EULOGISED AS SUCH."

Bhāṣya.

"The assignment of shares in question we find eulogised as the 'sacrificial fee', in the text—'*Ēṣā vai darshapūrṇamāsayordakṣiṇā*'; from this also we conclude that (like the sacrificial fee) this assignment also is for the purpose of inducement for service."

SŪTRA (50).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THE ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS BEING FOR THE PURPOSE OF 'EATING'; BECAUSE AS REGARDS THE SUBSTANCE (CAKE), THERE IS EQUALITY (BETWEEN THE PRIESTS AND THE SACRIFICER, IN SO FAR AS THE OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBSTANCE IS CONCERNED).

Bhāṣya.

The assignment of shares must be taken as being for the purpose of 'eating';—"why?"—because there can be no 'giving' in the case.—

"Why not ?"—Because it is only the *owner* of a thing that can give it, not one who is not its owner.—"Why is there no ownership in this case ?" —Because as a matter of fact, the substance (Cake) has been already dedicated by the sacrificer to a particular Deity with the terms 'this is for such and such a deity'; and when a thing has been so dedicated to a deity, cultured people no longer treat it as their *own*. Consequently if the sacrificer follows this custom of cultured people, he could not have any ownership over the cake (so dedicated). And thus [since he has no ownership over it, it cannot be given away by him, and] it cannot therefore serve the purpose of securing the services (of the priests).

It has been argued that—"nowhere do we find any such expression as that the shares *should be eaten*, and there is as much harm in doing what is *not enjoined* as there is in omitting to do what is *enjoined*".—Our answer to this is as follows:—When the sacrificer pronounces the words 'this for the Brahman-Priest' and so forth (when assigning the parts of the Cake), some sort of connection is established between the shares and the Brahman and other priests;—in this connection, either the *shares* would benefit the *Brahman and other priests*, or the *Brahman and other priests* would benefit the shares;—as a matter of fact, however, we do not find any perceptible benefit being conferred by the *Brahman and other priests* upon the *shares*; —on the other hand, it is possible for some benefit to be conferred on *the Brahman and other priests* by the *shares* when these latter are eaten;— hence we conclude that the assignment of the shares is for the purpose of eating.—"What is the benefit (that could be conferred by the shares on the priests)?"—When the Priests have their hunger satisfied by the eating of the Cake, they acquire the strength necessary for the completing of the remaining part of the sacrificial performance.

SŪTRA (51).

AS FOR THE EULOGISING OF 'GIVING' (AS BEING THE SACRIFICIAL FEE), THAT IS DUE TO THE ASSIGNMENT.

Bhāṣya.

As regards the eulogising of the assignment of shares as 'the sacrificial fee', this is due to the fact of 'assignment', which is common (to the assignment of the shares of the Cake and the assignment of shares in the sacrificial fee); hence the eulogy would be applicable to the assignment of shares in question, even when it is not for the purpose of securing the service (of the Priests).

End of Pāda iv of Adhyāya III.

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA V.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The 'Remnant-offerings to Sviṣṭakṛt and others should not be done out of Clarified Butter.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE REMNANT-OFFERING SHOULD BE MADE OUT OF CLARIFIED BUTTER ALSO; BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH ALL SUBSTANCES."

Bhāṣya.

[We now proceed to deal with the exception to the general law propounded in Sū. 44 of the last *Pāda*—that the Remnant-offerings are to be made out of all the substances used at the sacrifice—*Tantravārtika*.]

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Uttarārdhāt sviṣṭakṛtē samavadyati*' ['Offers to Sviṣṭakṛt out of the latter half'] (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 6. 5); and again—'*Iḍāmupahvayati*' ['He invokes the *Iḍā*'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 7. 3); and similarly other doings with *Remnants*.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are the *Sviṣṭakṛt* and *Iḍā* offerings to be made out of the remnant of the Clarified Butter used at the *Upāmshu-yāja*—or not?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"The said acts *are* to be done;—why?—*because it has been laid down in connection with all substances*; that is, inasmuch as all the substances are mentioned in a common context, the remnant-rites should be performed out of all of them. Further, the term 'all' has been actually used in this connection, in the text '*Tadyat sarvēbhyo havirbhyaḥ samavadyati*' ['One offers it out of all the offering-substances'].—From all this it follows that the remnant-rites are performed out of the Clarified Butter also."

SŪTRA (2).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE REASON [OF THE OFFERING, BEING APPLICABLE TO ALL SUBSTANCES].

Bhāṣya.

"The reason for the Remnant-offerings to *Sviṣṭakṛt* has been described in the text—'The deities said to *Sviṣṭakṛt*—please carry our offerings; he said—I would ask for the boon that shares at sacrifices may be assigned to me; they said—ask for it; then *Sviṣṭakṛt* said—People should offer to me out of the latter half';—the reason that is described in this commendatory passage applies equally to Clarified Butter and other substances.

Consequently the remnant-offerings should be made out of Clarified Butter."

SŪTRA (3).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *continued*]—" (THIRDLY), BECAUSE IN CONNECTION WITH ONE SACRIFICE, THE TERM 'SAMAVATTA' ('CONJOINTLY SLICED') IS FOUND."

Bhāṣya.

"In connection with the 'Cooked Rice' dedicated to *Āditya* at the *Prāyaṇīya* sacrifice, we find the text '*Agnayē sviṣṭakṛtē samavadyati*' ['For *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt*, one should offer what has been conjointly sliced'] (Taitti. Brā. 1. 7. 4. 4). As a matter of fact, when an offering is made out of a single substance—*Ājya* (Clarified Butter) for instance, it is spoken of by means of the word '*avadyati*' (*slices*, for offering),—and when the term '*samavadyati*' ('*slices conjointly*') is used, it means that it is a mixed offering consisting of portions 'sliced' out of more than one substance.—Such being the case and the meaning of the text being that the offering to *Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt* should consist of what has been 'conjointly sliced', the procedure adopted at the *Prāyaṇīya* sacrifice would be correct only if (in addition to the portion sliced out of the *Cooked Rice*) a 'slice' were also cut out of the *Clarified Butter*,—the use of which at the *Prāyaṇīya* would come in (from the *Upāmshuyāja*, of which the *Prāyaṇīya* is a 'modification') under the general law (that 'the modification is to be performed in the same manner as the Original Archetype'),—as it is only thus that there would be an offering consisting of the pieces 'sliced conjointly' (out of the two substances, *Cooked Rice* and *Clarified Butter*). If this were not done (and if no portion of the Clarified Butter were sliced out for offering), then the only 'slice' cut out for offering would be from the single substance, *Cooked Rice*, and if this were what is meant, then the term used in the text would have been '*avadyati*' (simply 'slices out for offering', not '*samavadyati*', 'slices out conjointly', as we actually find it). [For this reason also the Remnant-offering should be made out of the *Clarified Butter*.]"

SŪTRA (4).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA *concluded*]—" LASTLY, BECAUSE A COMMENDATORY DECLARATION RELATING TO THE OFFERING TO 'SVIṢṬAKṚT' ACTUALLY REFERS TO THE CLARIFIED BUTTER."

Bhāṣya.

We have the following commendatory declaration relating to the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*, which refers to the Clarified Butter contained in the *Dhruvā*-vessel :—'*Avadāya avadāya dhruvām pratyabhighārayati, sviṣṭakṛtē avadāya na dhruvām pratyabhighārayati, na hi tataḥ param āhutim yakṣyan bhavati*' ['After each offering, one should pour back the Butter-remnant into the *Dhruvā* vessel; but after having made the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*,

he need not pour back any remnant into the *Dhruvā*-vessel; as there is no other offering to be made after the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*'].—This passage explains the purpose for which the remnant is poured back into the vessel,—and this purpose clearly is that another offering is going to be made out of the remnants thus collected in the *Dhruvā*-vessel; this is further confirmed by the statement that after the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*, there is to be no such *pouring back*, as after that, there are no other offerings to be made.—All this goes to show that there is pouring back of the Clarified Butter into the vessel only for the purpose of making the remnant-offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*. [Thus it is clear from this also that the remnant-offering has to be made out of the *Clarified Butter*.]"

SŪTRA (5).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THIS (REMNANT-OFFERING OUT OF THE CLARIFIED BUTTER) COULD NOT BE DONE, AS THERE CAN BE NO 'REMNANT' IN THIS CASE; AND THIS ABSENCE OF 'REMNANT' WOULD BE DUE TO THE FACT THAT ALL THE CLARIFIED BUTTER WOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN UP (BY THE OTHER OFFERINGS).

Bhāṣya.

It is not possible that there should be *Sviṣṭakṛt* and *Iḍā-offerings* made out of the Clarified Butter contained in the Dhruvā-vessel.—"Why?"—Because *there can be no remnant in this case*.—"Why cannot there be a remnant in this case?"—*Because all the Clarified Butter would have been taken up (by the main offerings).*

SŪTRA (6).

WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN LEFT IN THE DHRUVĀ-VESSEL CANNOT BE TREATED AS A 'REMNANT', AS THE BUTTER IN THAT VESSEL IS MEANT FOR SEVERAL PURPOSES IN COMMON.

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"The Clarified Butter that had been secured for the *Upāmshuyāja*,—out of that some would be left over in the *Dhruvā*-vessel; and this could be treated as the 'remnant' (out of which the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* could be made)."

That cannot be; as what is contained in the *Dhruvā* is *meant for several purposes in common*,—for instance, for being offered at the *Upāmshuyāja* and for several other purposes; in fact Clarified Butter is required for all those actions where the sacrifice is performed by means of that Butter; and at whatever action Clarified Butter has to be used, at each one of these it has to be brought in and 'prepared'. Hence the Clarified Butter in the *Dhruvā* vessel is meant for all these several purposes. In fact this is clearly indicated by the Vedic text also—'*Sarvasmai vā yajñāya*

gṛhyatē yad dhruvāyām ājyam' [' The Clarified Butter in the *Dhruvā* is what is brought in for all sacrifices '] (Taitti. Brā. 3. 3. 5. 5).—" What if it is so ? "—If the Clarified Butter collected in the *Dhruvā* for the purpose of the *Upāmshuyāja* is meant for several purposes in common,—then, even after the completion of the *Upāmshuyāja*, there would be other purposes to be served by it ; hence it cannot be regarded as something to be ' disposed of ' (as no longer required) ; it is only when a thing has served all its purposes and is only causing confusion by remaining there, that it has to be ' disposed of '. In some cases, when a thing has to be ' disposed of ', it is declared that it should be ' disposed of ' in such and such a manner. When however a thing brought in has still some use, it cannot be regarded as to be ' disposed of '. Consequently after the *Upāmshuyāja* has been performed, and even after the offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* has been made, the Clarified Butter left in the *Dhruvā* cannot be treated as ' remnant ' and as such, something to be ' disposed of '—[and the offering of the remnant is nothing more than a ' disposal ' of what is no longer required].—As analogous to this we have the case where rice for several persons has been cooked in a single vessel,—if one of them has eaten out of it, what remains in the vessel is not treated as ' remnant ' (or leavings) to be given away to dependants ; because it has still got to serve other purposes (i.e. the remaining persons are still there to eat it). Exactly similar is the case of the susbstance, Clarified Butter, left after the *Upāmshuyāja* [which, having been got together for use at several actions, cannot, after the completion of the *Upāmshuyāja* only, be treated as ' remnant ' and ' disposed of ' as such by being offered as ' remnant-offering '].

Says the Opponent—" [If the Clarified Butter in the *Dhruvā*-vessel cannot be offered as ' remnant ', then] there would a ' remnant ' of Clarified Butter in the *Juhū*, as in the *Cups*, i.e. as there is of *Soma* in the Ladles and Cups, according to injunctions."

In answer to this, we have the following *Sūtra*—

SŪTRA (7).

WHAT HAS BEEN COLLECTED IN THE JUHŪ-VESSEL IS ALL CONNECTED WITH A PARTICULAR OBLATION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been explained that there can be no ' remnant ' of the *Upāmshuyāja* in the *Dhruvā*, because the Clarified Butter got together for this sacrifice is meant in common for several actions.—Now the question is put—" why cannot the remnant-offering be made out of the Clarified Butter left in the *Juhū*-vessel,—in the same manner as there is remnant (of *Soma*) in the ladle where it had been taken up for being offered into the fire ? "—Our answer to this is that *what has been collected in the Juhū-vessel is all connected with a particular oblation*, and hence (as the whole of it will have been offered away) there would be no ' remnant ' in it.

SŪTRA (8).

"IT MAY BE AS IN THE LADLE",—IF THIS IS URGED [THE ANSWER WOULD BE AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

This argument, urged by the opponent, has got to be refuted. (This is done in the following *Sūtra*)—

SŪTRA (9).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE (IN THE CASE OF THE SOMA), THERE IS AN INFRINGEMENT OF AN INJUNCTION (IF ALL THE SOMA IS OFFERED AWAY), AND ALSO BECAUSE IT (THE POURING OF THE SOMA INTO THE CUPS AND VESSELS) IS MEANT TO BE ONLY A PREPARATION OF AN OFFERING-MATERIAL. [FOR THESE TWO REASONS, THE WHOLE OF THE SOMA-JUICE IS NOT OFFERED AWAY.]

Bhāṣya.

The case of the Clarified Butter in the *Juhū* is not analogous to that of the *Soma* in the cups and vessels. In the case of the latter [if all the Soma were offered away in oblations], there would be an infringement of the injunction '*Somasyāgnērvīhītyanuvaṣaṭkaroti*' (Aitarēya Brā. 3. 5). [which lays down an oblation to be offered later on].—Then again, in regard to the pouring of the Soma into the cups and vessels, all that such texts as—'*Aindravāyavam gṛhṇāti*' ['should hold the cups dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*'] lay down is the mere *holding*,—not holding accompanied by offering as oblations; and all that is meant by this *holding* is that the Soma is prepared as an offering-material.—[For these two reasons, there is no offering of all the Soma in the cups and vessels]; [and hence 'remnant' becomes possible].—In the case of the Clarified Butter on the other hand, what is laid down is the offering of it as an oblation, in such texts as '*Chaturgṛhītam juhoti*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 1. 1. 1)—[Hence in this case all the Butter in the *Juhū* is offered away; and hence there can be no remnant.]

SŪTRA (10).

THE TERM 'ALL' REFERS TO WHAT IS THERE; AS WHAT IS LAID DOWN CAN PERTAIN ONLY TO SUCH THINGS AS ARE IN EXISTENCE.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 1) that—"the text has laid down that 'the slicing is done for offering out of all substances' [and hence the remnant-offering should be done out of the Clarified Butter also]."—Our answer

to this is as follows:—What is declared in the text refers to only such 'remnants' of substances *as are there already*, and not to all substances without any qualification; the meaning thus is that 'the slicing is to be done out of such remnants *as are already there*'; just as when it is said '*all* the rice', or '*all* the Brāhmaṇas have eaten'—the term '*all*' refers to such *rice* and such Brāhmaṇas, as may be there (and it cannot refer to all the rice, or all the Brāhmaṇas, in the world);—similarly in the case in question ('all substances' stands for all those of which remnants may be actually there) [and as there is no remnant of the Clarified Butter, there could not be any remnant-offering out of it].

SŪTRA (11).

THE INDICATIVE TEXT REFERS TO THE MIXTURE OF GENUSES.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 3) that "the use of the term 'conjoint (mixed) slicing' would not be applicable if no slicing for offering were made out of the Clarified Butter, brought in in accordance with the general law that 'the modification is to be done in the same manner as the original sacrifice'."—The answer to this is as follows:—Even though there may not be any remnant-offering out of the Clarified Butter, the term 'mixed slicing' would be quite applicable, as referring to the particular genuses,—i.e. as referring to the genus 'rice' and the genus 'Clarified Butter' [as mixed up in the 'Cooked Rice', in which there is both 'Rice' and 'Clarified Butter'; hence when a slice is cut out of this 'Cooked Rice', there is a *mixed slicing* of both Rice and Butter; this mention of 'mixed slicing' therefore *cannot* indicate the possibility of a slicing out of the pure and simple Clarified Butter by itself].—It is possible to take the term in this sense, as what is stated is a mere reiterative declaration, and it is open to us to take such a declaration in any sense that may be reasonably suitable.

SŪTRA (12).

THE LAST TEXT (QUOTED BY THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN) ONLY MEANS THAT THE VESSEL SHOULD NOT BE ENTIRELY EMPTY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued above (under Sū. 4) that—"there is a text which indicates that there should be pouring back of Clarified Butter into the *Dhruvā* [and there would be this 'remnant' available for making the remnant-offering]."—The answer to this is that the Butter that may be thus poured back is not for the purpose of making the remnant-offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*, because there would be no 'remnant' at all in the case; as has been already explained (under Sū. 5). Hence the meaning of the text quoted under Sū. 4 is as follows:—'Under the impression that no more oblations are going to be offered out of it, the Dhruvā should not be emptied,'

—if there were another oblation to be poured out of the *Dhruvā*, then, in the event of more clarified butter being poured back into the *Dhruvā*, the *Dhruvā* would be empty. What the sentence 'no more oblations are going to be offered out of it' means is that so long as there is an oblation still to be offered out of the *Dhruvā*, it should not be emptied (and it should continue to be refilled by pouring back Butter into it); but if no butter were poured back into it after each offering, the *Dhruvā* would become empty; and it should not become empty [so long as there is another oblation to be offered out of it]; but as soon as there remains no other oblation to be offered out of it, what would be the use of pouring back any more Clarified Butter into it?

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *At the 'Sākamprasthāyya' also there is to be no 'remnant-offering'.*

SŪTRA (13).

AT THE 'SĀKAMPRASTHĀYYA' SACRIFICE ALSO, THE OFFERING TO SVIṢṬAKṚT SHOULD BE AS IN THE AFORESAID CASE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa,* we read—'*Sākamprasthāyyēna yajēta*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 4. 3).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the remnant-offering connected with *Sviṣṭakṛt* and *Iḍā* to be made at this sacrifice, or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "the offering *is* to be made ;—why ?—because the *Sākamprasthāyya* is a modification of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* (at which the said offering is made, and the modification has to be performed like its original archetype)."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta* :—The said offering is *not* to be made at the *Sākamprasthāyya* :—why ?—*because there is no remnant, there being no remnant on account of the whole of the substance having been taken up* (Sū. 5).—"How is that ?"—In connection with the sacrifice in question, we read—'*Ājyabhāgābhyām pracharyāgnēyēna cha puroḍāshēna agnīdhrē srucham pradāya saha kumbhibhirabhikrāman āha*' ['After having made the offerings of Clarified Butter and the Cake dedicated to Agni, making over, to the Agnidhra Priest, the ladles and taking the *Kumbhis* with himself, he goes forward and says.... '] [which makes it clear that after the main Butter-offerings have been made, there is none of the Butter left there]. —Thus the conclusion is that there are to be no remnant-offerings at the *Sākamprasthāyya.*

ADHIKARAṆA (3): *There are to be no 'Remnant-offerings' at the Sautrāmaṇī sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (14).

AT THE SAUTRĀMAṆĪ SACRIFICE ALSO [THERE ARE TO BE NO 'REMNANT-OFFERINGS'] OUT OF THE CUPS.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice, in connection with which certain 'cups' (of Soma-juice) are mentioned as dedicated to *Ashvins*, to *Sārasvatī* and to *Indra*. This sacrifice is the 'modification' of a sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*) at which the 'remnant-offerings' are to be made;—consequently, according to the general law that 'the modification is to be performed in the manner of its original archetype', it would appear to be necessary to make the 'remnant-offerings' connected with *Sviṣṭakṛt* and *Iḍā*.

Now there arises the question—Are the 'remnant-offerings' to be *omitted* at the *Sautrāmaṇī* sacrifice, or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, in accordance with the general law (referred to), the remnant-offerings should be made (*not omitted*).

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*—At the *Sautrāmaṇī sacrifice also there are to be no remnant-offerings out of the cups* (Sū.). —The particle '*cha*' ('also') serves to apply to this case all that has been urged in the foregoing two *Adhikaraṇas*.—"Why should there be no such offering?"—*Because there is no remnant, the absence of remnant being due to the whole of the substance having been taken up* (Sū. 5).

At this sacrifice also, they proceed to offer oblations with the cups—for which purpose cups of milk and cups of wine are taken up; and all the substance that is contained in these cups is taken up and verbally dedicated to their respective deities; as is laid down in the text—'*Gṛhītān grahān ṛtvija ādadatē, āshvinamadhvaryuḥ, sārasvatam brahmā, aindram pratiprasthātā* ['The Priests take up the cups—the *Adhvaryu* takes up the cup dedicated to the *Ashvins*; the *Brahman* takes up that dedicated to *Sarasvatī*, and the *Pratiprasthātṛ* takes up that dedicated to Indra'.] Thus the whole of the substance is taken up by these oblations; that the substance is to be offered in oblations is also laid down in the text—'*Uttarē' gnau payograhān jūhvati, dakṣiṇē'gnau surāgrahān jūhvati*' ['They offer the cups of milk into the Northern Fire, and the cups of wine into the Southern Fire'].

SŪTRA (15).

THE MENTION OF 'REMNANT' ALSO IS TO BE TAKEN AS IN THE PREVIOUS CASE.

Bhāṣya.

This same conclusion (arrived at under Sū. 5) is supported by the mention of 'remnant', in the text—'He should keep back a little, he should

not offer up the whole' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 8. 6. 2); this prohibition of *the offering of the whole* would be explicable only if (without this prohibition) there were a possibility of the whole being offered. And it is on account of a distinct declaration that the 'remnant-offering' to *Sviṣṭakṛt* is not to be made at this sacrifice, out of the remnant that has been kept back (in accordance with the prohibition just quoted); because a different use is laid down for that remnant in the text '*Brāhmaṇam parikrīṇīyāt uchchhēṣaṇasya pātāram*' (Tai. Brā. 1. 8. 6. 2.) ['He should engage a Brāhmaṇa who should drink the remnant'] [by whom the remnant is to be *drunk*, and not used as an offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt*]. There is a similar use laid down for another remnant of the same kind in the text—'*Shatātṛṇṇāyām vikṣārayanti*' ['They pour it into a hundred-holed jar']. (Taitti. Brā. 1. 8. 6. 4.)

Adhikaraṇa (4): *At the 'Sarvapṛṣṭha' Sacrifice, the 'Remnant-offering' should be made only once.*

SŪTRA (16).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Though the substance is one, the 'remnant-offerings' should be made with each of the acts (that go to make up the Sarvapṛṣṭha sacrifice).

Bhāṣya.

[We have dealt with cases where there is no 'remnant-offering' to be made. We are now considering a case where there is a peculiarity regarding the remnant-offerings.]

There is the '*Sarvapṛṣṭha*' sacrifice [consisting of several oblations offered to *Indra* in his various aspects]—spoken of in the texts—'*Indrāya rathantarāya*', '*Indrāya vairūpāya*', '*Indrāya vairājāya*', '*Indrāya shākvarāya*'. [Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 7. 2];—at this sacrifice, the *Cake* is the substance used in connection with all these several oblations in common.

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the remnant-offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* to be done with each of these oblations? Or, only once?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that, in view of the general law that 'the modification is to be performed in the same manner as its original Archetype', the offering should be made with each oblation,—even though there is only one substance common to all the oblations,—as each oblation is a distinct act by itself."

SŪTRA (17).

[Siddhānta]—Inasmuch as there is no division (of the substance, among the several oblations), there must be a common 'remnant' for all [so that there can be only one offering of the 'remnant').

Bhāṣya.

We assert that the 'remnant-offering should be made only once': *because there is no division of the substance among the several oblations*; as a matter of fact, portions of the *Cake* are not divided among the several oblations; all that is said is that 'the remnant-offering to *Sviṣṭakṛt* should be made out of the *latter half* of the Cake',—and of the Cake, there is only one 'latter half'; so when an offering is made out of this 'latter half', it cannot be distinguished from the remnant of which oblation the offering has been made, and from the remnant of which it has not been made.—Similarly in the case of the *Iḍā* offering also.—From all this it follows that the 'remnant offering' should be made only once.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *In the case of the cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu, there should be two 'Eatings' of the Remnant.*

SŪTRA (18).

In the case of the cup dedicated to Indra-Vāyu, there should be an 'Eating of Remnants' in connection with each oblation,—by virtue of the direct injunction.

Bhāṣya.

[There are two ways of 'disposing of' the remnants of sacrificial materials:—(1) offering them into the Fire, to *Sviṣṭakṛt*, and (2) eating them. We have hitherto dealt with the *offering* of remnants; we are now going to deal with the *eating* of remnants. In the natural order this present *Adhikaraṇa* should have come after the next—where the general question of the eating of Soma-remnants is dealt with,—yet the author has brought in this first, because, in a way, it is an exception to the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.]

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, laid down in the text—'*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*'; [at this sacrifice, several cups and ladles are used; each cup is dedicated to a distinct deity, and offered as such; and the remnant left in the cup after the offering has been made, is subsequently 'eaten' (see next *Adhikaraṇa*); one of these cups is dedicated jointly to the two deities *Indra* and *Vāyu*]; in regard to this cup dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu* there arises the question—Is the *eating* of the remnant in this cup to be done *once*, or *twice*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "since the *eating* is meant to be an 'embellishment' for the *Soma*, it should be done once only".

As against this, the *Siddhānta* is that in the case of the cup dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*, the eating should be done twice;—why?—*By virtue of the direct injunction*; we have the following injunction—'Out of the cup dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*, one should eat twice, and should make two *Vaṣaṭkāra* offerings';—and no burden can be too heavy to be borne by a direct injunction [hence in spite of all the arguments urged in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* an exception has to be made in the case of the cup dedicated to *Indra-Vāyu*].

Adhikaraṇa (6): *In the case of 'Soma', there must be 'Eating of Remnants'.*

SŪTRA (19).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In the case of Soma, there is no 'Eating', as there is no injunction to that effect".

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are several *Soma-oblations* laid down.—In regard to these, there arises the question—Is the remnant of these *Soma-oblations* to be eaten, or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "*there is no eating, in the case of Soma*;—why ?—because *there is no injunction to that effect*; and in the absence of an injunction it cannot be known for certain that there should be 'eating'; hence the conclusion is that the remnant of Soma-oblations should not be eaten".

SŪTRA (20).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, there should be 'Eating', because we find a text which, though having a different application, is indicative of the eating.

Bhāṣya.

There should be 'eating'; as there is the following text, which, though having a different application, indicates the 'eating'—'*Sarvataḥ parihāramāshvinam bhakṣayati bhakṣitāpyāyitāmshchamasān dakṣiṇasyānaso' valambē sādayanti*' (see Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 4. 9. 4-5) ['He takes round the cup dedicated to the *Ashvins* and eats it; after the cups have been eaten and refilled, they deposit them on the prop of the cart to the south'].—Unless there were 'eating' of Soma in general, such particular cases of 'eating' as are mentioned in this text could not be spoken of.

SŪTRA (21).

In fact, the texts are direct injunctions, as they speak of what is not already known; hence the 'Eating' would be in accordance with direct injunctions.

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"What has been cited (in support of the *eating*) is only an indicative; it is necessary to point to an injunction of it."

Answer—The texts that are cited as 'indications' may be treated as injunctions: For instance, the text, '*Sarvataḥ parihāramāshvinam bhakṣayati, etc.*' (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 4. 9. 4) actually enjoins a particular form of

eating; as this is something not already known, the sentence cannot be taken as a mere reiterative reference to the 'Eating'. In fact, if the text were taken as enjoining something not already known, it would serve a distinctly useful purpose. Thus then, there should be 'Eating' of *Soma*, only in cases in connection with which it is mentioned in the texts; and in this there would not be any improper extension of the practice of eating.

Adhikaraṇa (7): *The 'Soma-remnant' should be eaten by the Priests holding the Cups.*

SŪTRA (22).

Out of the cups, there must be 'Eating', because of the names (given to the cups),—the application of the names being based upon the fact (of 'Eating' being done out of them, by the Priests).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Praitu hotushchamasaḥ, pra brahmaṇaḥ, prodgātṛṛṇām, pra yajamānasya, prayantu sadasyānām*' ['Let the *Hotṛ's cup* come forward, also the *Brahman's cup*, the *Udgātṛs' cup*, the *Yajamāna's cup*, and the *Sadasyas' cup*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is eating (of Soma) to be done by these cup-owners, or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "it should not be done; as it has just been pointed out that there should be no undue extension of the practice of eating".

On this we have the following *Siddhānta*—Out of the cups, there should be 'eating';—why?—*because of the names given to the cups*;—i.e. the names '*Hotushchamasaḥ*' (Hotṛ's cup), '*Brahmanashchamasaḥ*' (Brahman's cup), '*Udgātushchamasaḥ*' (Udgātṛ's cup) clearly indicate that the particular cup is called '*hotushchamasaḥ*' because the *Hotṛ* Priest *eats* (literally '*sips*', '*chamati*'), shall eat, or has eaten, out of that cup; if the Hotṛ Priest did not *eat* (or *sip*) out of it, it could not be '*hotushchamasaḥ*'; and from this it follows that he does eat out of it. [Similarly with the other names.]

Says the Opponent—"In what way does this 'indicative' (of the 'eating') operate?"

It is operative through *competency*, we say. What the direction says is that 'the *Hotushchamasa* should come forward'; now if the *Hotṛ* did not *eat* (*chamēt*) out of it, then no such thing as the '*hotushchamasaḥ*' (Hotṛ's cup) would have the competency to 'come forward'.—It would not do if the *Hotṛ* Priest were to 'eat' rice or some such thing, as the cup in question is called the '*Soma-chamasa*', '*Soma*-cup'. Then again (the name cannot be regarded as indicative of ownership, because) as a matter of fact, the cup is the property, not of the *Hotṛ* priest, but of the Sacrificer; all that the *Hotṛ* priest can do is to 'eat' out of it (by virtue of which it is called his '*chamasa*', cup).—Further, if *Soma* is 'eaten' out of the cup [and not some other thing, like *Rice*], then alone is it possible for further oblations to be offered with that cup; because *Soma* is a sacred substance, hence the eating of it does not pollute the cup, and it is possible to offer subsequent oblations with it.—"[In the case of other substances, Rice and the like also] it would be possible to offer oblations with a cup that is polluted, on the strength

of texts enjoining the offering of the oblations."—But any such text could set aside the prohibition of using polluted cups only if there were no other way of eating out of the cups and also offering the oblations, without using polluted cups; as a matter of fact, there is such a way, if the 'eating' out of the cup is of *Soma* (not of *Rice* or any such thing) [whereby, on account of the peculiar sanctity attaching to the *Soma*, the cup is not polluted, and hence the offering of the subsequent oblations with it does not go against the prohibition of using *polluted* cups].—From all this it follows that the *Soma* should be eaten by those priests who hold the cups.

Says the Opponent—"[In the case of the eating of Rice and such things also] people could have recourse to *scraping* the cup and such other means (for removing the impurity attaching to the cup on account of the eating of Rice, etc.) [and then the cup, thus purified, could be used in offering the oblations]".

In that case the relationship (of the cup to the eating Priest) having ceased (by reason of the scraping of the portion touched by the eater's lips), the cup would no longer be the same cup, it would become a totally different object.

It is for this reason (that like the priests, the sacrificer also should eat the *Soma* out of the cup named after him) that the following text forbids the eating of *Soma* by a *non-Brāhmaṇa* sacrificer—'*Sa yadi rājanyam vaishyam vā yājayēt, sa yadi somam bibhakṣayiṣēt nyagrodhastibhīrāhṛtya tāh sampiṣya dadhani unmṛjya tamasmai bhakṣam prayachchhēt, na somam*' (Aita. Brā. 7. 30) ['If he officiates at the sacrifice performed by a *Kṣattriya* or a *Vaishya*,—and the sacrificer wishes to eat *Soma*, the priest should fetch the shoots of the banyan-tree, pound them and mix them up with curd, and then offer this to the sacrificer for eating, and not the *Soma*'];—this text clearly shows that there shall be omission *of the eating of Soma* (in the case of the *non-Brāhmaṇa* sacrificer); now this fear of the non-Brāhmaṇa sacrificer eating *Soma* [without which there could be no prohibition] could be possible only if, as a rule, *Soma* were meant to be eaten out of the cups by persons after whom the cups are named.—From all this we conclude that there must be eating of *Soma* by these persons out of the cups named after them.

ADHIKARAṆA (8): *The Soma is to be eaten by the 'Udgātṛ' (chanting) priests together with the 'Subrahmaṇya' Priest.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"ONLY ONE PERSON SHALL EAT OUT OF THE 'UDGĀTṚ'S CUP,'—BECAUSE SUCH IS THE DIRECT ASSERTION."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice laid down in the text '*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*';—in connection with this sacrifice, we read '*Praitu hotushchamasaḥ........pra udgātṝṇām*'.—It has been decided in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa* that the eating out of the *Cups* is to be regulated by their names [i.e. the *Hotṛ* is to eat out of the 'Hotṛ's cup', the *Brahman*, out of the 'Brahman's cup' and so on].—Now in connection with the cup named '*Udgātṝṇām chamasaḥ*', 'the cup of the Udgātṛs', there arises the question —[There being only one priest of the name of '*Udgātṛ*'] is the one Udgātṛ priest alone to eat out of this cup ?—or all the Priests ?—or all the *Sāmavēdin* priests, except the *Subrahmaṇya* Priest ?—or all the *Sāmavēdin* priests along with the *Subrahmaṇya* ?

(A) On this question, we have the following view as the first *Pūrvapakṣa* (A)—"The one *Udgātṛ* priest alone is to eat out of it;—*because such is the Direct Assertion*;—i.e. the *Udgātṛ* priest is the only person who is mentioned in the name of the cup—which has been called in the text as '*Udgātṝṇām chamasaḥ*', 'the cup of the *Udgātṛs*'.—'But in the text we have the Plural number, which means that *several* persons should eat.'—The answer to that is that it is true that the Plural number is found in the text, but that number appears as pertaining to the noun-base '*Udgātṛ*'; under the circumstances, if significance were meant to be attached to the Plural number, then it would denote the *plurality of Udgātṛ Priests*; as a matter of fact, however, there is only one *Udgātṛ* Priest;—consequently, even though directly mentioned, the *plurality* could not bring about different (several) *Udgātṛ* Priests;—hence it must be concluded that no significance is meant to be attached to the Plural number.—Then again, the notion that several persons should eat out of the cup could be got at only by Inference.—'How ?' —It would be got at by means of the following inferential reasoning:—The Plural number is applied only to such noun-bases as denote several individuals,—in the case in question we find the Plural number applied to the base '*Udgātṛ*',—hence verily the cup must belong to several (*Udgātṛs*).—This is a purely inferential process. On the other hand, the fact that there is only one *Udgātṛ* priest,—not even a second or a third—is directly perceptible. Perception is always more authoritative than Inference. Hence the cup belongs to—and is to be eaten out of,—by only one person, and that person, the one *Udgātṛ* priest."

SŪTRA (24).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—" OR, ALL [THE PRIESTS SHOULD EAT OUT OF THE CUP] ; BECAUSE THERE IS AN INDICATION OF ALL."

Bhāṣya.

(B)—" Or, all the priests should eat out of the *Udgātṛ-cup*. If the *Udgātṛ* priest were the only one person to eat out of it, then the presence of the plural number (in '*udgātṛṛṇām*') would have to be regarded as a mistake; specially as such plurality is neither referred to nor predicated.—' In the event of all the priests eating out of the cup, the presence of the name of the *Udgātṛ*-priest (in '*Udgātṛṛṇām chamasaḥ*') would have to be regarded as a mistake'.—Our answer to that is that the term '*Udgātṛṛṇām*' may, in that case, be taken in a figurative sense, as standing for 'the Udgātṛ-priest *and the rest*'."

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—" OR, THE HYMN-CHANTERS ALONE [SHOULD EAT OUT OF THE CUP] ; AS THE INDICATION IS OF THESE ALONE, SPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE PRESENCE OF THE PLURAL NUMBER."

Bhāṣya.

(C)—Says the Opponent to the *Pūrvapakṣa* (B)—" It is not right that the cup should be eaten out of by several persons.—Why ?—Because the connection of the term '*Udgātṛ*' with '*Chamasa*' is indicated by a directly perceived 'sentence';—again, the connection of the Plural Number with the term '*Udgātṛ*' is shown by 'Direct Assertion';—no other Priest has any connection with the Plural Number;—hence it is not right that the cup should be eaten out of by several persons including the *Udgātṛ* as well as others (as held by Pūrvapakṣin *B*)."

It is in answer to this that we have the *third Pūrvapakṣa* (C):—" As a matter of fact, the term '*Udgātṛ*' is capable of expressing Plurality (and taking the Plural Number), through the particular action,—that of *chanting*,—the term '*Udgātṛ*' in the Plural literally denoting *chanters* (*Udgāyanti iti Udgātāraḥ*).—" Who are these *several chanters* (who are spoken of by the term '*Udgātṛṛṇām*' in the Plural) ?'—They are the three hymn-chanting priests—(1) *Prastotṛ*, (2) *Udgātṛ* and (3) *Pratihartṛ*. Thus by reason of the presence of the Plural Number, we conclude that the term '*Udgātṛ*' (with the Plural Number) is meant to stand for those in whom the inferred action (of chanting) is present. In this manner, both the Plural Number and the term '*Udgātṛ*' become explicable.—For these reasons we conclude that the cup is to be eaten out of by the *hymn-chanters*."

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, ALL (THE FOUR SĀMAVEDIN PRIESTS, SHOULD EAT OUT OF THE CUP); BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL EQUALLY CONNECTED WITH THE (SĀMA) VEDA; AND IT IS FOR A SPECIAL REASON THAT THE NAME ('UDGĀTṚ') IS RESTRICTED TO ONE ONLY (OF THE SAID FOUR SĀMAVEDIN PRIESTS).

All the *Sāmavedin* priests—i.e. the three named above (*Prastotṛ*, *Udgātṛ* and *Pratihartṛ*) along with the *Subrahmaṇya* Priest—should eat out of the cup. —"How so?"—In answer to this, it will not be right to say—'because they are connected with chanting';—why so?—because connection with '*Udgāna*' (chanting) is something quite different from connection with '*Gāna*' (singing),—'*Udgāna*' (chanting aloud) being something different from '*Gāna*' (singing); '*Gāna*' is mere *singing*, secular as well as Vedic, while the other, '*Udgāna*', derived from the root '*Gai*' (to sing) and the prefix '*ut*', is well-known as the name of a particular phase of Sāma-chant; now the person who does this Sāma-chanting and is therefore called the '*Udgātṛ*' is one only, and there are not several persons of this name. Thus then, it will not be right to say that there shall be several *Udgātṛ* priests, as all are equally connected with 'Sāma-chanting'.—"What then is the correct answer to the question why all the four *Sāmavedin* priests should eat out of the cup?"—The correct answer is that *they are all equally connected with the Sāma-veda*. In this sense an exposition of the Veda is called '*audgātra*', and several functions are also called '*audgātra*'; so that one who studies the *Audgātra* exposition, or performs the *Audgātra* functions, is called the '*Udgātṛ*'.—"How so?"—It is well-known that the function of the *Udgātṛ* is called '*audgātra*'; and from this it is clear that *Udgātṛ* is the performer of the *Audgātra* functions. Thus then, if a man knows what *Udgātṛ* is, he at once says, even though it is not explained, that the function pertaining to that *Udgātṛ* is '*audgātra*'; commonly, if one knows the meaning of the term '*audgātra*', he at once says that the performer of the *audgātra* functions is the '*Udgātṛ*', even though he may not be told so. For instance, if a man knows the person named *Udamēgha*, he at once calls his child '*audamēghi*' even without being told so; and conversely if one knows *Audamēghi*, he at once recognises his father to be Udamēgha, even without being told.—Thus then the application of the name '*Udgātṛ*' is possible on the basis of the presence of the '*audgātra*' functions; and it is in this sense that the name '*Udgātṛ*' is applicable to all the four—*Prastotṛ*, *Udgātṛ*, *Pratihartṛ* and *Subrahmaṇya*. In this manner, both the name '*Udgātṛ*' and the Plural Number (in '*Udgatṝṇām*') become explained; and there is no other objection to this view.

From all this it follows that all the four priests connected with the '*Audgātra*' functions should eat out of the *Udgātṛ-Cup*.

In cases where there is some special reason, Udgātṛ priests are to be taken as exclusive of the *Subrahmaṇya Priest*; just as in the sentence 'Being seated, the *Udgātṛ* priests hymn with the Sāman', the term '*Udgātṛ*' is applied to those only who *sing hymns* [and not to all who perform the

Audgātra functions],—in the same manner we have the sentence '*Udgātāro nāpavyāharēyuḥ uttamāyām ēṣottamā*', where the name '*Udgātṛ*' has been taken to be *exclusive of the Subrahmaṇya Priests.*

[Kumārila does not accept this as the *Siddhānta*; according to him the Siddhānta view is that the eating should be done by all the Sāmavedin Priests—*with the exception of the Subrahmaṇya*; i.e. the *Subrahmaṇya* is not to eat the Soma.—See Tantravārtika, Trans., pp. 1466-1467.—Maṇḍana Mishra accepts Kumārila's view].

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The 'Grāvastut' Priest also eats the Soma.*

SŪTRA (27).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"FOR THE GRĀVASTUT PRIEST, THERE IS TO BE NO 'EATING', AS NO SUCH 'EATING' HAS BEEN LAID DOWN".

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice there is an *assistant to the Hotṛ Priest*, named '*Grāvastut*'.—In regard to him there arises the question—Is he to eat the *Soma* or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "the *Grāvastut* is not to eat the *Soma*;—why ?—because 'eating' for him has nowhere been declared".

This statement that "eating for the Grāvastut has nowhere been declared" has been made by the *Pūrvapakṣin* under the impression that the *Cup-bearing Priests* only are entitled to eat out of the 'Hāriyojana' cup. ['*Hāriyojana Cup*" is that cup which is taken up with the Mantra '*Harirasi hāriyojanaḥ, etc.*'—Vāja. Saṁ. 8. 11.]

SŪTRA (28).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—HE SHOULD CERTAINLY EAT OUT OF THE 'HĀRIYOJANA' CUP; AS THE CUP HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE CONNECTED WITH ALL (THE PRIESTS).

Bhāṣya.

We think that the *Grāvastut* is one who should eat out of the '*Hāriyojana*' cup; this is what has been thus declared—"The cup-bearing Priests eat out of the other cups according to the cup held by each—hence of this *Hāriyojana*, they are all anxious to partake"; from this it follows that if 'all' are desirous of partaking of the '*Hāriyojana*' cup, the *Grāvastut* Priest also should partake of it.

SŪTRA (29).

[OBJECTION]—"IN REALITY IT IS THE CUP-BEARING PRIESTS THAT SHOULD EAT (OUT OF THE 'HĀRIYOJANA CUP'),—BECAUSE OF JUXTAPOSITION".

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*vā*' ('in reality') serves to deny the view that has been expressed under Sū. 28.

The objection is as follows :—"It is not right that the *Grāvastut* should eat out of the 'Hāriyojana Cup'; because the persons entitled to eat out of that cup are the *cup-bearing priests*, not all the priests (as declared under Sū. 28).—'How do you get at this idea ?'—There can be no doubt that what the text quoted lays down is a division among the cup-bearing priests ; as in the passage quoted, the opening clause says—'The *cup-bearing priests* eat out of the other cups according to the cup held by each of them,'—and having thus referred to the 'eating' by the *Cup-bearing Priests*, it goes on to add, 'hence all of them are desirous of partaking of the *Hāriyojana* Cup';—these two clauses form parts of a single sentence (and are syntactically connected)—as is indicated by the presence of the term '*atha*' ('hence'), which must refer to what has gone before ; and in the phrase '*sarva ēva*', ('all of them'), the clear implication of the particle '*ēva*' is that the term 'all' stands for all *those who have been spoken of in the preceding clause* ;—from all this we conclude that the first clause, 'the cup-bearing priests eat out of the other cups according to the cup held by each', forms 'one sentence' (i.e. is syntactically connected) with the second clause—'hence all of them are desirous of partaking of the *Hāriyojana* Cup'. Thus then, the text quoted should be taken as laying down a division among the *Cup-bearing Priests*, who are the persons spoken of in 'juxtaposition' to the whole sentence ; the sense of the whole sentence being that 'in the case of the other cups, the cup-bearing Priests eat according to the cup held by each of them, but all of them eat out of the *Hāriyojana* Cup'."

SŪTRA (30).

[ANSWER]—IN REALITY, HOWEVER, THE 'EATING' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS REFERRING TO ALL,—SUCH BEING THE SENSE OF THE INJUNCTION ; THE MENTION OF THE 'CUP-BEARING PRIESTS' IS ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF EULOGISING (THE 'HĀRIYOJANA' CUP).

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in reality') sets aside the view just set forth (under Sū. 29). It is not right to take the text to mean that 'only the cup-bearing priests eat out of the *Hāriyojana* Cup'; because as a matter of fact, all the priests are enjoined to eat ;—the words being '*Sarvē bhakṣayanti*' ('all eat'), which cannot be taken to enjoin the 'cup-bearing Priests' only to eat. As in that case the sentence would have to be taken as laying down two connections (of the *Hāriyojana* Cup ; one with 'all', and the other with the 'cup-bearing priests only'); the interpretation put upon the passage therefore must be a different one.

"What is that different interpretation ?"

The first clause, 'The cup-bearing Priests eat out of the other cups, according to the cup held by each', is a mere reference to the well-known fact that 'the cup-bearing Priests eat, and that they eat in accordance with the cup held by each' [this fact not standing in need of being *enjoined*

in the present passage, having been already enjoined elsewhere]; and the second clause lays down (what is not already known) that 'out of the *Hāriyojana Cup, all the Priests eat*',—not only the *cup-bearing Priests*.

"What would be the advantage of this interpretation?"

The first advantage would be that the term 'all' would be taken in its natural sense of *all priests*, and not in its restricted sense (as referring to the *cup-bearing priests* only). The second advantage would be that it would not be necessary to take the single sentence as laying down two unknown connections.—For these reasons, this interpretation is certainly better than the one suggested (under Sū. 29).

Then, as regards the mention of the 'cup-bearing priests' (in the first clause),—it only serves to '*eulogise*',—that is, extol,—the *Hāriyojana Cup*; that is to say, the *cup-bearing priests* have been mentioned only for the purpose of extolling the *Hāriyojana Cup*.

"In what way is it extolled?"

The sense of the eulogy is as follows—'So excellent is the *Hāriyojana* cup that all the priests desire to eat out of it, while of the other cups, each is eaten out of by only one priest,—these latter therefore are not so excellent, being inferior to the *Hāriyojana Cup*'.

Adhikaraṇa (10): *The function of pronouncing the syllable 'vaṣaṭ' entitles one to eat the Soma-remnant.*

SŪTRA (31).

One is entitled to eat (Soma) also by virtue of pronouncing the syllable 'vaṣaṭ'.

Bhāṣya.

Question—"Is the eating of the *Soma* to be determined only by the *name* (given to the cups) [as explained under Sū. 22]?"

Answer—No; *one is entitled to eat Soma also by virtue of pronouncing the syllable 'vaṣaṭ'*; i.e. the pronouncing of the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' is also a ground for eating *Soma*.—"How so?"—We know this from a *Shruti-text*, which says—'The pronouncer of the syllable *vaṣaṭ* is the first to eat';—as this '*eating by the pronouncer of vaṣaṭ*' is not something already known, this text cannot be taken as enjoining merely the *first place* to be accorded to it; in fact it should be taken as enjoining the *eating as qualified by priority.*

[It is the *Hotṛ* priest who pronounces the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*'; and in accordance with this *Adhikaraṇa*, he should have an additional share of the Soma to be eaten, by virtue of that pronouncing.]

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *The 'offering of oblations into fire' and the 'extracting of the Soma-juice' also entitle one to eat Soma.*

SŪTRA (32).

ALSO BY VIRTUE OF 'OFFERING LIBATIONS INTO FIRE' AND 'EXTRACTING THE SOMA-JUICE'.

Bhāṣya.

'Offering of oblations into fire' and 'extracting of Soma-juice'—these also are grounds for the eating of *Soma*.—'How?'—We have the text—'*Havirdhānē grāvabhirabhiṣutya, āhavanīyē hutvā, pratyañchaḥ parētya sadasi bhakṣān bhakṣayanti*' ['In the *Havirdhāna* Room, having extracted the Soma-juice by means of stones, and having offered an oblation into the sacrificial fire, they turn back into the Assembly Room and eat their shares'] (cf. Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 2. 11. 4).—This text cannot be taken as laying down merely the *order* of the actions mentioned,—i.e. the 'eating' is to come after the 'offering of the oblations into fire' has been done;—*firstly*, because the 'eating' itself has not yet been recognised as *to be done* [and until that is done, its position in the order of sequence cannot be laid down];—and *secondly*, if the sentence were taken as laying down the *order* of the 'eating' in relation to each of the two acts of 'offering oblations into fire' and 'extracting the Soma-juice',—as expressed by the two terms 'having extracted the Soma-juice' and 'having offered the oblations into fire',—then, there would be syntactical split.—Further, the order is already recognised by the very nature of the acts concerned; [i.e. until the juice has been extracted there can be no 'offering of it into the fire', and until the 'offering of the juice into fire' has been done, there can be no eating of its remnant]; as until the use of a substance has been accomplished, it cannot be 'disposed of' [and 'eating' of the Remnant is only a *disposal* of it].—Nor can the text quoted be taken as laying down the two acts of 'offering oblations into fire' and 'extracting the Soma-juice' as subsidiary to the 'eating'; because as a matter of fact, the 'extracting of the Soma-juice' is for the purpose of 'offering oblations into fire', and this 'offering of oblations into fire' is for the purpose of securing a particular reward.—Hence the text should be taken as laying down the 'eating' for the persons who do the 'extracting of Soma-juice' and the 'offering of oblations into fire',—the sense being that those who 'extract the juice' and 'offer the oblations into fire' should eat the Soma.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The pronouncer of the syllable 'vaṣaṭ' and others should eat Soma out of the Cup belonging to others.*

SŪTRA (33).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" BECAUSE OF THE DIRECT SPECIFIC DECLARATION WITH REGARD TO THE 'CUPS', THE INDEFINITE (GENERAL) DECLARATION MUST APPLY TO OTHER CASES ".

Bhāṣya.

There is the text—'*Praitu hotushchamasaḥ, pra brahmaṇaḥ, pra udgātṛṛṇām*'. ['May the *Hotṛ's* Cup come forward, also the *Brahman's* Cup and also the Cup of the *Udgātṛs*'.]

In connection with this, there arises the question—(*a*) Those who offer the oblations into the fire, (*b*) those who do the extracting of the Soma-juice, and (*c*) those who pronounce the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' [who have been shown in the foregoing *adhikaraṇas* to be entitled to the 'eating of Soma'], are these to eat out of the *cups* or not ?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* :—" They are not to eat out of the *cups*, because the eating out of the cups has been declared specifically with regard to the *Cup-bearing Priests*—in such definitely specific texts as '*Praitu hotushchamasaḥ, etc.*'; as regards the 'eating' by those who do 'the offering of oblations into fire' and those who do 'the extracting of the Soma-juice', it has been spoken of only in a general (indefinite) declaration (to the effect that 'they also are entitled to the eating').—(*Question*)—" All the Soma that is to be 'embellished' (by the *eating*) being contained in the *cups*, out of which the Cup-bearing Priests are to eat it,—where would there be another occasion when the 'eating' could be done by those others who do 'the offering of oblations into fire' and others ? That is, where would there be the indefinite and general occasion (when those others would eat the Soma] ? "—(*Answer*)—That occasion would be in other cases,—i.e. in cases where the *Cup-bearing Priests* would not be there."

SŪTRA (34).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE ('EATING' OUT OF THE CUPS BY THE OTHER PRIESTS) ; BECAUSE THE GROUNDS FOR IT ARE PRESENT (IN THEIR CASE ALSO) ; AND THERE IS NO RESTRICTION IN REGARD TO THE CUPS,—THE TEXT ONLY MAKING AN AFFIRMATION REGARDING THE PERSONS WHO ARE TO DO THE 'EATING' (OUT OF THE CUPS).

Bhāṣya.

The 'pronouncer of the syllable *vaṣaṭ*' and the others also are to 'eat' out of the cups; because the texts lay down the grounds for their 'eating'; they do not forbid them.

Objection—"But, inasmuch as the *Cup-bearing Priests* have been specifically and directly mentioned as to eat out of the cups, the others would naturally become excluded."

Answer—There is no restriction in regard to the cups, the text only making an affirmation regarding the persons who are to do the eating out of the cups:—that is to say, the words of the text—'*Praitu hotushchamasaḥ, etc.*' cannot be taken as prohibiting (excluding) 'the pronouncer of the syllable *vaṣaṭ*' and others; because the words are affirmative and injunctive, not negative and prohibitive.—From this it follows that 'the pronouncer of the syllable *vaṣaṭ* and others also are to eat out of the cups'.

SŪTRA (35).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND OTHERS ALSO MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUPS.

Bhāṣya.

There is a text which speaks of persons other than the Cup-bearing Priests as being connected with the cups—'*Chamasāṁshchamasādhvaryavē prayachchhati, tān sa vaṣaṭkartrē harati*' ['He hands over the cups to the Cup-bearing *Adhvaryu*, and he carries them to the *Pronouncer of the syllable vaṣaṭ*']; now it is only his own cup that could be carried to the 'pronouncer of the syllable *vaṣaṭ*';—and there would be no sense in the several *cups* being carried to him if 'the Pronouncer of the syllable *vaṣaṭ*' and others (offerers of oblations into fire and extracters of Soma-juice) also were not to eat out of those cups.—From this also it follows that all these also are to eat out of the Cups.

Adhikaraṇa (13): *The 'Hotṛ' Priest is the first to eat the Soma-remnant.*

Bhāṣya.

Question—"In a case where several priests eat out of the vessel, what is the order in which they shall eat?"

In answer to this question we have the following *Adhikaraṇa*,—of which the *Pūrvapakṣa* is set forth in the following *Sūtra*:—

SŪTRA (36).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"In the case of several priests eating out of one vessel, the Adhvaryu should be the first to eat; as that is the natural order."

Bhāṣya.

"It is the turn of that priest to eat first in whose hands the *Soma* is [and as the vessel containing the Soma is in the hands of the Adhvaryu, it is his turn to eat it first]."

SŪTRA (37).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the Hotṛ Priest should eat first,—as such is the indication of the Mantra-texts.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the Hotṛ Priest should eat first,—because *such is the indication of the mantra*-texts. We have such *mantra*-texts as—(*a*) '*Hotushchit pūrvē haviradyamāshata*' (Ṛgvēda 10. 94. 2), and (*b*) '*Hotēva naḥ prathamaḥ pāhi*' (Ṛgvēda 5. 43. 3) [where the meaning of (*a*) is—'It is only the pounding stones that obtain the *Soma-juice* before the Hotṛ Priest', i.e. no other person gets it before him; and that of (*b*) is—'Please drink first (of this Soma), like the Hotṛ priest'].

SŪTRA (38).

Also because such is the declaration.

Bhāṣya.

We have the declaration that—'The first eating is by the Pronouncer of the syllable *Vaṣaṭ*' [and it is the Hotṛ priest who is this Pronouncer].—It would not be right to argue that "this is a mere declaration; and as it declares several factors [(1) the pronouncing of the syllable, (2) the eating, and (3) the priority], no significance need attach to the *priority*";—it

will not be right to argue thus, because it is this *priority* that is not already known from other sources [the other factors being already known]; and hence in regard to this *priority*, the text cannot be taken as a mere reiterative reference; it must be taken as an *injunction*. As for there being several factors mentioned, it is not difficult for a sentence to enjoin several factors when it makes use of a compound to do so.

SŪTRA (39).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE ORDER OF SEQUENCE AMONG THE GROUNDS (OF 'EATING').

Bhāṣya.

Among the various functions that have been declared as entitling the priests to eat the *Soma*,—the first to be performed is the 'pronouncing of the syllable *Vaṣaṭ*', which is done by the *Hotṛ*;—then comes the 'offering of oblations into Fire', which is done by the *Adhvaryu*;—and by virtue of this order of sequence among the 'grounds of eating', the same order should be followed in what is done on the basis of these 'grounds', and consequently in the order of eating also.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The Soma is to be 'eaten' after Invitation.*

SŪTRA (40).

THE 'EATING' IS TO BE DONE AFTER ONE HAS BEEN INVITED TO DO SO;—SUCH BEING THE DIRECT DECLARATION.

Bhāṣya.

Now arises the question—When several persons 'eat' the Soma out of a single vessel, must they receive an invitation to eat before eating? Or they may or may not seek invitation?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* being that—"it would be much simpler if no invitation were to be sought for",—the *Siddhānta* is that one should eat it only after having sought and obtained the invitation to do so.—Why so?—Because *such is the direct declaration*—'*Soma* should not be drunk unless one has been called to drink it'; where 'calling', stands for 'inviting'.

This *Sūtra* is meant to be introductory (to what follows in the following *Sūtra*).

Adhikaraṇa (15): *The request for permission to eat should be conveyed by means of Vēdic words.*

Bhāṣya.

It has been concluded that the eating should be done only on invitation.—Now arises the question—Is this request for permission to be conveyed by means of words of common parlance? Or by means of Vēdic words?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "there can be no restriction regarding this (one may use the Vēdic words or any other words)".

Against this, we have the *Siddhānta* in the following *Sūtra*.

SŪTRA (41).

The Invitation should be sought by means of the Mantra 'Upahūta upahvayasva'; such being the indication (of the Mantra itself).

Bhāṣya.

The Mantra mentioned is indicative of 'request for permission'; and on the strength of this indication, it has been declared to be what should be used in making the request for invitation; because *mantras* are generally employed on the basis of their indicative power. When this *mantra* has been thus laid down as to be used, words of common parlance naturally become excluded.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *The answer to the 'Request for Invitation' should be given by means of Vēdic words.*

SŪTRA (42).

WHEN REQUEST FOR INVITATION IS MADE, THE ANSWER SHOULD BE BY MEANS OF SUCH WORDS (OF THE MANTRA) AS MIGHT CONVEY THAT SENSE.

Bhāṣya.

We have learnt that the request for invitation is to be conveyed by means of the *mantra* '*Upahūta upahvayasva*'.—Now there arises the question as to the form of the *answer* to the request. Is the answer to be by ordinary words? or by means of this same *mantra*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "this Vēdic *mantra* having been used in conveying the request for invitation, the answer should be by means of some other words, and those of common parlance".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* view is that '*to the invitation*, the answer should be by means of this same *mantra*'.

Objection—"The word '*Upaḥvayasva*' (meaning 'invite me please') is indicative of the *question* (request) [as such, it cannot be used for the *answer* to the request]".

Answer—The word that precedes the word '*upaḥvayasva*'—i.e. the word '*upahūtaḥ*' ('you are invited')—is the one that indicates the answer, and hence can be used as the *answer*.

Objection—"In that case, the order of the words is wrong; the *request* should come first, *then* the *answer*".

Answer—On the strength of the meaning conveyed by the word, the word, though occurring first in the text, would be used as the *answer*; for the meaning of the word (being of the nature of 'Direct Assertion') is always more authoritative than 'order'.

[Hence the *request for invitation* is to be made with the word '*upaḥvayasva*', and the *answer* with the word '*uphūtaḥ*'.]

ADHIKARAṆA (17): *Request for Permission is necessary in the case of men eating out of the same Vessel.*

SŪTRA (43).

IT SHOULD BE DONE ONLY AMONG PERSONS EATING OUT OF THE SAME VESSEL; AS IT IS ONLY IN THEIR CASE THAT THERE IS CONGREGATION.

Bhāṣya.

There arises this further question—Should the request for permission be made to any person at random? Or to only one who is to eat out of the same vessel?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"as nothing particular is said on this point, the permission may be sought from any person".

In answer to this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The request for permission should be made only among those who are to eat out of the same vessel.—Why?—Because the request for permission is, in this case, subsidiary (to the act of *eating*); and the form of this request is that, when one wishes to do what is to be done by another, he prefers his request to that other person, with the words 'please permit me';—or when one wishes to eat with another person, he makes the mind of this other person favourable towards his joining.—All this is not possible in the case of persons eating out of different vessels; because in that case, one man does not wish to do what should be done by another;—nor, at dining together, does one join another in the eating of the same thing (in case they are eating out of different vessels). On the other hand, in a case where the Soma-juice contained in a single vessel has to be 'embellished' (by 'eating'), the most equitable division is that the shares should be equal;—but if they proceed to drink it without dividing it equally, it is possible that one drinks what should have been drunk by another; hence in such cases there is need for the request for permission (to drink), in some such form as 'The proper thing to do is that you drink one half and I drink the other,—but it is just possible that I may drink more or less than my proper share, please, therefore, permit me to drink'. Or again, the man may make the request for permission, saying 'it is possible that in drinking out of the same vessel as yourself, I may disturb your peace of mind'.—From all this it follows that the request for permission is to be made only in the case of persons eating out of the same vessel.

ADHIKARAṆA (18) : *The Sacrificer himself should also eat the Soma.*

SŪTRA (44).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ON THE TRANSFERENCE OF THE 'YĀJYĀ', THE 'EATING', LIKE THE 'APPOINTMENT', DOES NOT BECOME TRANSFERRED."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; in course of it certain sacrifices are offered to the Seasons;—in connection with which we read—'*Yajamānasya yājyā, so'bhiprēṣyati hotarētadyajēti, svayaṁ vā niṣadya yajati*' ['The *Yājyā mantra* (which is ordinarily recited by the *Hotṛ* priest) is recited by the Sacrificer;—he says to the Hotṛ priest—*Please offer this sacrifice* (to the seasons),—or he sits and offers the sacrifice himself'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—In the event of the sacrificer himself offering the sacrifice [and reciting the *Yājyā*], is he to eat the *Soma* or not?

On this question, there is the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"Even though the *Yājyā* has been transferred (from the *Hotṛ* to the *Sacrificer*), yet the *eating* should not be similarly transferred (from the *Hotṛ* to the *Sacrificer*),—the *eating* should still be done by the *Hotṛ*, and not by the *Sacrificer*.—Why so?—Because the reciting of the *Yājyā-mantra* is something quite different from the *eating*; and the transference of one thing need not involve the transference of another thing;—just as on the transference of the Soma *Yājyā* (from the *Hotṛ*), his 'appointment' (as *Hotṛ* Priest) does not become transferred from him,—so also in the present case [the transference of the *Yājyā* does not mean the transference of the *Eating*].—[*Objection*]—'The direction is that the syllable *vaṣaṭ* is pronounced along with the reciting of the *Yājyā*; so that where there is reciting of the *Yājyā*, there is the pronouncing of the syllable *vaṣaṭ*,—and where there is pronouncing of the syllable *vaṣaṭ*, there is *eating* of *Soma*'.—It is not so, we reply; the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' is not a constituent part of the *Yājyā-mantra*; hence the non-recital of the *Yājyā* does not mean the non-pronouncing of the syllable *vaṣaṭ*.—As for the direction that 'the syllable *vaṣaṭ* is pronounced along with the reciting of the *Yājyā*',—even when the *Yājyā* is recited by another person (the sacrificer), the pronouncing of the syllable *vaṣaṭ* may still be done by the *Hotṛ* [and even so the pronouncing of the syllable *vaṣaṭ* will have been done *along with the reciting of the Yājyā*]; specially as the transference of the *Yājyā* is done in obedience to the distinct injunction to that effect; not so the transference of the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*'; and things that are done according to injunctions should be done strictly in accordance with the injunction; and, as a matter of fact, there is injunction in regard to the transference of the *Yājyā* only."

SŪTRA (45).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THERE SHOULD BE 'EATING' BY THE SACRIFICER, BECAUSE THERE IS TRANSFERENCE (TO HIM) OF THE GROUND (FOR 'EATING').

Bhāṣya.

In reality, there should be 'eating' by the Sacrificer;—why?—*because there is transference, to him, of the ground for eating.* The 'ground for eating' is the *pronouncing of the syllable 'vaṣaṭ'*,—this pronouncing is transferred to the Sacrificer when the *Yājyā* is transferred to him; as there is the text that 'the syllable *vaṣaṭ* is pronounced along with the *Yājyā*'.—"But it has already been pointed out that at the time the *Yājyā* is being recited by the Sacrificer, the *Hotṛ* may be pronouncing the syllable '*vaṣaṭ*' [and even so the *pronouncing* will have been done *along with* the *reciting*]".—This is no answer at all. Because, we have the rule that the sacrifice should be performed 'without rest' (interruption);—and the sacrifice is completed with the *pronouncing of the syllable 'vaṣaṭ'*, not by the *Yājyā* only;—consequently, till the *pronouncing of the syllable 'vaṣaṭ'*, the sacrificer should not rest;—if *this pronouncing of the syllable 'vaṣaṭ'* however, were done by some one else, then during that time the sacrificer would be resting; so that he would not be *offering the sacrifice*; and yet what he has been enjoined to do is to *offer the sacrifice*, not merely to recite the *Yājyā-mantra*; as the injunction is that 'he himself should sit and *offer the sacrifice*', which enjoins the offering of the sacrifice with all its accessories.

SŪTRA (46).

AS FOR THE 'APPOINTMENT', THERE IS NO TRANSFERENCE OF IT, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ALREADY.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued by the *Pūrvapakṣin* that "there can be no transference of the *eating*, just as there is no transference of the *Appointment*".—Our answer to that is that the Appointment is not transferred, simply because it cannot be transferred: having been already accomplished, how could it be transferred from the *Hotṛ*? In fact, if the Appointment were done in connection with the Sacrificer, after the lapse of its prescribed time, it would be most defective; and what is defective cannot accomplish its purpose. Nor can the Appointment come in (for the Sacrificer) by the general law that 'the modification should be performed in the same manner as its original Archetype'.—It might be argued that "if that be so, then it comes to this that what *can* be done is brought in by that general law, and what cannot be done is not brought in";—our answer is that that is only natural. What a text enjoins is something not already known,—and it has to be done precisely as it has been enjoined; if in a certain case

it *cannot* be done, then it should be done in a case where it *can* be done; it should never be done where it would be defective.—It is for these reasons therefore that, while the *non-transference* of the *Appointment* is only right and proper, there can be no non-transference of the *Eating* [and the *Eating*, therefore, has to be done by the Sacrificer, in the case in question].

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *The 'Fruit-mixture' (Phala-chamasa) is a 'modification' of the sacrificial offering.*

SŪTRA (47).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE FRUIT-MIXTURE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS A CONDITIONAL 'MODIFICATION' OF THE SOMA TO BE EATEN; SUCH BEING THE DIRECT ASSERTION (OF THE VĒDIC TEXT)".

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Sa yadi rājanyaṁ vaishyaṁ vā yājayēt, sa yadi somam bibhakṣayiṣēt, nyagradhastibhirāhṛtya, tāḥ sampiṣya, dadhani unmṛjya, tamasmai bhakṣam prayachchhēt, na somam*' [' If one officiates at a sacrifice for a Kṣattriya or a Vaishya,—and if these latter wish to eat *Soma*, the Priest shall fetch banyan-shoots, pounder them and mix them up with curd,—and offer this to him to eat, not the *Soma*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the 'Fruit-mixture' a 'modification' (i.e. substitute) for the *Soma to be eaten*? Or for Soma to be offered?—i.e. is the *Fruit-mixture* meant to be *eaten*? Or is it meant to be the substance offered at the sacrifice?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "*the Fruit-mixture should be regarded as a conditional 'modification' of the Soma to be eaten*; as thus taken, it becomes syntactically connected with the 'eating' which is directly mentioned in the text quoted—'offer this to him *to eat*'; in the text we do not find any such expression as that 'with this fruit-mixture he should *offer the sacrifice*'.—From this we conclude that the *Fruit-mixture* is a substitute for the *Soma to be eaten*".

SŪTRA (48).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY IT SHOULD BE TREATED AS A 'MODIFICATION' (SUBSTITUTE) FOR THE SOMA TO BE OFFERED AT THE SACRIFICE; AS THE 'CONSECRATION' ('EMBELLISHMENT') IS ALWAYS MEANT FOR WHAT IS TO BE OFFERED.

Bhāṣya.

The Fruit-mixture should be regarded as a substitute for what is to be offered; i.e. one should offer the Fruit-mixture at the sacrifice.—Why so?—The 'eating' of the *Soma* is meant to be a 'consecration' ('embellishment') of the *Soma*; so that if the Fruit-mixture is to be eaten, then that 'eating' must be a 'consecration' (embellishment) of the Fruit-mixture; and this 'consecration' would be purposeless, if the Fruit-mixture were not to be used anywhere else (besides the *eating*).—If 'eating' were the principal factor, then there would be no sense in the reiterative reference

that is made to *Soma*, in the concluding words of the text '*not Soma*'.—On the other hand, if the Fruit-mixture were a substitute for the Soma *to be offered*, then there would be some sense in the 'consecration' of that mixture.—From all this, it follows that the Fruit-mixture should be regarded as a substitute for the substance *to be offered*.

Says the Opponent—"When there is no connection (in the text) between the Fruit-mixture and the verb 'to sacrifice', how can it be regarded as a substitute for the substance to be offered *at a sacrifice ?*"

Answer—The connection with the verb 'to sacrifice' is there.—How ?—What the text says is—'If one *sacrifices* on behalf of a *Kṣattriya* or a *Vaishya* he should pounder banyan-shoots and offer it to him to eat';—it is clear that the substance described here is meant to be used *at this sacrifice*; as otherwise, if it were meant solely for the purpose of being *eaten*, then there would be no connection between the first and the second parts of the passage quoted. If it had been meant that the *Soma* should be 'consecrated' by being eaten, then the expression used (in connection with the Fruit-mixture) would have been 'he should consecrate the banyan-shoots'.—From this it follows that the connection (of the mixture) intended primarily is not with the *eating*, and it should be connected with the *sacrifice*; as it is the *sacrifice* that is the subject-matter of the whole Context; and hence, there would be no incongruity in this connection.

Objection—"Inasmuch as the text contains the words '*Tamasmai bhakṣam prayachchhēt*' ['should offer him to eat'], it is clear that the mixture in question should be taken as the means of accomplishing the 'eating', not the *sacrificing*,—by reason of the close proximity of the term '*bhakṣa*' ('to eat')".

Answer—Even though the connection (between the *mixture* and the *eating*) is expressed by the words of the text, yet, finding that such a connection does not serve any useful purpose, we declare that the connection (of the *mixture*) lies with the *sacrificing*, which is the subject-matter of the context.

Question—"How then is the *mixture* to be connected with the *eating* ? [as, certainly it cannot be denied that the mixture is actually meant to be *eaten*]."

That the substance used in the sacrifice should be *eaten* follows from the general Injunction itself,—and in this way the *mixture* secures its connection with the *eating*. In fact, the connection with *eating* also implies connection with the *sacrifice*; because it is only when the substance is offered in *sacrifice* that it comes to be '*bhakṣa*' (something to be eaten at the sacrifice). Hence the declaration in the text that the mixture is to be *eaten* naturally implies that it is to be offered at the *sacrifice*; thus then, the words '*tamasmai bhakṣam prayachchhēt*' ['should offer it to him to eat'] should be taken to mean '*tamasmai bhakṣaṁ kuryāt*' ['should make the mixture a substance to be eaten by the sacrificer at the sacrifice'], i.e. should deal with it in such a manner as to make it a *bhakṣa*, a substance to be eaten at the sacrifice; as a matter of fact, it is only when it is offered at the *sacrifice* that it becomes a substance to be *eaten* at the sacrifice.—From this it follows that the mixture in question should be offered at the sacrifice.

[Kumārila deals with this *Sūtra* somewhat differently.—See *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1492–1495.]

SŪTRA (49).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE MENTION OF THE 'OBLATION INTO THE FIRE'.

Bhāṣya.

In fact we have an injunction laying down a particular 'oblation into the Fire' (as to be offered out of the mixture in question)—'*Yadā anyāṁshchamasān juhvati athaitasya darbhataruṇakēṇopahatya juhoti*' ['When they offer oblations into the Fire out of other Cups, they cover this cup containing the Fruit-mixture with a fresh shoot of Kusha-grass and *offer an oblation out of it* into the Fire']. It is only if the mixture were meant to be used as a substance to be offered in the sacrifice, that there could be any occasion for the prescribing of the detail in connection with the oblation that it is to be covered with 'the fresh shoot of *Kusha*-grass'. From this also it is clear that the mixture in question is to be offered at the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (50).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS COEVAL WITH THE CUPS (OF SOMA).

Bhāṣya.

We have the text—'*Yadā anyāṁshchamasān unnayanti athainam chamasamunnayanti*' ['At the time that they hold up the other cups, they raise this cup (containing the Fruit-mixture) also']. It is only if the *mixture* were meant to be offered in sacrifice that there would be any occasion for the cup being held up; not so if it were only meant to be *eaten*.—For this reason also the mixture should be offered at the sacrifice.

SŪTRA (51).

LASTLY, BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we conclude that the mixture should be offered at the sacrifice ?—"For what reason ?"—*Because we find indicatives* :—"What is this *indicative* ?"—It is found in the reference to the prohibition of *Soma* that we have at the end of the text—'He should offer the mixture, *not the Soma*, for eating'; this non-eating of the *Soma* would be possible only if the mixture were the substance offered at the sacrifice [if the substance offered at the sacrifice were *Soma*, then there would be no avoidance of the eating of the *Soma*, as what is to be eaten is the 'remnant of the substance used at the sacrifice']. From all this we conclude that the mixture in question should be taken as to be offered at the sacrifice.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *In the case of the cups at a Kṣattriya's Sacrifice also, the Brāhmaṇas are to 'attend upon' (eat out of) them.*

SŪTRA (52).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE CHARACTER OF THOSE 'APPROACHING' THE CUP SHOULD BE REGULATED BY THE CASTE (OF THE SACRIFICER)."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Dashapēya* sacrifice, which is a part of the *Rājasūya* sacrifice, we read—'*Shatam brāhmaṇāḥ soman bhakṣayanti, dashadashaikaikachamasamanuprasarpanti*' ['A hundred Brāhmaṇas eat the *Soma*, ten persons shall approach each of the cups'].

In regard to this there arises the question—In a case where the 'cup' has been prepared for a *Kṣattriya* sacrificer, should also the persons 'approaching' the Cup be *Kṣattriyas*? or should they be *Brāhmaṇas*?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"They must be *Kṣattriyas*;—why?—because the sentence 'Ten persons shall attend upon each Cup' lays down the *number* of persons 'approaching' the cup; this *number* 'ten' being laid down in connection with the *Kṣattriya* caste, —the caste '*Kṣattriya*' remains the constant factor; hence the ten *Kṣattriyas* should 'approach' the cup;—so that among the 'hundred', there would be *Kṣattriyas* as well as *Brāhmaṇas* [ten being *Kṣattriyas* and the rest Brāhmaṇas],—the mention of the number 'hundred' being a mere reiterative reference, so far as the ten *Kṣattriyas* are concerned; and the sentence 'a hundred eat the *Soma*' also being very much like a reiterative reference. —From all this it follows that *Kṣattriyas* should 'approach' [i.e. eat out of] the Cup prepared for the *Kṣattriya* sacrificer.—Some people urge here the following objection—'It would be very wrong for *Brāhmaṇas* and *Kṣattriyas* to eat out of the same cup'.—But there can be no harm in this, as it has been declared that in the case of *Soma*, there is no 'pollution' at all."

SŪTRA (53).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD BE BRĀHMAṆAS; THE VEDIC TEXT BEING EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO BOTH.

Bhāṣya.

The persons 'approaching' the cup prepared for the *Kṣattriya* sacrificer should be *Brāhmaṇas*;—why?—because, by Direct Assertion, the Injunctive text 'a hundred Brāhmaṇas eat the *Soma*' lays down the number 'hundred' as pertaining to *Brāhmaṇas*; thus there being these 'hundred *Brāhmaṇas*'

(who are to eat the *Soma*), what the second sentence 'Ten persons, etc. etc.', does is to lay down that when these hundred Brāhmaṇas proceed to 'approach' (i.e. eat out of) the cups, the number for each cup should be *ten*'; hence the meaning is that of the 'hundred Brāhmaṇas', *ten* Brāhmaṇas should 'approach' the cup prepared for the *Kṣattriya* sacrificer.

[Kumārila does not approve of this presentation of the Adhikaraṇa (*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1500); he has explained it in a different manner; for which see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1502–1504.]

End of Pāda v of Adhyāya III.

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA VI.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The injunction regarding the 'Sruva' being made of 'Khadira-wood', and such other injunctions, should be taken as appertaining to the Primary Sacrifice (Archetype).*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" THE IMPLEMENTS MUST APPERTAIN TO ALL SACRIFICES, BECAUSE THEY DO NOT OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF ANY PARTICULAR SACRIFICE [I.E. IS ISOLATED].

Bhāṣya.

[We have dealt so far with such accessories as are amenable to one or more out of the six means of cognition,—Direct Assertion, Indicative Power, Syntactical Connection, Context, Order and Name; —we now proceed to discuss those that are not amenable to any of these means of cognition.]

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, we find the following isolated injunctions—(*a*) '*Yasya khādiraḥ sruvo bhavati sa chhandasāmēva rasēnāvadyati sarasā asya āhutayo bhavanti*' ['If one uses the *Sruva* of *Khadira* wood, he sacrifices with the very essence of the Vedas, all his oblations become juicy'];—(*b*) '*Yasya parṇamayī juhūrbhavati na sa pāpaṁ shlokaṁ shṛnoti*' ['He whose *Juhū* is made of *Palāsha* wood hears no evil word'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 5. 7. 1), and such others.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do the two things that are laid down here—i.e. 'that the *Sruva* should be of *Khadira* wood' and 'that the *Juhū* should be made of *Palāsha* wood'—find place in (appertain to) the *Primary* sacrifice (Archetype) only? or in the Archetype as well as in the Ectype?

On this question we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—" *The injunctions appertain to all sacrifices, because they do not occur in the Context of any sacrifice*;—i.e. such injunctions should appertain to the Archetype as well as the Ectype;—why?—*because they do not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice* (i.e. they are isolated); that is, they are not found under any such *context* as deals with any particular sacrifice; and on the strength of *Syntactical Connection* (of the injunctive texts themselves), they must appertain to all sacrifices".

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE ARCHETYPE ONLY, AS ONLY THUS THERE WOULD BE NO (SUPERFLUOUS) REPETITION.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, all those implements that are prescribed without reference to any particular sacrifice are to find place in the Archetypal Sacrifice;—why?—*because it is only thus that there would be no superfluous repetition;* that is, it is only when they are related to the Archetype that needless repetition is avoided.—"What is the harm if there *is* repetition?"—*Impossibility,* we answer; that is to say, if something finds place in the *Archetype* as well as the *Ectype*, it must find place in the Archetype;—but what finds place in the Archetype comes into the Ectype on the strength of the general law (that 'the Ectype is to be done in the same manner as the Archetype');—hence (for the purpose of being connected with that thing) the Ectype does not stand in need of any such isolated injunction as the one under consideration;—from which it follows that such an injunction cannot lay down anything for the Ectype. It is for this reason that we say that what is enjoined is for the *Archetype* only.

SŪTRA (3).

[SAYS THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN]—"BUT, INASMUCH AS THE THING IN QUESTION FINDS PLACE IN THE ECTYPE ON THE STRENGTH OF THE INJUNCTION ITSELF,—WHAT COMES TO IT UNDER THE GENERAL LAW MUST BE THINGS OTHER THAN WHAT COMES TO IT THROUGH THE INJUNCTION UNDER CONSIDERATION".

Bhāṣya.

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"We still say that since the injunction in question does not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice, it must appertain to both the Archetype and the Ectype.—As for the argument that the thing enjoined would come into the Ectype under the general law (that the Ectype is to be done in the same manner as the Archetype),—our answer is that (it is the other way about), when the thing has already come into the Ectype by virtue of the isolated Injunction to that effect, it does not stand in need of that thing coming to it under the said general law. Hence what the general law can bring into the Ectype will be all other details except the one that has come into it already through the isolated injunction under consideration.—Then again, the fact that the *Sruva* (at all sacrifices including the Ectype) is to be of *Khadira* wood is laid down directly by the *perceptible* Injunction under consideration, while if it were to come into the Ectype through the general law, that would at best be only

an *inference* ; and Perception is always more authoritative than Inference. —For all these reasons we conclude that the isolated Injunction (which does not occur in the context of any sacrifice) appertains to both the Archetype and the Ectype."

SŪTRA (4).

"IF IT IS URGED BY THE SIDDHĀNTIN THAT—'IN VIEW OF A PERCEPTIBLE FACT [THE GENERAL LAW IS TO BE TREATED AS MORE AUTHORITATIVE THAN THE ISOLATED INJUNCTION]'—[THEN OUR ANSWER WOULD BE AS IN THE NEXT SŪTRA]."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Siddhāntin* might argue as follows :—'If the isolated Injunction were more authoritative than the general law (that the Ectype is to be done like the Archetype), then a thing having come into the Ectype by virtue of that Injunction, it would not stand in need of the general law ; so that when all the needs of the Ectype will have been supplied in this manner, there would be no application of the general law at all ;—and under these circumstances, there would be no possibility of our finding the *Prayājas* performed at the *Ectype* (at which the *Prayājas* come in from the Archetype only by virtue of the general law) : but in fact, we do actually find the *Prayājas* at the Ectype, as is indicated by the text '*Prayājē prayājē kṛṣṇalam juhoti*' ['At each *Prayāja* one should offer the oblation of a gold piece into the fire'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 2. 3).—On the other hand, if the general law is more authoritative than an isolated Injunction, then the perceived fact (of the Prayājas being present at the Ectype) becomes plainly explicable.—From all this we conclude that the isolated injunction appertains to the Archetype only.'

"Our answer to this argument of the Siddhāntin would be as follows :—

SŪTRA (5).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S REJOINDER]—"THAT CANNOT BE ; AS THE ISOLATED INJUNCTION LAYS DOWN ONLY ONE THING".

Bhāṣya.

"The isolated Injunction in question cannot appertain to the Archetype only ; it must appertain to all sacrifices ; for the simple reason that it does not occur in the context of any particular sacrifice. It has been argued that if the Ectype has all its needs fulfilled by the isolated injunction, there can be no application of the general law. But this is not right ; because the isolated Injunction does not render the general law unnecessary ; in fact, it is only when the *Sruva* has come into the Ectype by virtue of the general law,—that the fact of its being made of *Khadira-wood* is laid down by the isolated injunction ; so that if the general law were not there (to admit the *Sruva*

into the Ectype), the isolated Injunction would not be applicable at all [as there would be nothing that could be of *Khadira-wood*] ;—nor can the isolated Injunction be taken as prescribing the use of the *Sruva* and also the fact of its being made of *Khadira-wood* ;—why ?—*because the Injunction lays down only one thing*; the injunction that 'he who uses a *Sruva* of *Khadira-wood*, etc.' lays down only one thing ; and it does not lay down the *Sruva*, as well as the fact of its being made of *Khadira-wood* ; all that the text does lay down is *the fact of its being made of Khadira-wood* with regard to the *Sruva* which latter has already come in (by the general law).—Thus then there is use for the general law, which lays down all those other details which are *not* laid down by the directly perceptible isolated Injunction.—From all this it follows that the isolated Injunction appertains to both the Archetype and the Ectype."

SŪTRA (6).

"IT MIGHT BE URGED (BY THE SIDDHĀNTIN) THAT 'THE INJUNCTION IN QUESTION [IS ENTIRELY LIKE THAT OF THE INJUNCTION OF OTHER ACCESSORIES OF THE ARCHETYPE]' ;—[OUR ANSWER TO THIS WOULD BE AS SET FORTH IN THE NEXT SŪTRA]."

Bhāṣya.

"The *Siddhāntin* may argue as follows :—'The Injunction in question is just like the other injunctions bearing upon the Archetype. For instance, the accessories of the Archetype are laid down in detailed as well as in abbreviated form ; for instance, when it is said "offers the five *Prayājas*", it is in an abbreviated form ; but when the same is said in the form "*Samidho yajati*, etc." (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 6. 1. 1) [where all the Prayājas are separately named], it is in a detailed form ;—in the case under consideration also, when it is said "He whose *Sruva* is made of *Khadira-wood*, etc. etc.", it is in a detailed form ; but when it is said "He whose *Sruva* is of this shape", it is in an abbreviated form.—Such is the kind of injunction that we find in connection with the Archetype.—Now the injunction under discussion also is of this same kind ;—hence it follows that this injunction also pertains to the Archetype. This is a pure inference from the Universal to the Particular.—From all this it follows that the isolated injunction appertains to the Archetype.'

"Our answer to this reasoning is as follows :—

SŪTRA (7).

[PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S ANSWER TO THE SIDDHĀNTIN'S ARGUMENT IN SŪ. 6]—"IT IS NOT SO ; AS IT IS A CASE OF SIMPLE SIMILARITY."

Bhāṣya.

"It cannot be as explained above. Such inferences from the Universal to the Particular as have been put forward above do not prove anything ;

all that is true is that there is some *similarity* between the injunctions bearing upon the Archetype and the Injunction under consideration ; there is nothing to prove that this latter pertains to the Archetype.—Then again, in connection with the Ectype also, there are accessories enjoined in detailed and abbreviated forms : for instance—when it is said that 'there are three oblations into the fire' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 9. 3), it is in an abbreviated form ; and when the injunction proceeds to lay down the *mantras* with which these oblations are offered,—such as '*Āmanamasyāmanasya devāḥ*, etc.' [Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 3. 9. 3], it is in a detailed form.—Thus it is found that isolated Injunctions are similar also to the injunctions bearing upon the Ectype.—From all this it follows that what is put forward by the Siddhāntin (under Sū. 6) is no reason for holding that what is enjoined in the isolated injunction should find place in the Archetype."

[Of *Sūtras* 6 and 7, Kumārila has suggested a second interpretation—see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1509-1510.]

SŪTRA (8).

[SIDDHĀNTIN'S FINAL ANSWER TO THE PŪRVAPAKṢA]—IN REALITY, THERE BEING A CONFLICT OF OPINION IN REGARD TO THE ECTYPE,—INASMUCH AS WHATEVER IS LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL LAW APPLIES IN ITS ENTIRETY (TO THE ECTYPE),—WHAT IS ENJOINED IN THE ISOLATED INJUNCTION MUST APPERTAIN TO THE ARCHETYPE.

Bhāṣya.

The particle '*tu*' ('in reality') rejects the view set forth above. What we hold is that the isolated Injunction does not pertain to all sacrifices (Archetype as well as Ectype) ;—why ?—*because whatever is laid down by the general law applies in its entirety to the Ectype* ; i.e. the general law brings to the Ectype the entire procedure, and the needs of the Ectype and its resultant *Apūrva* cannot all be fulfilled by the isolated Injunction ; specially because it is evident from *Syntactical Connection* that what is laid down in the isolated Injunction (i.e. being made of *Khadira-wood*) is in connection with the implements, and not with the (ectypal) sacrifices (directly) ; and these sacrifices stand in need of help from the Archetype, through the clear indication of the General Law ; and hence it is with the Archetype that they become syntactically connected. Thus it is that what can supply all the needs of the Ectype are the accessories of the Archetype, not any isolated Injunctions. It is necessary therefore that the General Law should be brought into operation ;—and when the General Law becomes operative, there is no need for the application of the isolated Injunction. In fact, in the absence of 'Context' or any other indicative of connection, even though the isolated Injunction were operative, it could not become connected with the Ectype. For these reasons the isolated Injunction can have no connection with the ectypal action.—Thus then, *there being a conflict of opinion in regard to the* '*mukhya*', the sacrifice in question,—i.e. the Ectype,—as

to whether it is supplemented by the isolated Injunction, or by the archetypal accessories,—it follows, on the strength of the General Law, that it is supplemented by the archetypal accessories; and under the circumstances, the isolated Injunction cannot apply to it.—From all this it follows that the isolated Injunction pertains to the Archetype.

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The number 'seventeen' connected with the 'Sāmidhēnī' mantras appertains to the Ectype: Exception to Adhi.* (1).

SŪTRA (9).

ON ACCOUNT OF THE PECULIARITY OF THE CONTEXT, THE NUMBER MUST PERTAIN TO THE ECTYPE; AS IT WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE (WITH THE ACCESSORIES OF THE ARCHETYPE).

Bhāṣya.

Without reference to any particular sacrifice, the extent of the *Sāmidhēnī* Mantras is thus declared—'*Saptadasha Sāmidhēnīranubrūyāt*' ['one should recite the seventeen *Sāmidhēnī Mantras*'] (Aita. Brā. 1. 1).

[The mantras beginning with '*Pra vo vājā abhidyavaḥ*'—Ṛgveda 3. 27. 1—are called '*Sāmidhēnī*', 'Kindling', because they are recited at the time of kindling the Sacrificial Fire. The number of these is *eleven*; but in connection with their recitation, several numbers—15, 17 and so forth—are found to be laid down; these numbers are made up by some of the same mantras being repeated twice or thrice.]—

In regard to this there arises the question—Does this injunction (of the number 'seventeen') pertain to the Archetype or the Ectype?

On this question, we have the *Pūrvapakṣa* view that, "in accordance with the principle of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the number 'seventeen' should appertain to the Archetype; and that as 'fifteen' is the number definitely prescribed in connection with the Archetype, there should be an option [i.e. one may recite either *seventeen* or *fifteen Sāmidhēnī* Mantras]".

Against this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—Injunctions like the one under consideration should appertain to the Ectype;—why?—because the Archetype has all its requirements fulfilled by the number 'fifteen'.—"But we have already pointed out that there would be an option (between 'fifteen' and 'seventeen')."—*On account of the peculiarity of the Context*, there can be no option between 'fifteen' and 'seventeen' (in regard to the Archetype); specially because the two injunctions differ entirely in their character; [the 'fifteen' being enjoined in the special context of the Archetype itself, while 'seventeen' is enjoined in an isolated injunction].—As regards the Ectype, however, the admission of the number 'fifteen' into it would be based upon Inference (on the strength of the general law that 'the Ectype is to be done in the same manner as the Archetype'), and this number therefore would be set aside by the directly perceived Injunction of the number 'seventeen', which therefore would find place in that Ectype. In this manner there would be no needless repetition either (as was found in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*) and the Injunction of the entire performance would thus become summed up, without any needless

repetition [such as was found in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*].—From all this it follows that Injunctions like the one we have been considering appertain to the Ectype.

[Kumārila is not satisfied with this presentation of the *Adhikaraṇa*; he proposes a somewhat different interpretation, see *Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1515-1516.]

Adhikaraṇa (3) : *Accessories like the Milking Vessel appertain to the Archetype : An exception to the foregoing Adhikaraṇa.*

SŪTRA (10).

All that is 'conditional' should find place in the Archetype ; this change of the original being due to the mention of the special condition.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darshapūrṇamāsa* it is laid down—'If the sacrificer is desirous of acquiring cattle, water should be carried in the milking vessel.'—Similarly in connection with animal dedicated to *Agni-Soma*, we find the following declaration, in reference to the sacrificial post—'If one desires Brahmic glory, he should make the sacrificial post of *Bilva* wood' [Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 1. 8. 1].

In regard to such texts, there arises the question—In regard to (conditional) injunctions, like these, there arises the question—Should they find place in the Archetype or in the Ectype ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "they should find place in the Ectype ; because the requirements of the Archetype have been fulfilled by means of (*a*) the *other vessel* (*Chamasa*, cup, which is enjoined specially in regard to the Archetype, *Darshapūrṇamāsa* (in the case of the first text), and (*b*) (in the case of the second text) the *other Sacrificial post* (i.e. that made of *Khadira* wood, which is enjoined specially in connection with the Archetype, *Jyotiṣṭoma*) [which leaves no room for the 'milking vessel' and the '*Bilva* wood']."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa*, we have the following *Siddhānta*—*What is conditional pertains to the Archetype* ; because it has been enjoined with special reference to the condition ; (*b*) the Sacrificial Post made of *Khadira* or *Palāsha* or *Rohitaka* has been enjoined in a general way (without reference to any conditions or circumstances) (in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) ; (*a*) so also has the 'Cup' been enjoined (in connection with *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, as to be used for keeping water near the Āhavanīya fire) ; while (*b*) the *Bilva* wood (for the Post) and the *Milking Vessel* (for the carrying of water) have been laid down with reference to special conditions (that of (*a*) being desirous of 'Brahmic glory' and of (*b*) being desirous of obtaining Cattle) ; and a special Injunction always sets aside a general one. As regards 'Context', that is common to all actions (Archetype and Ectype) ; the presence of the 'condition', however, is something very special ;—and what comes into a sacrifice through the *general* injunction does so only indirectly, by having recourse to indirect indication [the *general* term being taken as indirectly standing for the *special* thing] ; on the other hand, what

comes through a special injunction does so through the perceptible *Direct Assertion* ;—and *Direct Assertion* is always more authoritative than *Indirect Indication* ;—and what is *perceptible* is more authoritative than what is *not-perceptible*.—For these reasons the articles enjoined are to find place in the Archetype only [and at the *Ectype*, the *Cup* shall always be used for the keeping of water, as is going to be decided under 8. 1. 24].

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The 'Fire-installation' is not auxiliary to the 'Pavamāna' Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (11).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" ON ACCOUNT OF THE 'CONTEXT', THE FIRE-INSTALLATION MUST BE REGARDED AS AUXILIARY TO THE SACRIFICE (PAVAMĀNA)."

Bhāṣya.

[Hitherto we have been dealing with Injunctions admittedly 'isolated', not occurring in the context of any particular sacrifice; we are now going to deal with an Injunction which, though apparently occurring in the context of a particular sacrifice, has to be treated as an 'isolated' one.]

There are the *Pavamāna* sacrifices spoken of in the texts—'*Agnayē aṣṭākapālam nirvapēt—Agnayē pāvakāya—Agnayē shuchayē*' [Taitti. Sam. 2. 2. 4. 2];—in the 'context' of these same sacrifices, we find the injunction that 'During the spring, the Brāhmaṇa shall install the fires' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 2. 6).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the Fire-installation for the purpose of (auxiliary to) the *Pavamāna* sacrifices, or not?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—" Fire-installation *is* for the purpose of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices;—why?—*on account of the context*; that is, it is found to be spoken of in the context of these sacrifices, and hence it must be regarded as being subservient to their purpose".

SŪTRA (12).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS IN REALITY, THE PAVAMĀNA SACRIFICES THEMSELVES ARE PERFORMED FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE 'FIRE'.

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, the *Pavamāna* sacrifices are performed for the purpose of (consecrating) the Fire. If the Fire were for the purpose of (auxiliary to) the Sacrifice, then the Fire-installation, as auxiliary to the Fire, could be regarded as helping the sacrifices; but the sacrifices in question (*Pavamāna*) do not bring about any results; so that the Fire-installation (if auxiliary to those sacrifices) would also be useless.—" But why should the *Pavamāna* sacrifices be regarded as auxiliary to the Fire?"—Simply because they serve no purpose at all, while the Fires serve a distinctly useful purpose.—Though the sacrifices are *to be accomplished*, yet they could be performed for the purpose of the Fires which are accomplished entities; [though ordinarily it is the *accomplished* entity that serves the

purpose of what is yet *to be accomplished*].—From all this, it follows that Fire-installation is not auxiliary to the *Pavamāna* sacrifices.

SŪTRA (13).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND AN INDICATION.

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text which shows that the *Pavamāna* sacrifices are performed for the purpose of the Fires.—" What is that indicative text ? " —It is as follows—' *Jīryati vā ēṣa āhitaḥ pashuryadagniḥ, tadētānyēva agnyādhēyasya havīmṣi samvatsarā nirvapēt, tēna vā ēṣa na jīryati, tēnainam purnarnavam karoti, tanna sūkṣmam* ' (see Taitti. Sam. 1. 5. 7. 3) [' The Fire that has been installed droops ; hence these offerings should be made at the end of a year, in connection with the Fire-installation ; by this the Fire does not droop ; it makes it fresh, and it is no longer small '], [where the offerings, by which the *Pavamāna* sacrifices are meant, are clearly spoken of as helping the Fire that has been installed].

Adhikaraṇa (5): *The Fire-installation is auxiliary to all Sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (14).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The Injunction of 'Fire-installation' should be taken as pertaining to the Archetype,—just like other isolated injunctions."

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the 'Fire-installation' referred to in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, there arises the question—Is the *Fire*-installation auxiliary to the Archetype only, or to all sacrifices?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "it is auxiliary to the Archetype only;—why?—*just like other isolated injunctions*; i.e. just for the same reason for which other isolated injunctions pertain to the Archetype (see Sū. 10, above)".

SŪTRA (15).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the Fire-installation is auxiliary to all sacrifices, because it 'has its own time' [or, according to Tantravārtika, p. 1530, '*has been enjoined by itself independently*'].

Bhāṣya.

In reality the 'Installation' should be taken as auxiliary to all sacrifices.—"What is the meaning of this?"—The meaning is that the 'Installation' is for the sake of the *Fire* which is used at all sacrifices. As a matter of fact, this 'Installation' has not been enjoined in reference to the Archetypal Sacrifices; nor is there any 'Direct Assertion', or 'Indication', or 'Syntactical Connection', or 'Context', or 'Order', or 'Name',—which points to the 'Installation' being an auxiliary to any particular sacrifice. As regards the 'other isolated injunctions', as applied to any particular factor, it is only after its auxiliary character has been recognised by some other means, that we proceed to consider whether the factors are auxiliaries to the Archetype or to the Ectype; hence in their case it is only right [that they should be taken as auxiliary to the Archetype on the grounds set forth under Sū. 10].—In the case in question, however, there are no grounds for believing that the 'Installation' is auxiliary to any sacrifice; hence it is regarded as being done for the sake of the 'Fire', not for the sake of any 'action' (sacrifice); and as the 'Fires' are for the purpose of all sacrifices (as shown under 3. 7. 39), we declare that the 'Installation' also must be for the purpose of (and auxiliary to) all sacrifices. [This is going to be definitely established under 11. 3. 2.]

Further, the 'Installation' has got its '*own time*' definitely laid down (in the injunction 'The Brāhmaṇa should install the Fires *during the spring*'). This should not have been so laid down (if the installation were auxiliary to any particular sacrifice); for (if it were auxiliary to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), it would have to be performed whenever the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is performed;—and this could *not* always be the '*spring*'; similarly (if it were auxiliary to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) it should have to be performed whenever the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* are performed;—and this would be either the Moonless Day or the Full-moon Day [not the '*spring*'].—On the other hand, if the 'Installation' is *not* auxiliary to any such Archetypes, then it would not be done necessarily at the performance of those Archetypes; and in that case, a separate injunction of the time for it would be only right and proper.—For these reasons the 'Installation' cannot be regarded as auxiliary to any particular Archetype.

Adhikaraṇa (6): *The Pavamāna Sacrifices should be offered in the unconsecrated Fire.*

SŪTRA (16).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The consecrated Fire should come into the Pavamāna sacrifices from the Archetype,—just as the Prayājas do.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Pavamāna* sacrifices laid down in the texts—'*Agnayē pavamānāya*, etc.' (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 2. 4. 2).

In regard to these there arises the question—Are the *Pavamāna* sacrifices to be offered in the Fire that has been consecrated by means of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices, or in one not so consecrated ?

On this question, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*—"*To the Pavamāna* sacrifices, the Fire sanctified by means of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices should come in from the Archetype ;—why ?—on the strength of the general law (that 'the Ectype should be performed in the manner of the Archetype') ; —*just as the Prayājas do* ; i.e. just as the *Prayājas* come into the *Pavamāna* sacrifices by virtue of the general law, even so would the Fires sanctified by the *Pavamāna* sacrifices also come into them".

SŪTRA (17).

[Siddhānta]—In reality it cannot be so ; as the Pavamāna sacrifices themselves are for the very purpose of consecrating the fires.

Bhāṣya.

In reality at the *Pavamāna* sacrifices themselves, there can be no consecration of the Fires by means of those same sacrifices.—Why ?—*Because the Pavamāna sacrifices themselves are for the very purpose of consecrating the Fires* ; i.e. when the *Pavamāna* sacrifices are performed, they are performed for the purpose of consecrating the Fires ; what is brought in by virtue of the general law is what is auxiliary to the Archetype ; [i.e. it is only an auxiliary to the archetypal sacrifice, *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, that can come into its ectypes] ;—the consecration done by means of the *Pavamāna* sacrifices is for the sake of the Fires ; it is not an auxiliary to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ; hence it cannot be brought in by virtue of the general law.—Further, by their very nature, the *Pavamāna* sacrifices need an Archetype which is devoid of the consecration brought about by those sacrifices ; for the simple reason that the *Pavamāna* sacrifices have not been enjoined as to be performed at the time (of the sacrifice which would be the *Archetype* of

those sacrifices), [these sacrifices would therefore not be there at all]. [From all this it follows that the *Pavamāna* sacrifices are to be performed in Fires which have undergone the simple consecration of 'installation', and which have *not* undergone the further consecration through the *Pavamāna* sacrifices—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., pp. 1533-1534.]

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The 'Upākaraṇa' and other rites are to be performed only in connection with the 'Agnīṣomīya' animal.*

SŪTRA (18).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (A)]—"WHAT IS LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH ANIMALS SHOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL THE ANIMALS, AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT."

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, there are three animals—(1) the *Agnīṣomīya*, mentioned in the text '*Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhatē*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6), (2) the *Savanīya*, and (3) the *Anubandhya*. There are also certain details to be performed in connection with the animals, such as—(*a*) *Upākaraṇam* [Touching the animal with the two *mantras* beginning with '*Prajāpatērjāyamānāḥ*, etc.' (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 1. 4. 1) and '*Imam pashum*, etc.' (*Ibid.*)], (*b*) *Upānayanam* [Bringing forward], (*c*) *Akṣayā-bandhaḥ* [Tying with a rope], (*d*) *Yūpē niyojanam* [Fettering to the Sacrificial Post], (*e*) *Sanjñapanam* [Suffocating to death], (*f*) *Vishasanam* [Dissecting], and so forth.

In connection with these details there arises the question—Are these to be performed in connection with all the three animals—*Agnīṣomīya*, *Savanīya*, and *Anubandhya*? Or with the two, *Agnīṣomīya* and *Savanīya*? Or with the *Agnīṣomīya* only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view (A) is as follows:—"They should be performed in connection with all the three animals, *as there is no difference in the context*.—What is this *non-difference*?—It is this, that all the animals have been spoken of in one and the same context, that of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and as all of them are mentioned in that same context, all the details laid down in connection with the animals become connected with all the three animals, and there can be no differentiation among them."

In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* (A), we put forward the following view which is *Pūrvapakṣa* (B):—"All these details should belong to the *Savanīya* animal only. The injunction regarding the animals could appertain equally to all the animals only if there were no distinction in regard to their context; as a matter of fact, however, there is a distinction in their context, inasmuch as the details relating to the animals have been laid down in the sub-context dealing with the *Savanīya* animals, in the following text—'*Āgnēyaḥ pashuragniṣṭomē ālabhyaḥ, āgnēyo hyagniṣṭomaḥ; aindrāgnaḥ pashurukthyē ālabhyaḥ, aindrāgnāni hyukthāni; aindro vṛṣṇiḥ ṣoḍashini alabhyaḥ, aindro vai vṛṣṇiḥ aindraḥ ṣoḍashī; sārasvatī meṣī atirātrē ālabhyā, vāg vai sarasvatī*' (Shatapatha Brā. 4. 2. 5. 14),—and so on, all the details relating to the animals are laid down. From this it follows that, on account of this special context, the details should be performed in connection with the *Savanīya animal only*."

[In answer to this *Pūrvapakṣa* (B), we have the following *Sūtra*, which sets forth a view which has been regarded as *Pūrvapakṣa* (C).]—

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (C)]—"ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POSITION, [THE DETAILS SHOULD BE PERFORMED] IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREVIOUS (AGNĪṢOMĪYA) ANIMAL ALSO."

Bhāṣya.

"It has been asserted that on account of the *Context*, the details should be taken as to be performed in connection with the *Savanīya* animals. This we accept; but we have to add that on account of *Position*, they should be performed in connection with the *Agnīṣomīya* also; as the details are laid down in connection with the *Aupavasathya* (Fourth) Day, whose position in the order of sequence is the same as that of the *Agnīṣomīya*. Hence the details should be performed in connection with both (the *Savanīya* as well as the *Agnīṣomīya*)."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—ACCORDING TO SOME VEDIC TEXTS, [THE 'SAVANĪYA' ANIMALS ARE SPOKEN OF] IN CONNECTION WITH THE FOLLOWING DAY; IN THAT CASE, ITS MENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE PREVIOUS DAY IS TO BE TAKEN AS MEANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF LAYING DOWN CERTAIN ACCESSORY DETAILS.

Bhāṣya.

According to some Vedic Recensions, the *Savanīya* animals are spoken of in connection with the following day; and in view of this, the text quoted is to be taken as laying down certain accessory details.—"What is that accessory detail for the purpose of laying down which there is the Text (that speaks of the *Savanīya* as connected with the previous day)?"—The answer to this is as follows—Having named the animals, the Text goes on to say—'*Yathā vai matsyo'vidito janamavadhunutē ēvam vā ētē aprajñāyamānā janamavadhunvatē*' ['Just as an unknown fish strikes and shakes a man in water, in the same manner these animals if unknown strike and shake the people'];—then there arises the question—in what way are the Soma-extractions to be connected with the animals?—and it is in answer to this that the 'extraction of the omentum' is laid down as the accessory detail (connecting the Soma-extraction with the animals); so that it is for the purpose of laying down this accessory detail (of the 'extraction of the omentum') that we have the text (speaking of the *Savanīya* animal in connection with the previous day); as it is only thus that this text becomes syntactically connected with the 'extraction of the omentum'.

"What if it is so?"

Well, if it is so, then the details laid down in connection with the animals cannot be taken, on the strength of 'Context', as pertaining to the *Savanīya* animals,—they have to be taken as pertaining to the *Agnīṣomīya* animal only, on the strength of 'Order' (Position).

Question—"Which is that text which speaks of the *Savanīya* in connection with the 'following day'?"

Answer—The text is—'*Āshvinam graham gṛhītvā trvṛtā yūpam parivīya āgnēyam savanīyam pashumupākaroti*'.

[The *Siddhānta* position may be thus explained (see *Ṣaḍdarshanachintanikā*, pp. 997-998)—First of all, the context of the *Savanīya* animals being first and foremost is found in only some recensional texts, not in all; under the circumstances, the force of the 'Context' loses all its force........The aim of the Context is to lay down for the first time how the 'extraction of the omentum' of the animal is to be done, and how it is to be prepared for offering in sacrifice; and it is only incidentally that the *Savanīya* animal is mentioned; and why this animal has been incidentally mentioned is to be thus explained—As a matter of fact, the work to be done on two days is all described together,—i.e. what is to be done on the *following day* is described along with what is to be done on the *previous day*. For instance, first of all the *Agnīṣomīya* animal is prepared and killed and its omentum extracted; next the *Savanīya* animal is to be prepared and killed and the *Soma-juice* is to be extracted;—but this latter is done on the 'following day', called the '*Sutyāha*'; while the *Agnīṣomīya* animal is prepared and killed and its omentum extracted on the day previous to this, which previous day is called the *Aupavasathya* day [described in *Shatapatha-Brā.* 1. 1. 1. 7, as the day on which the Vishvēdēvas come to dwell with the sacrificer in the hope that he will offer sacrifices to them on the following day]. It is clear from this that the *Agnīṣomīya* animal is dealt with first,—then the *Savanīya* animal.—The *Savanīya* animal is mentioned in the Context of the *Agnīṣomīya* animal, simply for the purpose of laying down the details of the 'extraction of the omentum' of the *Savanīya* animal. That the *Savanīya* animal is to be dealt with on the following day is clear from the text quoted '*Āshvinam graham gṛhītva*, etc.']

SŪTRA (21).

[OBJECTION]—"WHAT THE TEXT QUOTED ('ĀSHVINAM GRAHAM, ETC.') DOES IS TO ENJOIN THE TIME FOR WHAT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED BY THE 'EXTRACTION OF THE OMENTUM'";—IF THIS IS URGED [BY THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN, THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

[Says the *Pūrvapakṣin*]—"It is not right to assert that, on the strength of 'Order', the details in question should be taken as pertaining to the *Agnīṣomīya* animal; because in reality, on the strength of the 'Context', they should be taken as pertaining to the *Savanīya* animal. As a matter of fact, when the *Savanīya* is mentioned in connection with the previous day, it is mentioned for being *enjoined*, and all that the text speaking of the '*Āshvina*' (i.e. the text quoted by the *Siddhāntin*, '*Āshvinam graham*, etc.' as indicating the connection with the *following day*) does is to lay down

the particular detail of *Time*.—"How?"—Well, the text lays down the time for what has been 'transferred' by the 'extraction of the omentum'. In fact, the 'extraction of the omentum' having been laid down in connection with the *Morning Extraction of Soma-juice*, the *killing of the animal* (from which the omentum has to be extracted) also naturally falls on the same day; but the exact time for it not being known, the text quoted '*Āshvinam graham*, etc.' lays down the precise *time* only.—As for 'tying of the threefold rope round the sacrificial post', this is mentioned only by way of reference to what has been already laid down elsewhere; if it were not so, then the text quoted would contain the injunction of the said 'tying of the rope' and also the injunction of the '*Upākaraṇa*' of the *Savanīya* animal; and in this way, there would be a syntactical split.—For these reasons the details in question should be taken as pertaining to the *Savanīya* animal only."

["If the Siddhantin thinks that there is no 'Context' of the *Savanīya*, he is very much mistaken; because as a matter of fact, the original appearance of the *Savanīya* animal is due to the previous sentence '*Āgnēyamajam*, etc.' (see Text quoted under Sū. 18); then the sentence '*Vapayā pracharanti*' transfers the 'extraction of the animal's omentum' to a subsequent occasion; and lastly, the exact time for it being still unknown, the sentence *Āshvinan graham*, etc.' lays down that time. That is to say, the sentence '*Vapayā prātaḥsavanē pracharanti*' transfers the principal detail—that of Extraction of the omentum—to a subsequent occasion; and inasmuch as the accessories must follow their Principal, the other details, such as *killing* and the rest, also become transformed to the subsequent occasion. But with all this, there still remains an uncertainty as to the exact time, and then the time 'immediately following upon the holding of the *Āshvina Cup*' comes to be laid down by the sentence '*Āshvinam graham*, etc.'. Thus it is this last sentence which serves the purpose of laying down the accessory detail of *Time*. If this sentence were not taken as laying down the time for the *killing*, etc. of the *Savanīya* animal, it would have to be taken as laying down the time for (1) the 'Tying of the Rope round the Post', (2) the *Upākaraṇa* of the animal, and (3) the sacrifice with all its material, Deity, etc.; and this multiplicity of enjoined things would cause an objectionable syntactical split..... ....The sense of the *Bhāṣya* comes to be this—If it were not as explained by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, then the sentence '*Āshvinam graham*, etc.' would have to be taken as laying down, in regard to the 'Tying', something in connection with which the 'threefold rope' and the particular time could be enjoined; and the phrase '*upākaraṇasya cha*' (*Bhāṣya*) means that the time laid down would be for the *Upākaraṇa* also. Hence, inasmuch as this text is found to serve the purpose of laying down the necessary accessories, it has to be admitted that there is a 'Context' pertaining to the *Savanīya* animals.—*Tantravartika*—Trans., pp. 1541-1542.]

SŪTRA (22).

[ANSWER TO THE PŪRVAPAKṢIN'S OBJECTION]—THAT CANNOT BE; AS WHAT IS TRANSFERRED IS ONLY A PART OF THE ANIMAL.

Bhāṣya.

It cannot be as it has been urged by the *Pūrvapakṣin*; in reality, on the strength of the 'Order', the details in question must be taken as pertaining

to the *Agniṣomīya* animal. As for the mention of the *Savanīya* in connection with the time at which the *Āshvina Cup* is taken up,—that is for the purpose of actually enjoining the *Savanīya* itself; if it were taken as laying down accessories of the *Savanīya*, then there would be a syntactical split; not so when it is taken as enjoining the *Savanīya* itself. It is not possible for the text '*Āshvinam graham*, etc.' to be taken as laying down the time for what has been transferred by the 'extraction of the omentum'; because the omentum is only one part (of the animal); and hence it could transfer only those details which come after the preparation of the omentum, and not the *Upakāraṇa* of the animal (which comes before the 'extraction of the omentum').

SŪTRA (23).

[OBJECTION]—"[THE TRANSFERENCE] MAY BE DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS ITSELF"—IF THIS BE URGED [THEN OUR ANSWER WOULD BE AS GIVEN IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"[If the transference could not be due to the 'extraction of the omentum'], then it could be due to the nature of the business,—and for the *Savanīya* thus transferred, the time would be taken as enjoined by the sentence '*Āshvinam graham*, etc.'. This 'nature of the business' is indicated by the text—'*Muṣṭinā pidhāya vapoddharaṇam āsita ā vapāhomāt*' [Covering the extracted omentum with the first, he should sit there till the omentum is offered into the Fire']; now if the 'extraction of the omentum' were done on the previous (i.e. fourth) day and if it were offered into the fire on the following (i.e. the fifth) day, then it would mean that the man would have to keep the omentum covered with his fist and sit down continuously for two days; and certainly no one could do this; for it would be necessary for him to find time to take his food and have some rest, etc."

SŪTRA (24).

THAT CANNOT BE; AS WHAT IS SUGGESTED WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY IF THERE WERE AN INCONGRUITY IN THE VEDIC TEXT.

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested by the *Pūrvapakṣin* is not possible. It could be so only if the doing of the 'Extraction of the omentum' on the previous day and the offering on the following—involved an incongruity in the Vedic text;—as it is however, there is no such incongruity in the Veda; as it is quite possible to 'cover the omentum' with a *fistful* of grass, or a *fistful* of leaves [in which case there would be no such incongruity as that of the man having to remain sitting for two days, etc.].

Objection—"But the text contains the word '*āsita*', which means that the man *should remain sitting*".

Answer—The root '*ās*' does not always mean *to sit*; in fact it is also used in the sense of *neutrality* or *indifference* (*rest*); as we find in such assertions as '*Gṛhyāni parigṛhya āste*', '*Kṣetrāni parigṛhya āstē*' ['Having received the household utensils, he *rests*', 'Having received lands, he *rests*'], where the root '*ās*' denotes something which is *not—sitting*, i.e. cessation of activity (*resting*). In the text in question also, this same sense would be applicable—the man, having covered the omentum with a fistful of grass or of leaves may (*rest*) remain inactive.—From all this it follows that the text speaking of the time of the holding of the *Āshvina Cup* serves to enjoin the *Savanīya*; so that the details regarding the animals do not appear in the 'Context' of the *Savanīya* animals, and as such, they cannot be regarded as pertaining to the *Savanīya* animals.

SŪTRA (25).

THUS THEN, BY VIRTUE OF ITS 'POSITION', THE DETAILS IN QUESTION MUST APPERTAIN TO THE PREVIOUS (I.E. AGNĪṢOMĪYA) ANIMAL; SPECIALLY AS THE CONSECRATION (BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SAID DETAILS) IS MEANT FOR THE SAKE OF THAT ANIMAL.

Bhāṣya.

It has been seen that there is no 'Context' of the *Savanīya* animals;—such being the case, for reasons already stated before (in Sū. 19),—i.e. on account of its 'position',—the details should appertain to the previous—i.e. the *Agniṣomīya*—animal;—specially as the consecration (brought about by the details in question) is for the sake of the Animal-sacrifice, not for the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice. In the event of its being for the sake of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, there would be no difference among the three animals (as regards the admissibility of the details in question to one or the other). As a matter of fact, however, the animal-sacrifices also, being not already enjoined elsewhere, have the capacity of admitting the details in question,—and as such it is these to whom the 'Context' belongs.—For these reasons, on the ground of 'Order' (Position), the details in question should be regarded as appertaining to the *Agniṣomīya* animal.

SŪTRA (26).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reasons also we conclude that the details relating to the animals appertain to the *Agniṣomīya* animal.—"For what reason?"—*Because we find indications*; i.e. there is a text indicative of the same idea: '*Vapayā prātaḥsavanē charanti, puroḍāshēna mādhyandinē savanē*' ['The omentum is to be offered at the Morning Extraction, and the Cake at the

Midday Extraction']; —this text speaks of the 'animal-offering' (in the shape of the omentum) and the 'Cake' [and as such indicates that the details in question should appertain to the *Agniṣomīya* animal only].—If it did not do so, and if the details belonged in common to all the three animals [or even two of them—adds the *Tantravārtika*], then there would be this difficulty that the 'Cake' (mentioned in the text just quoted) could not have any connection with the *Savanīya* animal; because the 'Cake' has been regarded as consecratory of the *two* deities, Agni and Soma conjointly (not of *Agni* singly, which is the deity of the *Savanīya*); and by reason of this special capacity of the Cake (to consecrate the *joint deities*), it would naturally connect itself with the *Agniṣomīya* animal (which also is connected with the same two deities jointly), and not with the *Savanīya* (which being related to *Agni* only) can have no connection with the *two deities* Agni and Soma *jointly*. This same fact is also indicated (by the text quoted).— From this also, it follows that the details in question should appertain to the *Agniṣomīya* [and the details accruing to the *Savanīya* would be only such as would come to it under the general law—says *Tantravārtika*].

SŪTRA (27).

THE TEXT [SPEAKING OF THE 'COVERING OF THE HOLES'] IS NOT INJUNCTIVE; IT IS PURELY DECLARATORY.

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* is in anticipation of a few words from the Opponent, who says—"The Cake-offering [which serves the purpose of consecrating the two deities Agni-Soma may not apply to the *Savanīya* animal; but] as serving the purpose of 'covering up the holes' [as mentioned in the Vedic text.—'*Suṣiro vā ētarhi pashuḥ*, etc.'] (it may find a place with the *Savanīya* animal)".—[It is in answer to this that we have the Sūtra which means that] what is suggested is not possible; because the text quoted *is not injunctive, it is purely declaratory*; that is, the text does not enjoin the 'Cake-offering' for the purpose of 'covering the holes'; in fact, it is only a declaration, as has already been explained [under *pāda* ii, of Discourse I, where it has been shown that such passages as are argumentative, setting forth a reason for a certain thing, cannot be regarded as *injunctive*]. Consequently the 'Cake-offering' must be treated as serving the purpose of consecrating the deities; and on that account, it is only when the Cake-offering appertains to the *Agniṣomīya* animal that it is possible for it to be found at the time of dealing with the *Savanīya* animal (which follows after that of the *Agniṣomīya*), and not on the ground that it appertains, *in common*, to both (the *Agnisomiya* and the *Savanīya*).—From all this it follows that the details relating to the animals appertain to the *Agniṣomīya* animal only.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *Details like the 'Fetching of the Branch' appertain to both 'Milkings'.*

SUTRA (28).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Between the two 'milkings' that which is simply boiled (and not made into curd) should be unconnected (with the details),—because of the difference in the time."

Bhāṣya.

[In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the cows are milked twice] there is one milking in the previous evening and another milking in the morning.—There are also certain accessory details laid down in connection with 'milking'—such as 'fetching the branch' (for driving the calf away from the cow), 'bringing in of the cow', 'making the milk of the cow flow', 'milking' and so forth.

In connection with these, there arises the question—Are these details to be performed in connection with the Evening-milking only, or with both milkings ?

On this the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—"*Between the two milkings, that which is simply boiled* (and not made into curd, i.e. the morning milking) *should not be connected with the details* ;—why ?—because the 'Fetching of the Branch' and other details have been laid down in the same 'order' as the *Evening-milking*, in connection with the *Aupavasathya* (i.e. Previous) day ; on the same (previous) day is the *Evening-milking* also done.—Hence on the strength of 'Order', the details relating to the milking should be performed in connection with the *Evening-milking* only [this milk being made into *curd* used on the following day"].

SŪTRA (29).

[Siddhānta]—In reality [the details appertain to both milkings] because there is no difference in the 'Context' and the injunction of the time applies to the action along with all the details.

Bhāṣya.

The 'Context' is common to both ; it belongs as much to the *curd* as to the *milk* ; and 'Context' is more authoritative than 'Order' (on which latter the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is based) ; therefore the details laid down in connection with milking should appertain to both milkings.—Further, it is *not* that the Evening-milking is laid down as to be done on the previous day ;—"when then ?"—as a matter of fact, it is laid down as to be done

on the following day.—"How so?"—The text bearing on the subject is as follows—"*Aindram dadhi amāvāsyāyām, aindrampayaḥ amāvāsyāyām.*" ['The Curd dedicated to Indra, on the Amavāsyā day; the milk dedicated to Indra, on the *Amāvāsyā* day'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 2. 5. 4. 1); wherein both the milkings are enjoined as to be done along with all details on the *Amāvāsyā* day. Even so, however, the evening-milking is done on the previous day by reason of the exigencies of the case; i.e. it is the very nature of the curd that it starts (with the milking) on the previous day and is finally made up on the following day. Thus it is not true that the details have been laid down in the 'Order' of the Evening-Milking (which is the premise upon which the *Pūrvapakṣa* is based).—From all this it follows that the details in question appertain to both Milkings.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *Details like 'placing', 'washing' and the rest appertain to all three 'Extractions'.*

SŪTRA (30).

Similarly the vessels are to be taken as laid down in connection with other 'Extractions' also.

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice laid down in the text—'*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 5. 2. 2).—In reference to this sacrifice, ten vessels,—the '*Aindravāyava*' (*Dedicated to Indra-Vayu*) and the rest, are laid down in connection with the *Morning-Extraction* [there being *three* 'extractions' of the Soma-juice, in the morning, in the evening and at midday]; in regard to these vessels certain details have been prescribed, such as—(*a*) '*Upoptē anyē grahāḥ sādyantē, anupoptē dhruvāḥ*', ['The other vessels are placed on a raised ground, the *Dhruvā* vessel is placed on ground not raised'], and (*b*) '*Dashāpavitrēṇa graham sammārṣṭi*' ['Cleanses the vessel with the hem of the garment'].—Apart from these ten, there are other vessels, laid down in connection with the Midday Extractions and others again in connection with the third (Evening) Extraction.

Now, in regard to the vessels used at the Midday Extraction and those used at the Evening Extractions there arises the question—should the details (of *Placing* and *Cleansing*) be performed in connection with *all vessels*? or only in connection with those (ten) that are used at the Morning-Extraction?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "the Details should be performed only in connection with those used at the Morning Extraction, not with any others; because it is in the 'Order' (Position) of the Morning Extraction that the Details have been laid down."

On this we have the following *Siddhānta*—*To other Extractions* than the Morning one,—i.e. to the Midday Extraction and at the third Extraction—also, the injunction of the vessels (and what is to be done to them) is applicable, in the same manner as in the previous *Adhikaraṇa*. That is, the 'Context' is one and the same for all the three Extractions,—and it is in that same 'Context' that the details in question have been laid down;—through 'Syntactical Connection' also, the details are connected with every one of the vessels (used at the three Extractions);—and both 'Syntactical Connection' and 'Context' are more authoritative than 'Order'.—Hence it follows that the details laid down in connection with the vessels appertain to all the vessels that are used at the three Extractions.

ADHIKARAṆA (10): *The 'Threefoldness of the Rope' pertains to all animals.*

SŪTRA (31).

THE ROPE ALSO [PERTAINS TO ALL], SPECIALLY AS WE FIND INDICATIVES TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the *Agnīṣomīya* is one of the animals used, as laid down in the text—'*Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhēta*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6);—in connection with this we find mentioned the 'Rope', as also certain details relating to the Rope, in the text—'The Rope is threefold; it is made of Kusha-grass; it should be made of well-beaten grass'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these details appertain in common to the Rope of the *Agnīṣomīya* animal, as well as to that of the *Savanīya* animal? Or to the rope of the *Agnīṣomīya* animal only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "through the 'Context', they should appertain to the Rope of the *Agnīṣomīya* animal only".

Against this, we have the following *Siddhānta*:—The details appertain in common to both (the Rope of the *Agnīṣomīya* as well as the Rope of the *Savanīya*);—why?—*because we find indicatives to that effect*,—the indicative text declaring—'*Āshvinam graham gṛhītvā trvritā yūpam parivīya āgnēyam pashumupākaroti*'. ['Taking up the vessel dedicated to the *Ashvins*, and covering the Post with the threefold rope; one touches the *animal dedicated to Agni*, i.e. the *Savanīya animal*]; wherein the *Rope* is indicated as to be used for the 'Covering' of the Post for the *Savanīya* animal; and this indication would be possible only if the Rope and its details were common to both the animals. If it appertained to the *Agnīṣomīya* animal only, then it would have become excluded from the 'Covering' of the Post in connection with the *Savanīya* animal, which 'covering' is different from the 'covering' done in connection with the Archetype; then again, the 'covering of the Post' done in connection with *Savanīya* is totally different from the 'covering' done at the Archetype, and yet we find 'threefoldness' mentioned in connection with it.—How so?—Well, we find the text—'Taking up the vessel dedicated to the *Ashvins*, and going out, he covers the Post';—such being the case, if the *Rope* did not appertain in common to the *Agnīṣomīya* and the *Savanīya*, then it would follow that the 'Covering' (in connection with the *Savanīya*) should be done with a *piece of cloth*; and yet the text indicates the *Rope* (by the mention of 'threefoldness').—Hence it follows that the Rope is common to both the animals;—and when the Rope is common, the details relating to it should also be common.—Thus it is that the fact of the Rope being common to both is shown by the indicative text.—"But what is the reason here (apart from the indication—

in support of the *Siddhānta*) ? "—The reason is that through 'Context', the Rope and its details should appertain to the Post of the *Agnīṣomīya* animal only, while through 'Syntactical Connection', they should appertain to every Post (connected with the *Agnīṣomīya* as well as the *Savanīya* animal).

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *Details like 'Placing' should be done to the 'Aṁshu' and the 'Adābhya' also.*

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" WHAT IS ENJOINED AT A DISTANCE CANNOT BE CONNECTED WITH THE OTHER DETAILS, BECAUSE OF NON-PROXIMITY ".

Bhāṣya.

There are certain vessels '*enjoined at a distance*' from the *Jyotiṣṭoma* (i.e. in a totally different context),—such, for instance, as the vessels *Aṁshu* and *Adābhya*, which have been enjoined in the section dealing with the *Aupasada-Anuvākyā* (which is a section far removed from the section dealing with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*).

In regard to these vessels (*Aṁshu and Adābhya*), there arises the question —Should the details (*Placing, Cleansing*, and so forth) laid down in connection with vessels used at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* be performed in connection with the *Aṁshu* and the *Adābhya*, or not ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—" The said details are *not* to be formed in connection with the *Aṁshu* and the *Adābhya*,—*because of non-proximity*; in the case of the 'boiling' laid down in the text—'One boils what is dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa*' (Tai. S. 6. 4. 8. 2)—we find that *boiling* is done only to that cup which is dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa*, and not to all the cups; in the same manner, all the details under consideration should be done to those vessels only that are mentioned in the same Context (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), and not to all vessels ".

SŪTRA (33).

IN REALITY, THE VESSELS NOT MENTIONED IN THE SAME CONTEXT ALSO SHOULD BE CONNECTED WITH THE DETAILS IN QUESTION ; AS THOSE VESSELS ALSO ARE OF USE AT IT (THE JYOTIṢṬOMA SACRIFICE) ; SPECIALLY AS WHAT IS AUXILIARY TO A SACRIFICE MUST APPLY TO ALL THAT IS OF USE AT THAT SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

A vessel like the *Aṁshu* and *Adābhya*, even though not mentioned in the same Context (of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), should be connected with the details in question ;—why ?—because 'Syntactical Connection' is more authoritative than 'Context'.

Objection—" If these details were performed elsewhere (in connection with another sacrifice), they could not help the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, in any way ".

Answer—They would certainly help the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—because the *Aṁshu* and the *Adābhya are of use at it*;—i.e. they are of use at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*. Then again, the details relating to the vessel is of the nature of 'auxiliary', and as such, through the vessel, they would help the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and as many vessels would be serviceable at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*,—to all these the details in question should appertain.—From this we conclude that the details laid down in connection with the vessels should be performed in connection with the *Aṁshu* and the *Adābhya* also.

SŪTRA (34).

THERE COULD BE RESTRICTION ONLY IF THERE WERE A DIRECT DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

What has been said by the *Pūrvapakṣin* (under Sū. 32) in regard to the 'boiling' of the milk in the vessel dedicated to *Mitra-Varuṇa* is quite right, so far as that case is concerned; as in that case there is the direct declaration (to the effect that the 'boiling' is to be in connection with that particular vessel),—and hence this direct declaration sets aside the indication of the 'Context' and restricts the *boiling* in its scope. In the case in question, however, it is quite the reverse; in the case cited it is the indication of the 'Context' that the *boiling* should be done to all the vessels, while the restriction of it to a particular vessel is done by the direct declaration contained in the 'Sentence' quoted;—while in the case in question, the connection of the details with all vessels is directly declared by the 'Sentence', and it is the indication of the 'Context' that restricts it to particular vessels. [And as 'Sentence', i.e., 'Syntactical Connection', is always more authoritative than the 'Context'] it follows that the details in question are to be performed even in connection with those vessels (the *Aṁshu* and the *Adābhya*) which are not mentioned in the same 'Context' with them.

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The qualifications of the 'Chitriṇī' and other Bricks are auxiliary to the Fire and hence should be connected with the details laid down for the Fire-altar.*

SŪTRA (35).

SIMILARLY, EVEN THOSE THAT ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE SAME 'CONTEXT' SHOULD BE REGARDED AS AUXILIARY TO THE FIRE.

Bhāṣya.

Without any reference to the *Fire*, we have the texts—(*a*) '*Chitriṇī-rupadadhāti, bajriṇīrupadadhāti*' ['He puts in bricks with figures, he puts in bricks with the mark of the thunder-bolt'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 7. 3. 1);—(*b*) '*Bhūtāṣṭakā upadadhāti*' ['He puts in well-baked bricks'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 5. 6. 3. 1).—Then, there are certain *qualifications of Bricks* laid down in the context (of the *Fire-altar*), such as—'Bricks should be made entire and not black'; 'one should smear the bricks with ashes'.

Now, there arises the question—Should these latter qualifications be applicable in those bricks that are not mentioned in the same Context,—or not ?

On this the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The qualifications should not be applicable to them;—why ?—because of non-proximity (remoteness)".

The *Siddhānta* view is that the bricks like those in question should be regarded to be as much an auxiliary to the *Fire* (altar) as the vessels have been found (in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa*) to be to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; because here also 'Syntactical Connection' is more authoritative than 'Context'; and also because the bricks in question also are used for the building of the Fire-altar. [Consequently, the qualifications laid down in the Context of the 'Fire-altar' should be present in the *Chitriṇī* and other bricks also, though these are not mentioned in the same Context.]

Adhikaraṇa (13): *Such details as 'Measuring out', 'Fetching', 'Purchase' and 'Juice-Extraction' etc. are applicable to the case of Soma only.*

SŪTRA (36).

The 'conditional', not being equal to the 'normal', cannot have the same details appertaining to it.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Sa yadi rājanyam*, etc.' ['If one should sacrifice for the *Kṣattriya* or the *Vaishya*, and he wishes to eat *Soma*, one should collect banyan-shoots, pound them and mix them up with curds, and offer *this* to him to eat, not *Soma*'].—In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* again, there are certain details to be performed in regard to the *Soma*,—such as 'Measuring out', 'Fetching', 'Purchasing', 'Juice-Extraction' and so forth.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do these details appertain equally to the *Soma* and the 'Fruit-mixture'? Or do they appertain to the *Soma only*, the 'Fruit-mixture' being only a 'Modification' of the *Soma*?

The purpose of this *Adhikaraṇa* is to determine whether or not these details are to be performed by such persons (Ksattriyas and Vaishyas) as may be desirous of having their sacrifice complete in all its details.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "the details are equally applicable to both the *Soma* and the *Fruit-mixture*; as the 'Context' is the same".

The *Siddhānta* however is as follows:—Things like the 'Fruit-mixture' are 'conditional', due to certain special circumstances; and hence it *cannot have the same details appertaining to them.*—Why so?—Because *it is not equal to what is 'normal'*; i.e. the 'Fruit-mixture' is not equal to the *Soma*; inasmuch as *Soma* has been enjoined as the 'normal' substance, to be used in all cases, while the 'Fruit-mixture' is only 'conditional' (its use depending on the circumstance of the sacrificer being a *Kṣattriya* or a *Vaishya*, and then too only for the sole purpose of being 'eaten', the offerings, in this case also, being made of Soma-juice itself).—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then, inasmuch as the details in question also have been enjoined as 'normal' (to be done in all cases), they cannot be performed as if they were only 'conditional' (to be done only under special circumstances).—If they were treated as common (to both the *Soma* and the *Fruit-mixture*), then it would mean the injunction of something wholly irrelevant.—Further, if the *Fruit-mixture*, being conditional, were to take in the details laid down in connection with *Soma*,—then those details, being common, would have to be regarded as repeated twice.—From all this, it follows that the *Fruit-mixture* cannot have all the details appertaining to it.

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The details laid down in connection with the Principal Substance should appertain to its Substitute also.*

SŪTRA (37).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" THE SUBSTITUTE ALSO SHOULD BE TREATED SIMILARLY ".

Bhāṣya.

A *substitute* is laid down for cases where the principal substance is not available; e.g. if the *Vrīhi* Corn (which is the principal substance prescribed for making the *Cake*) is not available, *Nīvāra* Corn is used in its place.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the details laid down in connection with *Vrīhi* equally applicable to the *Nīvara*, or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—" *the substitute is to be treated similarly*; that is, just as the *conditional* (*fruit-mixture*) cannot have applicable to it those same details that are prescribed for the *normal* (*Soma*),—so the *substitute* also; as the substitute also is *not equal* to the Principal.—' What is the inequality ? '—The ' inequality ' consists in this that the details have been prescribed in reference to the *Vrīhi*, not in reference to the *Nīvāra*; what happens is that the details are directly enjoined in reference to the *Vrīhi*, and if they are applied at all to the substitute, it is only on the basis of Presumption."

SŪTRA (38).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—NOT SO; IN FACT, IT SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANCE; AS THE PURPOSE SERVED BY BOTH IS ONE AND THE SAME.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right to say that the substitute is not to be treated like the Principal; in fact, it should be treated exactly as it has been laid down (in connection with the Principal); because in this case, the relation between the two substances is not that of the *root-substance* and its *modification*.—Why ?—That the details laid down in connection with the *Vrīhi* are adopted in the case of a particular *Vrīhi* Corn, is due to the fact that it has the ' character ' of ' *Vrīhi* ',—and when the *Nīvāra* is declared to be a substitute for *Vrīhi*, it does not mean that the ' character ' of ' *Nīvāra* ' takes the place of the ' character ' of ' *Vrīhi* ' (as it happens in the case of the *root-substance*, Milk, and its *modification*, Curd); hence the relation between the two cannot be that of the *root substance* and its *modification*.—" How then do the details laid down for the *Vrīhi* become applicable to the *Nīvāra* ? "—Our answer to this is that those individual *Vrīhi* grains which are distinguished by the

character of '*Vrīhi*', are actually present in the *Nīvāra* grains (that are taken up as the substitute for *Vrīhi*); and it is for the sake of these that the details in question are applied; so that the injunction of these details applies equally to those grains of *Nīvāra* as also to the other grains of *Vrīhi*.—"What is the equality between the two?"—The equality lies in the fact that both the grains are distinguished by the *character* (or *shape*) of '*Vrīhi*'.—For these reasons the details are to be applied equally to both (the Principal substance *Vrīhi* and its substitute, *Nīvāra*).

[In this connection, see Sū. 6. 3. 27, where we are taught that the substitute must be *like the Principal*, in *shape*; so that if the *shape* of the *Vrīhi* is present in the *Nīvāra*, in this sense the *Nīvāra* can be spoken of as 'distinguished by the *shape of Vrīhi*'; this is what is meant by saying that the "*Vrīhi* distinguished by the character of '*Vrīhi*' is present in the *Nīvāra*".]

SŪTRA (39).

ALSO BECAUSE IT IS NOT SOMETHING AUTHORISED BY THE SCRIPTURES.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the substitute cannot be regarded as a *modification* of the Principal.—For what reason?—The reason is that the substitute (*Nīvāra*) comes in on account of the *need*; that is, when the principal substance becomes spoilt, there is need for a substance to be used at the sacrifice, and it is in fulfilling this need that the *Nīvāra* is brought in (on the ground of its resemblance to the principal, *Vrīhi*) [and it is not that the *Nīvāra* is actually laid down by the scriptures as to be used]; but the said need cannot justify the idea that the genus '*Nīvāra*' comes in in the place of the genus '*Vrīhi*'.—For this reason the substitute cannot be regarded as a 'modification' of the Principal substance which is enjoined by the scripture as the one to be used.

Adhikaraṇa (15): *In the case of those 'substitutes' also which are actually enjoined by the scriptures, the details laid down in connection with the 'Principal' should be performed.*

SŪTRA (40).

THE SECONDARY SUBSTANCE IS MENTIONED FOR THE PURPOSE OF RESTRICTING (THE SUBSTITUTE).

Bhāṣya.

[It having been explained in the preceding *Adhikaraṇa* that the Substitute, not laid down in the scriptures, is to be treated like the Principal] now the question that arises is—Is the Substitute that is actually laid down in the scriptures to be treated like the Principal—or not? For instance, we have the text—'If one cannot obtain *Soma*, he should extract the juice of the *Putika*' (P. U. Brā. 9. 5. 3) [where the *Putika* is actually laid down as the substitute for *Soma*,—and the question is—Is the *Putika* to be treated like the *Soma*?]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"it is *not* to be treated like the Principal substance; because its case is entirely different from the Substitute that is *not* mentioned in the scriptures".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*The secondary substance is mentioned for the purpose of restricting the substitute.* The meaning is that in this case also the substitution is due to *need*: *Soma* not being there, the substance that should have to be used would be something resembling *Soma*, and what the text quoted does is to restrict the substitution to the *Putika* which bears *some* resemblance to the Soma, and what is meant is that this *Putika* is the only one thing that may be used in the absence of anything more like the *Soma*; what is meant being that when in the place of the enjoined Principal substance, something else closely resembling it should have been used, what is actually substituted is something different even from this latter (which resembles it to a smaller extent); and it is not substituted as a means to the accomplishment of the sacrifice. [All that is meant is that, in the event of the *Soma* not being available, the *Putika* is the substance that may be brought in, as possessing some of the properties of the Soma. See, in this connection, Sū. 6. 3. 16, 17. Says the *Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1568—The *Putika* cannot be regarded as forming part of the sacrifice in the manner in which the *Soma* is; it is brought in only as the substratum of some of the properties of *Soma*; hence even though it is mentioned in the *Veda*, it should be dealt with in the same manner as the substitute has been dealt with in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*.]

Adhikaraṇa (16): *Details like the 'Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi'—Initiatory Sacrifice—appertain to the Agniṣṭoma.*

SŪTRA (41).

[Pūrvapakṣa *continued*]—"The Forms are to be treated all alike, as there is no difference of 'Context'."

Bhāṣya.

There is the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; of this four Forms have been spoken of—viz.: (1) *Agniṣṭoma*, (2) *Ukthya*, (3) *Ṣoḍashi* and (4) *Atirātra*. In connection with this sacrifice certain details are prescribed—such as the *Initiatory Sacrifice* and the like. [In reality, there are *seven* Forms of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, these four, and *Atyagniṣṭoma*, *Āptoryamā* and *Vājapēya*. It is by way of illustration that only four have been mentioned.]

In regard to these, there arises the question—Have these details been prescribed in connection with the entire *Jyotiṣṭoma* in all its forms? or only in its *Agniṣṭoma*-form?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"*All the Forms are to be treated alike*;—why?—*because there is no difference of Context*; there is no difference in the Context of the several Forms, whereby it could be determined that the details appertain to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in its *Agniṣṭoma*-form only; hence the Forms should be treated all alike".

SŪTRA (42).

[Pūrvapakṣa *concluded*]—"They are spoken of also as if they were similar."

Bhāṣya.

In the context where they are mentioned, the Forms are spoken of as if they were similar; for instance, there is the text—'*Yadi agniṣṭomo juhoti, yadi ukthyaḥ paridhimanakti, yadi atirātraḥ ētadēva yajurjapan havirdhānam pratipadyēta*' ['If it is the *Agniṣṭoma*, one offers the libation into Fire;—if it is the *Ukthya*, he anoints the bounding sticks;—if it is the *Atirātra*, he goes to the *Havirdhāna* cart, repeating this same *Yajus*'];—here we find the several Forms mentioned separately, which shows that the details here mentioned appertain to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in all its forms; and it follows from this that the details that may be found to be mentioned in common (not in reference to any one *form* specifically) should also appertain to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in all its forms. If the details were not meant to apply equally to all [and applied to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in general], then it would appertain to the *Agniṣṭoma*

form only (as being the first); and in that case there would be no need to mention the *Agniṣṭoma* in the passage quoted; as even without such mention, the *Agniṣṭoma* would become connected with the details all the same. As a matter of fact, however, we find the passage speaking of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in all its forms; from which we conclude that the Context belongs to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in all its forms.—Further, we find the text—'*Āgnēyamajamagniṣṭomē ālabhēta, aindrāgnam dvitīyamukthyē, aindram vṛṣṇim tṛtīyam ṣoḍashini*' ['At the *Agniṣṭoma*, one should kill the goat dedicated to Agni; at the *Ukthya*, one should kill the second animal dedicated to *Indra-Agni*; at the *Ṣodeshan* one should kill the third ram dedicated to *Indra*']; the mention of the 'second' and the 'third' would be explicable only if all the three were dealt with alike.—[If the Forms were regarded as secondary modifications, then, inasmuch as there would be no one such detail with each,—for instance, the *Aindrāgna* at the *Ukthya*—that would bar the applicability, to the same Form, of all the other details, the *Āgnēya*, etc.; while, if in accordance with the passage just quoted we should have only the *Āgnēya* goat at the *Agniṣṭoma*,—the *Āgnēya* and the *Aindrāgna* goats, as the *second*, at the *Ukthya*,—and the *Āgnēya*, the *Aindrāgna* and the *Aindra Vṛṣṇi*, as the *third*, at the *ṣoḍashinī*.]—Thus at the *Ukthya*, there would be two *causes*—the *Agniṣṭoma-chant* and the *Ukthya-chant*,—and as the corresponding *effects* we would have the *Āgnēya* animal and the *Aindrāgna* animal;—and thus the mention of the 'second' becomes quite explicable.—Similarly at the *Ṣoḍashin* and the *Atirātra*—also.—If, on the other hand, there were the relation of *original* and its *modification*, the connection of the *Āgnēya*,—which would come into the *Ukthya* only by virtue of the general law of admitting into the modification of all the details of the original,—would have to be set aside by the directly-asserted '*Aindrāgna*' and the rest; and in that case the mention of the 'second' and the 'third' would not be explicable.—From all this we conclude that the Initiatory sacrifice and other details appertain to the *Jyotiṣṭoma in all its forms*.

SŪTRA (43).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN FACT, THE (LATER) FORMS ARE MERE MODIFICATIONS, BECAUSE THEY ARE ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC DESIRABLE RESULTS, AND THIS ASSOCIATION IS AS CONSTANT AS THE MOST CONSTANT FACTOR IN THE WHOLE SACRIFICE.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that all the Forms should be treated alike; in fact the later Forms, *Ukthya* and the rest, should be treated as mere 'modifications' of the first Form (*Agniṣṭoma*). As a matter of fact, the Initiatory Sacrifice and the other details relating to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* have been laid down on the basis of the *Agniṣṭoma* which has been treated as the basic Form (without which there could be no *Jyotiṣṭoma* at all).

—"How do you get at this idea?"—This idea is derived from the fact that the *Ukthya* and the other Forms have been laid down as *associated with specific desirable results*, in such texts as—(*a*) 'When one desires cattle, he should take up the *Ukthya*', (*b*) 'When one desires strength, he should hymn with the *Ṣoḍashin*', and (*c*) 'When one desires offspring, he should offer for him the *Atirātra* sacrifice';—and when an accessory associated with a specific desire is enjoined, it can find place in the sacrifice only after modifying that accessory which forms a constant factor in the sacrifice (where it is performed in its constant form, without reference to any particular desirable result).—"Why?"—Because in such cases, the particular desirable result follows from the particular accessory (associated with that result); for the text says that 'one should take up the *Ukthya if he desires cattle*', *not* 'if he desires the *Jyotiṣṭoma*', or 'if he desires the *Ukthya*'; and the meaning of the injunction is that 'he should take up the *Ukthya* so that cattle may come to him'.—"In what manner would this be done?"—As for that, from the fact that this injunction being in close proximity to the injunction of the constant element of the sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*), it follows that the procedure of this latter would be adopted in the performance of what has been enjoined as to be performed with a view to particular results (for instance, the *Ukthya*).

Question—"But how is it ascertained that the said Procedure really appertains to the constant element in the sacrifice, and not to that factor which is associated with a desirable result? Or that it does not appertain in common to both?"

Answer—Whenever a desirable result follows from the use of a certain accessory, it does so only when the accessory is used while the action leading to that result is *being performed*, not otherwise;—as for the *procedure*, that procedure is adopted which happens to be in proximity to the action; and when the question arises as to whether this procedure appertains to the *means of accomplishing the act* (i.e. the accessory), or to *what is to be accomplished* (i.e. the action),—it cannot but be taken as appertaining to the latter (i.e. what is *to be accomplished*); because unless it appertains to *what is to be accomplished*, it can have no connection with the *means of accomplishment*; as a matter of fact, the form in which a particular procedure is prescribed is —'By this process one should make such and such a thing the means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished'; and there is no method or process possible by which anything could be the *means of accomplishing* an action until the action is *being accomplished*. Thus then, if one were to attribute the Procedure to the *means of accomplishing*, he must admit that it appertains to that also which is *to be accomplished*.—Now in the case in question the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice is what is *to be accomplished*, and the various *Forms* are the *means of accomplishing it*; hence it becomes established that the Procedure appertains to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*.

Question—"But why cannot the Procedure appertain to both [the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the *Forms*] in common?"

Answer—Because the Procedure is prescribed as a constant factor; so that whenever the *Jyotiṣṭoma* is performed, the *Initiatory Sacrifice* (which forms part of the Procedure) must be performed. The Form '*Ukthya*',

on the other hand, is to be performed at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, *only if the performer happens to be one who desires cattle*. Thus then, though the details of Procedure (comprising the Initiatory Sacrifice) must be performed at the *Jyotiṣṭoma always*, yet the *Ukthya* and the other Forms are to be performed only on a certain occasion [when the performer happens to desire the result with which the particular Form is associated].—Such being the case, if the details which are to be always performed at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* were regarded as appertaining to the *Ukthya* and other Forms,—this would be a contradiction in terms, the two being entirely incompatible; in fact, if the details have to be done in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma always*, then they cannot appertain to the *Ukthya* and other Forms [as these are not invariable concomitants of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*]; and if they appertain to the *Ukthya* and other Forms, then they cannot be such as should be performed at the *Jyotiṣṭoma always*;—the two are entirely incompatible. —It is for this reason that the Procedure (comprising the Initiatory Sacrifice and other details) cannot be taken as appertaining to both (the *Jyotiṣṭoma* and the Forms).

Further, if what is ephemeral (variable) were declared to be constant (invariable),—then that declaration of the constant factor would itself be rendered ephemeral (variable)! and thereby that declaration would become set aside!

From all this it follows that the details in question appertain to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* only, in its Constant form (the *Agniṣṭoma*), and not to the *Ukthya* and other Forms which are associated with the desire for particular results.

SŪTRA (44).

FURTHER, ON ACCOUNT OF REPETITION, THE DETAILS SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE ORIGINAL (ARCHETYPE).

Bhāṣya.

Says the Opponent—"The *Agniṣṭoma* Form also is found mentioned as leading to a particular result."

True; there are two *Agniṣṭomas* spoken of—one, constant (essential) and the other, associated with the desire for a certain result: and by virtue of these two texts (speaking of the two *Agniṣṭomas*), the idea would be that it is the constant *Agniṣṭoma* itself which leads to the said result; and even so, the 'constant' character of the *Agniṣṭoma* would remain unaffected;—and in this way also the Initiatory Sacrifice and other details would appertain to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* in its constant form, *Agniṣṭoma*.

SŪTRA (45).

THE COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE IS MERELY VERBAL.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*, in the *Bhāṣya* on Sū. 42) that "the reference to the *Ukthya* and the *Atirātra* as the 'second' and the

'third' respectively can be justified only if all the Forms be regarded as to be treated alike,—not otherwise".—But it is merely a verbal statement that the animal laid down in connection with the *Ukthya* as to be dedicated to *Indra-Agni* is the *second*, and that laid down in connection with the *Ṣoḍashin* as to be dedicated to *Indra* is the *third*; and this statement cannot be treated as indicative of the fact that all the Forms have to be treated alike.

SŪTRA (46).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE NEGATION OF THE INDICATIVES OF THE FOREGOING.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also the *Ukthya* and other Forms should be regarded as 'modifications' of the *Agniṣṭoma* (which should be regarded as the 'original' or 'archetype' of all the other Forms).—"For what reason?"—*Because of the negation of the indicatives of the foregoing*,—which we find in the sentence—'If it is the *Agniṣṭoma*, one offers the oblation into the Fire; if it is the *Ukthya*, one anoints the bounding sticks and *does not offer the oblation into the Fire*';—this negation of the 'offering of the oblation into the Fire' would not be there [i.e. it would have no meaning, if the *Ukthya* were not a 'modification' of the *Agniṣṭoma*]. [The meaning of the sentence is that the *Ukthya* shall take in all the details of the *Agniṣṭoma*, with the single exception of the 'oblation into Fire'; and this relation between the two is possible only when one, the preceding one, is the original archetype of the following one.]

Though, on the strength of the declaration ('If it is the *Agniṣṭoma*, etc. etc.,' quoted under Sū. 42), it would seem that when certain conditions are present, all the Forms are to be treated alike, yet—

SŪTRA (47).

THE MENTION OF THE ONE FORM IS DUE TO THE PECULIAR CHARACTER.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (under Sū. 42) that "in the passage, '*Yadyagniṣṭomaḥ*, etc. etc.' there is mention of the Forms as if they were all similar".—The answer to this is that what is relevant has been spoken of through what is not relevant [i.e. the irrelevant accessory has been introduced as if it were relevant, through the mention of a relevant action to which the accessory belongs—says *Tantravārtika*); and in this case the mention (in this passage) of the *Agniṣṭoma* (whose presence is already indicated by the Context) should be taken as a reference to what is already known.

[According to Kumārila, the objection met here is based upon the presence of the conditional '*yadi*', 'if', in the passage; the sense of the objection being

that "it is not right that the *constant* (*Agniṣṭoma*) and the *variable* (*Ukthya*, etc.) should be mentioned in the same passage—each one of them with a conditional clause relating to the details of procedure". The sense of the reply is that even so, as the several Forms are enjoined in the Veda in close proximity, there is nothing illogical in stating the possibility of certain details of procedure, which can belong to the constant *Agniṣṭoma* only, finding place in the variable *Ukthya*, etc., also.]

[The following note given in the *Ṣaḍdarshanachintanikā*, on the basis of the *Bhāṭṭadīpikā*, is of importance :—There are, properly speaking, only *four*, not *seven*, *Samsthās* or 'Forms' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice—(1) *Agniṣṭoma*, (2) *Ukthya*, (3) *Ṣoḍashin*, and (4) *Atirātra*. In the course of an extensive sacrifice, some hymns are recited, and by a peculiar adaptation of these hymns, when one Hymn was completed, it was regarded as the completion of a 'Form'. The term '*Samsthā*' or 'Form', stands for the *place where one stops*. In the *Agniṣṭoma-Form*, there are twelve hymns, the twelfth and the last being the *Agniṣṭoma-hymn*, by virtue of which the Form itself is called '*Agniṣṭoma*'. This is both constant (indispensable) and variable (optional); though the Form (sacrifice) is one and the same.—As regards the *Ukthya-Form*, it consists of the whole of the *Agniṣṭoma-sacrifice* with three hymns in addition to the *Agniṣṭoma*-hymns.—The *Ṣoḍashi-Form* comprises the *Ukthya*-sacrifice and it concludes with the *Ṣoḍashi*-hymn.—Lastly, the *Atirātra-Form* consists of the *Ṣoḍashi-sacrifice*, and at it twelve additional hymns are recited three times during one night, and then a hymn named '*Āshvina*' is recited last.—*Atyāgniṣṭoma*, *Vājapēya*, and *Āptoryamā*,—which are the other three Forms attributed to the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—are all included in the four described above, though they have been separately dealt with in the *Smṛtis*. When the *Agniṣṭoma* is performed after the reciting of the *Agniṣṭoma*, *Ukthya* and *Ṣoḍashi stotras*, it becomes known as the '*Atyāgniṣṭoma*'.—When the *Ṣoḍashi* sacrifice is performed after the performance of the *Atyāgniṣṭoma* and the recital of the *Vājapēya*-hymn, it becomes known as the *Vājapēya-sacrifice*.—When the performance of the *Atirātra*-sacrifice is followed by the recital (three times) of twelve hymns, and at the fourth time, three additional hymns are recited, it becomes known as the *Āptoryamā* sacrifice.—For a *Kṣattriya*, the *Atyāgniṣṭoma* is indispensable, the *Ukthya* and other Forms are optional.]

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA VII.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *Details like 'Varhi' (grass) appertain to the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa as well as to their subsidiaries.*

SŪTRA (1).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" BECAUSE OF THE PARTICULAR CONTEXT, THAT WHICH IS* NOT CONNECTED (WITH ANYTHING INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONTEXT) SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; at which *grass* is laid down as to be used, and certain details are laid down as to be performed in connection with the *grass*; similarly there is the 'altar' and certain details relating to the 'altar'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these things, *grass* and the rest, and the details laid down in connection with them, appertain to the Primary Sacrifice only? Or to the Primary Sacrifice as well as its subsidiaries?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—" *Because of the particular Context, that which is not connected with anything incompatible with the Context should appertain to the Primary Sacrifice*;—that is to say, the accessories and details like those in question should appertain to the Primary Sacrifice;—why?—*because of the particular Context*; i.e. 'Context' belongs to the Primary Sacrifices, not to the subsidiaries,—and the details in question are connected with a particular Context,—hence it follows that they must appertain to the Primary Sacrifice."

SŪTRA (2).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THEY SHOULD APPERTAIN TO ALL; BECAUSE THE 'AUXILIARY CHARACTER' OF THINGS IS NOT DETERMINED BY 'CONTEXT'.

Bhāṣya.

The details in question should, in reality, be taken as appertaining to '*all*'—i.e. to the Primary as well as the Subsidiary; as in this case the

* The word '*asaṁyuktam*', 'not connected', means that, even though 'Syntactical Connection' indicates the connection of the 'offering-material' and the 'grass', yet there is no connection with anything incompatible with the Context. That is to say, in the case in question, the terms 'offering-material' and 'grass' are quite capable of being taken in connection with the Context, and are not 'unconnected' with it.—*Tantravārtika*—Trans., p. 1596.

auxiliary character cannot be determined by 'Context'; in fact, the character of the 'auxiliary' consists in *being of use*; so that, that which is *of use* to anything is its 'auxiliary';—in the case in question, the details are *of use* to all the Primary and Subsidiary Sacrifices.—"How do you know that?"—We know it from the sentence—'*Vēdyām haviṁṣi āsādayati*' ['Keeps the offering-materials on the Altar']; here through this sentence—i.e. 'Syntactical Connection'—we learn that this refers to *all offering-materials*; and it is through 'Context' that it would refer to that offering-material only which is used at the Primary Sacrifice. Under the circumstances, 'Syntactical Connection' being more authoritative than 'Context', it follows that *offering-materials in general* are to be kept *on the grass* ['*on the altar*', '*vēdyām*', would appear to be the reading demanded by what has gone before; but the two manuscripts also read '*varhiṣi*' as in the printed text].

Says the Opponent—"If the *Context* is set aside by *Syntactical Connection* (and the details in question are not confined to the actions mentioned in the Context), then the said details would become applicable to *grass* in ordinary use also [and will not be confined to *grass* used at sacrifices].—'What is the harm if it be so?'—The objection to that is that the details would have to be performed everywhere (wherever there may be any grass at all)!"

Answer—Certainly, the indication of the Context is duly honoured in that the details are taken as to be confined to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifices only*; so that they could not be performed in connection with things in ordinary use.

Opponent—"If that is so, then, inasmuch as the *Subsidiary Sacrifices* are not included under the connotation of the name '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, the details could not be performed at those subsidiaries."

Answer—Though it is true that the subsidiaries are not denoted by the term '*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*', yet they are of use at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices; so that the details performed in connection with the subsidiaries, would be of use to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices.—For these reasons then, the details in question should be performed at the Primary Sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*) as well as its subsidiaries.

SŪTRA (3).

[OBJECTION]—"IN THAT CASE THEY SHOULD APPERTAIN TO THOSE OTHER SACRIFICES ALSO WHICH ARE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY [BEING ENJOINED IN TEXTS NOT FAR REMOVED FROM THE CONTEXT IN QUESTION]."

Bhāṣya.

Objection—"In that case, the details in question should be performed with *grass* used at the *Piṇḍapitṛ*-sacrifice also; this sacrifice also is performed on *chopped grass* [and *chopping* is one of the details that we are considering]; and hence the grass is of use at this sacrifice also;—consequently

this sacrifice (*Piṇḍa-pitṛ-yajña*) also should be connected with the details in question which have been enjoined in close proximity to it (though not under the same *Context*)."

SŪTRA (4).

[ANSWER]—THAT CANNOT BE ; AS THE SENTENCE LAYING DOWN THE DETAILS IN QUESTION IS APPURTENANT TO THE DARSHA-PŪRṆAMĀSA.

Bhāṣya.

The *grass* used at the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña* could not take in the details in question ; as there is a single sentence dealing with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* along with the details ; hence it follows that the details are of use at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* ;—and what is of use at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* can find place in those sacrifices only, not at any other sacrifice ; consequently these details could not appertain to the *Piṇḍapitṛyajña.*

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIVES.

Bhāṣya.

There is also a text indicative of the same conclusion—'*Sa vai dhruvāmēvāgrē'bhighārayati, tato hi prathamāvājyabhāgau yakṣyan bhavati*'—where it is shown that the '*abhighāraṇa*' (*Pouring*) is for the purpose of the first two '*Ājyabhāga*-offerings'.

[The text quoted shows that the 'Pouring' enjoined in the text 'The butter left after the performance of the *Prayāja* he pours over the offering-materials' is connected with the Primary as well as its subsidiaries ; as thus alone would there be any justification for the order of sequence laid down in the text quoted, which means that 'the first *pouring* should be done over the *Dhruvā*-vessel',—why ?—'because out of that he is just going to offer the two *Ājyabhāga*-sacrifices' ;—this reason could have some sense only if 'pouring' were meant to be done also to the offering-material used at the *Ājyabhāga*-sacrifice (subsidiary) ;—otherwise the 'pouring' would be done over the *Dhruvā* only for purposes of the *Upāṁshuyāja* (primary) only ; and in that case, as there would be no subsequent 'pouring', there would be no sense in the reason given—'because he is going to offer the *Ājyabhāga*-sacrifice' ;—from all this it follows that the details in question appertain to the Primary as well as its subsidiaries.—*Tantravārtika.*]

ADHIKARAṆA (2): *The 'Embellishments' (Saṁskāras) of the 'Master of the Sacrifice' (Sacrificer) appertain to the 'Primary' Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (6).

WHAT IS LAID DOWN IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'MASTER' SHOULD, IN REALITY, APPERTAIN TO THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE; AS HE IS RELATED TO THE RESULT.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are certain 'embellishments' laid down,—such as shaving of the head and beard, keeping of the '*Payovratas*' and certain other austerities.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these appertain to the Primary and the Subsidiaries? Or to the Primary only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"they appertain to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries,—in accordance with the principle of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—These embellishments *have been laid down in connection with* (i.e. *for*) *the 'Master'* (i.e. the Sacrificer),—consequently they *should appertain to the Primary Sacrifice.*—Why?—*Because he is related to the result*; that is, the relation of the *Sacrificer* with the *Sacrifice* is this that the *Sacrifice gives* (supplies) the transcendental result, and the *Sacrificer obtains* it.—*Objection*—"But there is the other relation also between the two—the *Sacrifice* is *something to be accomplished* (performed), and the *Sacrificer* is one who *accomplishes* (performs) it."—[That may be so, but] as a matter of fact, when a person is spoken of (in connection with the injunction of a Sacrifice), it is only for the purpose of indicating to whom the result (of the Sacrifice) would accrue. He does not *bring about* the Sacrifice; the Sacrifice itself becomes *related to being* (existence).—"Why, then, should the result (of the Sacrifice) accrue to the person who performs it?"—The *embellishments* are spoken of as 'embellishing'; so that what they do is to bring about, in the person 'embellished', the capacity to accomplish his purpose;—now the 'purpose' of the person is to obtain the result,—not (merely) to accomplish the Sacrifice. Thus then, those embellishments that pertain to the person render the person *capable of obtaining the result,*—not *capable of accomplishing the Sacrifice.*—Says the Opponent:—"If they do not bring about the capacity to accomplish the Sacrifice,—how then can they be regarded as *accessories of the Sacrifice*?"—Our answer to this is that they are so regarded because they render assistance to the Sacrifice in accomplishing its own purpose.—"What is the *purpose* of the Sacrifice?"—It is that the *performer* should obtain the result.—From all this it follows that the embellishments of the Sacrificer appertain to the Primary Sacrifice only.

[As a matter of fact, it is the result of the Primary Sacrifice, not that of the Subsidiaries that accrues to the Sacrificer; because the Subsidiaries only serve the purpose of helping the Primary in bringing about its result, and they do not themselves bring about any result accruing directly to the Sacrificer.—*Tantra-vārtka*.]

Adhikaraṇa (3): *Accessories like the 'Saumika-Vēdi' appertain to the Primary, as well as to the Subsidiaries.*

SŪTRA (7).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Because of the mention of the 'desire to do' [the accessory in question should be taken as appertaining to the Primary only]."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Ṣaṭtriṁshatprakramā prāchī, chaturviṁshatiragrēṇa, triṁshat jaghanēna—iyati shakṣyāmahē*' (see Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 2. 4. 5) ['Thirty-six steps towards the east, twenty-four on the front, and thirty at the back; in a court-yard of this size we can work'].—[This court-yard is called the *Saumika-Vēdi*, 'the Court-yard of the Soma-sacrifice', comprising the entire area covered by the *Sadas*, Assembly Room, the *Havirdhāna*, and the other places needed for the Sacrifice.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—Does this 'Court-yard' appertain to the Primary and the Subsidiaries?—Or to the Primary only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows—"*Because of the mention of the 'desire to do' it should be taken as appertaining to the Primary.*—'Where is the *desire to do* (spoken of)?'—It is spoken of in the phase 'in this court-yard we can work'; the assertion that 'in this court-yard we can work' is said in regard to what is *desired to be done*;—and what is *desired to be done* is the Primary Sacrifice, not its subsidiaries; because what brings about the desired result is the Primary, not its subsidiaries.—An Opponent says—'If the subsidiaries are not *desired to be done*, why then are they done at all?'—Our answer to this is that even though not desired to be done, they are done; that is to say, even though they themselves are not desired to be done, yet, what happens is that *through* these subsidiaries, which themselves are not desired to be done, something else is desired to be done;—and it is thus that those subsidiaries also come to be performed.—The Court-yard thus must appertain to what is *desired to be done*; and hence it must appertain to the Primary Sacrifice."

This *Pūrvapakṣa* remains unanswered for the present.

[The answer, representing the *Siddhānta* is stated later on, under Sū. 9.—The reason for this postponement of the statement of the *Siddhānta* appears to lie in the fact that the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa* of the next *Adhikaraṇa*, set forth in Sū. 8, is analogous to that of the present *Adhikaraṇa* set forth in Sū. 7; and therefore the *Sūtra-kāra* has set forth the two *Pūrvapakṣas* in the two consecutive *Sūtras* 7 and 8, and then set forth the two corresponding *Siddhāntas* also in the two consecutive *Sūtras* 9 and 10.]

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *'Touching' appertains to the Primary and the Subsidiaries.*

SŪTRA (8).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"SO ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE NAME [THE ACCESSORY SHOULD BE TAKEN AS APPERTAINING TO THE PRIMARY]."

Bhāṣya.

There are the two *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which we read—'*Chaturhotrā paurṇamāsīmabhimṛshēt, pañchahotrā amāvāsyāyām*' ['At the *Purṇamāsī*, he should touch the substance with the *Chaturhotā-mantra* (Mai. Saṁ. 1. 9. 1), and at the *Amāvāsyā* he should touch the substance with the *Pañchahotā-mantra*' (*Ibid.*)].

In regard to this there arises the question—Does the 'Touching' herein laid down appertain to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries?—Or to the Primary only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "it appertains to the Primary;—the two terms '*paurṇamāsī*' and '*amāvāsyā*' are names of the two Primary Sacrifices; hence the 'Touching' must appertain to the Primary Sacrifices only".

SŪTRA (9).

[SIDDHĀNTA OF ADHIKARAṆA (3)]—IN FACT THE RESULT IS DECLARED TO FOLLOW FROM THE PRIMARY ALONG WITH THE SUBSIDIARIES; THE 'DESIRE TO DO' ALSO SHOULD BE TAKEN AS PERTAINING TO BOTH.

Bhāṣya.

This is the (*Siddhānta*) answer to the *Pūrvapakṣa* (Sū. 7) that was left unanswered.

It has been argued that—"what is 'desired to be done is the Primary, not the subsidiaries, and hence the 'court-yard' must appertain to the Primary".—This however is not right; because '*the Result has been declared to follow from the Primary along with the subsidiaries*'; i.e. as a matter of fact, what we learn from the Veda is that the Result follows from the Primary along with its subsidiaries; hence what is 'desired to be done' must be the Primary along with its subsidiaries. Even though the subsidiaries (by themselves) may not be 'desired to be done', yet there is no doubt that they have to be performed in the 'Court-yard'; as otherwise the Primary with its subsidiaries would not have been performed in the 'Court-yard'.

SŪTRA (10).

[SIDDHĀNTA OF ADHIKARAṆA (4)]—INASMUCH AS WHAT IS LAID DOWN IS AN ACCESSORY, IT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS LAID DOWN FOR ALL.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that—"inasmuch as the terms '*paurṇamāsī*' and '*amāvāsyā*' are names of sacrifices, the *Touching* should be taken as to be done to the offering-materials used at the Primary Sacrifice only".—This is not right; because there should be *Touching* of the offering-materials to be used at the Subsidiary Sacrifices also.—Why?—Because *what is laid down is an accessory*; i.e. in fact, when *Touching* is laid down, it is as an accessory.—'What is that which lays it down?'—It is the statement which declares that Touching is an accessory.—Then again, what the two words '*paurṇamāsīm*' and '*amāvāsyām*'—ending with the Accusative ending—express is that 'the *Touching* should be done for the sake of the *Paurṇamāsī* sacrifice' and that 'the *Touching* should be done for the sake of the *Amavāsyā* sacrifice'; consequently the *Touching* should be done in connection with every one of those acts where, being done, it would help the *Paurṇamāsī* or the *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice;—and as a matter of fact, the *Touching* would help these two sacrifices whenever it is done in connection with any action that may be related, either directly or indirectly, to the *Paurṇamāsī* or *Amāvāsyā* sacrifice.—From all this it follows that the *Touching* should be done to the offering-materials used at the Primary as well as the subsidiary sacrifices.

Adhikaraṇa (5): *The 'Initiation' and the 'Sacrificial Fee' appertain to the Primary Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (11).

THE 'INITIATION' AND THE 'SACRIFICIAL FEE' SHOULD BE TAKEN AS APPERTAINING TO THE PRIMARY SACRIFICE,—SUCH BEING THE DIRECT ASSERTION.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma,* 'Initiations' are mentioned—'*Tisro dīkṣāḥ*' ('There are three *Initiations*'];—the 'Sacrificial Fee' also is mentioned—'*Tasya dvādashashatam dakṣiṇā*' ['At it 112 forms the *Sacrificial Fee*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Do the Initiation and the Sacrificial Fee appertain to the Primary and the Subsidiaries? Or to the Primary only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"as the men engaged in the sacrifice are related to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries, the Initiation and the Sacrificial Fee also should appertain to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries".

The *Siddhānta* view however is as follows:—The Initiation and the Sacrificial Fee should be taken as appertaining to the Primary;—why?—*because of Direct Assertion*; we find Direct Assertions to the effect, such as '*Dīkṣāḥ somasya, dakṣiṇāḥ somasya*' ['The Initiations pertain to the Soma-sacrifice, the Sacrificial Fees pertain to the Soma-sacrifice']; and no burden is too heavy for Direct Assertion; [i.e. when there are Direct Assertions in the Veda to the effect that the accessories in question appertain to the Primary Sacrifice, no other arguments to the contrary can have any force].—Thus it is that, on account of the Direct Assertions to that effect, the Initiation and the Sacrificial Fee must be taken as appertaining to the Soma-sacrifice (Primary).

SŪTRA (12).

ALSO, BECAUSE WE FIND TEXTS INDICATIVE OF THE ABSENCE (OF INITIATION AND FEE, AT THE SUBSIDIARIES).

Bhāṣya.

There is a text which actually indicates the absence of the Initiations at the Subsidiaries.—How so?—There is the text—'*Adhvaryo yat pashunā ayākṣīḥ atha kā asya dīkṣā; yat ṣaḍ-hotāram juhoti sā asya dīkṣā*' ['*O Adhvaryu,* when you performed the *Nirudha-Pashu-Yāga,* what was the Initiation at it?—The Initiation at it consisted of the offering of the *Ṣaḍ-hotṛ* oblation']; —which shows that there is no Initiation at the *Nirūḍhapashu-Yāga* (which

is a subsidiary); [since it is declared that the purpose of the 'Initiation' is served by a certain oblation,—which means that there is no real Initiation at it].—From this it follows that there is no Initiation or Sacrificial Fee at the Subsidiary Sacrifices. [Read '*nāṅgānām*' as in several manuscripts.]

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The 'Altar' is not an accessory of the Sacrificial Post.*

SŪTRA (13).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"FOR THE SAME REASON, THE ALTAR IS AN ACCESSORY OF THE SACRIFICIAL POST."

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, one of the animals killed is the *Agnīṣomīya*, spoken of in the text '*Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhēta*' ['Being initiated, one kills the *Agnīṣomīya* animal'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6); in connection with this there is a *post* (to which the animal is tied); in reference to this Post, there is the text—'*Vajro vai yūpaḥ; yadantarvēdiminuyāt tannirdahēt, yad vahirvēdi anavaruddhaḥ syāt; ardhamantarvēdi minoti ardham vahirvēdi, avaruddho bhavati, na nirdahati*' ['The Post is thunderbolt; if one were to measure (or, *plant*) it inside the altar, it would burn him; if he were to measure it outside the altar, it would not be firmly fixed; therefore he should measure half of it inside the altar and half outside; so that it may be firmly fixed and also not destroy him'].

[In order to ascertain the size of the hole in which the Post would be fixed, it is necessary to measure the post; the text speaks of the *measuring* as to be done half *inside the altar* and half *outside*.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—When it is said that the measuring is to be done 'inside the altar', is it the *altar* laid down as an accessory of the Post? Or is the phrase 'half inside the altar and half outside the altar' meant only to indicate the exact spot (the middle point), where the Post is to be measured?

Question—"In what way would the altar be regarded as an accessory of the Post? And in what way could the words be taken as indicative of the exact spot?"

Answer—If the words were intended to lay down the connection of the 'half' of the Post and the 'inside' of the Altar,—i.e. to convey the idea that 'the Post should be connected with the Altar in this manner',—then the Altar would be an accessory of the Post. On the other hand, if the meaning intended were that 'the exact spot for measuring the Post should be that on being placed where, half of the Post should lie inside the altar, and half outside',—then the words would be taken as indicating the exact spot.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on this question is as follows:—"*For the same reason, the Altar is an accessory of the Post*; that is, just as the Initiations and the Sacrificial Fee are accessories of the Primary Sacrifice,—similarly, when the Post has to be measured, at the time of measuring half of it should be inside the altar [so that clearly the *altar* becomes an accessory of the Altar].—In this interpretation, the direct connotation of the term '*vēdi*'

('altar') is followed, whereas, in the other case, the term 'altar' would be taken as indirectly indicating the spot; and as between Direct Denotation and Indirect Indication, if there is a doubt as to which should be accepted, it is Direct Denotation that should be accepted as the more logical of the two. For this reason, the Altar should be regarded as laid down as an accessory of the Post."

SŪTRA (14).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT IS ONLY THE SPOT THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATED BY THE WORD ('INSIDE THE ALTAR'); AS IT OCCURS IN THE SAME SENTENCE WITH WHAT (ACCORDING TO THE PŪRVAPAKṢA) IS NOT ENJOINED.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the term '*vēdi*' ('altar') indicates only the spot, and it does not lay down the altar as an accessory of the Post—why?—*because it occurs in the same sentence with what is not enjoined.* That is to say, the words '*Ardhamantarvēdi minoti ardham vahirvēdi*' ('He measures it half inside the altar and half outside') are clearly perceived as forming one sentence (one syntactical unit); now if they are taken as indicating the *spot* (i.e. the spot where the inside and the outside of the altar meet,—the spot, that is, on being placed where half of the post lies inside the altar and half outside),—then the whole forms part of what is enjoined [both the *inside* and *outside* being taken as helping to indicate the exact spot];—on the other hand, if the altar be taken as enjoined (by the phrase 'inside the altar') as an accessory of the Post,—then, in that case, the 'outside the altar' would be something that is not *enjoined*; the fact of the altar being an accessory of the Post having been laid down by the mention of the 'inside of the altar', the mention of the 'outside of the altar' would serve no useful purpose at all.—Says the Opponent:—"The words 'outside the altar' also would serve the purpose of laying down the *outside* also as an accessory of the Post".—But in that case there would be a syntactical split.—Hence we conclude that if the altar were taken as laid down as an accessory of the Post, then the words 'outside the altar' should not be there at all. On the other hand, if the words are taken as indicating a spot, then as what is indicated is a particular spot, the presence of the words 'outside the altar' becomes necessary; for if these words were not there (and there were only the words 'inside the altar'), then it would follow that the Post may be placed on any spot *inside the altar.* When, however, the words 'outside the altar' are also there, then the exact spot meant to be indicated becomes indicated as that on which, if the Post is placed at the time of measuring, half of it lies *inside the altar and half outside the altar.* And as this exact spot could not be indicated without the words 'outside the altar', it is necessary that these words should be there.—From all this it follows that the words should be taken as indicating a particular spot.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *The 'Havirdhāna' Cart is not an accessory of the 'Sāmidhēnī' verses.*

SŪTRA (15).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—" INASMUCH AS THE EXPRESSION 'SĀMIDHENĪSTADANVĀHŪḤ' ['THEY RECITE THE SĀMIDHĒNĪ VERSES NEAR IT'], SPEAKS OF THE 'HAVIRDHĀNA' CARTS, THESE (CARTS) ARE ACCESSORIES OF THE SĀMIDHĒNĪ VERSES."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'*Uta yat sunvanti sāmidhēnīstadanvāhūḥ*' ['They recite the *Sāmidhēnī* verses near that one of the two *Havirdhāna* carts by which they extract the Soma-juice']; this means that 'one should associate with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses that one of the two *Havirdhāna* carts near which they extract the Soma-juice'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—In this text, is the *Havirdhāna* cart enjoined as an accessory of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses,—the sense being that 'the *Sāmidhēnī* verses should be recited as associated with the *Havirdhāna* cart'? Or does the mention of the *Havirdhāna* cart only indicate the place for the reciting of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses?

On this, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—" The *Havirdhāna* is enjoined here as an accessory of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses,—the sense being that 'one should associate with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses that cart near which they extract the Soma-juice'; thus, on account of the direct assertion that 'the *Sāmidhēnī* verses should be recited as associated with the *Havirdhāna*', this *direct assertion* becomes honoured only if the *Havirdhāna* cart is regarded as an accessory of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses; if it were not so [i.e. if it were not so regarded], then it would have to be taken as *indirectly indicating* the place; [and *Direct Assertion* is more authoritative than *Indirect Indication*].—From all this, it follows that the *Havirdhāna* cart is an accessory of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses."

SŪTRA (16).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IT IS THE PLACE ONLY (THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN AS INDICATED BY THE TEXT); AS THE CART IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED TO SERVE THE PURPOSES OF THE SOMA.

Bhāṣya.

The purpose served by the text under consideration is the indicating of the exact spot; the sense being that 'the *Sāmidhēnīs* should be recited on the spot where they extract the Soma-juice'; [as regards the *Havirdhāna* Cart] *it is actually perceived to serve the purposes of the Soma*; as a matter of fact, it is laid down that 'one should keep the Soma in the *Havirdhāna* Cart to the south', which shows that the Cart is to be got there for the purpose of keeping the *Soma*. As for the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, they also have to

be introduced for the purpose of 'kindling the Fire'.—Now all that the text under consideration says is that—'For the purpose of kindling the Fire, the *Sāmidhēnī* verses should be introduced as associated with that *Havirdhāna* Cart near which they extract the Soma-juice'; and from this we learn nothing as to whether the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, on being associated with the *Havirdhāna* Cart, confer any benefit upon the latter,—or the *Havirdhāna* confers a benefit upon the *Sāmidhēnīs*.—What we say is that the *Sāmidhēnī* verses do not confer any benefit upon the *Havirdhāna* Cart. What the text under consideration enjoins is, not that 'the *Sāmidhēnī* verses should be recited', but that they are to be associated with a particular *Havirdhāna*. Then again, nothing that is not actually enjoined as such can be an accessory to anything (at a sacrificial performance);—there is no such injunction as that 'the *Havirdhāna* should be brought in for the purpose of being associated with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses'.—"What then is it that is asserted in the text under consideration?"—What is asserted is the association of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses with a particular *Havirdhāna* Cart; so that all that is enjoined is some sort of connection (of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses) with the *Havirdhāna* Cart;—as for the *Havirdhāna* Cart, it has nowhere been laid down as having any connection with the *Sāmidhēnī* verses; for this reason the text under consideration could not be taken as reiterating (or referring to) that connection (of the *Havirdhāna* Cart).—"With what then is the *Havirdhāna* Cart connected?"—As a matter of fact, *it is actually perceived to serve the purpose of the Soma*, and we do not perceive any purpose served by the cart for the *Sāmidhēnī* verses.—It is the *place* with which the *Sāmidhēnī* verses are connected (by virtue of the text under consideration); we find that the place where the *Hotṛ-priest* (who is to recite the *Sāmidhēnī* verses) is 'on the other side of the Altar'; now this place 'on the other side of the Altar' may be close either to the southern or to the northern *Havirdhāna* Cart; hence it becomes necessary to specify (as that text does) the place 'near that *Havirdhāna* Cart where they extract the Soma-juice' [as that where the *Sāmidhēnī* verses have to be recited].—From all this it follows that when the text under consideration speaks of the *Havirdhāna* Cart, it is for the purpose of indicating the *place*.

Says the Opponent—"Why cannot the text be construed to mean that 'the *Sāmidhēnī* verses are to be connected with that *Havirdhāna* Cart near which they extract the Soma-juice'?"

That is not possible. As in that case, two connections would be the objects of injunction, viz. (1) connection with *Havirdhāna* in general, and (2) connection with a particular *Havirdhāna*; and this would involve a syntactical split. Hence such a construction is not admissible.

SŪTRA (17).

THE NAME ALSO POINTS TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

The name also points to the same conclusion that we have arrived at by means of reasonings,—i.e. that the *Havirdhāna* serves the purposes of (and hence is an accessory of) the *Soma*.

[The term '*havirdhāna*' literally means 'that which holds the offering-material, which is Soma'; from which it is clear that the cart is an accessory of the *Soma*; if the cart were an accessory of the *Sāmidhēnī* verses, its name would have been '*Sāmidhēnī-dhāna*'.—*Tantravārtika*.]

Adhikaraṇa (8): *The details of a sacrificial performance may be performed through the agency of other persons.*

SŪTRA (18).

[Pūrvapakṣa (A)]—" The result mentioned in the scriptures accrues to the actual performer, as is clear from the scriptures themselves; consequently the 'Sacrificer' himself should carry on the entire performance."

Bhāṣya.

[We are now going to consider the cases of conflict between 'Name' on the one hand, and 'Direct Assertion' and the rest on the other;—the main question to be determined being, in what way and how far such names as '*hotā*' (Person), '*hautram*' (Action), serve the purpose of indicating the actual performers of actions.—But before taking up this question, a preliminary question has to be settled: It is only when there are several persons as performers of the actions occurring during the performance of a sacrifice, that there can be any question as to which person will perform which act. If all the actions were to be performed by the *Sacrificer* himself, then no such questions could arise, as there would be no room for any other performers.—*Tantravārtika*.]

As instances to be considered here, we have the several sacrificial performances—(*a*) 'Desiring heaven, one should offer the *Agnihotra*'; (*b*) 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices'; (*c*) 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma*'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are all such sacrifices to be performed entirely by the 'Sacrificer' himself?—Or is it the (Principal) Act of Dedication (and Appointment) alone that must be done by the Sacrificer himself, and the rest of the details either by the Sacrificer or by others?—Or the rest of the details must be done by others?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view (A) is as follows:—" *The Sacrificer himself should carry on the entire performance*.—'Why?'—Because, as a matter of fact, the result of an action accrues to a person only when he performs the act himself.—'How do you know that?'—It is *clear from the scriptures themselves*; that is, the fact that the result of an action accrues to a person only when he performs the act himself is indicated by scriptural texts.—'Which is that text?'—It is the text—'Desiring heaven one should perform a sacrifice',—where the *person desiring heaven* is mentioned, the meaning of the text being that 'becoming the performer of the sacrifice, one should attain Heaven'; so that it is only when the man is the performer of the entire act, along with its subsidiaries, that he obtains the result. Hence it follows that the Sacrificer himself should carry on the entire performance."

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA (B)]—" INASMUCH AS 'DEDICATION' IS THE PRINCIPAL ACT, THAT MUST BE DONE BY THE 'SACRIFICER' HIMSELF, HE BEING THE PRINCIPAL PERSON CONCERNED; AS FOR THE OTHER ACTS, THEY MAY BE DONE EITHER BY THE SACRIFICER HIMSELF OR BY ANOTHER PERSON."

Bhāṣya.

" Among the acts (making up a sacrificial performance), predominance attaches to the act of 'Dedication'.—Why?—Because, he who performs the 'dedication' performs the entire sacrifice.—How so?—'Dedication' consists in the *appointment* (of priests), the securing of their services on payment; and when they have been 'won over' by this 'dedication', they perform all the acts; so that when a man has done the said 'dedication', all the acts (done by the priests) are really done by that man himself.—From this it follows that the act of 'Dedication' is one that must be done by the Sacrificer himself, the other details may be performed either by the Sacrificer himself or by any other person."

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, ANOTHER PERSON SHOULD [PERFORM THE DETAILS]; BECAUSE THE 'SECURING OF PAID AGENTS' HAS BEEN ACTUALLY ENJOINED, AND THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF THE 'SACRIFICER' HIMSELF.

Bhāṣya.

Of the rest of the details, another person should be the performer;—why?—because the 'securing of paid agents' has been actually enjoined; from among the various methods of securing the services of men, the one method specified by the scriptures is 'payment for services'; from which it follows that all the details are to be performed by persons whose services have been secured by 'payment for services';—and any such 'payment for services' would be impossible in the case of the *Sacrificer* (who could not make a payment to himself);—so that, if he himself were to perform any of the details, that would have been performed by one whose services had *not* been secured by 'payment'; and to that extent the injunction of securing 'paid agents' would have to be regarded either as futile or as serving only some transcendental purpose.—From all this it follows that all the other sacrificial details (with the sole exception of 'Dedication') should be performed by other persons engaged as 'paid agents'; but the 'Dedication' should be done by the Sacrificer himself, and in this way all the rest also become performed by himself.

Adhikaraṇa (9): *The number of Priests engaged at a Sacrifice is limited.*

SŪTRA (21).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"As regards the Priests to be engaged, their number would be in accordance with the requirements of each sacrifice; hence there can be no restriction regarding their number; specially as there is no specification (in the scriptures) regarding it."

Bhāṣya.

"In regard to the actions to be done by the priests that have been engaged, there can be no limitation regarding their number;—why?—*because there is no specification*; i.e. in regard to the number of persons officiating at sacrifices, we do not find any specification anywhere in the scriptures; in fact their number would be determined by the requirements of each sacrifice; i.e. the sacrificer should engage as many priests as may be able to perform all the details of the prescribed procedure."

SŪTRA (22).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the priests should be engaged in accordance with their names; as it is under these names that their respective duties have been severally assigned in the Veda.

Bhāṣya.

In fact, the number of priests engaged should be as many as the duties that have been laid down as to be performed by the several performers named in the Veda. The texts naming such performers (priests) are the following:—'(1) First of all, the *Adhvaryu*-priest does the distribution;—(2) the *Pratiprasthātṛ*-priest offers the *Manthin-offering*;—(3) the *Nēṣṭṛ*-priest brings up the sacrificer's wife;—(4) the *Unnētṛ*-priest fills the cups;—again, (5) the *Prastotṛ*-priest introduces the chant;—(6) the *Udgātṛ*-priest does the chanting;—(7) the *Pratihartṛ*-priest sings the *Pratihāra* chant;—(8) the *Subrahmaṇya*-priest recites the *Subrahmaṇyā Mantra*;—(9) the *Hotṛ*-priest recites the *Prātaranuvāka* hymn;—(10) the *Maitrāvaruṇa*-priest gives directions and recites the *Puronuvākyā*;—(11) the *Achchhāvāka*-priest recites the *Yājyā*;—(12) the *Grāvastut*-priest recites the *Grāvastotrīya mantra*'.—In accordance with this, there is need for just so many priests; hence for the performance of the duties assigned to each of them, these must be engaged. Apart from the acts herein

enumerated, there is none other that is to be performed; even though there may be some not mentioned in the above texts, yet they would be only such as would be already indicated by the names of the Priests—[e.g. the actual *pouring of the oblations into Fire*, i.e. *Homa*, is to be done by the *Hotṛ*-priest].—From this it follows that only these Priests—twelve in number —are to be engaged.

SŪTRA (23).

[OBJECTION]—" AS ONE AND THE SAME PERSON MAY HAVE SEVERAL DUTIES [THE ENUMERATION OF DUTIES CANNOT DETERMINE THE EXACT NUMBER OF PRIESTS TO BE ENGAGED] ",— IF THIS BE URGED [THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

" If it is asserted that only so many priests should be engaged (as have been mentioned in the texts quoted above),—that cannot be right; because as regards the names of priests mentioned in the text,—what happens is that when a priest makes up his mind to perform a certain function he receives the priestly title with which that function is associated; so that it is possible for a single person to perform several functions and thereby become entitled to several priestly titles. Thus then (the enumeration of the priestly titles and the priestly functions not affording the basis for determining the exact number of Priests to be engaged) there can be no restriction regarding their number."

SŪTRA (24).

[ANSWER]—THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE; BECAUSE IT IS IN THE ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION (OF THE PRIESTS, THAT THEIR DISTINCT TITLES ARE MENTIONED).

Bhāṣya.

What has been urged (regarding a single man performing several functions and thereby acquiring several titles) is not possible; because in the very originative injunctions laying down the Priests to be employed, we find that each priest, while still being brought into existence [i.e. before he begins to function], is given a distinct title; for instance, we read—' He appoints the *Brahman-priest*; he appoints the *Hotṛ-priest*; he appoints the *Udgātṛ-priest*; he appoints the *Adhvaryu-priest*' and so forth; [where each priest is given his title along with the *appointment*];—from this it is clear that in the performance of the Sacrifice there is need for priests of this kind, and hence they must be engaged. And inasmuch as the necessity of engaging the priests is dictated by the requirements of the sacrifice, the passage quoted is to be taken merely as describing the appointment of the

priests, not as an injunction (of engaging them)* ;—nor can it be taken as a mere reiteration, as there is no need for such reiteration. As a matter of fact, it is not necessary for the Veda to declare in so many words that 'so many priests should be appointed'; as such a declaration would serve no useful purpose; and yet the passages quoted are capable of *indicating* the particular number (of priests to be appointed); hence the text is to be taken as pointing out just that number (of priests) which it indicates.

From all this it follows that sixteen† officiating Priests are to be appointed. This is the number of priests required at the Soma-sacrifice (*Jyotiṣṭoma*), as also at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*.

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* The *Tantravārtika* (Trans., p. 1622) takes exception to this remark. It concludes that 'the number *is* laid down, at the very outset, by the Injunction of the *appointments* themselves'.

† These *sixteen* Priests are the following :—(1) *Adhvaryu*—who does everything that is laid down in the Yajurveda; he has the following three assistants, (2) *Pratiprasthatṛ*, (3) *Nēṣṭṛ*, and (4) *Unnētṛ* ;—(5) *Brahman*—who supervises the performance of all the details connected with all the three Vedas ;—he has the following three assistants—(6) *Brahmaṇāchchhaṁsin*, (7) *Agnīt*, and (8) *Potṛ* ;—(9) *Udgātṛ* —who does all the Soma-singing; he has the following three assistants—(10) *Prastotṛ*, (11) *Pratihartṛ*, and (12) *Subrahmaṇya* ;—(13) *Hotṛ*—who does the *Shamsana* (reciting of hymns); he has the following three assistants—(14) *Maitrāvaruṇa*, (15) *Achchhāvāka*, and (16) *Grāvastut*.—These are the sixteen Priests to be 'appointed' by the 'Sacrificer', who forms the *seventeenth* 'priest'.—See below Sūtras 3. 7. 33 to 3. 7. 38.

Adhikaraṇa (10): *The 'Chamasādhvaryus' (Cup-bearing Priests) are distinct from those mentioned in the preceding Adhikaraṇa.*

SŪTRA (25).

The 'Chamasādhvaryus' [are different from the aforesaid Priests], as they are named after those.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are employed priests called '*Chamasādhvaryu*' as laid down in the text 'One should appoint the *Chamasādhvaryus*'.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are these *Chamasādhvaryu* Priests included among those mentioned in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*? Or are they different from them?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"the exact number of priests having been already described in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, the *Chamasādhvaryus* must be included among those".

The *Siddhānta* is that the *Chamasādhvaryus* should be different from those mentioned before;—why?—because *they are named after those*; that is, these *Chamasādhvaryus* are found to be named after those enumerated in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*,—in such texts as—'The *Chamasādhvaryus* related to the priests working in the middle', 'the *Chamasādhvaryus* related to the *Hotrakas*' [where it is clear that the *Chamasādhvaryus* are subordinate to, and hence different from, the other priests].

Objection—"Those same priests that have been mentioned before may also be *Chamasādhvaryus*."

That cannot be; *because they are mentioned along with those*,—for instance, in the text '*Madhyataḥkāriṇām chamasādhvaryavaḥ*' ['The *Chamasādhvaryus* related to the priests working in the middle];—the Genitive ending (in '*madhyataḥkāriṇām*') can be justified only if there is some relationship (between the *Chamasādhvaryus* and the other priests); and hence as they are found to be named after the other priests, it follows that they have for their master (they are subordinate to) those priests, not to the *Sacrificer*; and what we have declared to be the *Siddhānta* is that the *Chamasādhvaryus* are different from those priests that have been appointed by (and are subordinate to) the Sacrificer; and hence it follows that the priests for performing the functions of the *Chamasādhvaryu* are not to be appointed by the Sacrificer; they are to be appointed by the (other) priests.

Further the very originative injunction of the *Chamasādhvaryus* makes them entirely distinct; it says—'One should appoint the *Chamasādhvaryus*'.

ADHIKARAṆA (11): *There should be several 'Chamasādhvaryus'.*

SŪTRA (26).

INASMUCH AS IN THEIR ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION, THEY ARE SPOKEN OF AS 'SEVERAL' [THERE SHOULD BE SEVERAL CHAMASĀDHVARYUS].

Bhāṣya.

In regard to the aforesaid *Chamasādhvaryus*, there arises the question—Is there no restriction as to their number,—they may be one or two or several ?—Or must they be several ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "there is no restriction".

The *Siddhānta* is that they should be several ;—because *in their originative injunction they are spoken of as several* ; that is, in the injunction which lays down the engagement of these priests, we find the plural number used—'*Chamasādhvaryavaḥ*' ['*Chamasādhvaryus*']; hence it follows that there should be several *Chamasādhvaryus*.

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ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The number of 'Chamasādhvaryus' should be 'Ten' only.*

SŪTRA (27).

[THE NUMBER OF THESE PRIESTS] SHOULD BE 'TEN', BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIONS TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* there are priests called '*Chamasādhvaryu*', and it has been explained that there should be several of these priests. Now there arises the question—How many are they to be ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"they should be *three*, on the strength of the plural number in the word speaking of these priests (in their originative injunction) [according to Sūtra 11. 1. 43)".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*The number of these priests should be 'Ten', because we find indications to that effect*; i.e. there should be *Ten Chamasādhvaryus*; we find an indication to this effect in a text occurring in connection with the *Dashapēya* sacrifice, which is a 'modification' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*—'*Dasha chamasādhvaryavo, dasha dasha ēkaikam chamasamanusarpanti, ētasmāt kāraṇāt dashapēyo bhavati*' ['There are *ten Chamasādhvaryus*; ten men follow each cup; that is why the sacrifice comes to be called *Dashapēya*, Drunk-by-Ten']; the declaration herein made clearly indicates that the number of *Chamasādhvaryus* should be *ten*; if they were to be *three* only, then that would not be compatible with the text quoted; beyond the number '*three*' too, unless the number were precisely '*ten*', it would not be compatible with the text; hence it follows that their number should be *Ten only*; as the number of their masters (in the shape of the major priests) also is *Ten*, there could be no need for more *Chamasādhvaryus*; for this reason also the exact number 'Ten' is accepted as the right one; and when the number 'Ten' is admitted, every number lower than that becomes included. For this reason also the number of *Chamasādhvaryus* should be *Ten only*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The 'Shamitṛ' (Slaughterer of the Animal) is not distinct from the Major Priests.*

SŪTRA (28).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE SHAMITṚ ALSO [SHOULD BE A DISTINCT PRIEST], BECAUSE OF THE DISTINCT NAME."

Bhāṣya.

There is a priest called '*Shamitṛ*', mentioned in the text—'*Shamitāram upanayīta*' ['One should bring up the *Shamitṛ*'].

In regard to this priest, there arises the question—Is this *Shamitṛ* only one of the priests already spoken of above (*Adhvaryu* and the rest) ?—Or is he distinct from them ?

The view that appears to be most plausible is that he should be one among those already described, as it is those alone that have been named in the text speaking of the *appointment* of priests.

Against this however we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa* view :—"The '*Shamitṛ*' *s ould be a distinct priest, because of the distinct name* ; as a matter of fact, we find a distinct name for this priest—the statement being to the effect that 'the priest bearing this name (*Shamitṛ*) should perform this work (of slaughtering the animal)' ; hence it follows that a priest of this name should be engaged. By reason of the mention of this additional priest, it also follows that there should be an increase in the number of priests mentioned before. From all this it follows that the *Shamitṛ*-priest is distinct from the Adhvaryu and other priests.—Then again, we find the text—'*Klomā chordhvam vaikartanañcha shamituḥ, tad bhrāhmaṇāya dadyāt yadyabrāhmaṇaḥ syāt*' ['The liver and the upper quarter belongs to the *Shamitṛ Priest* ; one should give it to a *Brāhmaṇa* if he be a *non-Brāhmaṇa*'] (Ai. Brā. 7. 1); the possibility of the priest being a *non-Brāhmaṇa* herein mentioned is not applicable to any Major Priest [as all Major Priests must be *Brāhmaṇas*]. [This also indicates that the *Shamitṛ* is distinct from the Major Priests.]"

SŪTRA (29).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY [HE CANNOT BE DISTINCT FROM THE OTHERS]; BECAUSE OF THE 'CONTEXT', AND ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO ORIGINATIVE INJUNCTION (SPEAKING OF HIS APPOINTMENT).

Bhāṣya.

It is true that there appears to be an increase in the number of priests (by the mention of the *Shamitṛ* and his functions) ; but this does not pertain to the 'appointment' of the priests ; [i.e. there is no text speaking of the *Shamitṛ* as one of the priests to be 'appointed']. As regards the incongruity

involved (in the naming of the priest and the assigning of his functions, and yet not laying down his 'appointment'),—that can be explained on the basis of the fact that one of the Major Priests themselves would perform the said functions also (in addition to his own duties; and also become entitled to the name '*Shamitṛ*').

As regards the possibility of being a '*non-Brāhmaṇa*' spoken of in the text quoted by the *Pūrvapakṣin*,—that refers to the *Sacrificer* (not to the *Shamitṛ*),—the meaning being that 'if the *Sacrificer* happen to be a *non-Brāhmaṇa* [the liver, etc., of the animal should be given to a Brāhmaṇa]'.

Says the Opponent—"The words of the text 'if he happen to be a *non-Brāhmaṇa*' clearly refer to the *Shamitṛ* priest, who has been spoken of in the preceding sentence."

Our answer to this is that the name '*Shamitṛ*' is meant to be applied in its etymological sense of 'one who does the slaughtering'; and as such it is applicable to the other priests also [anyone of them who does the 'slaughtering' becomes the 'slaughterer', '*Shamitṛ*'].—Further, the functions of the *Shamitṛ* have been mentioned in the section dealing with the functions of the *Adhvaryu*; from which it follows that those functions also are to be performed by the *Adhvaryu*; so that, by reason of performing the function of 'slaughtering', the *Adhvaryu* himself becomes the *Shamitṛ* (slaughterer).—For these reasons we conclude that the possibility of being a *non-Brāhmaṇa* must refer to the *Sacrificer*, though he has not been spoken of in the sentence.

[The *Tantravārtika* remarks that, it is on account of the Priest performing such questionable acts as *slaughtering* that the 'priestly functions' have come to be spoken of disparagingly.]

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *The 'Upaga' Priest is not distinct from the others.*

SŪTRA (30).

THE UPAGA PRIESTS ALSO [ARE NOT DISTINCT], BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIONS TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* there are some priests called '*Upaga*'; in regard to these, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"because there is a distinct name, it means that these priests are in addition to the number of other priests, and hence they should be distinct from the *Adhvaryu* and the rest".

The *Siddhānta* is that they should be some among those same priests.—"How so?"—Because all the priests to be engaged have been duly enumerated in the originative injunction, and because the name '*Upaga*' is meant to be applied in its etymological sense [of one who does the '*Upagāna*', the supplementary singing].—An indication of this we find in the text—'*Na adhvaryurupagāyet*' ['The *Adhvaryu* should not do the supplementary singing']; if the *Upaga* priest were someone totally distinct from the *Adhvaryu* and the rest, then, there could be no such prohibition in regard to the *Adhvaryu*; as in that case, there would be no possibility of the *Adhvaryu* doing the work [and no Vedic text prohibits what is impossible]. Thus then, inasmuch as the text prohibits the act for the *Adhvaryu*, we conclude that the *Upaga* is one out of those same priests (*Adhvaryu* and the rest) who have been spoken of in the originative injunction.

Adhikaraṇa (15): *The 'Soma-vendor' is distinct from the Priests.*

SŪTRA (31).

The Vendor (of Soma) is distinct (from the Priests); as the act (of selling) is not enjoined.

Bhāṣya.

[At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*] there is the man who sells *Soma.*

In regard to him there arises the question—Is this Soma-vendor one out of the *Adhvaryu* and other priests? Or is he distinct from them?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—" he must be one from among the priests; as it is only these that have been described as priests officiating at a sacrifice ".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*The vendor of Soma should be distinct from the priests*; as a matter of fact, the act enjoined as part of the performance is the *buying of Soma,*—not its *selling*; the latter comes in only as implied in the action of *buying.*—The *Adhvaryu* and other priests are engaged for performing the details laid down in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice; —the act of *selling* is not among those laid down in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*;—hence [as this act of *selling* could not be done by the *Adhvaryu* and other priests] it follows that the Soma-vendor is *not* one of these priests.

ADHIKARAṆA (16): *All the men engaged in a sacrificial performance are not entitled to the title of 'Ṛtvik' (Priest).*

SŪTRA (32).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THEY TAKE PART IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SACRIFICE, THEY ARE ALL EQUALLY ENTITLED TO THE TITLE OF 'ṚTVIK' (PRIEST)."

Bhāṣya.

The question that arises now is—Are all the persons mentioned in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice to be regarded as 'Priests'?—or only some of them?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"All of them are to be regarded as 'priests';—why?—*because they take part in the performance of the sacrifice*; as a matter of fact, all these men take part in the accomplishment of the sacrifice;—i.e. all of them 'perform the sacrifice (*yajanti*) at the proper time (*ṛtau*)';—and those who 'perform the sacrifice at the proper time' (*ṛtau yajanti*) are '*Ṛtviks*' (Priests) [in the etymological sense of the term '*ṛtvik*'];—nor do we find any ground for any such differentiation among the men taking part in the performance as that 'these alone are *Ṛtviks* because they *perform the sacrifice in the proper time*, and not those others'. Hence the title of 'priest' (*Ṛtvik*) belongs to all of them equally.—It might be argued that there is an actual preclusion (of all but *seventeen*) mentioned in the text—'*Saumyasya adhvarasya yajñakratoḥ saptadasha ṛtvijaḥ*' ['At the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there are *seventeen* priests'].—Our answer to this is that *Preclusion* is beset with several objections. The text quoted therefore has to be taken as a purely commendatory declaration."

SŪTRA (33).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THERE IS PRECLUSION (OF ALL EXCEPT 'SEVENTEEN').

Bhāṣya.

In reality, all the persons engaged in the performance cannot be 'Priests';—why?—*because there is Preclusion of all except seventeen*;—we have the text—'*Saumyasya adhvarasya yajñakratoḥ saptadasha ṛtvijaḥ*' ['In the performance of the Soma-sacrifice, there are *seventeen* priests'];—now this text cannot be an Injunction, as most of the seventeen have been already enjoined elsewhere;—nor can it be a mere reiteration, as such a reiteration would be useless;—under the circumstances, if it were not a Preclusion, then it would be wholly meaningless.

Objection—" But Preclusion is open to the objection that it involves (1) the abandoning of the real meaning of the sentence, (2) the assumption of a different meaning, and (3) the rejecting of what has been already got at."

Answer—(1) As regards the 'abandoning of the real meaning', there is nothing wrong in this, as what is accepted also forms part of that meaning.—(2) As regards the 'assumption of a different meaning', in that also there can be nothing wrong, as that meaning also is actually cognised.—" How so ? "—There being many persons engaged in the sacrificial performances who might be regarded as 'Priests', the text speaks of '*seventeen* priests'; this serves to indicate the connection of the title 'priest' with *seventeen* persons only, not with the rest ;—so that the idea that we obtain is that the title of 'priest' being one to which several men might be regarded as entitled, all but seventeen men are precluded. Then there arises the question—Does the text serve to establish the connection of the 'seventeen' persons with the title, or to preclude the other persons from connection with the title ? As a matter of fact, the connection of the *seventeen* persons being already known from other sources, the assertion of that same would be useless ; hence we conclude that the text is meant to *preclude* persons other than these 'seventeen'.

Says the Opponent—" Even if those besides the *seventeen* were excluded (by the text quoted), there could be no real exclusion of them. Because, even so, they do not cease to be those who 'perform the sacrifice at the proper time' (*ṛtau yajanti*) ; and so long as they 'perform the sacrifice at the proper time', they cannot cease to be '*Ṛtviks*' (Priests)."

Answer—It is true that they do not cease to be entitled to the title of 'priest' merely on account of the *exclusion* ; but, on the strength of the preclusive text, they cannot be employed in the work of a 'priest'.—" What is the *work of a priest* ? "—The Priests fast,—the Priests are 'appointed',—the Priests are given the Sacrificial Fee.

Says the Opponent—" How is it that some of those who are entitled to the title of 'priest' are not to be employed on the *work of priests* ? "

Answer—As a matter of fact, the title of 'priest' is of two kinds,—one based upon the 'performance of sacrifice at the proper time', and another based upon 'appointment' and 'receiving support (in the shape of Fees)'.—In the case under question, it would be futile to take that title which is based upon the 'performance of sacrifice'; hence we take that based upon 'appointment' and 'receiving support.'

Opponent—" In this way, there is a *vicious circle* : those alone are to be 'appointed' who are 'priests', and those alone are 'priests' who are 'appointed' ;—this certainly involves a *vicious circle*."

Answer—The injunction that 'one should appoint the priests' does not mean that 'those who are already priests should be appointed' ; what it means is that 'they are to become *priests* by being appointed' ; it is only when such is the meaning that the Accusative ending, in such texts as '*Adhvaryuṁ vṛṇītē*' ('should appoint the *Adhvaryu* priest') becomes justifiable,—and thus alone does the 'appointment' come to serve a perceptible purpose (of securing the 'priesthood' of the person concerned).

If someone were to ask—"How can a man become an *Adhvaryu* merely by the wish of the person (appointing him)?"—we would say—yes, he does become so.—"But how?"—Well, when the text lays down that 'such and such an entity is to be brought about under such and such a title' [e.g. 'a person is to be brought up who bears the title of *Priest*'],—and it is found that no such entity with the said title is there,—the conclusion is that when it does not exist, it has to be brought into existence, if it is capable of being brought into existence; e.g. when it is laid down that 'one should offer the oblation with the *Juhū*',—if the *Juhū* is not there, it is brought into existence. Similarly in the case in question also,—when it is found necessary to connect the title 'Priest' with certain persons,—and it is open to the Sacrificer to connect any one without any restriction,—then it is that such texts as '*Adhvaryuṁ vṛṇītē*' serve to supply the restriction that 'the connection of the title should be brought about by *appointment*'.—Thus there is no *vicious circle* at all.

From all this it follows that the declaration that 'there are only *seventeen* priests' contains a *preclusion*; so that there are only *seventeen* persons who are to be made 'priests' by means of the prescribed preparatory rites (such as *Appointment* and the like).

SŪTRA (34).

[OBJECTION]—"THE (PRECLUSIVE) TEXT QUOTED MAY BE TAKEN ONLY AS STATING ONE ALTERNATIVE",—IF THIS IS URGED, [THEN OUR ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA].

Bhāṣya.

If the Opponent urge that—"the text which speaks of *seventeen priests* may be taken as a commendatory declaration stating only one alternative view [the other view being that there are *Twenty-seven priests*—the *seventeen* major priests and the *ten Chamasādhvaryus*; or that all persons engaged in the performance are 'priests', only that seventeen of these are *superior* to the rest]",—this has to be refuted [and this is done in the following *Sūtra*].

SŪTRA (35).

THAT CANNOT BE RIGHT; AS THERE IS NO MENTION AT ALL OF ALL (THE PERSONS ENGAGED).

Bhāṣya.

What has been suggested cannot be right; in the Context there is no mention at all of *all persons engaged in the performance*, in reference to whom the preclusive text (speaking of '*seventeen* priests') could be taken as a commendatory declaration (selecting for commendation *seventeen* men from among all those engaged in the performance). It is only when a higher number has been mentioned, that the mention of the lower number

can be taken as commendatory; as the '*twelve* pans' having been mentioned, when we find the assertion regarding '*eight* pans', we take the latter to be commendatory. In the case in question however, there is no mention of any higher number; hence the preclusive text cannot be taken as a commendatory declaration.

Adhikaraṇa (17): *The 'seventeen Priests' are the 'Brahman' and the rest, who are mentioned in the texts dealing with 'Initiation' and the 'Sacrificial Fee'.*

SŪTRA (36).

In reality, there is restriction (of the title 'Priest'), based upon texts dealing with the 'Sacrificial Fees'.

Bhāṣya.

It has been established that there are *seventeen* priests.—We now proceed to consider which are these *seventeen*.

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"there is no knowing [it cannot be determined which these *seventeen* are]".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows—*In reality, there is restriction of the title 'priest', based on the texts dealing with the Sacrificial Fees*;—the application of the title should be restricted on the basis of connection with the Sacrificial Fees;—it is laid down that 'the Sacrificial Fee is to be paid *to the Priests*'; and after having laid down this general injunction, a few particular persons —like the *Brahman-priest*—are specifically named in the texts laying down the order in which the Fee is to be paid to those engaged in the performance;— such, for instance, as 'He gives it to the *Agnīt*, then to the *Brahman*, then to so and so' (Taitti. Brā. 1. 1. 6. 10). From this it follows that those that are specifically named in these texts are the real 'Priests', any others besides these cannot be called 'priests';—the title being restricted by the Sacrificial Fees.

SŪTRA (37).

Also because the Initiation of these (Priests) alone has been laid down after the declaration that they are 'Sacrificers'.

Bhāṣya.

Having declared that 'Those that are Priests are sacrificers', the Veda goes on to speak of the Initiation of the *Brahman* and the rest, in the text that lays down the order in which these are to be 'initiated'—viz. 'Having initiated (1) the *Sacrificer*, the *Adhvaryu* initiates (2) the *Brahman*, then (3) the *Udgātṛ*, then (4) the *Hotṛ*; then the *Pratiprasthātṛ* initiates (5) the *Adhvaryu*, and then the *Halfers* [those entitled to half the Fee],—viz. (6) the *Brāhmaṇāchchhaṁsin*, who is assistant to the Brahman,—(7) the *Prastotṛ*, who is assistant to the *Udgātṛ*,—and (8) the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, who is assistant to the *Hotṛ*;—then the *Nēṣṭṛ* initiates the (9) *Pratiprasthātṛ*, and then the

Thirders [those entitled to one-third of the Fee],—viz. (10) the *Agnīdh*, who is assistant to the *Brahman*,—(11) the *Pratihartṛ*, who is assistant to the *Udgātṛ*,—and (12) the *Achchhāvāka*, who is assistant to the *Hotṛ*;—then the *Unnētṛ* initiates (13) the *Nēṣṭṛ*, and then the *Fourthers* [those entitled to one-fourth of the Fee]—viz. (14) the *Potṛ*, who is assistant to the *Brahman*,—(15) the *Subrahmaṇya*, who is assistant to the *Udgātṛ*,—and (16) the *Grāvastut*, who is assistant to the *Hotṛ*;—then (17) the *Unnētṛ* is initiated by some other Brāhmaṇa, or by a Religious Student deputed for that purpose by his Teacher.—Now all these Initiations are 'embellishments' for the *Sacrificers*. From this also it follows that the seventeen persons entitled to be called 'Priests' are the *Brahman* and the rest mentioned here.

ADHIKARAṆA (18): *The 'Master' forms the 'Seventeenth' of the Priests.*

SŪTRA (38).

THE MASTER OF THE HOUSE IS TO BE REGARDED AS THE SEVENTEENTH 'PRIEST', ON THE BASIS OF THE SIMILARITY OF FUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

It has been stated above that there are 'seventeen Priests', and that these are the *Brahman* and the rest.

Now there arises the question—[As the text enumerating the Initiations has named only *sixteen* persons]—Who is the *seventeenth* ? Is it some member of the Assembly ? Or the Master of the House (the Sacrificer) ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows :—" Some member of the Assembly should be the *seventeenth* ; as it is only such a person who would be a *worker* (a servant), the other is the *Master,*—and it is only a *worker* that can be engaged on payment ; the *Priests* are all engaged on payment ;—hence it follows that the seventeenth 'Priest' should be some member of the Assembly. Further, there are texts speaking of the '*sadasya*' (member of the Assembly), of a 'Cup' belonging to him, as also his 'appointment' ;—and it is a *Priest* that is to be 'appointed', not the *Master* himself. For these reasons the seventeenth *Priest* must be some member of the Assembly."

In answer to the above, we have the following *Siddhānta* :—*The Master of the House is to be regarded as the seventeenth 'Priest', on the basis of the similarity of functions* ; it is the Master that should form the *seventeenth* of the Priests ;—why ?—because of *the similarity of functions* ; that is, persons who *perform the sacrifice* become known as 'Priests' ;—the Master of the House is certainly one who *performs the sacrifice* ;—hence he must be a 'priest' ; on the ground that the function of 'performing the sacrifice' belongs to him in common (with the Priests).—As regards the argument that—" the texts speak of the 'member of the Assembly', of the 'Cup' belonging to him, and also of his 'appointment', and hence this seventeenth should be some member of the Assembly ",—our answer is that when the texts speak of the 'member of the Assembly', they speak of the *Brahman Priest*, and the 'Cup' and the 'appointment' also that they speak of are of the same *Brahman Priest* ; and he is called '*sadasya*' (member of the Assembly), because he is really one of the persons present in the Sacrificial House.—From all this it follows that the Master is the seventeenth of the 'priests'.

ADHIKARAṆA (19): *(A) Each of the Priests is to perform only those functions that have been named after him.—(B) The Fires serve the purposes of all Sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (39).

(A)—[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE PRIESTS SHOULD PERFORM ALL THE FUNCTIONS, AS THEY ARE ENGAGED FOR THAT PURPOSE."—(B)—THE FIRES SERVE THE PURPOSES OF ALL THE SACRIFICES, AS THEY HAVE THEIR OWN TIME.

[Having dealt with the number and character of *Performers*, we now proceed to consider the question of the employment of these performers in the various performances.]

Bhāṣya.

We have seen that at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* there are seventeen Priests, including the Master of the Sacrifice.—(A) The question that arises now is—Are all the Priests to do all that is to be done by men (in connection with the sacrificial performance)?—Or is there any restriction (differentiation and distribution of functions)?

—(B) There is another question also—Are the three Fires (*Gārhapatya, Dakṣiṇāgni,* and *Āhavanīya*) to be used in connection with all that can be done with the help of Fire?—Or is there some restriction (as to what is to be done with which Fire)?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view on Question (A) is that—"all *the Priests should perform all the functions, as they are engaged for that purpose*; that is to say, having been appointed for the purposes of the sacrificial performance, they should do all that is to be done by men". [The *Siddhānta* of this question is stated in Sū. 40, below.]

(B) As regards the Fires, it is the *Siddhānta* that is set forth in the Sūtra, and this is as follows:—All the Fires should be used in connection with all the actions that can be done with the help of Fire; because the Fires are needed by all those actions. The particle '*sva*' is a reference to the Fires; the meaning being that the Fires are to be used in connection with all sacrifices, *as they have their own time* [that is, they have been enjoined in relation to their own time, and not to the time of any particular sacrifice; and hence they may be used whenever they are required]. We have understood this (as the final *Siddhānta*).

[In the Bhāṣya on this *Adhikaraṇa*, specially on Sū. 39, there is a confusion; it is made clear in the *Tantravārtika* (Trans., pp. 1643–1646).—The Sūtra 39 contains two distinct statements—the first part is the statement of a *Pūrvapakṣa*, and the second part, the statement of a *Siddhānta*. The question regarding this *Siddhānta* (relating to the Fires) is—Are the three consecrated Fires to be used in connection with the *Primary* Sacrifice only? Or with the *Primary* as well as the *Subsidiaries*?—The *Pūrvapakṣa* is that "they should be used at the Primary

Sacrifice only, for the simple reason that they have not been laid down in the context of any sacrifice (according to Sū. 3. 6. 2).—The *Siddhānta* is that the Fires should be used in connection with the Primary as well as with the Subsidiary sacrifices, because they have been laid down independently by themselves—*having their own time.*—As regards *Question* (A), in regard to the Priests, the *Pūrvapakṣa* is stated in the first part of Sū. 39 and the *Siddhānta* in Sū. 40.]

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA OF ADHIKARAṆA 19(A)]—THERE SHOULD BE A RESTRICTION (AND DISTRIBUTION) OF FUNCTIONS (AMONG THE PRIESTS), ON THE BASIS OF THEIR NAMES; AS IT IS FOR THAT PURPOSE THAT (DISTINCT) NAMES HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO THEM.

Bhāṣya.

On the basis of the particular names given to particular priests, there should be a restriction of functions; only the functions that have been named after a certain priest should be performed by that Priest; as it is only thus that a useful purpose would be served by the naming of the functions (after the Priests); that is, the functions named '*Ādhvaryava*' should be performed by the *Adhvaryu*-priest,—those named '*hautra*' should be performed by the *Hotṛ*-priest,—those named '*Audgātra*' should be performed by the *Udgātṛ*-priest.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *In some cases the distribution of functions among the Priests is not strictly in accordance with their name.—Exception to the preceding Adhikaraṇa.*

SŪTRA (41).

THE INDICATION (OF THE PARTICULAR PRIEST TO PERFORM A PARTICULAR FUNCTION) IS DONE BY DIRECT INJUNCTION AS ALSO BY SPECIFIC NAME.

Bhāṣya.

Question—Is this a universal rule (to be followed in all cases) that a function is to be performed by the Priest after whom it is named?

[*Pūrvapakṣa*—" Yes ".]

Siddhānta—It is not so; because as a matter of fact, the indication of the particular Priest to perform a particular function is done by Direct Injunction and also by specific name (not always by the generic names '*Ādhvaryava*', '*Hautra*', and '*Audgātra*').—As an example of indication by Direct Injunction, we have the text '*Tasmāt maitrāvaruṇaḥ prēṣyati chānuchāha*' ('Therefore the Maitrāvaruṇa gives directions and recites the *Puronuvākyā*') (Taitti. Brā. 3. 12. 9. 5);—[where the two functions of *giving directions* and *reciting* are specifically assigned to the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest, though the *giving of directions* falls within those functions that have been called '*Ādhvaryava*', and as such should have been performed by the *Adhvaryu*; similarly the *reciting* is a function falling within those called '*Hautra*' and as such should have been done by the *Hotṛ* priest.—But in view of the Direct Injunction quoted, both these are done by the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Priest].

Similarly as instances of *specific names* given to acts indicating their performer, we have the names '*potrīyā*' and '*nēṣṭrīyā*' [which are given to certain actions, which under the general rule would have been done by the *Brahman* and the *Adhvaryu* respectively, but, which, by virtue of these special names, are done by the *Potṛ* and the *Nēṣṭṛ* respectively].

These are exceptions to the general rule that the performers of functions are indicated by the names given to the functions.

SŪTRA (42).

SIMILARLY WE FIND INDICATIONS ALSO TO THE SAME EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

We have the text—'*Hotuḥ prātaranuvākamanubruvata upashṛṇuyāt*' ['He may listen to the *Hotṛ* reciting the *Prātaranuvāka*'], which, occurring

under the section dealing with the functions of the *Hotṛ* and hence called '*Hautra*', indicates the *Hotṛ*-priest as the performer of the act of *Reciting*.—Similarly there is another indicative text—'*Udgīthaḥ udgātṛṛṇām ṛchaḥ, praṇavaḥ ukthashaṁsinām, pratihāraḥ adhvaryūṇām*' ['The *Udgītha* is for the *Udgātṛ*-priests, the verses and the *Praṇava* of the *Ukthashaṁsins*, and the *Pratihāra* of the *Adhvaryus*'], which indicates a differentiation of functions by means of specific names.—The following is another indicative text—'*Yo va'dhvaryoḥ svaṁ vēda svavānēva bhavati, ētat vā'dhvaryoḥ svam yadāshrāvayati*' ['He who understands the Adhvaryu's *own* thing becomes endowed with wealth; this is the Adhvaryu's *own* thing that he urges the *Agnīdh* to direct the Hotṛ to recite'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 3. 1. 2. 3), which indicates the particular performer by means of a specific name.

Adhikaraṇa (21): *The 'Reciting' and the 'Directing' are to be done by the Maitrāvaruṇa, only when they are done concurrently.*

SŪTRA (43).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The 'Directing' and the 'Reciting' are to be done (in all cases) by the Maitrāvaruṇa; as such is the Injunction."

Bhāṣya.

[It having been established that the indication of performers by *Name* is set aside by Direct Injunction, we now proceed to consider the question as to whether it is set aside wholly, or only in part.—*Tantravārtika.*]

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice, there is the *Agnīṣomīya* animal, spoken of in the text—'*Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhēta*' ['The initiated person who sacrifices the *Agnīṣomīya* animal'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6). In connection with this animal, there is the text—'*Tasmāt maitrāvaruṇaḥ preṣyati chānuchāha*' ['Therefore the Maitrāvaruṇa priest gives directions and also recites the *Purōnuvākyā*'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is the *Maitrāvaruṇa* priest to do all the *Reciting* and all the *Directing* that is done? Or only in that case where the *direction* is contained in what is *recited* [i.e. where both are done concurrently through the same words]?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "all *recitings* (and all *directings*) are to be done by the *Maitrāvaruṇa*, as there is no ground for differentiation; as a matter of fact there are no grounds for any such differentiation as that 'this *Reciting*, and not that, is to be done by the *Maitrāvaruṇa*'; hence it follows that the *Maitrāvaruṇa* is to do all the *Reciting* and *Directing* that is to be done [though these functions, as included under the name '*Hautra*', should have been performed by the *Hotṛ*-priest]".

SŪTRA (44).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the Injunction applies to the 'reciting' of the 'Puronuvākyā' only; as it is this that is accompanied by the Direction.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, it is only the *Puronuvākyā* that is to be *recited* by the *Maitrāvaruṇa*;—why?—because the *Maitrāvaruṇa* comes in as the reciter only in cases where the *Reciting* and *Directing* are done together; in cases where there is mere *reciting* of the *Anuvākyā*, the *Maitrāvaruṇa* does not come in at all; nor in cases where there is *Directing only*;—it is only where the two

come together that the *Maitrāvaruṇa* comes in;—hence it is only in connection with cases where the two are done together that we have the declaration in the text—'the Maitrāvaruṇa directs and recites', '*Maitrāvaruṇaḥ prēṣyati chānuchāha*',—where the repetition of the particle 'cha' indicates that the reference is to cases where the two acts are done together.

[The *Puronuvākyā* verse ends with the Imperative word '*yaja*' ('please sacrifice'), which contains the *directing* which is done when the *Puronuvākyā* is recited,—thus the two acts of *Reciting* and *Directing* being done together.]

SŪTRA (45).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THE HOTṚ PRIEST MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECITING OF THE 'PRĀTARANUVĀKA'.

Bhāṣya.

For the following reason also we think that all *Reciting* is not to be done by the *Maitrāvaruṇa*.—For what reason?—Because the Veda indicates the *Hotṛ* in connection with the reciting of the *Prātaranuvāka*.—How is this indicated?—There is the text—'*Yatra hotuḥ prātaranuvākamanubruvataḥ upashṛṇuyāt tadā adhvaryurgṛhṇīyāt*' ['When he hears the *Hotṛ* reciting the *Prātaranuvāka*, the *Adhvaryu* should hold the cup.'].—From this it follows that *all* reciting is not to be done by the *Maitrāvaruṇa*

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ADHIKARAṆA (22): *The 'Chamasa-homa' is to be performed by the Adhvaryu.*

SUTRA (46).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE 'CHAMASA-OBLATIONS' ARE TO BE OFFERED BY THE CHAMASĀDHVARYUS,—BY REASON OF THE NAME."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Chamasādhvaryu* priests. In regard to these, there arises the question—Are the *Chamasa-oblations* to be offered by the *Chamasādhvaryus*? or by the *Adhvaryu*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"the *Chamasādhvaryus* should offer them;—why?—because they are named '*Chamasādhvaryu*', which indicates that in regard to the *Chamasas*, they perform the functions of the *Adhvaryu*; hence (the offering of oblations being the function of the *Adhvaryu*) it follows that the *Chamasa*-oblations should be offered by the *Chamasādhvaryus*".

SŪTRA (47).

IN REALITY, THE ADHVARYU SHOULD OFFER THE OBLATIONS, BECAUSE OF THE LAW RELATING TO HIM.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *Adhvaryu* should offer the oblations; because the Law is that all the functions that are called '*Ādhvaryava*' should be performed by the *Adhvaryu*;—and the offering of oblations (into Fire) is an '*Ādhvaryava*' function;—hence the oblations should be offered by the *Adhvaryu*.—"But by reason of the specific name '*Chamasādhvaryu*' (which connects the priests of this name with the *Chamasa*-oblations), the oblations in question should be offered by the *Chamasādhvaryus* [the indication of the specific name setting aside that of the generic name '*Ādhvaryava*']."—That cannot be, we reply;—these priests are called '*Chamasādhvaryu*' in the sense that they 'function *like the Adhvaryu* in regard to the *Chamasas*'; which can only mean that 'if the *Adhvaryu* offers the *Chamasa-oblations*, the *Chamasādhvaryus* also may offer them'; in fact, if the oblations were offered by the *Chamasādhvaryus*, and not by the *Adhvaryu*, then the *Chamasādhvaryus* would not be functioning *like the Adhvaryu*.—From this it follows that the *Chamasādhvaryus* are *not* to offer the *Chamasa-oblations*.

SŪTRA (48).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND 'ANOTHER' PRIEST MENTIONED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'CHAMASA'.

Bhāṣya.

We find that in connection with the *Chamasa*, the Veda speaks of a priest other than the *Chamasādhvaryu*.—"How so?"—We have the text—'*Chamasāṁshchamasādhvaryavē prayachchhati, tān sa vaṣaṭkartrē harati*', from which we learn that someone else offers the oblation and hands over the *Chamasa* to the *Chamasādhvaryu*.—"How is this deduced?"—What we understand the text to mean is that when the *Chamasādhvaryu* offers it to the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ*, he does so with the view that the *Vaṣaṭkartṛ* will eat out of it; which implies that the *Chamasa* is handed over to the *Chamasādhvaryu*, after the oblation has been offered out of it;—and that the person who hands it over to him is the person who has offered the oblation;—from which it is clear that the man offering the oblations is other than the *Chamasādhvaryu*.—Then again we have the text—'*Yo vā adhvaryoḥ svaṁ vēda svavānēva bhavati, srugvā adhvaryoḥ svam, vāyavyamasya svam, chamaso'sya svam*', where the *Chamasa* is spoken of as the '*sva*' (property) of the *Adhvaryu*;—as a matter of fact, however, the *Chamasa* is the property of the *Sacrificer*, not of the *Adhvaryu*; hence when the text speaks of the *Chamasa* as the 'property' of the *Adhvaryu*, what is meant is that the *Chamasa-oblations* are to be offered by the *Adhvaryu*.

SŪTRA (49).

IT IS ONLY IN CASES OF INCAPACITY (OF THE ADHVARYU) THAT THE CHAMASĀDHVARYUS COULD BE REGARDED (AS ENTITLED TO OFFER THE OBLATIONS IN QUESTION).

Bhāṣya.

Question—"How then is the name '*Chamasādhvaryu*' to be accounted for?"

Answer—*They should be regarded as entitled to offer the oblations in cases of incapacity*; that is, in cases where, on account of being otherwise engaged, the *Adhvaryu* is unable to offer the oblations, the *Chamasādhvaryus* would be the persons to offer them, by virtue of their name.

ADHIKARAṆA (23): *The 'Shyēna' and the 'Vājapēya' sacrifices are to be performed by several classes of priests,—not by single class of priests.*

SŪTRA (50).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"ON ACCOUNT OF THE VEDIC INJUNCTION (NAME),—IN CASES WHERE THE ACTIONS HAPPEN TO BE MENTIONED IN A PARTICULAR VEDA,—THEY SHOULD BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT VEDA ONLY,—AS IN THE FOREGOING CASE."

Bhāṣya.

We find the *Shyēna* sacrifice mentioned in the Veda named '*Audgātra*', (i.e. *Sāmaveda*) and the *Vājapēya* sacrifice in the Veda called '*Ādhvaryava*' (i.e. *Yajurveda*).—In regard to these, there arises the question—Are all the details in connection with the *Shyēna* to be performed by the *Udgātṛ* (Sāmavedin) priests alone,—and all the details of the *Vājapēya*, by the *Adhvaryu* (Yajurvedin) priests alone?—or in both cases, the details are to be performed by several classes of priests?

On this question, the *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"*On account of the Vedic Injunction,*—i.e. on account of the *Name*—it should be *as in the foregoing case*; i.e. just as on the strength of the name '*Ādhvaryava*' all the details mentioned in that section are performed by the *Adhvaryu*,—in the same manner, *in cases where the actions happen to be mentioned in a particular Veda, they should be done in accordance with that Veda only*; that is to say, when a sacrifice is laid down in a Veda named after a certain priest, all the details in connection with that sacrifice should be performed by that same priest; as therein the sacrifice is enjoined along with all its accessory details.—From this it follows that all the details of the *Shyēna* (which is laid down in the *Audgātra* i.e. *Sāmaveda*) should be performed by the *Udgātṛ* priest, and all the details of the *Vājapēya* (which is laid down in the *Ādhvaryava* section) should be performed by the *Adhvaryu* priest."

SŪTRA (51).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—INASMUCH AS THEY BORROW THE DETAILS (FROM THE PRIMARY ARCHETYPES), THEY SHOULD IN REALITY BE PERFORMED ALONG WITH THEIR ACCESSORIES, AS EQUIPPED WITH THEIR OWN DETAILS, ON THE BASIS OF THE GENERAL LAW; THE INDICATION (OF THE NAME) CAN BE ACCEPTED ONLY IN OTHER CASES, WHERE THERE ARE NO CLEAR INJUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

Inasmuch as they borrow the details from the Primary Sacrifices, —*the sacrifice should be performed as equipped with its own details,*—i.e.

accompanied by all the accessories that come into it by virtue of the general law (that 'the modification should be performed in the manner of the Primary'),—and *along with its accessories* ;—this is what we learn from the Veda itself.—Now as regards the two sacrifices in question, they are both 'modifications' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and as such they stand in need of those accessories that are already there in the *Jyotiṣṭoma* ;—and at the *Jyotiṣṭoma* there are several Priests performing the details ;—so that the case in question also has to be taken as connected with those same several priests.

Objection—"The indication by the Name is something direct, while the implication of the General Law is only an indirect means of knowledge, being purely inferential in character [so that the latter should not override the former]."

Answer—It is true that indication by the Name is a direct means of knowledge ; but after all it is only an ordinary (secular) means of knowledge ; so that in this case also, it is necessary to *infer* a Vedic text and then make it bear upon the case in question ; while in the case of indication by the General Law (that 'the modification should be performed in the manner of the Primary'), what is brought to bear upon the case in question is a Vedic text which is actually perceived even though found in a remoter context, on the basis of which text, the sacrifice in question (i.e. the modification) becomes connected with the directly cognised procedure of the Primary Sacrifice. It is for this reason that the General Law is stronger (than *Name* and overrides it).

As regards the argument that—"on the strength of *Name* [all the details should be performed by a single priest]",—the answer is that *the indication by Name can be accepted only in regard to other cases, where there are no clear injunctions* ;—that is to say, in the case of such details as do not come into the sacrifice by virtue of the General Law, the matter may be determined by indications of the *Name*. For instance, in connection with the *Shyēna*, we find it laid down that 'they pierce with thorns', and [as there is no such *Piercing* done at the Primary Sacrifice, the name of the performer of this act cannot be brought in from the Primary, under the General Law] this *Piercing* will be done by the *Udgātṛ* priest (as indicated by the *name* '*Audgātra*');—similarly in connection with the *Vājapēya*, it is laid down that 'they offer it with the *Ūṣapuṭa*' (Shatapatha-Brā. 5. 2. 1. 16), and this *offering* will be done by the *Adhvaryu* (as indicated by the *name* '*Ādhvaryava*'). [The '*Ūṣapuṭa*' is the cup prepared out of leaves of the *Ashvattha* tree with dust taken from *barren land*, *ūṣa*.]

End of Pāda vii of Adhyāya III.

ADHYĀYA III.

PĀDA VIII.

ADHIKARAṆA (1): *The 'purchasing' of services is the function of the Master of the Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (1).

THE 'PURCHASING' IS THE FUNCTION OF THE MASTER; AS THE PERFORMANCE IS FOR HIS PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

There is the act of 'purchasing',—i.e. securing the services of Priests on the payment of certain Fees, such as 'twelve and hundred' at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, the '*Anvāhārya*' (Cooked Rice) at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* and so forth [*vide* Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 7. 3. 1].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the Priests to be 'purchased' by the *Adhvaryu* or by the *Master*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"on the strength of the Name ('*Ādhvaryava*', under which the 'Purchasing of Priests' is included), it should be done by the *Adhvaryu*".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*The 'purchasing' is the function of the Master*;—why?—*as the performance is for his purpose*; i.e. it is the *Sacrificer* (Master of the Sacrifice) who desires to obtain the results [that are to follow from the performance of the Sacrifice];—in ordinary practice, when a man desires to obtain certain results from the performance of an act, he has to do that act himself;—if he 'purchases' (secures on payment) the services of other persons (to help him in the performance), he is regarded as doing it himself. Under the circumstances, if he were not to do the 'purchasing' [and if it were done by someone else], he would not be doing the main act himself.—From all this it follows that it is the Master that does the 'purchasing'.

SŪTRA (2).

IT COULD BE DONE BY OTHERS IN A CASE WHERE THERE IS A DIRECT DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

Question—Is then this the universal rule [that the 'purchasing' should be done *always* by the Master]?

Answer—Not so; *it could be done by others in a case where there is a direct declaration to that effect.* In a case where there is a direct declaration as to the person who is to do the 'purchasing' [i.e. to make payments for services rendered],—the 'purchasing' has to be done in accordance

with that declaration; e.g. there is the declaration—'*Ya ētāmiṣṭakāmupadadhyāt sa trīn varān dadyāt*' ['He who puts in this brick should give three excellent things (cows)'] (Taitti. Sam. 5. 2. 8. 2). [Here the *Parasmaipada* ending in the word '*upadadhyāt*' indicates that the 'placing' of the bricks is to be done by a person other than the Master,—and it is asserted that it is this same person that should give the 'three cows' to the priest, in payment of services rendered by him.—So that in this particular case, the 'purchasing' is done by a person other than the Master.]

[Sūtra (2) which embodies an exception to Sūtra (1), has been taken as a distinct *Adhikaraṇa* by itself—by Maṇḍana Mishra and by Mādhavāchārya. Kumārila has included it under the first *Adhikaraṇa*, as above.]

Adhikaraṇa (2): *The 'Shaving of the Head' and other 'Embellishments' pertain to the Master of the Sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (3).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"Inasmuch as the Embellishments add to the capacity of the performing person, they should be restricted (to persons) in accordance with the Veda (Name),—just like the performing of the several functions."

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Kēshashmashrū vapatē, dato dhāvatē, nakhāni nikṛntatē, snāti*' ['He shaves his head and beard, cleanses his teeth, pares his nails, and bathes'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 1. 2).

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are the Embellishments like those here described to be done by the *Adhvaryu* or by the *Sacrificer* (Master) ?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"They should be done by the *Adhvaryu*; as a matter of fact, Embellishments should be restricted in accordance with the Veda,—i.e. on the basis of *Name*,—just like the performance of functions by individual persons; that is, just as the other details are performed by that priest who bears the name that is given to the Vedic Sections under which these details are laid down [e.g. the *Adhvaryu* performs the functions laid down in the '*Ādhvaryava*' Section of the Veda], —in the same manner, the *Embellishments* [should be performed by persons whose names are borne by the Vedic Section laying down the Embellishments]."

SŪTRA (4).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, the Embellishments, like the Principal Action, must pertain to the Sacrificer, as he is the principal person concerned.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the acts in question should be done by the Sacrificer;—why ? —because *he is the principal person concerned*.—"What is the meaning of his being the principal person ?"—The result of an action is always understood to be one that is aimed at by the performer of that action; hence what the *Embellishments* do is to bring about, in the person performing them, the capacity to perform the main act. No person, who seeks to bring about in himself the said capacity by the performance of a certain act,

ever secures the services of other persons for the performance of that act; in fact, he secures the services of others for the purpose of obtaining certain desirable things; the act that brings about a capacity in a person should always be done by that person himself; as is found in the case of the Principal Action; that is to say, as a matter of fact, all those Principal Actions which tend to produce results in the Person, are always performed by the Sacrificer himself; similarly in the case in question also [as the Embellishments in question also tend to bring about a capacity in the Sacrificer, they should be performed by the Sacrificer himself].

SŪTRA (5).

ALSO BECAUSE OF THE WORDS OF CERTAIN TEXTS.

Bhāṣya.

We find such texts as—'*Tamabhyanakti, sharēṣikayā'nakti*' ['*He anoints him*', 'he anoints him with the arrow-stick'], where the verb is found in the *Parasmaipada* form, which clearly indicates that it is someone else that does the *anointing* for the Sacrificer [and the *Anointing* is an 'Embellishment'].

SŪTRA (6).

FURTHER, THE ACTION IN QUESTION HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF AS A SUBORDINATE FACTOR.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued (by the *Pūrvapakṣin*) that "the Embellishments should be restricted on the basis of *Names*, in accordance with the Veda".—But this is not right; because *the action in question has been spoken of as a subordinate factor*. As a matter of fact, we accept the Name as the determining factor only in cases where the action appears as the predominant factor,—i.e. as one for the performance of which the services of certain persons (priests) have to be secured; it is only in the case of such an action [where the Men are subordinate to, and subserve the purposes of, the *Action*, which is the predominant factor] that its performer is taken to be determined by the Name (of the Vedic Section in which the injunction of the action is found).—In the case of the *Shaving of the Head* and other Embellishments [which appear as subordinate to, and subserving the purposes of, the Man],—if they were taken as related to (and pertaining to) the priests, then such a relation would have to be *assumed*, as in that case [the actions not standing in need of any such connection, being already connected with the Sacrificer]—those Embellishments would come in only as serving some transcendental purpose; while in the case of those acts (sacrificial details) as bear directly upon the sacrificial performance, their connection with those persons (priests) is already established (by the fact of their standing in need of *performers*; and hence it has not got to be assumed);

—[the connection of the Embellishments with the *Sacrificer* is also one that is already established by the fact of their being spoken of as subordinate to, and subserving the visible purpose, *cleanliness*, of the Sacrificer];—and so long as an established relationship is possible, there can be no justification for the assuming of an unestablished one.—From all this it follows that in a case where the Man is the predominant factor [and the action is subordinate to him], *Name* cannot be the determining factor (in the indication of the Performer for it).

SŪTRA (7).

ALSO BECAUSE THEY HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN IN REFERENCE TO THE RESULTANT 'APŪRVA'.

Bhāṣya.

By the term '*Chodanā*' (in the *Sūtra*) we mean the *resultant Apūrva* (of the Primary Sacrifice); so that what the *Sūtra* means is that the Embellishments in question have been laid down in reference to the resultant *Apūrva*; and as it is not possible for them to be done by themselves without a material substratum (the *thing to be embellished*, without which there can be no *Embellishment*), they are taken as to be done to such *things*;—and they could be done to, and be connected with, things remote from themselves, only if it were not possible for them to be done to, and be connected with, a thing in close proximity to them; and when it is possible for them to be done to a thing in close proximity to themselves, they should not be done to remoter things, as they will have their requirements fulfilled by being done to the nearer thing.—For this reason also the Embellishments should pertain to the *Sacrificer* (who is in close proximity to them).

SŪTRA (8).

ON ACCOUNT OF INEQUALITY, THEY COULD NOT BE APPLICABLE EQUALLY [TO ALL THE PERSONS].

Bhāṣya.

This *Sūtra* is to be taken as following upon a few words to be supplied [as embodying an argument answered by the *Sūtra*]; these words being—"Why cannot the Embellishments be taken as applicable equally (to both, the Sacrificer as well as the Priests)? When they have not been laid down in special reference to any particular person, they should be applicable to every person".

The answer to this is that the Injunction of the Embellishments cannot apply equally to all persons.—"Why?"—Because *of inequality*; i.e. all the persons are not equally circumstanced in regard to the injunction in question.—"What is the *inequality*?"—The *inequality* lies in the fact that the Embellishments have been enjoined for the *Sacrificer*, not for the *Priests*.—"But how do you know that they are enjoined for the *Sacrificer*?"—From

the fact that when a man desires to accomplish an end by an act, he should do that act himself (see Sū. 3. 7. 18).—" But as they are not enjoined in special reference to any particular person, they should be taken as enjoined for the Priests also."—We are of opinion that, as they cannot serve any useful purpose in connection with the priests, they cannot be taken as enjoined for them.—" Why is no useful purpose served by them in connection with the Priests ? "—If they were done by (and to) the Priests, they would be acts that are neither *done* nor *got done* by the Sacrificer ; for the simple reason that the services of the Priests have not been secured for the performance of those Embellishments ;—and if they were done by the Priests themselves, then they could not in any way benefit the person who stands in need [of aids to the fulfilment of the Sacrifice and the resultant *Apūrva*] ;—and thus they would be entirely useless. This is the reason why they cannot be taken as enjoined for the Priests ;—and this is what constitutes the 'inequality' (spoken of in the *Sūtra*).—From all this it follows that the Embellishments cannot apply equally to all the persons.

ADHIKARAṆA (3) : *The Penances are to be performed by the Sacrificer.*

SŪTRA (9).

PENANCES ALSO [ARE TO BE PERFORMED BY THE SACRIFICER]; BECAUSE THEY HELP IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE RESULT;—AS IN ORDINARY LIFE.

Bhāṣya.

Certain Penances are found to be enjoined—'He does not eat for two days', 'he does not eat for three days', and so forth.

In regard to these there arises the question—Are the Penances to be performed by the Priests? Or by the Sacrificer?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The Penances should be taken as to be performed by the Priests,—on the basis of the *name* ['*Ādhvaryava*', of that section of the Veda where the Penances are enjoined]".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—The Penances should be performed by the Sacrificer;—why?—because *they help in the accomplishment of the result*; i.e. the Penances are performed with a view to the accomplishment of the result; as a matter of fact, a man obtains the results of a sacrifice only when he is equipped with Penances.—"How do you know this?"—The performance of Penances is painful;—pain is the direct consequence of sin;—sin is an obstacle in the accomplishment of the result of sacrifices;—sin is in fact conducive to evil, and so long as there is sin, no good can come about;—hence it is necessary to remove it. Both Merit and Demerit are destroyed by the experiencing of their effects; hence it is that for the experiencing of pain as the result of sin, religious Penances are prescribed; the idea being that the pain experienced in the performing of the Penance is the effect of the sin (meant to be destroyed).—In this way the Penance comes to have a visible purpose, and no invisible (unseen) purpose has to be assumed.—Thus then, the (obstructing) sin having been destroyed by the experiencing of its effect (pain suffered in the performance of the Penance), the sacrifice becomes free from obstruction and thus brings about its result. [It is in this way that Penances help in the accomplishment of the Result.] —And the accomplishing of the result is what is to be done by the Sacrificer, not by the Priests. From this it follows that the Penances are to be performed by the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (10).

THERE IS ALSO A SUPPLEMENTARY DECLARATION POINTING TO THE SAME CONCLUSION.

Bhāṣya.

This same conclusion is indicated by a supplementary declaration, which is to the following effect—'*Yadā vai puruṣē na kiñchana antarbhavati*

yadā asya kṛṣṇam chakṣuṣo nashyati—atha mēdhyatamaḥ ' [' When there is nothing inside the man, and when the pupil has disappeared, then is he most fitted for a sacrifice '],—which means that when he is fasting, then is he '*fit for mēdha*' ('*mēdhya*'); now '*mēdha*' is *sacrifice*, and 'sacrifice' consists in *giving away*; so that what the supplementary declaration quoted means is that 'by the Penance, the man is rendered fit for giving away'; and the person who *gives away* things is the Sacrificer (not the Priests).—From this also it follows that Penances are to be performed by the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (11).

IT CAN BE DONE BY OTHERS, WHEN THERE IS AN INJUNCTION TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

Question—" Is it then the universal rule that all penances should be performed by the Sacrificer ? "

Answer—No; *it can be done by others when there is an injunction to that effect*; i.e. when there is an injunction to that effect, then it should be done by the Priests; e.g. there is the injunction—' All the Priests fast ' (in which case the *fasting* has to be done by the Priests).

SŪTRA (12).

ALSO BECAUSE THE PENANCE IS A SUBORDINATE FACTOR, THE QUESTION OF ITS PERFORMER CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY THE NAME OF THE VEDIC SECTION.

Bhāṣya.

It has been argued that "on the basis of *Name* ('*Ādhvaryava*', of the Vedic Section where the Penances are prescribed), the Penances should be taken as to be performed by the Priest (*Adhvaryu*)".—The answer to this is that, *because the Penance is a subordinate factor*, its performer cannot be determined by *Name*; as *Name* is regarded as the determining factor only in cases where the *Man* is the subordinate factor [which is not so in the case in question].

Or, the Sūtra may be explained in the following manner—

[*By a second interpretation of this Sūtra, the Bhāṣya makes a separate Adhikaraṇa of it, which is as follows*]—

ADHIKARAṆA (4): *The 'Red Turban' and other similar details pertain to all the Priests.*

SŪTRA (12).

INASMUCH AS THEY ARE SUBORDINATE ACCESSORIES, THEIR CONNECTION CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY THE 'NAME' OF THE VEDIC SECTION.

Bhāṣya.

(*a*) In connection with the *Shyēna* sacrifice, we read—'*Lohitoṣṇīṣā lohitavasanā ṛtvijaḥ pracharanti*' ['Red-turbaned and red-clothed priests move about';—(*b*) similarly in connection with the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, we read—'*Hiraṇyamālina ṛtvijaḥ pracharanti*' ['Gold-necklaced priests move about'].

In regard to these there arises the question—(*a*) At the *Shyēna*, is it only the *Udgātṛ* priests who are to be 'red-turbaned' and (*b*) at the *Vājapēya*, only the *Adhvaryus* who are to wear the golden necklace? Or, at both sacrifices, all the priests are to wear it?

The Pūrvapakṣa view is that—"(*a*) On the strength of *Name* ['*Audgātra*' of the Veda where the *Shyēna* is prescribed], the *Udgātṛ* priests alone are to wear the Red-turban at the *Shyēna*,—and (*b*) on account of the *Name* ['*Ādhvaryava*' of the Veda where the *Vājapēya* is prescribed], the *Adhvaryu* priests alone are to wear the golden necklace at the *Vājapēya*".

The *Siddhānta* view is as follows:—*Inasmuch as the things in question are subordinate accessories, their connection cannot be determined by the name of the Vedic Section*; that is to say, *being red-turbaned* is a subordinate accessory,—so also is *being gold-necklaced*;—and the Man (Priest) is the predominant factor;—hence it follows that the *Red Turban* and the *Gold-necklace* are meant to be *accessories* (*or appurtenances*) *of the Man*, and not as *something to be done*; consequently the *Man* must be regarded as the predominant factor.—"What if it is so?"—If it is so, then, there is the principle already accepted, that in cases where the *Man* is the predominant factor, the *Name* cannot be the determining factor in indicating the performer of the action concerned.

Further, from the fact of the articles being spoken of as the accessories of man, it follows that what is laid down pertains to all the men (concerned); because as a rule, whenever an accessory is laid down in close proximity to the predominant factors (of which it is an accessory), it means that it is laid down in connection with each one of the predominant factors;—and this all-round connection having been indicated by Direct Declaration,—how could it be restricted by a *Name*, even if there were a *name*?—From all this it follows that at each of the two sacrifices (*Shyēna* and *Vājapēya*), the accessory details like those under consideration are to be adopted by all the priests.

ADHIKARAṆA (5): *The 'desire for rain' pertains to the Sacrificer.*

SŪTRA (13).

SIMILARLY, THE 'DESIRE' ALSO [PERTAINS TO THE SACRIFICER]; BECAUSE IT IS HE THAT IS CONNECTED WITH THE PURPOSE (OF THE PERFORMANCE).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we read—'*Yadi kāmayēt varṣēt parjanyaḥ nīchaiḥ sado minuyāt*' ['If he desire that Parjanya should rain, he should measure out the Assembly on low ground'].

In regard to this there arises the question—Is the 'Desire' mentioned here that of the Priest? Or of the Sacrificer? What the question means is—Who is the nominative to the verb '*kāmayēt*' ('should desire')—is it the *Adhvaryu* priest, or the *Sacrificer*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"The *desire* should be taken as that of the Priest, because of the Name (of the Vedic Section); the indication of the Name is that the Person who is eager to obtain results from the sacrifice is the *Adhvaryu priest*, who is the person spoken of in the Context [after whose name the Section of the Veda has been named as '*Ādhvaryava*']; hence it is the *Adhvaryu* who is taken as syntactically connected with the verb '*minuyāt*' ('should measure out');—from all this it follows that the 'desire' spoken of is that of the Priest."

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*Desire also* should be like the *Penance*; that is, the *Desire* pertains to the *Sacrificer*.—"Why so?"—*Because it is he that is connected with the purpose of the performance*; that is to say, it is understood that the Sacrificer is connected with the 'purpose'—i.e. the Result—of the Sacrifice as performed along with its accessory details.—Then again, in the case of the text '*Jyotiṣṭomēna svargakāmo yajēta*' ['Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* Sacrifice'] the particular ending (*Ātmanēpada* in '*yajeta*'),—makes it clear that the desire for 'heaven' is that of the Sacrificer: in the case in question, the peculiar ending (*Parasmaipada*) in '*minuyāt*' makes it clear that the *Adhvaryu* is to do the *measuring out* for the sake of someone else (i.e. the Sacrificer).—It has been urged that—"by reason of Syntactical Connection (of the verb 'should desire') with the person appearing in the Context as the seeker for result [the Desire should pertain to the *Adhvaryu*]".—But even with this Syntactical Connection the sentence could be explained as 'In the event of the *Sacrificer* being desirous (of rain), the *Adhvaryu* should measure out, etc.'

SŪTRA (14).

IT CAN PERTAIN TO OTHERS, ONLY WHEN IT IS SPOKEN OF AS SUCH.

Bhāṣya.

In a case *where it is spoken of as such*, the *desire* may be taken as pertaining to the Priest. For instance, there is the text—'*Udgāta ātmanēvā yajamānāya vā yam kāmam kāmayatē tamāgāyati*' ['The *Udgātṛ* priest sings out that result which he desires for himself or for the sacrificer'].—Now here, if the term '*ātmanē*' ('for himself') were to mean 'for the sacrificer', then there could be no justification for the adding of the term '*yajamānāya*', or of the term '*vā*';—hence it follows that by reason of the (separate) mention of the 'Sacrificer', the *Udgātṛ* priest should be taken as speaking of himself (as *desiring results*).

ADHIKARAṆA (6): *The Mantras beginning with 'Āyurdā' and the like are to be recited by the Sacrificer.*

SŪTRA (15).

THE MANTRAS ALSO WHICH ARE NOT CONNECTED WITH ANY ACTION, ARE LIKE 'DESIRE' [I.E. THEY ARE CONNECTED WITH THE SACRIFICER].

Bhāṣya.

The Mantras that are meant to be considered here are those like the following—'*Āyurdā agnē āyur mē dēhi*', '*Varchodā agnē asi varcho mē dēhi*' ['O Agni, you are the bestower of longevity, bestow longevity upon me!', 'O Agni, you are the bestower of glory, bestow glory upon me']. [The Mantras are laid down as to be simply recited, not in connection with the performance of any sacrificial details.] (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 5. 5. 4.)

In regard to these there arises the question—Are these to be recited by the Priest? Or by the Sacrificer?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"On account of the *name* (of the Vedic Section in which these *Mantras* occur), the Mantras should be taken as to be recited by the Priest".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—These *Mantras* should be like what has gone before; that is like 'desire' [they should be taken as connected with the Sacrificer]; it is only thus that there would be justification for the presence in the *Mantra* of the *term* expressive of the speaker himself [i.e. the pronoun '*mē*']. In the expressions 'bestow longevity upon me' and 'bestow glory upon me',—the terms 'longevity' and 'glory' stand for the result expected to follow from the performance undertaken,—the sense being 'O Fire, please accomplish the result of my action'.—Now the result expected to follow from an action is spoken of only for the purposes of encouragement; and the person who is encouraged by it is the *Sacrificer*, no one else. As a matter of fact, the Fire (that is addressed in the *Mantras*) has not been kindled for the sake of the result that is to accrue from the performance to the *Priest*; as this result (being in the shape of the Sacrificial Fee payable to him) is already an accomplished entity; in fact, the Fire has been kindled for the sake of the result that is to accrue to the *Sacrificer*; this result is not yet an accomplished entity, and is therefore to be spoken of as *to be hoped for*; and this encourages the Sacrificer and thereby tends to save the performance from becoming defective. Even when the Priest is encouraged by the prospect of (the Fee which is) an accomplished entity, he is so encouraged only in the performance which is to bring its reward to the Sacrificer; but the presence of the term expressive of the speaker himself could not be justifiable if the reciting were done by the Priest; the term expressive of the speaker himself retains its direct natural meaning only when the words are recited by the Sacrificer.—From all this it follows that the Mantras in question should be recited by the Sacrificer.

SŪTRA (16).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND THE MANTRAS BEING RECITED DURING THE ABSENCE (OF FIRE).

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, we find similar Mantras being addressed during the absence of Fire,—when the man is away from home (and his Fire);—the *Mantra* being '*Iha ēva san tatra santam tvā agnē, etc.*' [' While remaining here, I address thee, O Agni, who art there, etc.'] [where the words of the *Mantra* itself clearly indicate that the speaker is away from the Fire]. Now a man away from the Fires can never be a 'Priest'; as the term 'priest' denotes one who is actually engaged in the sacrificial performance [and this can only be when the Fires are there]. As regards the Sacrificer, however, it is possible for him to be away from the Fire and still remain the 'Sacrificer'; because it is possible for him to go away from home after having made suitable arrangements for his *Agnihotra* (daily offerings to his Fires);—then again, it is quite possible for a man living away from home to *give away* (dedicate) things (for being offered at a sacrifice).—The *Mantra* just quoted ('*Iha ēva san, etc.*') is just such a *Mantra* as is addressed to the Fire by one who is away from home;—this is indicated by the words of the *Mantra* itself, which, therefore, indicate that the *Mantra* is to be addressed by the Sacrificer;—and from this it follows that all *Mantras* of this kind are to be recited by the Sacrificer.

ADHIKARAṆA (7): *Mantras occurring in two sections of the Veda are to be recited by both persons.*

SŪTRA (17).

A MANTRA MENTIONED IN TWO PLACES IS TO BE RECITED BY BOTH PERSONS; AS THE REPETITION OF THE MANTRA MUST HAVE SOME PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; in connection with these we find certain *Mantras* that are mentioned in two places—one in the section (*Ādhvaryava*) dealing with the functions of the *Adhvaryu*, and then again in the section (*Yājamāna*) dealing with the functions of the Sacrificer:—For instance, (*a*) the *Mantras* with which the Clarified Butter is taken up—'*Pañchānām tvā vātānām yantrāya dhartrāya gṛhṇāmi*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 6. 1. 2) and so on, and (*b*) the *Mantras* with which the two *Srucass* are arranged —'*Vājasya mā prasavēna*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 1. 13. 1) and so on.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are such *Mantras* to be recited by both (the Sacrificer and the *Adhvaryu*)? Or by the *Adhvaryu* alone?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"on the basis of Name ('*Ādhvaryava*'), the Mantras should be taken as connected with the *Adhvaryu*".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—Both should recite the *Mantras* in question;—why?—*because the repetition of the Mantra must have some purpose.* Inasmuch as the *Mantras* have been named after both the persons, it follows that both are reciters of them; hence both should recite the *Mantras*;—the *Adhvaryu* reciting them with the intention of doing what is indicated by the words of the *Mantras*,—and the Sacrificer reciting them with a view to avoid carelessness and mistakes.

Adhikaraṇa (8): *The 'learned' Sacrificer alone is to be made to recite the Mantras.*

SŪTRA (18).

It is only the learned man that is to be made to recite the Mantra; as the illiterate man is not entitled (to perform sacrifices).

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Vājapēya* sacrifice, we read—(*a*) 'He makes the Sacrificer recite the *Kl̥pti Mantras*' [The *Mantras* beginning with the words '*Āyuryajñēna kalpatām*, etc.'—Vājasnēya Saṁ. 9. 21—are called '*Kl̥pti Mantras*'], and (*b*) 'He makes the Sacrificer recite the *Ujjisati*-mantras [i.e. the *Mantras* beginning with the words '*Agnirēkākṣarēṇa*'—Vājasa. Saṁ. 9. 31].

In regard to these, there arises the question—Are all Sacrificers, the learned as well as the illiterate, to be made to recite these? Or the learned ones only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"both the learned and the illiterate should be made to recite the *Mantras*, as no distinction has been made between them".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—The learned alone should be made to recite the *Mantras*;—why?—*because the illiterate man is not entitled to perform* sacrifices; as a matter of fact, the illiterate man is not entitled to perform sacrifices, for the simple reason that he has not the requisite capacity.—"At the time of the performance, he would learn the Mantras and then recite them; and having thus acquired the necessary capacity, he would be entitled (to the performance)."—That cannot be,—we say. Because the performance of sacrifices has been laid down as coming after the Veda has been studied, and the *study of the Veda* is not included under the text laying down the performance of sacrifices.—"How so?"—Because it is without reference to any act or performance that it has been enjoined that 'the Veda should be studied'. And when we have this independent injunction of the study of the Veda, it cannot be assumed that the injunction that the Veda should be studied is expressed by such sentences as 'one should offer the *Agnihotra*'. Because all that this latter sentence lays down is the offering of the *Agnihotra* libations,—and it follows that only one who has studied the Veda is entitled to perform the act,—not one who is entirely ignorant of the Veda.—"By knowing how much of the Veda does a man become entitled to perform sacrifices?"—By knowing that much which, on being known, supplies him with the requisite capacity to perform the sacrifice as laid down in the scriptures. Thus it is only the man who knows that much of the Veda is entitled to the performance of a sacrifice.

Objection—" But the injunction that we have is that 'one should study the Veda', which means that the whole of the Veda is to be studied: so that by reading up merely a part of the Veda one cannot become entitled to the performance of a sacrifice."

Answer—The Veda has to be studied for the purpose of knowing all about sacrifices; such being the case, when one is going to perform a particular sacrifice, the knowledge of any other sacrifice could not serve any visible purpose; consequently in determining whether one is or is not entitled to the performance of any particular sacrifice, no heed need be paid to his knowledge of any other sacrifice; because for the knowledge of that other sacrifice, it would be necessary to study that portion of the Veda which deals with that sacrifice. With all this however, the study of the whole Veda has been enjoined, for the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of all the sacrifices one by one.—Hence we conclude that when a man knows all about the details of any one sacrifice he becomes entitled to the performance of that sacrifice. Under the circumstances, a man who is ignorant of the details of the sacrifice will not be able to perform that sacrifice at all; how then could there be any possibility of his being made to recite the *Mantras*?—From all this it follows that it is right to say that it is only the learned person that should be made to recite the *Mantras*.

[Kumārila's remarks on this are interesting—'Such being the case, the knowing of the branches of knowledge other than the Veda proper would be very far from necessary for the due performance of sacrifices. But so far as the knowledge of the *Self* is concerned, inasmuch as without that knowledge one could not take up the performance of any sacrifice at all [as a sacrifice is always performed with a view to some benefit expected to accrue to the Person after the death of the physical body], it must be regarded as necessary for the performance of all sacrifices'.—*Tantravārtika*, Trans., p. 1678.]

ADHIKARAṆA (9): *The twelve 'Double Acts' are to be done by the Adhvaryu.*

SŪTRA (19).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"INASMUCH AS THEY ARE SPOKEN OF UNDER THE NAME 'YĀJAMĀNA' ['PERTAINING TO THE SACRIFICER'], THE ACTIONS SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY THE SACRIFICER."

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, in connection with which *twelve* actions (forming *Six* 'Couples') have been laid down—'He lets loose the calf; puts the boiling pot on the fire;—threshes the corn; strikes the pestle and mortar with *Shamyā*;—spreads out the flour; puts the baking pans on the fire;—bakes the cake; heats the clarified butter;—brings the *Stambayajuṣ* and takes it up; touches the altar;—girds the loin of the Sacrificer's wife; collects the *Prokṣaṇī* and also the clarified butter;—these are the twelve *Dvandvas* (Double Acts) at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*'. [Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 6. 9. 3-4.]

In regard to these actions, there arises the question—Are these to be done by the *Adhvaryu*, or by the Sacrificer?

[This doubt arises from the fact that in the first place, every one of these acts is found to be enjoined in its proper place among the acts styled '*Ādhvaryava*',—and then subsequently again they are spoken of under the name '*Yājamāna*', where it is laid down that 'one should offer the sacrifice only after having accomplished all these acts'. As named '*Ādhvaryava*', they should be done by the *Adhvaryu*; while as named '*Yājamāna*', they should be done by the *Yajamāna*, Sacrificer. They cannot be done by both, like the reciting of the *mantras* dealt with under Sū. 3. 8. 17.—*Bhāṭṭadīpika*.]

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"*Inasmuch as they are spoken of under the name 'Yājamānā', the actions should be performed by the Sacrificer*: that is to say, by reason of their being given the specific name '*Yājamāna*', it follows that they are to be performed by the *Sacrificer*; just as it is in the case of actions named '*Potrīya*' and '*Nēṣṭrīya*' [where by reason of these *names*, the acts are taken as to be performed by the *Potṛ* and the *Neṣṭṛ* priests respectively]".

SŪTRA (20).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, THE ADHVARYU [SHOULD PERFORM THEM]; AS HE IS ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE (OF PERFORMING SUCH ACTIONS); AS REGARDS THE NAME ('YĀJAMĀNA'), ITS INDICATION IS TO BE ACCEPTED ONLY IN SO FAR AS IT HAS THE SUPPORT OF REASON.

Bhāṣya.

In reality, the *Adhvaryu* should perform these actions; because it is for the performance of such actions that his services are secured; this

fact we deduce from the *Name*, inasmuch as all these details are found laid down in the section called '*Ādhvaryava*'; while what is mentioned in the section called '*Yājamāna*' is only the 'coupling' of the actions,—this 'coupling' consisting in bringing together two actions.—Now if the *Adhvaryu* were to *perform* the actions, and the Sacrificer were to bring them together,—this would be absolutely impossible. Hence what has to be done is that, on the ground of its being a subordinate factor, the idea of 'coupling' has to be set aside (ignored),—in accordance with the principle going to be enunciated under Sū. 12. 2. 25.—From all this it follows that the actions in question are to be performed by the *Adhvaryu*.

As regards the argument that—"on the basis of the Name ('*Yājamāna*', the actions should be performed by the Sacrificer)",—this has got to be refuted; and the refutation is this:—*The indication of Name is to be accepted only in so far as it has the support of reason*; and in this case the only reasonable deduction that we could make from the Name '*Yājamāna*' would be that 'in regard to these actions, the Sacrificer should say to the *Adhvaryu—these actions have to be turned into couples—please therefore do this and that* (naming the actions under consideration). In the case of a few of the actions under consideration, the permission of the Sacrificer has to be obtained (by the *Adhvaryu*); and as regards these, the name '*Yājamāna*' may be due to this fact; but even so all notion of any transcendental result following from this should have to be given up.

It has been argued that—"as it is in the case of the names '*potrīya*' and '*neṣṭrīya*', so should it be in the present case also".—The answer to this is that in the case of the names mentioned, it is only right that the actions should be done by the priests indicated; because the actions are indicated by the names as pertaining to the particular priests. In the case in question however, the conditions are different—the 'coupling' pertains to the Sacrificer, while the actions themselves pertain to the *Adhvaryu*; hence there is no incongruity.

Adhikaraṇa (10): *The Hotṛ-priest should recite the 'Karaṇa-mantra' assigned to the Adhvaryu.*

SŪTRA (21).

When there is an impossibility (of reciting both), it is the 'Karaṇa-mantra' that should be recited (by the Hotṛ), because of the peculiar relationship (between the Hotṛ and the Mantra connected with the Adhvaryu); as for the other Mantra, someone else, from among the priests, may recite it,—who may have a special reason for doing it.

Bhāṣya.

At the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there is the *Agniṣomīya* animal; for the tethering of this animal there is a sacrificial Post, round which a rope is entwined; and in connection with this entwining of the rope, there are two *mantras* recited—one, by the *Adhvaryu*, which is the '*Karaṇa-mantra*' (i.e. the *Mantra* by means of which the *Entwining* is done), and the other, by the *Hotṛ*, which is descriptive of the Entwining while it is being done,—the former being the *Mantra* beginning with '*Parivīrasi*' (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 3. 6. 2), and the latter, the *Mantra* beginning with '*Yuvāsuvāsāḥ*' (Ṛgveda 3. 8. 4).—The *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana* sacrifice is a 'modification' (or Ectype) of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, and hence it takes in the said two *Mantras* by virtue of the general law (that the Ectype is to be done in the manner of the Archetype); and in regard to the two *Mantras* as to be used at this *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, there arises a doubt.—"What doubt can there be (and why)?"—At this sacrifice, there is a curtailment of the number of priests by reason of the declaration that at this sacrifice 'he who is the *Hotṛ* is also the *Adhvaryu*', so that [it being not possible for the two Mantras to be recited simultaneously, one by the *Adhvaryu* and the other by the *Hotṛ*, as there is no *Adhvaryu* at all] there arises the question—When the *Hotṛ* (who is also the *Adhvaryu*) is going to recite the *Mantra*—is he to recite the *Karaṇa-mantra* which (at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) is recited by the *Adhvaryu* (i.e. the *Mantra* '*Parivīrasi*, etc.')? or the other *Mantra* descriptive of the Entwining while it is being done, which (at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) is recited by the *Hotṛ*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that "there can be no hard and fast rule on this point [i.e. it is open to the *Hotṛ* to recite either the one or the other]".

The *Siddhānta* is as follows:—*There being an impossibility of both being recited, it is the Karaṇa-mantra that should be recited by the Hotṛ*; that is, he should recite the *mantra* '*Parivīrasi*, etc.', which (at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) is recited by the *Adhvaryu*,—and not the *mantra* '*Yuvāsuvāsāḥ*, etc.', which

is descriptive of the *Entwining* being done, and which (at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*) is recited by the *Hotṛ*.—" Why so ? "—*Because of the peculiar relationship (between the Hotṛ and the mantra recited by the Adhvaryu at the Jyotiṣṭoma)*; that is to say, there are two relationships borne by the *Hotṛ*—the *first* one is his relationship to the *mantras* connected with the *Hotṛ* (at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), which relationship, in the case of the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, is indirect, being based upon the general law (that 'the Ectype is to be performed in the manner of the Archetype'),—and the *second* one is his relationship to the *mantras* connected with the *Adhvaryu* (at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*), which relationship is *direct*, being based upon the direct assertion that 'at the *Kuṇḍapāyināmayana*, one who is the *Hotṛ*, is also the *Adhvaryu*';—now this last assertion enjoins the *Hotṛ*, directly, to perform the functions of the *Adhvaryu*; and this perceptible Injunction is more authoritative than the one inferred (on the basis of the general law relating to the Archetype and the Ectype).—From all this it follows that the *Hotṛ* should recite the *Karaṇa-mantra*, '*Parivīrasi*, etc.', which is connected with the *Adhvaryu*.

Question—" Who then would recite the *mantra* ('*Yuvāsuvāsāḥ*, etc.') which is connected with the *Hotṛ*, and the reciting of which by the *Hotṛ* is impossible under the circumstances ? "

Answer—As for the other mantra, someone else, from among the priests, would recite it, who may have a special reason for doing it. That is to say, another priest, an assistant of the *Hotṛ*, may recite the other *mantra*,—any of them who may not be otherwise engaged at the time or to whom some sort of predominance might attach at the time.

Adhikaraṇa (11): *One who does the 'Directing' is different from one who carries out the directions.*

SŪTRA (22).

THE DIRECTINGS ARE TO BE DONE BY A DIFFERENT PERSON, BECAUSE DIRECTIONS ARE ALWAYS ADDRESSED TO OTHERS.

Bhāṣya.

There are the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifices; in connection with these the act of *Directing* has been laid down,—such directing for instance as—'Bring the water-vessels;—place fuel and grass;—cleanse the *Sruks*;—gird up the loin of the Sacrificer's wife;—come up with clarified butter'.

In connection with these directions, there arises the question—Is the person doing the *directing* the same as the one that does the acts directed to be done? Or is the *director* different from the person carrying out the directions?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"The person *directing* and the person carrying out the directions are one and the same.—Why so?—Because of the *name* ['*Ādhvaryava*' under which both are included; hence both the acts are to be done by the *Adhvaryu*].—'But the directing of one's own self is most incongruous.'—The answer to this is that it will not be a *direction*; we shall explain the Imperative Ending (*Loṭ*) as expressing the idea that the time for the action denoted by the root has arrived [i.e. the sentence 'bring the water-vessels' means 'it is time for the vessels to be brought up'].—Says the Opponent—'Even if the idea expressed be that *the time has arrived*, the use of the *Second Person* (in the verb) is restricted to the presence of such correlatives as 'you' and the like; and certainly there can be no mixing up of the *First* with the *Second* Person'.—The answer to this is as follows—The Second Person is restricted to the presence of such correlatives of 'you' only when the idea of 'you' is meant to be expressed; for instance, when the idea meant to be expressed is that 'the time for *your* doing the act has arrived', then alone the verb is to be used in the Second Person,—and it does not take either the First or the Third Person. When however all that is meant to be expressed is that 'the time for doing the action has arrived',—and not '*your* doing', or '*my* doing',—then the verb is not to take the Second Person, simply in accordance with the presence of such correlative words as 'you' and the like.—Nor is it possible for both these ideas to be meant to be expressed at the same time—that 'the time for the action has arrived' and that 'it is time for *your* doing it';—as this would involve a syntactical split. Thus then there are only two possibilities—(1) the fact of the time for action having arrived being already known, the idea intended to be conveyed may be that 'it is *your* time to do the act',—or (2) the idea of 'your time' being already known, the idea intended to be conveyed is that 'it is time

for the doing of the act'.—Now what is required to be declared (by a Vedic Injunction) is the time for the doing of the act,—not the time of 'you'; there is a useful purpose served by the remembrance of the *time for action*;—it is already known that 'the action is to be done' [hence there is some use in speaking of the time for it]; the object 'you', on the other hand, is not known as that 'it is to be done'.—From all this it follows that, on the basis of *Name*, the *Adhvaryu* alone is to do the *directing* as also to carry out the direction."

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta* :—The person doing the *directing* should be different from one who carries out the direction.—Why ?—*Because directions are always meant for others*; as a matter of fact, a direction can be addressed only to another person, never to one's own self.—"We have already explained that the words would mean that 'the time has arrived'."—Our answer to that is that so long as it is possible for the Imperative word to be taken as a direction, it cannot be right to take it as expressing the idea that 'the time has arrived'; because in this latter case it has to be held that the idea of 'you', though clearly comprehended, is not meant to be expressed. In the case in question we find that it is possible to take the word as a *direction*; hence it must be a *direction*;—and if it is a *direction*, then it is established that what is *directed* to be done is something different [and should be done by another person].

ADHIKARAṆA (12): *The 'Directing' and the 'carrying out of the Direction' are to be done by the Adhvaryu and the Agnīdh respectively.*

SŪTRA (23).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE ADHVARYU SHOULD CARRY OUT THE DIRECTIONS; AS THIS IS SHOWN (BY VEDIC TEXTS)."

Bhāṣya.

After the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, there arises the further question—Is the *Adhvaryu* to *direct* the *Agnīdh*? Or the *Agnīdh* is to direct the *Adhvaryu*?

The apparent view appears to be that as nothing is specifically laid down, there can be no restriction as to who should direct whom.

As against this *prima facie* view, we have the following *Pūrvapakṣa*:—"The *Adhvaryu* should be the person who carries out the direction;—why? —because *this is shown by Vedic texts*; we have the following text indicative of the same conclusion—'*Tiryañcham sphyam dhārayēt, yadanvañcham dhārayēt vajro vai sphyo vajrēṇa adhvaryum kṣiṇvīta*' ['He should hold the *Sphya* obliquely; if he holds it horizontally, the *Sphya*, being the thunderbolt, he would destroy the *Adhvaryu* with the thunderbolt'] (cf. Taitti. Brā. 3. 2. 10. 1); this passage shows that the *Sphya* is in the hand of the person who does the *directing*; and the assertion that 'he destroys the *Adhvaryu* with the thunderbolt' indicates the *Adhvaryu* to be other than the person *directing*. From this it follows that it is the *Agnīdh* who should direct the *Adhvaryu*."

SŪTRA (24).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY THE TERM ['ADHVARYU', OCCURRING IN THE TEXT QUOTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE 'SPHYA'] IS TO BE TAKEN IN THE FIGURATIVE (INDIRECT) SENSE [AS STANDING FOR THE 'AGNĪDH' PRIEST],—ON THE BASIS OF THE SIMILARITY OF THEIR FUNCTIONS.

Bhāṣya.

It is not right that "the *Agnīdh* does the *directing*, and the *Adhvaryu* carries out the direction"; the right view is that the *Adhvaryu* should direct the *Agnīdh*; as in this way the *directing* as well as the *carrying out of the direction* would be *done by the Adhvaryu* [in the sense that the carrying out of the direction being done under his direction, it can be regarded as done by himself, though indirectly]; and this would be in keeping with the *name* '*Ādhvaryava*' [under which both the acts are included]. In this

way then the *Adhvaryu* would be the predominant person.—" Where would his predominance lie ? "—It lies in the fact that everything is to be done by him, on the basis of the *Name* (' *Ādhvaryava* ').—As regards the argument that " we find the *Adhvaryu* actually spoken of (in the text just quoted, regarding the holding of the *Sphya*) as the person carrying out the directions ",—our answer to this is that it is true that we find him so spoken of ; but when we come to think of it, we do not find any authority for the *Adhvaryu* being regarded as the person carrying out the directions (given by others) ; hence this view must be wrong ; in fact, a view in support of which there is no authority, must be treated as an illusion ; e.g. the notion in regard to *shell* that it is *silver*.—On the other hand, there *is* authority for the view that the *Agnīdh* is the person to carry out the directions (given by the *Adhvaryu*) ; hence the *Agnīdh* is the worker ; and in the text quoted (in connection with the holding of the *Sphya*), the term '*adhvaryu*' is really found to be used in the sense of *the worker* (and not of the *Adhvaryu Priest*), and hence in a figurative sense ; so that it is the *Agnīdh* priest who is spoken of as '*Adhvaryu*' on the ground that he is the person who will work out the details laid down in the *Ādhvaryava* section of the Veda (under the direction of the *Adhvaryu*).—From all this it follows that the directing is the function of the *Adhvaryu* and the carrying out of those directions is the function of the *Agnīdh*.

ADHIKARAṆA (13): *The results spoken of in the 'Karaṇa-mantras' accrue to the Sacrificer.*

SŪTRA (25).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—"THE RESULT SPOKEN OF IN THE 'KARAṆA-MANTRAS' ACCRUES TO THE PRIEST; AS THEN ALONE CAN THE MENTION OF IT SERVE A USEFUL PURPOSE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read—'*Mamāgnē varcho vihavēṣvastu—iti pūrvamagnim gṛhṇāti*' ['Saying—*O Agni, may glory be mine in contests*—he first takes hold of the Fire'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 4. 7. 14. 1). [*Nyāyamālavistara* explains the meaning as 'may that reward be mine which is endowed with the glory of excellent oblations'. The translation has adopted the meaning assigned to the *mantra* in the *Bhāṣya* itself—see below.]

In regard to this, there arises the question—The reward that is asked for,—does it accrue to the Priest or to the Sacrificer?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It pertains to the *Adhvaryu Priest* only.—Why?—Because this view is in keeping with the direct meaning of the text; any other view would necessitate the attributing of an indirect meaning to the text,—i.e. the *self* of the speaking Priest (expressed by the word '*mama*', 'mine') would have to be taken as standing for the *Sacrificer*. From this it follows that what is asked for is a reward accruing to the Priest.—'What would be the meaning of the text in that case?'—The sense is—'If the Fire is held in this piece of fuel, the performance of the sacrifice will be possible, and thence, at all contests, in all cases of competition, I shall be glorious';—this is an assertion made by the *Adhvaryu*, and thereby he becomes encouraged."

SŪTRA (26).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT ACCRUES TO THE MASTER (SACRIFICER),—BECAUSE IT IS FOR HIS SAKE [THAT THE ACTION IS PERFORMED].

Bhāṣya.

The reward spoken of *accrues to the Sacrificer, because it is for his sake that the action is performed*; as a matter of fact, the entire sacrifice, along with all its accessories and subsidiaries, is performed for the sake of the Sacrificer,—as is clear from the particular (*Ātmanēpada*) ending [in the injunctive word '*yajēta*' contained in the injunction '*Jyotiṣṭomēna*

svargakāmo yajēta', 'Desiring heaven, one should perform the *Jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice']. As a matter of fact, the purpose for which the sacrifice along with its accessories is performed is the accomplishment of the result desired by the Sacrificer,—not the glory or fame of the *Adhvaryu*, however well equipped the latter may be.—"What if that is so?"—If that is so, then the mention of the Result indicates that the Result should be brought about (worked for); that is to say, in the case in question, the fact that the *Anvādhāna* (Supplementary Laying) of the Fire should be performed becomes indicated by the *mantra* cited, only if it speaks of a result accruing to the Sacrificer,—not if it only speaks of the glory of the *Adhvaryu* priest.—From this it follows that what is asked for in the *mantra* is a result accruing to the Sacrificer.

Question—"In that case, why should not the *mantra* be recited by the Sacrificer himself?"

Answer—By virtue of the *name* ('*Ādhvaryava*'), the *Supplementary Laying* (*Anvādhāna*) of the Fire is a function of the *Adhvaryu*;—and as this *Supplementary Laying of Fire* is done by means of the said *mantra*, the *mantra* also comes to be regarded as '*Ādhvaryava*' (i.e. recited by the *Adhvaryu*); and it is the *Adhvaryu* that is referred to in the *mantra* (by the term '*mama*', 'mine'); hence it is that the *mantra* is recited by the *Adhvaryu*. In the phrase 'may glory be mine', it is the *sacrificer's* glory that is spoken of (by the *Adhvaryu*) as 'mine', figuratively; just as though the victory in a battle has accrued to the king, yet the soldiers speak of it as '*our* victory'.

SŪTRA (27).

ALSO BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIONS TO THE SAME EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

There is an indicative text also, pointing to the same conclusion.—There is the text—'*Yām vai kāñchana ṛtvija āṣhiṣamāshāsatē yajamānasya eva sā*' ['Whatever benediction the Priests ask for, it verily accrues to the Sacrificer'],—where it is shown that the benediction is for the Sacrificer.—For this reason also we declare that the result that is spoken of accrues to the Sacrificer. The purpose served (by this mention of the reward) is exactly as pointed out in the *Pūrvapakṣa* [i.e. it serves to encourage the person concerned].

ADHIKARAṆA (14): *Such results spoken of in the 'Karaṇa-mantras' as are helpful in the performance accrue to the Priest.*

SŪTRA (28).

THE RESULT THAT IS HELPFUL IN THE PERFORMANCE ACCRUES TO THE PRIEST; AS EVEN SO, IT SERVES THE PURPOSE OF THE SACRIFICER.

Bhāṣya.

It has been understood that the results spoken of in the '*Karaṇa-mantras*' accrue to the Sacrificer.—The question that arises now is—Is this the universal rule [Is it always so]?—The answer is—No; in some cases, the result spoken of accrues to the Priests;—i.e. in those cases where the result in question is helpful in the performance; for instance, there is the *mantra*—'*Agnāviṣṇū māvakramiṣaṁ vijihāthām māmā santāptam* (Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 1. 12. 1). [This *mantra* is recited at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, by the *Adhvaryu*, while he is holding near his navel the two Ladles filled with clarified butter; the meaning of the *mantra* is—'O Agni-Viṣṇu, in the shape of the two Ladles, by holding you near my navel, I have not failed in my duty towards you,—may you not be separated from me, and may you also save me from becoming subject to heat and suffering'.]—Here, the result spoken of is *freedom from the effects of heat*;—now if this result accrues to the *Adhvaryu* Priest, and he does not suffer from heat, then he can perform his functions at the sacrifice in the proper manner, and the proper performance of the sacrifice thus secured is beneficial to the Sacrificer.—Thus in this case the result spoken of is one that accrues to the Priest.

SŪTRA (29).

ALSO WHERE THERE IS A DIRECT ASSERTION [TO THAT EFFECT].

Bhāṣya.

Also in a case where there is a direct assertion to that effect, the result is to be taken as accruing to the Priests.—For instance [at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*] under the southern *Havirdhāna Cart*, there are four one-span-mouthed holes, removed from each other by one *Prādesha* (six inches) [joined together at the bottom];—the *Adhvaryu* puts his hands into these, and says to the Sacrificer 'What is there in this?',—the other (i.e. the Sacrificer) says 'Prosperity';—then the *Adhvaryu* says—'May it accrue to both of us together'. [These questions and answers are embodied in the *mantra* '*Kimatra—bhadram—tannau saha*', which occurs in Taitti. Saṁ. 1. 3. 2. 1.]—Now here we find

that there is a direct assertion to the effect that the result spoken of (*Prosperity*) accrues to the *Adhvaryu* as well as the Sacrificer;—the phrase '*tannau saha*' clearly referring to both the persons, the *Adhvaryu* and the Sacrificer. Consequently it has to be admitted that in this case the result spoken of accrues to the *Adhvaryu* (also).

ADHIKARAṆA (15): *The 'Embellishments' of substances subserve the purposes of the Primary as well as the Subsidiary Sacrifices.*

SŪTRA (30).

THE EMBELLISHMENT OF A SUBSTANCE APPERTAINS TO ALL SACRIFICES; AS THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT.

[The cases of conflict among Direct Assertion, Indicative Power and the rest having been dealt with, it is now going to be shown that the conclusions arrived at are applicable not only to Primary Sacrifices, but also to their Subsidiaries and Modifications.]

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there have been laid down many details relating to (preparatory of) the Grass, and others relating to the Altar.

In regard to these, there arises the question—Do these subserve the purposes of (are helpful to) the Primary as well as its subsidiaries? Or of the Primary only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"by virtue of the Context, they should be helpful to the Primary only".

The *Siddhānta* is that it is not so; the Embellishment of substances subserves the purposes of the Primary as well as its subsidiaries, as has been already explained above (under Sū. 3. 7. 1 *et seq.*). [Though this has been already explained before, yet] it has been brought in here as leading up to what follows.

[According to the *Tantravārtika*, what is said here relates to the Primary and its Modifications; it remarks that what has been said before, under Sū. 3. 7. 1 *et seq.*, is that the details appertain to the Primary as well as its *subsidiaries*; and the present *Sūtra* has been introduced simply for the purpose of showing that the same conclusion holds good regarding the *Modifications* also.—From the last sentence of the *Bhāṣya* also it is clear that the reiteration of the conclusion is meant to be introductory to what follows,—and what follows is the connection of the Details of the Primary with its *Modifications*—not *subsidiaries*; so that the present *Adhikaraṇa* should really be taken in the way in which the *Tantravārtika* has taken it.—It is curious, that the wording of the *Sūtra* is clearer than that of the *Bhāṣya*, as therein it is clearly stated that they are for '*all sacrifices*', which includes the Primary, its *subsidiaries* as well as its *Modifications*.]

Adhikaraṇa (16): *The details peculiar to the Primary do not find place in its 'Modification'.*

SŪTRA (31).

Inasmuch as they are laid down as relating specifically to the Primary Original, they should have no place in the 'Modification'.

Bhāṣya.

In course of the *Jyotiṣṭoma* there is the *Agnīṣomīya* Animal [the animal dedicated and sacrificed to Agni-Soma], the sacrificing of which is laid down in the text—'*Yo dīkṣito yadagnīṣomīyam pashumālabhatē*' ['On being initiated, the man sacrifices the animal dedicated to Agni-Soma'] (Taitti. Saṁ. 6. 1. 11. 6); in connection with the killing of this animal, we read '*Barhiṣā yūpāvaṭamavastṛṇāti, ājyēna yūpamanakti*' ['He covers the pit of the Post with grass; he anoints the Post with clarified butter'].

In regard to this latter, there arises the question—Should the details, laid down in connection with the *Grass* and *Clarified Butter* used at the Primary Original Sacrifice (*Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*), be performed in connection with the Grass and Clarified Butter used for covering the pit and anointing the Post at the 'Modificatory Sacrifice' (*Agnīṣomīya*)?—or not?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"They should be performed at the Modification.—Why?—The sentence that lays down the details in question (in connection with the Primary), lays them down for all grass and all clarified butter;—that sentence is applicable to the Modification also, by the general law (that 'the Modification is to be performed in the manner of the Primary Original');—nor are the *Grass* and *Clarified Butter* used at the Modification useless;—hence it follows that the said details are to be performed in connection with these latter also."

The *Siddhānta*, in answer to this, is as follows:—*Inasmuch as they are laid down as relating specifically to the Primary Original, they should have no place in the Modification.* As a matter of fact, the details in question have been laid down in relation to the Primary Original, at which they help in the fulfilment of what is done with the *Grass* and the *Clarified Butter*, at that Primary Sacrifice. Those details alone of the Primary Original are transferred to the 'Modification' which are of use in the latter [and not all the details of the Primary]. But what the general law (relating to *Modifications*) requires (for its operation) is the Primary Original itself (whose procedure the law transfers to the Modification), and not its details; because what is transferred by the general law (to the *Modification*) is the *general outline* of the Primary, and not the *details*. [For if all the details of the Primary were to come into the Modification, then the result would be that the Primary Sacrifice would come to be performed all over again —says the *Tantravārtika*.]

Further, a detail cannot be syntactically connected with one thing, even though it be in close proximity to it,—when it is known to be appurtenant to something else,—at least so long as it is possible to connect it with that something else; for instance, in the case of the expression '*Bhāryā—rājñaḥ—puruṣo—dēvadattasya*' [where it being known that the '*bhāryā*' 'wife', spoken of is that of Devadatta, we cannot connect that word with '*rājñaḥ*' 'of the king',—even though the two words are in juxtaposition];—when such connection is not possible between two things in juxtaposition, how much less possible is it, my friend, in the case where the things are remote from one another?—In the case in question the accessory character of the details is recognised only in relation to the Primary Original; and it is mere *transference* that is done in connection with the Modification. If the details were all to come into the Modification, then it would be necessary also to establish their accessory character (in relation to the Modification); and all the required details in that case would be common to the Primary and the Modification, and there would be no occasion for any *ūha* or alteration in the details (in consideration of the exigencies of the Modification);—further *mantras* would be adopted in accordance with the indicatives that might be found in each case; and there would be no room for any such specification of details as 'they offer the omentum at the Morning Extraction, the Cake at the Midday Extraction',—or as 'The Father does not increase, nor the Mother, nor the Kin,—it is Prāṇa alone'.—From all this it follows that the details should be performed at the Modification only through those things through which they have been performed at the Primary Original;—now, there is no 'covering of the pit of the Post' at the Original Sacrifice, nor the 'anointing of the Post' [through and to which the details regarding the *Grass* and the *Butter* could have been performed at the Original]; consequently it follows that those details of the Original Sacrifice cannot be performed at the Modification (*Agnīṣomīya*),—being related specifically, as they are, to that Primary Original.

Adhikaraṇa (17): *The 'Vidhṛtis' and the 'Pavitras' are not to be made out of the Grass got for spreading over the Altar;—they may be made out of the 'Paribhojanīya' Grass.*

SŪTRA (32).

IN VIEW OF A VEDIC DECLARATION, THERE WOULD BE AN IMPOSSIBILITY; HENCE THE OTHER CASES MUST REMAIN UNDEFINED.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, we read (*a*) '*Samān aprachchhinnāgrau darbhau prādeshamātrau pavitrē karoti*'; and again (*b*) '*Aratnimātrē vidhṛtē karoti*' [(*a*) 'He makes two *Pavitras* of two pieces of Kusha-grass, six inches in length, equal and with their tips uncut', (*b*) 'He makes two *Vidhṛtis* of two pieces of Kusha-grass, 18 inches long.']

In regard to this there arises the question—Are the *Pavitras* and the *Vidhṛtis* made out of the grass that has been got for spreading over the Altar?—or out of some other grass?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"they should be made out of the grass got for spreading over the altar.—'Why so?'—Because it is that grass which has been spoken of in the Context, and the purificatory details also appertain equally to all kinds of grass;—hence the *Pavitras* and the *Vidhṛtis* should be made out of the same grass".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is as follows:—They should be made out of other grass.—"Why?"—Because of impossibility.—"How is there an impossibility?"—There is a Vedic declaration to the effect that 'He spreads the grass over the altar thrice or five times'; if this *spreading* is done in this manner, how could any *Vidhṛti* or *Pavitra* be made out of the grass that is so spread out? It is, in fact, *not possible* that one and the same grass should be used for *spreading* and also for making the *Vidhṛti* and the *Pavitra*. Thus then there would be two mutually incompatible statements—(1) the direct declaration (regarding the spreading of the grass over the altar three or five times) and (2) the statement that several uses could be made out of that same grass.—From this it follows that the *Vidhṛti* and the *Pavitra* should not be made out of the grass got for spreading over the altar.

"If not out of that, then whence?"—

Well, as regards the uses of grass (other than the spreading over the Altar), it would always remain *undefined* as to which particular grass is to be used; or it may be done out of the *grass* named '*Paribhojanīya*', which is there.

Adhikaraṇa (18): *The 'keeping' is to be done of that same Cake and other things which have been spoken of and used at the sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (33).

THE 'KEEPING' IS TO BE OF A PORTION (OF WHAT HAS BEEN USED AT THE SACRIFICE); AS IN THAT CASE, THERE IS CONNECTION OF WHAT IS ALREADY THERE.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read—'*Puroḍāshashakalam aindravāyavasya pātrē nidadhāti, dhānā āshvinapātrē, payasyām maitrāvaruṇapātrē*' ['He keeps the cake-piece in the *Aindravāyava* vessel, the fried barley in the *Āshvina* vessel, and the *Payasyā* in the *Maitrāvaruṇa* vessel'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Are these to be kept out of the substances that have been used at the sacrifice? Or out of others?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"according to the principle of the foregoing *Adhikaraṇa*, they should be kept out of substances other than those used at the sacrifice".

In answer to this, the *Siddhānta* is that *the keeping is to be of a portion of what has been used at the sacrifice*;—why?—because *in that case there is connection of what is already there.* That is to say, the Cake, the Fried Barley and the Curds being already there, the most reasonable course is that what is to be done should be done in connection with those, not in connection with other substances.—Another reason for the same conclusion is that the 'embellishment' (brought about by the 'keeping') must appertain to the Cake and other substances, not of the *Aindravāyava* and other vessels.—"Why?"—Because we find the Accusative ending in the words denoting those substances.—Then again, the *betterment* (embellishment) that is perceived (in the Cake, etc.) is that brought about by the '*keeping* of a portion', not by connection with the *Aindravāyava* and other vessels.—Lastly, it is only when the 'keeping' is done out of the substances used at the sacrifice that there is some good done to those substances.—For these reasons, the 'keeping' should be done in reference to the substances used at the sacrifice.—This should not be open to the objection that "this involves the enjoining (of the *keeping*) of what has been already *enjoined* (as to be offered into Fire), and also the anomaly of one and the same thing occupying the position of several kinds of subservience";—because the *piece* offered into the Fire would be entirely different from the piece that is 'disposed of' (by being *kept* in the vessels).

Adhikaraṇa (19): *The 'silence' enjoined in connection with the 'Kāmya Iṣṭis' serves the purposes of the Principal Sacrifice only.*

SŪTRA (34).

[Pūrvapakṣa]—"The accessory detail performed in connection with the 'Modification' should serve the purposes of all,—just like that laid down in connection with the Original Primary."

Bhāṣya.

We have the following text—'*Yajñātharvaṇam vai kāmyā iṣṭayaḥ tā upāmshu kartavyāḥ*' ['The *Iṣṭis with a purpose* pertain to the *Sacrificial Atharvan*,—they should be performed silently (inaudibly)'].

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this *silence* meant to be helpful in the Principal as well as the Subsidiary? or in the Principal only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"*the accessory detail performed in connection with the 'Modification' should serve the purposes of all*,—i.e. of all Principals and all Subsidiaries; as there is no discrimination,—*just like that laid down in connection with the Original Primary*; that is, just as (under Sū. 3. 7. 1 *et seq.*) it has been decided that the details enjoined regarding the Altar and those regarding the Clarified Butter appertain to (and are helpful at) the Principal as well as the Subsidiaries,—so should it be in the present case also".

SŪTRA (35).

[Siddhānta]—In reality, it serves the purposes of the Principal Sacrifice only; as it has not been enjoined in connection with the Subsidiary at all.

Bhāṣya.

The particular detail in question (i.e. *silence*) observed at the subsidiaries, should be regarded as serving the purposes of the Principal Sacrifice.—If it were taken as being for all the sacrifices, it could be so taken only by setting aside the indication of the 'Context' (whereby it should be restricted to the Principal only), on the strength of 'Syntactical Connection' which connects the silence with the Principal as well as the subsidiaries. But we find that in the present case the 'Syntactical Connection' has been qualified by the qualifying adjunct '*Iṣṭis with a purpose*'; and as a matter of fact it is the Principal Sacrifices that are 'with a purpose' (i.e. with a view to attaining certain rewards), and the subsidiaries only serve the

purpose of helping the Principals (in the fulfilment of the purpose of the latter) [and they do not serve any independent purposes of their own, not bringing any rewards apart from those brought about by the Principals],—and for this reason, what is laid down ('silence') cannot be regarded as *enjoined in connection with the subsidiary at all*; because what is meant to be related to the procedure of *silence* is only that sacrifice which has been enjoined as bringing about a desirable result [which alone can be called '*Kāmya Iṣṭi*', '*Iṣṭi*, or sacrifice, *with a purpose*'].—From this it follows that the 'silence' is meant to serve the purposes of the Principal Sacrifice only.

ADHIKARAṆA (20): *The 'butter' is to be used as 'ājya' at the subsidiaries of the Shyēna sacrifice.*

SŪTRA (36).

ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY (OF ITS BEING USED AT THE PRINCIPAL SACRIFICE), IT SHOULD BE USED AT ITS SUBSIDIARIES; SPECIALLY BY REASON OF THE PECULIAR CONNECTION.

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the *Shyēna* sacrifice, we read—'*Dṛtinavanitamājyam*' ['The *Ājya* to be used is the Butter stored in a leather bag'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is this Butter to be used at the Principal (Shyēna) sacrifice itself? Or at its subsidiaries?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is that—"it is to be used at the Principal Sacrifice; because the Context pertains to that; hence on the strength of the Injunction, it is the Principal Sacrifice that should be performed with Butter as the substance used".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*:—*On account of the impossibility of its being used at the Principal sacrifice, it should be used at its subsidiaries*,—i.e. at the subsidiaries of the *Shyēna* sacrifice.—"Why should there be an 'impossibility' (of its being used at the Principal itself)?"—Because the substance actually used at the Principal is the *Soma-juice* [the *Shyēna* being a 'modification' of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*].—"But on account of the Injunction (under consideration), Butter would be the substance used at it".—The meaning of the Injunction is *not* that 'Butter is to be used at the *Shyēna*',—but that "At the Shyēna, the *Ājya* to be used is Butter'; so that what is *enjoined* is the peculiar relationship (*of original and substitute*) between '*Ājya*' and 'Butter',—and the connection between the '*Ājya*' and the *Shyēna* sacrifice is only *referred to*. As a matter of fact, however, there is no direct connection between the *Shyēna* and the '*Ājya*'; while there is a direct connection between the '*Ājya*' and the subsidiaries of the *Shyēna*. So that the use of the 'Butter' must be taken to be enjoined in reference to (i.e. in the place of) the '*Ājya*', at that sacrifice with which the *Ājya* has had some connection; this is what is meant by the phrase (in the *Sūtra*), '*specially by reason of the peculiar proximity (connection)*'.

SŪTRA (37).

"THE SAME MAY BE THE CASE WITH FIRE-LAYING", —IF THIS BE URGED (THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING SŪTRA).

Bhāṣya.

The following view may be taken—"If *Fresh Butter* is to be used at the subsidiaries of the *Shyēna*, then it would also be used at the *Pavamāna*

Iṣṭis performed in connection with *Fire-laying;* because these *Iṣṭis* also are helpful to the *Shyēna,* the Shyēna being performed in the Fire consecrated by means of those *Iṣṭis* [so that in this sense these *Iṣṭis* would be 'subsidiaries of the *Shyēna*'; consequently Butter should have to be used at these *Iṣṭis* also]".

SŪTRA (38).

THAT CANNOT BE; BECAUSE THESE (IṢṬIS) DO NOT APPEAR IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SHYĒNA, AND THE FACT OF ONE ACT BEING SUBSIDIARY TO THE OTHER DEPENDS UPON THAT [I.E. ITS APPEARING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE LATTER].

Bhāṣya.

As a matter of fact, neither the *Pavamāna Iṣṭis,* nor even Fire-laying are found mentioned in the Context of the *Shyēna.*—"What then?"—If it is so, then there is no direct connection between *Fire-laying* and *Shyēna,*—the 'Laying' being of the *Fire,* and the Fire being connected with the *Shyēna;* so that there could be no reason for Butter being used among the substances used at the *Pavamāna Iṣṭis* (which are performed at the *Fire-laying*).—The mere fact of the *Laying* being of use to the Fires does not make the *Laying* a subsidiary to the *Shyēna;* there would be a ground for regarding it as a subsidiary to it only if such were the indication of anyone of the six means of knowledge, 'Context' and the rest. [And since there is no such ground] therefore it follows that there is no connection between the *Shyēna* and the *Laying* (of Fire), [and there is no reason for *Butter* being used at the Laying of Fire].

ADHIKARAṆA (21): *Butter is to be used as 'Ājya' at all subsidiaries of the Shyēna.*

SŪTRA (39).

[PŪRVAPAKṢA]—["THE BUTTER SHOULD BE USED] ONLY AT THE TIME [OF JUICE-EXTRACTION]; BECAUSE WE FIND INDICATIONS TO THAT EFFECT.

Bhāṣya.

The question that arises now is—Is the Butter to be used at only those subsidiaries of the *Shyēna* which are performed at the time of Juice-Extraction? Or at all subsidiaries of the *Shyēna*?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"It should be used at only those subsidiaries that are performed at the time of the Juice-Extraction, *because we find indications to that effect.* For instance, we have the text—'*Saha pashūnālabhatē*' ['He kills the animals together'], and then again, the declaration—'In place of the *Agniṣomīya* animal, there should be the *Agniṣomīya* Cake, and in place of the *Anubandhyā* animal, the *Maitrāvaruṇa* Cake;' these texts point to two vacant places (for which substitutes are provided). From this we understand that the declaration in regard to the use of Butter at the *Shyēna* sacrifice lays down a peculiarity in regard to the subsidiaries performed at the time of the Juice-Extraction. [If Butter were to be used, then there could not be any vacant places at all]".

SŪTRA (40).

[SIDDHĀNTA]—IN REALITY, IT SHOULD BE USED AT ALL THE SUBSIDIARIES, AS THERE IS NO DISTINCTION.

Bhāṣya.

Butter should be used at all the subsidiaries of the *Shyēna*;—why?—*because there is no distinction.* Inasmuch as we find no grounds for making a distinction, Butter should be taken as to be used at all the subsidiaries of the *Shyēna* sacrifice.

SŪTRA (41).

AS FOR 'INDICATIONS', THEY CAN BE ACCEPTED ONLY WHEN THEY ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REASON.

Bhāṣya.

The argument urged upon the basis of 'indications' has to be rebutted. There is no authority (or evidence) to show that what is asserted regarding

Butter to be used at the *Shyēna* applies to only those subsidiaries that are performed at the time of the Juice-extraction; all that is put forward in support of it is that 'we perceive indications to that effect'.—But as a matter of fact, perception, not based upon evidence (valid means of knowledge), is *wrong* perception, as it is in the case of the mirage.—"How then is there to be the killing of animals in the middle of an action?"—Because of Reason.—"What is the reason?"—The reason lies in the fact that by so doing, we retain the order of sequence; i.e. by so doing the right order of sequence is followed, even in the absence of a direct injunction to that effect.—From all this it follows that the Butter is to be used at all the subsidiaries of the *Shyēna*.

[It is a well-known fact that such Indications can be regarded as authoritative only with regard to such subjects as are amenable to reasoning. The case in question however is one amenable to Verbal Authority only. The *killing together* of the animal is to be done at the time of the juice-extraction, not because it is an accessory enjoined with special reference to that time,—but because of a reason pointing to that conclusion, which however does not apply to the case of the Butter. This reasoning is as follows—There is an *order of sequence* which, in the absence of any injunction, appears in the form of *proximity*; and this order of sequence would be followed if the other details are connected with the time of juice-extraction.—In this way, when the animals come to be killed at the time of the *Savanīya*, the time of no animals would be passed over.—*Tantravārtika*.]

Adhikaraṇa (22): *Only the 'Savanīya' Cakes should consist of flesh.*

SŪTRA (42).

Flesh should be used in place of the 'Savanīya' Cakes only, because of the specific Injunction.

Bhāṣya.

There is the sacrifice called '*Shākyānāmayana*' (the sacrifice of the *Shākyas*), which continues for thirty-six years.—In connection with this we read—'At the close of each day, the Master of the House goes out hunting, the animals that he kills there, the flesh of those go to make up the Savanīya Cakes'.

In regard to this, there arises the question—Is flesh to take the place of the *Savanīya* as well as all the possible Cakes? Or of the *Savanīya* Cakes only?

The *Pūrvapakṣa* view is as follows:—"All the Cakes should consist of flesh; it is not possible for the same sentence to enjoin the fact of the Cakes consisting of flesh, and also to specify those Cakes by means of the word '*Savanīya*'; as in so doing, there would be a syntactical split. Hence we conclude that all the Cakes are to consist of flesh".

In answer to this we have the following *Siddhānta*—*Flesh should be used in place of the Savanīya Cakes only*; because the words of the text—'the flesh goes to make up the Savanīya'—clearly lay down the connection between the *flesh* and the *Savanīya-Cake*; and the phrase 'the flesh becomes the Cakes' is a mere reference to the same.—"How is this so?" It is so because the term '*Savanīya*' could not be taken as referring to *all* Cakes; while the term 'Cake' can very well be taken as referring to the *Savanīya Cake*; it is for this reason that the term 'Cake' is taken as containing a *reference* (not an *Injunction*).—From all this it follows that flesh is to be used in place of the Savanīya offerings, fried barley, etc.—*because of the specific injunction.*

SŪTRA (43).

"Recourse to indirect (figurative) signification cannot be right, when there is no proximity",—if this is urged [then the answer would be as given in the following Sūtra].

Bhāṣya.

If you argue as follows—"It has been said that the term 'Cake' would contain a reference to the *Savanīya* offerings;—but as a matter of fact the

term 'Cake' is never used in the sense of *Fried barley* and such things; and so long as a word can be taken in its direct (natural) sense it cannot be right to take it in an indirect (figurative) sense",—[then our answer is as follows].—

SŪTRA (44).

IT IS POSSIBLE [TO TAKE THE WORD IN ITS INDIRECT FIGURATIVE SENSE, OF INDICATING THE 'SAVANĪYA' OFFERINGS]; AS IT IS SO INDICATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY SACRIFICE;—JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE 'VAIRĀJA'

Bhāṣya.

In connection with the original Primary sacrifice, *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we find the term 'Cake' used in its secondary sense and applied to the *Fried Barley* and similar things; on account of its being used in close proximity (to the names of these things): in the case in question also, it may be taken to be similarly used; because here also the 'Cakes' are in close proximity to the term '*Savanīya*'. Then again, in connection with the Original Primary, the word is applicable by reason of the presence of indicatives; it is the same in connection with the 'Modification' also; just as we have such expression as '*Chhatriṇo gachchhanti*', '*Dhvajino gachchhanti*' [where men holding the *umbrella* and the *flag* are called '*Chhatrin*' and '*Dhvajin*' because of the presence of the umbrella and the flag which are indicative marks].—Similarly in the expression '*Ukthyo vairūpasāmā ēkaviṁshaḥ ṣoḍashī vairājasāmā*' ['In the *Ukthya*, the *sāman* is the *Vairupa* with twenty-one *stomas*, and in the *Ṣoḍashin*, the *sāman* is *Vairāja*'], by reason of the original indicative in the shape of the word '*Sāman*', the *Vairūpa-pṛṣṭha* and the *Vairāja-pṛṣṭha* are understood to be meant [by the words '*vairupa-sāmā*' and '*vairāja-sāmā*'; where the terms '*vairupa-sāma*' and '*vairāja-sāmā*' are taken as indirectly and figuratively indicating the *Vairūpa-pṛṣṭha* and *Vairāja-pṛṣṭha*]. In the same manner, in the case in question, the *Savanīya* offerings are understood to consist of flesh.

End of Pāda viii of Adhyāya III.

End of Adhyāya III.

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SHABARA-BHĀṢYA

Vol. I.

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